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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is a study of labour regulation and the State in the 
Sudan in the light of a general theoretical conception of labour law and 
the State. The first Chapter defines the concepts of analysis that are 
used throughout the study, isolates the "essential" properties of the 
Capitalist State and Law from the historically concrete forms which they 
assume in a particular society and distinguishes between processes which 
influence development of the form of law and others which influence its 
sociological development. Drawing on the analysis in Chapter I, Chapter 
II exposes the inter-relationship between the Sudanese social formation, 
Sta te and Law and the implication of this inter-relationship for both the 
for m and substance of labour relations law. Chapters III, IV and V are 
specific verifications of the hypothesis regarding the inter-relationship 
between the State and labour relations law in the Sudan and that 
regarding the development of the "substance" and "ideology" of law in 
general. 
The thesis considers law as an empirically-founded discipline. 
But, it distinguishes between various types of empirical facts about law 
corresponding with respective semi-autonomous social levels at which law 
asserts its existence. The research method followed describes the 
empirical facts about law at the particular level and, in order to 
determine the epistemological significance of these facts, analytically 
relates them to empirical facts at other levels. Wherever used in the 
thesis the ter m "theory" signifies either this methodological procedure of 
analysing the inter-connection of empirical facts at a certain level and 
their inter-relation with other facts at other levels, or the substantive 
generalizations about law which findings at these various levels would 
allow. 
I consider my application of this methodology to the study of 
labour rela tions law, the historical dimension this application introduces 
in socio-economic analysis of this law, the criticism of certain Marxist 
and other sociological conceptions of law it enables, and the 
socio-histor ical rela ti vi ty of the "substance" and "ideology" of law it 
reveals as original contributions to the know ledge of labour law. . The 
compilation and evaluation within the framework of the theSIS of 
empirical materials on industrial relations in the Sudan are likewise 
original contribution to the knowledge of Sudanese "labour law" and 
labour law in general. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law is a social phenomenon. To be complete the knowledge of 
law requires examination of this phenomenon at several levels of 
abstraction corresponding In turn with several concrete inter-relationships 
between law and society. 
To begin with, the researcher needs to focus on the formalities 
and techniques of rule-making and legal administration and the rules 
principles and concepts governing them. At a second level, in order to 
ra tionalize these doctrinal aspects, the researcher needs to examine the 
substantive content of rules and legislation with relation to social 
practices and relations which law endeavours to regulate. The focus of 
the latter examination is to show the extent to which formal law (i.e. 
rules, legislation and the principles underlying their innovation and 
administration) contradicts, or otherwise compares with or justifies 
existing divisions, equalities inequalities, "balances" or "equilibriums" of 
powers of the parties who are bearers of these relations or practices. 
At a third level the researcher needs to examine the extent to which 
these practices and relations phenomenalizing these di visons, equalities, 
"balances" and "equilibriums" of powers are themselves limited by the 
existing social and political structures wi thin which they are taking 
place. At a fourth level the researcher needs to know whether and to 
what extent the latter structures are themsel ves concretized social 
manifesta tions of dominant economic relations of production. 
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It is only after examination of the respective facts at these 
varIOUS levels has been completed and a critical unification of the 
findings accomplished may a theory of "essential" law be formulated. 
The question why the for mula tion of such a theory is of particular 
importance in the case of an implicitly comparative socio-Iegal study 
(i.e. a study of law in an under-developed social formation in the light of 
know ledge about law available in a developed society) is explained below. 
The above delineation of the province of law means that law IS 
conditioned by underlying economic and social factors prevailing in a 
particular society. However, if law as a social discipline is socially and 
economically determined so also will this affect the academic discipline 
dealing with this law as its field of study. This is a fact of some 
significance in assessing the relevance, for a study of labour "law" in the 
Sudan, of the literature on labour law in Britain. Because it is largely 
domina ted by the practical needs of studying existing social industrial 
and legal practices (e.g. collective bargaining, industrial action and 
specif ic legisla ti ve and judicial approaches to these and other areas of 
labour relations) the analysis which this literature offers is not 
necessarily relevant for another country where these practices, and, 
structures within which such practices may take place, are either lacking 
or radically different. Even when they have attempted to draw general 
theoretical conclusions about law, some analysts (e.g. legal pluralists and 
sociological jurists) of law in developed societies did not in fact go 
beyond the second level of abstraction aforementioned. This premature 
theorization (i.e. a theorization effected before examination of 
respecti ve facts at other relevant levels of abstraction) produces only 
empiricist conceptions of law {i.e. conceptions that consider as 
"essential" characteristics of law[jhenomenaRforms which law happens to 
assume in a particular society at a particular stage of development). To 
propagate these conceptions as "theories" of law is to endow them with a 
universality that they do not possess. To apply these empiricist 
conceptions of law in a particular society to a study of law In another 
totally different society is to over look differences, between law in both 
societies, which even empirical investigation of law at anyone of the 
four levels aforementioned can reveal. 
This thesis argues that it IS always a "dominant" "form of 
economic relations" - (previously mentioned under the fourth level) -
which determines the "essential" forms of the State and Law, but that 
the autonomy of the State and Law are in turn always conditioned by the 
stage of development of the form of economic relations. However the 
effect of this development or under-development is reflected directly on 
society, thence on the State and through the medium of the State on 
labour relations law. Depending on whether the subject of examination 
"is a developed society or an under-developed social formation, the 
applica tion of this general hypothesis reveals either an "autochthonous" 
"evolutional" or "superstructural" "revolutional" course of social and legal 
developments respectively. In the context of the evolutional course of 
development which is typical of a developed Capitalist society both the 
State and Law (if viewed at the present point of time in isolation from 
their previous his tor ical stages) appear as representa ti ve of "balances of 
powers" and an apparently social consensus among classes and groups In 
the wider society - (Cf infra Chap.II £.98). Hence industrial relations 
law appears as largely determined by autonomous operation of 
autonomous institutions of collective bargaining, and, the State appears, 
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In this and other fields as merely instru mental In gIVing effect to 
collecti ve demands and wishes and further ing the interest oL the 
community as a united whole. In the context of the revolutional course 
of development which is typical of an under-developed social formation 
both the State and Law appear as effecting economic regulation of this 
formation from above. This latter course of development has its origin 
in colonialism and its imposition of a capitalist form of State and Law on 
a largely non-capitalist social formation. The sense in which this course 
of development is "revolutional" and the manner in which it interacts 
wi th the social formation as a whole are explained in the thesis. 
The thesis argues tha t labour leg isla tion In the Sudan is a 
capitalist form of law different from labour law in developed Capitalist 
Societies only in the degree of its ideological development or autonomy. 
Because it is a form of descendent regulation, labour legislation in the 
Sudan reflects, not the wishes or economic positions of autonomous 
workers' and employers' organizations but certain political and economic 
policy objectives formula ted and given pre-eminence by the State. The 
condition of the law regulating a particular area of labour relations (e.g. 
collecti ve, public individual and pr i va te individual labour relations) is 
always explicable by the stance of the State towards this area. The 
division of the part of the thesis dealing with labour legislation into 
three chapters, dealing respectively with collective labour relations, 
public individual labour relations and private indi vidual labour relations, 
itself corresponds with a typology of State intervention in the case of 
each one of these areas. The type and extent of this intervention is In 
each case determined by the proximity of the area under regulation to 
the political and economic policy considerations put forward as 
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influencing State intervention In varlous areas of social relations. 
The Chapters on labour legislation in the Sudan focus mainly on 
studying the effect which the stance of the State towards each particular 
area of labour relations has on the ideology of the law regulating this 
area and that of labour relations law in general. The aspects of the law 
designated as its ideology are; formalities of rule-making and legal 
administration and the social effectiveness of the law. The focus of the 
discussion is to demonstrate the extent to which political determination 
of the "law" and the particular rule-making and legal administration 
processes adopted affect both the formal effectiveness (i.e. impartiality 
and enforceability) and the social effectiveness (i.e. social-wide 
effectiveness of statutory law deriving from optimality of this law for 
the spontaneous social opera tion of the rela tions it endea vours to 
regulate) of the law. 
Introduction 
7 
CHAPTER I 
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY 
OF THE STATE AND LAW 
The visiting African Law-researcher is faced with the problem of 
analysing social phenomena in his own country in terms and concepts 
indigenous to legal education in the host country. The researcher may, 
in conformity with the dominant research methodology in the host 
country, underrate this predicament or deny its existence. But implicit 
in any research approach that does not account for the discrepancy 
between the social context of "Law" in for instance The Sudan and 
Britain and the implication of this for Law are the underlying 
assumptions about the positivism of social phenomena and exportability 
of social disciplines. 
A study of Law in two unequally developed social environments 
may gIve as a clue to the "knowledge of the Law" the definition which IS 
gi ven to Law in the developed environment. believe that such a 
def ini tion must be subjected to further scrutiny In order to distinguish, 
within Law, between what is inherent and universal In the Capitalist 
"form of Law" and what is ideological and peculiar to "the stage of 
development" of the developed society. 
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The search for a method of compara ti ve "sociological" 
investigation led me to exclude as unsuitable for this purpose sociologjcal 
theories that, limiting themselves within the sociological sphere, make 
their rules by assembly of social phenomena in order to explain other 
social phenomena. At a certain level of abstraction these theories 
beco me part of the concrete his tor ical reality they are endea vour ing to 
interpret. The problem with such methodology and its findings -
(whether a sociological theory of Law or pluralist theory of politics or 
industr ial relations) - is that they remain peculiar to the concrete 
historical formation m which they evolved - (i.e. developed Capitalist 
Societies). But they may not possess more than a descriptive value even 
in such societies. 
The difference between the two social environments concerned is 
also present in the stage of economic development. A method of 
investiga tion will be most effective if it integrates the economic and 
social spheres. 
Marxian theory possesses all the ingredients noted above as 
essential for compara ti ve "social" investiga tion. It possesses the 
potential of a "sociological" method that is capable of interpreting 
concrete historical formations without running the risk of being 
enveloped in the concrete history it is describing. It also contains the 
substantive and methodological conception that societies are determined 
by their underlying economic structures. It thus adopts as its terms of 
reference categories that are universal and applicable In the 
interpreta tion of social for ma tions in their specific stage of economiC 
development and social and economic configuration. 
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The maIn object of this chapter IS to argue that the "social" and 
historical substance which the "form of Law" and the "form of the State" 
assume, affect the ideologies of the social phenomena of Law and the 
State, and, is at any time reflective of the stage of economic and social 
development. This is important for understanding the "capitalist" forms 
of Law and the State in Sudan. The argument in this chapter also shows 
that the province of ideology in Law is too extensive to be delineated by 
a uni-disciplinary approach to legal research. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. Part 1 sets out the 
general philosophical background on which I intend to place my argument 
in Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter. Part 2 examines the implications of 
the argument in Part 1 for a number of issues whose discussion is vital 
for the analysis in the rest of the thesis. Part 3 utilizes the outcome of 
the discussion in the first two parts for summing up the argument for the 
historical relativity of the appearances of Law and the State and for 
advancing a general methodological conception of a "form of Law" and a 
"substance of Law" that would apply in the analysis of Law in the Sudan. 
1. General Methodological Questions 
The question whether Marxism IS valid for analysis of 
non-Capitalist social formations depends on whether Marxian theory is a 
methodological naturalistic conception of "h istory" (i .e. a science) or 
whether it IS In addition to that substantive materialist conception of 
"History" (i.e. a materialist theory of the determination and 
transfor ma tion of societies; a philosophy). If the first position is 
adopted the body of l\larxian writings remains "a scientific approach to a 
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strictly empirical investigation of the historical development of the 
modern capitalistic mode of production" (Korsch, 1963, p.167) .(1). 
According to this conception the truth of the substantive results achieved 
by Marx through application of his own method to philosophy and the 
SCIences is endogenous to the stage of development of the capitalistic 
mode of production at the time of that application (2). 
If the second position is adopted some of Marx mature works (e.g. 
"Capital") become an application to a specific society and science of a 
general philosophical conception of History. Thus Lenin says of the 
relation of "Capital" to a general dialetical philosophy; "in Capital .\\arx 
applied to a single science, logic, dialectics and the theory of know ledge 
of materialism which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and 
developed it further" (3). 
I shall argue that Marxian theory is both a philosophy and a 
SCIence. However my argument is not necessarily a synthesis of the two 
posi tions above. It IS ra ther an elabora tion of a specific 
interrela tionship between Marxian science and philosophy and of the 
methodological implica tions of this interrela tionship for both these 
science and philosophy. There is also no necessary connection between 
philosophy as used here and the metaphysical. Marxian theory is a 
science and a philosophy in the sense that depending on the level of 
generality at which any of the various questions this theory addresses 
itself to, IS analysed, its various propositions are stated either as 
scientific concepts or philosophical categories (4). Philosophical 
categories are in this sense different from scientific concepts in the 
degree of generality {i.e. in the removal from the data of sense "Bhaskar 
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1979, p.5") of the questions with reference to which they are formulated 
(5). Thus Marxian theory is "neither • . • refractory to empirical 
reference in the sense in which philosophical theories are" nor wholly 
provable by empirical test (Giddens, 1971 X). 
1.A Why IS Marxian Theory a Science and Philosophy? 
Soviet Marxists staunchly believed that "Dialectical Materialism" 
(6) was "the central" and "most important" of Marxian philosophy (7). 
Although "Dialetical Materialism" meant different things to Engels, 
Plekhanov, Lenin and Stalin, the overall theme they adhere to is that 
Marxian theory was, foremost a philosophy and science of history (8) and 
more than just a hypothesis or methodology for research. 
Other commentators also agree that the conception of Marxian 
theory solely as a methodological principle is incompatible with Marx's 
formula tion, in the 1859 "Introduction", which "implies the reifica tion of 
the concepts of economic base and superstructure and the transformation 
of their logical relation into a causal relationship of dependence and 
succession, the former being said to condition to determine to overthrow 
or to change the latter" and also incompatible with Marx's rejection of 
the suggestion that his theory applied only to the bourgeois economy of 
the modern world (Jordan 1967, p.299). 
Some of the commentators who accept that Marxian theory 
comprises a philosophy and a science consider the philosophy as a 
metaphysical or teleological view of history - (Jordan 1967, pp. 307-310, 
Elster 1985, p.10?) - that has no necessary logical connection with 
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Marxian historical materialism (i.e. science) - (Jordan 1967, pp. 300, 392) 
or has no such connection with development of the productive forces that 
Marx sees as obtaining within Capitalism (Elster 1985, p. 272). 
The metaphysical or teleological attributions are unacceptable in 
VIew of the fact that "destratification of SCIence (9)" and 
"dehistoriciza tion of reality" constituted the essence of Marx's critique 
of Idealism in the philosophy of Hegel (Bottomore 1985, p. 256). For 
their part Marx and Engels believe that their premises were not arbitrary 
dogmas but could be verified 'in a purely empirical way' (German 
Ideology Vol I pt. lA) (0). Yet "whether fused in dialectical 
materialism or separated in Western Marxism" the dialectic of Marxist 
theory has remained cast in an essentially idealist mould and its 
materialism expressed In a fundamentally empiricist form (Bottomore 
1985, p. 256). 
I believe that a reading of Marxian theory VIeWing this theory as 
'I. 
composed of logically inter-related and interdependent philosophy and 
SCIence may reveal a holistic and consistent understanding of Marx's 
works. 
I.B Wha t does it mean to say tha t Marxian Theory IS both a 
Philosophy and Science 
I.B.l The Dialectical Method 
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" In his description of the movement of the productive forces (Marx 
Capital III 1962, p. 798) Marx makes implicit use of his own version of 
Hegel dialectical method (11) (Bukhar in 1969, pp. 74-75, Bottomore 1985, 
p. 200). I will explain this further. The productive forces are things 
(12). To speak of a movement of the productive forces is explicable 
either as a metaphysical anthropomorphism, or, "metaphorism" (12a). I 
argue that the development of the productive forces is a "metaphorical" 
description of the movement engendered by the interaction of the 
producti ve forces and the social forces of production. This interaction 
is "nature-imposed" (13) and materializes into economic and social 
phenomena. This mater ializa tion is effected through a process which 
al though evolutional is contradictory in the Hegelian sense (14). But 
whereas the three stages of the Hegelian Triad are In Hegel's Philosophy 
different temporal stages of a thought process or moments of existence 
of an essence (Althusser 1969, pp.89-107), each and every stage and the 
"nega ti ve totali ty" they consti tute become in Marx's dialectics "a 
historical condition . i.e. a social condition associated with a 
"'particular historical form of society - Marcuse 1963, p.314". The poles 
of the contradictions are now external to the process of the 
contradiction itself. The three contradictions now condition the 
relationship between the natural and its reflection in the human mind. 
An idea which is a reflection of the natural world in the human mind 
persists as far as it is compatible with the sensuous consciousness of the 
natural world. A change in the natural environment triggers a new 
sensuous consciousness and disturbs the previously held ideas. Finally an 
idea compatible with the new sensuous consciousness is born (I4a). Thus 
the intellectual advance arising from contradictions in thought IS the 
reflection in the human brain of the dialectical process of motion in the 
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external world" (Lenin; PhN 1960, p.196, Jordan 1967, p.199). This 
consciousness is in its turn an integral part of the social process (Hook, 
1971 p.7l). "The social forces act upon the productive forces effecting 
their transformation, and the productive forces thus transformed reflect 
back upon the social forces of production (Plekhanov; OM 1947, 
pp.242-243") (15). 
l.B.2 Marx's "Capital" Presupposes Marxian Philosophy 
"Capital" is a theoretical construction, of the historical 
development of the Capitalist mode of production, undertaken from a 
philosophical materialist conception of history (16). This means that 
"the Capitalist system of production relations constitutes a totality 
an all-inclusive unity which for this very reason must be examined and 
presented as an interconnected whole" (Bottomore 1985, p.200). This 
presupposition is essential for, inter alia, understanding the specific 
classifica tion and "hyposta tiza tion" of the economic ca tegor ies and other 
tela ted concepts analysed in "Capital" (17). Korsch despite his doubts 
about a Marxian materialist philosophy of history believed that it is "one 
of the essential signs of Marx's dialectical materialist method that no 
distinction exists between the historical and the "theoretico-economic" 
material in "Capital" .•. and that the latter IS "precisely a theoretical 
comprehension of history" (Korsch 1970, p.54). Lukacs likewise argues; 
"by elaborating the connections between production and distribution, 
Marx brings the dialectical opposition of the economic and the extra 
economic into an organic and law-like relationship with the science of 
economics" (Lukacs 1978, p.64). 
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I believe that far from being a "hyposta tiza tion" or "crude 
functionalism" (Elster 1985, pp. 3-48; (I8) Jordan 1967, pp. 298-299) the 
movement which Marx metaphorically attributes to economic categories 
and the contradiction he sometimes predicts as inevitable among some of 
these categories derive from the sum total movement generated by all 
forms of class struggle at all the social levels of a mode of production 
(I9). 
The disregard of the interpenetration of production, distribution 
and the social practices produces a conceptually unbridgeable gap 
between the material base and the superstructures (20). It has also been 
noticed as responsible for the inadequacies of theories of the State in 
Britain (Holloway and Picciotto 1978, pp.l0, 14). It is not clear whether 
some of the contributors to the debate the latter two authors introduce 
are not themselves prey to an empiricist reading of capital that led them 
into subordinating the living economic and political class struggle to what 
IS In fact a fictitious movement of hypostatized economic categories 
t21}. 
l.B.3 Marxian Philosophy IS Responsi ve to Empir ical Reference 
The interdependence of Marxian philosophy and SCIence also means 
tha t a Marxian philosophy of History does not depend for its validation 
on any extra-historical facts. The connection of the social and poE tical 
structure with production must be shown empirically and without any 
mystifica tion or speculation (Marx, German Ideology 1940, pp.13-16) (22). 
"The theoretical conclusions of the Communists" writes Marx "merely 
express in general terms actual relations springing from an existing class 
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struggle, from an historical movement gOing on under':our very eyes" (23). 
The validation of philosophical materialism In this manner IS 
possible because Marx's implicit use of his own verSlOn of Hegel's 
dialectical method allows the deduction that Marxian philosophy and 
science are empirically-based and therefore verifiable by reference to 
the substance of the "Historical process" and to substances of specifically 
deter mined his tor ical processes respecti vel y. The relevance of Marxian 
Dialectics in explaining the mechanism of material determination is 
discussed later (infra Part 2.B.2.b). I illustrate here how the 
philosophical ca tegor iza tion of the process of this deter mina tion is 
dependent on scientific conceptualization of historical, empirically 
observable, processes. 
Marx considers the general movement of the productive forces as 
a key to understanding the different socio-economic forms of production 
(Marx Capital III 1962, p.798). The "development" of the productive 
forces is meant to indicate the ever-continuous cumula ti ve changes which 
the methods of Labour, its social productivity and incidentally the 
condition of the "objects of Labour" (23a) have experienced (24), and, 
are, theoretically, capable of experiencing, across different stages of 
human history. The socio-economic form which production historically 
assumes always corresponds to a definite stage of development of the 
producti ve forces. 
A question which interposes itself here is; what is it that 
constitutes a "stage" of development of the productive forces? However 
I a m inclined to believe that every phase of reproduction (25) constitutes 
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a new stage of development of the productive forces. If development of 
the productive forces means development of the methods of labour -and 
its social productivity - (and the incidental impact of this on natural 
resources i.e. objects of Labour) - there is no reason why every phase of 
reproduction, however infinitesimal its impact might be, cannot be a new 
stage in the development of the productive forces. Marx's emphasis on 
the process of centralization of the means of production and socialization 
of Labour - (Marx Capital I Ibid p.715), his identification of different 
pa tterns of Labour rela tions corresponding to def ini te stages of 
industrialization (26), and, his analysis of the organic composition of 
capital and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx Capital III 
1962, pp.227, 152, 143,242,210-259) are all attempts at periodizing the 
process of reproduction on the basis of its effect on the condition of the 
producti ve forces or vice versa. 
According to this perception piece-meal changes in wages and 
"modalities of control" (26a) or in the distribution of "roles and products" 
(26b) that obtain within a mode of production as results of cumulative 
development of the productive forces, the falling tendency of the rate of 
pr of i t and class struggle are the msel ves cu mula ti ve steps towards 
exhaustion of developmental potential of the dominant mode of 
production (27). "Analytically accentuated conclusions" (27a) of an 
empirically-based study of these processes within a determinate 
Capitalist Society may therefore also serve as prima facie partial 
evidence for the validity of philosophical materialism. 
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Commentators who View Marx's philosophy as teleological and his 
Capital as an empirical critique of political economy do not see _any 
logical connection between the two (Elster 1985, pp.55-56) and therefore 
also no such connection between changes that have been taking place 
within Capitalism since its inception and the thesis of determination by 
the economic structure (Elster 1985, pp.157, 272)(28). 
From a different perspective, Althusser and his followers also 
deny that stages of development of the productive forces consist in the 
ever-continuous phases of reproduction and that such development can at 
all be a cumulative process. Balibar, for instance, conceives a mode of 
production as periodized In the combination of its elements - (Balibar 
1975, p.252). It is the combination specific to the C~1P*, of; Labour 
power, means of production and the non-worker (Ibid p.212), which, in his 
view, constitutes the stage of development of the productive forces, to 
which the economic structure underlying the dominance of that mode of 
production corresponds. The recurrence of development of the 
productive forces appears, with Balibar, as determinable, not by the 
frequency of occurrence of reproduction nor by any other time 
frequency, but, by the "a temporal" frequency of the alteration of that 
combina tion. Depriving a "stage", of development of the productive 
forces. of its temporal content and identifying it with a combination of 
substance - (Balibar Ibid 226 cf. supra p. ) is tantamount to its 
"structur iza tion" (29). 
* Capi talist mode of production. 
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Althusser accepts Balibar's formulation of the so-called basic 
concepts of historical materialism (Althusser and Balibar 19] 5, 
pp.163-181, 209-225). For his part Althusser also gIves a wholly 
structuralist content to the Marxian concept of historical time (Althusser 
1975, pp.91-118). He substitutes his so called structuralist causation -
(which is an exclusively "synchronic" explanatory concept; Glucksmann 
1974, pp.148-150, 167) - for Marxist explanatory concepts which I believe 
emphasise both "evolution" and "systema tism" (30). 
What both Althusserians and the prevIOus Commentators slice off 
Marxian theory is the core of its materialist dialectic i.e. that through 
their mutual interaction the productive forces and the social forces of 
production are at any given time the originator of their own "historical" 
movement (31). Their view also disregards that determination by the 
economic structure - (which always naturally corresponds with the stage 
of development of the productive forces; Marx preface 362-63, Capital III 
1962, p.772) - is an ever-continuous dialectic between the material and 
social substance of any historical process or "the Historical process in 
general" (31a). 
The above VIew has its roots In the way in which its proponents 
View the relation between Marx's "Capital" and a general dialectical 
philosophy (e.g. Elster 1985, pp.37, 157). Ha ving displaced Marx's 
concrete works from their dialectical philosophical framework some of 
these proponents could offer only ahistorical, formal, logical explanations 
for the thesis of the primacy of the productive forces or the relation 
between the economic structure and the superstructure (32). Thus 
contradiction between the stage of development of the productive forces 
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and relations of production becomes for Elster and Cohen (33) an 
ahistorical - (i.e. because it is not judged by the empirical historical 
process) - event that may take place - (i.e. in the formal logical sphere), 
between the productive forces and a counterfactual set of relations 
(Elster 1985, pp.259-260) or "when stagnation of the productive forces 
sets in (Cohen 1978, pp. 160-174). Both Elster and Cohen offer an 
a mbiguous view of the concrete histor ical social and econom IC 
development that has been taking place since the inception of Capitalism 
and of the ability of Marxian Science and Philosophy to explain this 
development. 
Althusser argues for the expulsion of all traces of the Hegelian 
dialectical method from Marx, allegedly on ground of its incompa tibility 
wit h the dis tin c t l\l a r xis t " pro b 1 e mat i c " (A 1 t h u sse r 1 9 7 0 , P P • 2 4 - 69; 
1969,pp. 89-255). This argument is integral to Althusser's theory of 
"anti-humanist" and "anti-historicist" (34) Marxism. "The discontinuity 
which Althusser introduced" in these respects between theory and 
practices (35) was too radical and in effect made it "impossible" for him 
"to reconcile the two" (36). Althusser however chose theory and, 
considering Marxian theory as the product of a self-subsistent process of 
knowledge (Althusser 1975, pp.24-69) transferred its application wholly 
into the philosophical sphere. This however meant the denial of the 
applica tion of Marxian theory in any specific historical process or indeed 
the "Historical process in general" (Cf. infra f.39). In some of his later 
works Althusser denounced what he called this "theoreticist" tendency 
that underlay parts of the earlier works of "Reading Capital" and "For 
Marx" (Althusser 1976, pp.l06, 141). However, because Al thusser 's 
earlier concept of the "economic structure" (37) and other so called basic 
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concepts of historical materialism (Althusser Balibar 1975, pp.163-181, 
209-225) have remained unchanged, this subsequent renouncement, and 
the new emphasis associated with it, on the class struggle are superficial 
(38). Apply ing Althusser's recommended "sy mptoma tic reading" -
(Althusser 1975, pp.24-69) - to his own works we find that his essay; 
"Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (Althusser 1977, pp.123-173) 
is an intui ti ve account of a class struggle that does not discursi vel y fit 
into his overall theoretical apparatus. This is because there is simply no 
conceivable historical province for class struggle in Althusser's 
problematic as he himself seems to recognize (Althusser 1976, p. 106). 
1.B.4 The Distinction between Scientific Concepts and Philosophical 
Categories 
The interdependence of Marxian science and philosophy also means 
that all Marxian propositions are liable to interpretation at, at least, two 
broad levels of abstraction - (i.e. (1) as scientific concepts or hypotheses 
clnd (2) as philosophical categories). This in turn means that a 
proposition can be properly critically evaluated only after the level at 
which it is proposed to be understood and evaluated has been properly 
identified. This identification is essential for determining the type (e.g. 
empirical or theoretical), realm (i.e. the field from which such evidence 
may be gathered be it a determinate historical process or the "Historical 
process" Cf below f .39) and weight of evidence needed for the validation 
of the proposition. To illustrate this I will give a concrete example. 
Taken as a philosophical statement the thesis that the economic 
structure naturally corresponds to a definite stage in the development of 
the productive forces and deter mine the superstructures Udarx Preface 
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pp.362-63, Capital III 1962, p.772) cannot be categorically validated by 
empirical facts obtainable from a single concrete historically determined 
social formation (Marx, Preface, pp. 362-63). This is so for two reasons. 
The first is that the realm of this categorical statement is the Historical 
process in general. This is a field of application that has wider spatial 
and temporal historical dimensions. It includes, as its particular 
instances the sum total of historically determined social formations on 
earth, and the history of the evolution of Mankind past and present (39). 
The second reason is that such a categorical philosophical statement 
cannot possibly be validated directly by empirical evidence but only by 
"analytically accentuated findings" (39a) of the historical sciences 
vis-a-vis such evidence. 
It has been suggested in respect of the first reason that "only a 
world history written from the materialist point of view could provide 
the theoretical substantiation of historical materialism" (40). With 
regard to the second reason, it has also been suggested; "the meaning of 
the philosophical category of "matter" does not ... apply to any object 
of science but affirms the objectivity of all scientific knowledge of an 
object (Althusser 1977, p.5!)". 
The above discussion does not mean that Marxian philosophical 
categories are not responsive to empirical reference. It simply means 
that the validation of these categories can be effected only via the 
historical sciences. Thus "the validation of these categories remains the 
responsibility of science and not of philosophy" (Jordan 1967, p.255). 
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l.B.5 Marxist Theory as a Historical Science 
The preceding discussion supports a conclusion that the validity of 
Marxian philosophy does not wholly depend on the evidence obtainable 
from a concrete historical social formation and that, in interpreting the 
la tter Marxian propositions can only be proven as hypotheses of science. 
It follows from this that "materialists who apply philosophical categories 
to the objects of the sciences as if they were concepts of them are 
invol ved in a case of mistaken identity" (AI thusser 1977, p.51) (41). 
As a SCIence Marxian theory hypothesizes that the real basis of 
social life consists of definite productive forces and definite social 
rela tions established by men interacting in the production of their means 
of subsistence. This means that the study of institutionalized behaviour 
must deal with "determinate individuals" with men as they really are and 
not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination 
(Jordan 1967, p. 302). It furthermore claims that all human activity can 
be described by means of the same naturalistic method which applies 
equally to the world of nature and to the world of the mind (Ibid 300). 
Against "methodological individualism" Marxian SCIence, thus 
stated, affirms the non-reducibility of society to individuals (42). Like 
Durkheim Marx uses a "causal criterion" (42a) to establish the reality of 
social facts on a "collectivist conception of sociology" (42b) (Giddens 
1971, pp.66-67; 1977, p.2). In contrast to Durkheim, Marxian method 
substitutes a "relational criterion" for Durkheim's "criterion of 
externality" (Durkheim 1938, p.lO) as the basis for that reality (42c). It 
thus a voids Durkhei m 's mistake of establishing that reality by reifica tion 
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of society. ,I It is "the relations of people among thenisel ves vis-a-vis the 
natural objects in respect of which these relations are incurred" (42d) 
tha t constitute this basis. The Marxian position is also ad vanced 
because, by specifying this essential real object for social science 
"Marxism provides a potentially theoretically autonomous sociology". 
The pre-existence of societies also establishes their autonomy as possible 
objects of scientific investigation (Bhaskar 1979, pp.1-9l). 
Marxian SClence shares with certain schools of sociology -
(Durkheim 1938, p.4-3) the conviction that the empirically observable 
world should constitute the starting point for all theories (German 
Ideology 194-0, pp.13-16, Fruhschriften 1953, pp. 34-7-50)(43). Likewise 
Durkheim's stratification within the social sphere, of social facts into 
"articula ted structures" and "free currents" (i.e. practices) (Durkheim 
1938, pp.l0-13, 110) and his assertion of the explanatory primacy of the 
former (Ibid 110) - (i.e. without denying the latter their prima facie 
relevance) is not qualita ti vely different from the stra tifica tion (i.e. of 
.. . l'evels of abstraction) present in Marx's criticism of the classlcal 
economists and his concrete historical studies (44). The level of 
material production which Marxian theory advances as an additional and 
ul tima te referent in sociological explanation does not invalidate and 
indeed may only be reached via these methods of investigation within the 
"sociological sphere". "Different levels" (44a) of the "sociological 
sphere" may, while possessing their own ideological ra tionali ty, still be 
manifesta tions of the material structure (45). 
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Marxian SCIence subscribes to a philosophy that VIews all types of 
societies as specific socio economic forms of the process of production in 
general (Marx Capital III 1962, p. 798). The field of investigation of 
I Marxian science is not necessarily confined to the "synchronic" 
configuration of phenomena and determinate individuals in their relation 
to contemporaneous social structures (46). It endeavours also to explain 
the process through which the contemporaneous structures ha ve 
themselves materialized across time (Bukharin 1969, pp.269 -272). 
Thus delineated this field of investigation needs for its 
interpreta tion and comprehension an approach tha t transcends 
inter-disciplinary barriers. The subjects of investigation include (in 
addition to determinate individuals) series of social phenomena that vary 
in their "level of socialization" (46a) and extent of crystaliza tion or 
fluidi ty. To provide a more adequate account of the inter-relationship 
of phenomena at different "levels of socialization" and ultimately of the 
rela tionship between the economic structure and the ideological 
superstructures, disciplines such as economics, psychoanalysis, poll tics, 
histor ical sociology, industrial relations and cultural studies are all 
needed and the critical unification of their findings is essential for 
arriving at a clearer view of the socio-economic totality (47). 
I.B.6 The Primacy of Philosophy 
Many critics argue that Marx provided no schematic evidence to 
valida te his philosophical conception of History (i.e. did not use his 
methodological interpretational science to substantiate this conception) 
(48). It is however true that Marx and many of his successors paid less 
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attention to the question of validating philosophical materialism. Some 
of the texts that may be cited as interpretations of concrete historical 
situations, appear not as written to establish the philosophical hypothesis 
but as themselves based upon the prior acceptance of that hypothesis 
(49). 
The interpretation adopted in this thesis suggests also that Marx 
instead of explaining, through interpreta tion of concrete histor ical 
situa tions, the basis for his conviction in a materialist philosophy of 
History tries to base even his theoretical construction of the 
development of the Capitalist mode of production upon this so called 
unsubstantiated conviction. Thus Capital is not intended to and could 
not categorically validate the philosophical hypothesis (Jordan 1967, p. 
313). 
The explanation that the Marxian teleological VIew of "history" is 
responsible for leading him into neglecting the valida tion of his 
philosophical conviction (50) is unacceptable. Marx however constantly 
referred to the empirical nature of his view of history and knew what 
kind of evidence would confirm his hypothesis and where he should look 
for it (Jordan 1967, p.304). Marx even regards such evidence as so 
overwhelming and easy to come by that he does not think it worthwhile 
to test his hypothesis by applying it to a particular historical situation 
(Jordan 1967, p.304). As is perhaps obvious from the discussion in 
previous parts the fact that Marx provides no evidence to substantiate 
his philosophical hypothesis does not mean that Marxian science is not 
capable of producing an interpretation of the world history in support of 
this hypothesis. Thus it is suggested; "Marxist Theory ... has only laid 
the cornerstone of the science which Socialists must further advance in 
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all directions ••• (Lenin CW 4 1960, p.211)". 
Marx however does not regard his philosophical conjectures as 
hypotheses. In "Capital" the materialist evolution of society IS 
described as a process of natural history working with iron necessity 
towards inevitable results" (Capital I 1983, p.19)(51). Marx's conviction 
in his hypothesis is so strong that he, not only sees its substantiation as 
unnecessary, but also relies on it for espousal of a philosophy that would 
henceforward change the world instead of interpreting it (52). With 
regard to the relation between science and philosophy this could mean 
that the truth of the philosophical categories is taken for granted and 
that indulgence in the proof of scientific formulations of these categories 
is a gratuitous and redundant exercise (52a). Soviet Marxism even held 
that the materialist science of history presupposes or is deducible from 
the materialist philosophy (Jordan 1967, pp.348 - 369). 
The question of the relation between the philosophy, SCIence and 
also possibly practice of Marxism depends entirely on the subjective view 
and environment of the actor. It is perfectly consistent for any person 
to become a "Philosophical Materialist" first and depending on the 
conditions of his environment choose whether to, immediately change, or, 
interpret it. I believe that interpretation is always a scientific task 
and, to do justice to Marxist theory itself, must therefore always follow 
the methods of objective science potentially present within this theory. 
The propriety of uncritical adherence to Philosophical r-.,\aterialism is 
however justified because adherence to any philosophy depends on the 
"world ou tlook" of the actor. I have already pointed out that although 
responsi ve to empirical reference Marxian propositions require for their 
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proof as philosophical categories a type and scope of evidence different 
from that required for proof of scientific concepts. 
evidence is provided the partisanship of other people's philosophical 
beliefs (which cannot possibly be ruled out) may prevent its 
comprehension (53) 
However the subordination of Marxian philosophy of History to 
Marxian science or the denial of existence of the former hampers a 
consistent understanding of Marx works. Moreover such an approach 
may also have serious methodological implications for Marxist Science 
itself. The failure of both Lukacs and Korsch in presenting an adequate 
perception of Marxian Science (54) is not unrelated to their view of 
Marxian theory as the self-knowledge of Capitalist Society (Lukacs 1971, 
p.229) or the theoretical expression of a revolutionary process that will 
end up with the total abolition of bourgeois society (Korsch 1970, p.62). 
The limitation of the scope of Marxian theory to the specifically 
historically determined Capitalistic mode of production (Korsch 1963, 
p.167, 1970 p.44) and denial of philosophical categories that are not 
necessarily reducible to this mode (Korsch 1970, p.44) led to the belief in 
the identity or coincidence of consciousness and reality (Korsch 1970, 
p.78). The latter in its turn meant a conception of Marxis m that is 
incapable of distinguishing between science and ideology. 
2. Implica tions for Research 
The previous discussion has methodological and substantive 
implications for research. Section 2.A below examines the 
methodological implications. 
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2.A Methodological Implications 
The assumptions made in the prevIOus discussion are also implied 
at all stages of research in the thesis. I explain here only the nature 
and implication of the main assumptions. 
I consider theory and empirical data as complementary but 
distinguish between various levels of theorization and the different 
nature of the empirical data needed for substantiation in each case. 
Accordingly, I consider some Marxist and Third World literature as 
empirical data for theorization on the State and Law in Sudan. 
However, these same theories of Law and the State are also supported at 
a lower level by empirical data that I have compiled in a study of 
Industrial relations law in the Sudan. 
This method reflects two convictions that are themselves derived 
from the preVIOUS discussion. The first IS tha t no rna tter how 
tomprehensi ve empirical data at a certain social level on a particular 
subject is, it can never by itself vindicate a theory of the subject 
formulated solely on the basis of this empirical data. 
Just as a phenomenon is arguably explicable by collection of 
subjecti ve individual views about it (e.g. through questionnaire) so also is 
it explicable by other social or economic facts preceding it in point of 
time or order of hierarchy. Explanation of any phenomenon need, In 
order to discern and perceive the internal characteristics or rationality 
of this phenomenon, to trace its interrelationship with these other 
relevant social and economic facts (54a). It IS only after empirical 
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investiga tion of the phenomenon has thus been c·ompleted and the 
implica tions analysed tha t a theory of the phenomenon can be 
formulated. This thorough investigation and analysis are important 
because "essential relations" which theory seek to express are sometimes 
"ontologically distinctive from •.• out of phase with and perhaps In 
opposition to the phenomena (or phenomenal forms) they generate -
Bottomore 1985, p.407)". I also apply this methodological procedure to 
show that the non-capitalist phenomenal forms which certain economic 
social and legal relations assume in Sudan - (and possibly in some other 
under-developed social formations) - do not necessarily mean that these 
rela tions are also functionally non-capitalist (54b). 
The second conviction IS that the explanation of one set of 
phenomena by another does not necessarily mean the depr i va tion of 
either of them of its internal rationality. Explanation must emphasise 
both notions of "evolution" and "systema tism". 
2.B Substantive Implications 
2.B.l Redefinition of Concepts 
Drawing on previous analysis, the definition of concepts 
undertaken under this part presupposes two things. The first is the 
interpenetration of economic and social layers of a society. The second 
is the universality of Marxian propositions. The emphasis on the 
interpenetration of economic and social layers of a society is relevant in 
discussion of the relation between the material base and the 
superstructures. The visualization of this relation is important for 
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concept) of the autonomy of the State and Law which in turn is essential 
to my analyses of Law in general and then to Law and the State in Sudan 
in particular. This interpenetration also posits a conception of a mode 
of production as a societo-economic form internally composed of 
interpenetra ting levels of ma teriali ty and sociality. This conception is 
relevant, in discussing the implications for Law and the State of the 
presence, within one and the same social formation of Capitalist and 
non-capi talist economic relations. It also helps to evaluate the various 
theories that have been advanced as explanation for this phenomenon. 
It is also relevant in visualization of a theory of transition to 
Capitalism that will help guide the discussion, In the next Chapter, on 
the Capitalism or non-capitalism of the Sudan. 
Likewise the emphasis on the universality of Marxian propositions 
signifies tha t the content which concepts such as the "economic 
structure", "relations of production" and the "productive forces" assume 
in a definite concrete historical formation must not be confused with the 
contents of the philosophical categories of materialism. It is wrong 
from my view for instance to equate the philosophical category of the 
economIc structures and the Capitalist economic structure (55). The 
la tter is only a specific concrete historical form of the former. The 
main purpose of the discussion is the purification of these concepts from 
the historical connotations that have been attached to them as their 
"essential" meaning and the statement of their content at a level of 
generality that would make them applicable In the anatomy of any social 
formation including the one which constitutes the main subject of study 
f or this thesis. 
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The empir icis m and "histor icis m" (55a) of the "economic 
structure" and other concepts have also led to an empiricism .and 
"historicism" of forms of Law and the State and of certain of their 
attributes (e.g. autonomy). Hence another justification for the 
discussion IS to demonstrate that because of their empiricist 
presuppositions certain theories of Law and the State in developed 
Capitalist Societies cannot be universal theories of Law and the State. 
2.B.1.a Rela tions of Production 
For the purposes of the analysis in this thesis I treat "relations of 
production" and "economic relations" as synonymous. Man's original 
"rela tion" to his natural conditions of production is, strictly speaking, not 
a relation. "He actually does not relate to his conditions of production, 
but rather has a double existence, both subjectively as he himself, and 
objecti vely in these natural non-organic conditions of his existence" 
(Marx Grundrisse 1969, Penguin, p.491-93). This basic "relation" 
becomes a production relation or an economic relation when it is 
mediated through other men. "Economics" says Engels "deals not with 
things but with relations between persons, and, in the last resort, 
between classes; these relations are, however, always attached to things 
and appear as things" - (MESW 1962, p.374). An economic or production 
rela tion is, then, a relation between two or more individuals vis-a-vis the 
means of production or vis-a-vis their rela tion to the means of 
production. 
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"In all forms of society it IS a determinate' production and its 
rela tions which assign every other production and its relations their rank 
and influence" - Marx; Introduction 1953.27.(56). When we come to 
apply our definition of an economic relation, formulated with reference 
to individuals abstracted from their "societal" (57) context, to the 
anatomy of Capitalist Society for instance we find that the concept 
"economic relations" comprise within itself numerous hierarchical levels 
of relations which together articulate the dominance of the Capitalist 
mode of production in that Society. 
To begin with; Capitalist economIC relations comprise: (1) 
relations at the level of distribution of the means of production (i.e. the 
specific manner in which labour power and the objects and means of 
Labour are united); and (2) relations at the sub-level of distribution of 
roles and products (i.e. subsumption of the individuals under determinate 
relations of production specifying their role in production and their share 
of the products); and (3) The relations, reflective of this latter 
5ubsumption, among the social forces of production at different "levels of 
socializa tion" {i.e. from different levels of reI a tions at the plant level 
between - (and among) - direct producers and the owners of Capital and, 
gradually, to the level of their relaitons as collective producers and 
collecti ve owners, and, to that of their relations as poll tically organized 
producers, and politically organized owners of Capital). 
Ha ving reduced the process of production to different stages of 
rela tions of distribution we may ask; why is it called a process of 
production - (instead of one of distribution)? Production consists in a11 
these stages of distribution. But because of the anci11ary nature of the 
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distribution of products it IS conventional to consider production as 
articulated In the first act of distribution (i.e. the subsumption _ of 
indi viduals under determinate relations of production). It is an empty 
abstraction to consider production while ignoring this distribution (58). 
When defined with reference to its final results - (e.g. as increment of 
skill or efficiency of the means of Labour) "production" could also mean 
"development" (Marx Grundrisse, pp. 491-93, 1969 Penguin, quoted in M. 
Caine and A. Hunt, Marx and Engels on Law)(59). 
Returning to the definition of "economic relations", we may note 
that as a concept "economic or production relations", does not, because 
of its inclusion of the "sum total of the relations" in a Capitalist Society, 
help in an anatomy of that society. To be able to undertake that 
ana tomy, I will, first, prepare a breakdown of that concept into its 
component levels hoping to investigate each, separately, and, give it a 
specific epithet. 
I shall al way s use the phrase "h is tor ical - or his tor ical! y 
determined - form of an economic relation" to connote a specific manner 
in which Labour power and means and objects of labour are united and 
"the incidental sub-framework of organization of production" which the 
manner of this unity necessi ta tes. This rela tion is historical - or 
historically determined - because it is determined once, at the beginning, 
and, would last for the lifetime, of a mode of production. It is a 
rela tion of for m - (as opposed to a "combina tion" of substance) because 
it consists In the manner in which Labour power. and, means and objects 
of Labour - (i.e. means of production) are united but not of these 
elements in their unity (60). 
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A t the level of the sub-framework of organization of production 
and distribution, an economic relation becomes a relation between two or 
more individuals vis-a-vis their relation to the means of production. If 
we are to look for the substance of this relation the most likely target IS 
the completed sUbsumption of individuals under the specific historically 
determined forms of economic rela tions (61). This subsumption 
manifests itself into: (a) a determinate organization of the productive 
forces - (Labour power + means and objects of Labour); and (b) a 
determinate distribution of roles in production and shares of the 
products. But, following the distinction already made (61a) between 
analyses of forms and analyses of substance we may note that (a) and (b) 
above are not by themselves the "essence" of an economic relation. 
The essence of an economlc relation is not the deter mina te roles 
In production and the determinate shares of the product which the 
parties, to the relation, accept as forming the basis of their relation. 
These are only the effects of an economIC relation; its phenomenal 
forms; or, its modes of expression. N or does the essence of an 
economic relation consist in the determinate organization of the 
producti ve forces - (or in the external force which support tha t 
subsu mption). This must be the case because these are the sources the 
economic relation derive from, and, as such, they are external to itself 
(i.e. cannot, by themselves, be its essence). An economic relation IS, In 
essence, a power relation whose existence or non-existence depends on 
the "balance" (62) of powers at the disposal of each party to the relation. 
This is not, of course, to deny that "the powers" of the parties to the 
rela tion are, at any given time, an expression of; their share In the 
means of production, the place they occupy in the production process and 
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the condition of the productive forces (63). 
2.B.l.bThe Productive Forces 
"The productive forces" mean the material productive forces (64) 
and as such, include; the objects and means of labour and "Labour power" 
either in their unity in a particular mode of production - (i.e. as actual 
means of production) or in separation from each other (i.e. as potential 
means of production); Marx Capital II 1967, pp.36-37, Capital III 1962, 
pp. 804-805. As a constituent of the productive forces labour is 
perceived not as social labour but as Labour power; as a consumable 
value; an object (65). Defined as the means and object of Labour and 
labour power the productive forces do not belong to any particular 
historically determined form of production (66). Transition from one 
mode of production to another alters not the entities but only the form 
of unity of these elementary factors of the "productive forces". 
Moreover in contrast to the cataclysmic course of development of their 
socio-economic for ms the course of development of the producti ve forces 
is evolutional (67). 
2.B.l.c The Social Forces 
"The social forces of production" correspond to the human agents, 
their mutual "economic relations" and the social forms which these 
rela tions assume at the different "Levels of Socialization". 
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2.B.l.d Process of Production 
"Social process of production in general" is a phrase used by Marx 
to describe, in the abstract, the production of use-values independent of 
the socio-historical form of such production (Cf supra f.66). In ~larx's 
words, " ••• The Capitalist process of production is a historically 
determined form of the social process of production in general. The 
latter is as much a production process of material conditions of human 
life as a process taking place under specific historical and economIC 
production relations, producing and reproducing these production relations 
themsel ves, and thereby also the bearers of this process, their material 
condi tions of existence and their mutual relations, i.e. their particular 
socio-economic form (Marx; Capital III 1962, p.798). Because it is 
indispensable for human existence the process of production, irrespective 
of its form, must be a continuous process, and must continue to go 
periodically through the same phases (Marx; Capital 1983, p.53l). 
"When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as flowing on with 
incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same 
time, a process of reproduction (Ibid). 
Having defined the meanlngs I attach to "The relations of 
production", "the productive forces", "The social forces of production" 
and "the process of production in general" I now turn to discussion of the 
"Economic Structure". 
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2.B.1.c The Economic Structure 
Althusser - (For Marx, Ibid. III) - defines the economlC structure 
as comprising the forces of production and the relations of production. 
In another work - (Althusser &. Balibar 1975, pp.165-18l) - he fragments 
these two into their component elements, which, are, according to him; 
Labour power, direct Labourers, masters who are not direct Labourers, 
objects of production and instruments of production. "By combining or 
inter-relating these elements we shall reach a definition of the different 
modes of production" (Ibid 176). Balibar IS conception of a mode of 
production is identical to Althusser's (Althusser and Balibar 1975, 
pp.209-224). It is these elements in their combination which both 
Althusser and Balibar conceive as the economic structure. Al thusser, 
often, uses the "economic base", the "(economic) mode of production" and 
the "combination", interchangeably, to mean one and the same thing; 
namely the economic structure (Althusser; for Marx 1969, pp.111, 89-116 
idem. Reading Capital 1975, pp.174-18l). 
The elements Althusser and Balibar enumerate are not pre-gIven 
elements. The "non-worker" (Althusser &. Balibar 1975, p. 212) or the 
master who is not "a direct Labourer" (Ibid. 176) are not pre-given 
elements. The emergence, among the social forces of production, of 
non-Labourers who are the owners of the conditions of production IS 
itself a product of historical development of the productive forces (Marx 
Capital III 1962, p.798). 
The text on which Althusser relied In reaching the conclusion that 
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non-Labourers are a pre-given element is from Marx (Capital III 1962, 
p.?72) and reads: " ••. It is always the direct relationship of the owners 
of the conditions of production to the direct producers - a relation 
always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of 
the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity - which reveals 
the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure and 
with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, 
In short the corresponding specific form of the State". But this text IS 
a statement of a general principle which is as equally true with a 
classless society as with a class society. The elements which Althusser 
draw from this text are elements of only one specific species of 
rela tionships (i.e. relationships of a class society) among the different 
species of relationships that are covered by the text. They are by no 
means elements of a philosophy of historical materialism in general. 
They are simply elements of a historically determined socio-economic 
form (e.g. Capitalist Society). This is so because the "direct 
rela tionship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct 
producers" could be one of "equilibrium" (67a) e.g. because these owners 
and these producers are one and the same people (e.g. in a primitive 
commune or in a socialist mode of production). 
Marx never suggested that the economIC structure comprise the 
subjects and objects of the production epoch (i.e. material productive 
forces and social forces of production). In all relevant texts \ larx is 
clear ly speaking about relations between people which correspond to a 
defini te stage of development of their material productive forces (67b). 
In other words, there is always a clear distinction between three 
elements: the people, their production relations, and ~ their mater ial 
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producti ve forces. 
. , 
But it is "the sum total of the relations of 
production" which is pinpointed as constituting the economic structure 
(Marx; Preface, MESW 11962, pp.362-363. idem Capital 11983, p.86 idem 
Capital III 1962, p.772). 
In another text Marx, unequi vocally, sta tes tha t: ". . . The 
aggrega te of these relations, in which the agents of this production stand 
with respect to Nature and to one another, and in which they produce, is 
precisely society, considered from the standpoint of its economic 
structure. Capital III 1962, p. 798" (68). 
Al thusser and Balibar's conception of the economIC structure 
confuses its content as a philosophical category with its content as a 
conceptualiza tion of a configuration of phenomena in a concrete social 
formation. As a philosophical ca tegory the economic structure 
compr ises the aggregate of "economic relations" mentioned previously as 
present within a mode of production. When applied as a scientific 
hypothesis the economic structure connotes a totally different object. 
An economic relation applied as a scientific hypothesis connotes as its 
object a concrete living social relation incurred vis-a-vis a concrete real 
economIc acti vi ty. Likew ise conceived as a scientific hypothesis the 
economic structure becomes the aggregate of these living social 
economic reI a tions. The task for ~\arxist interpretation becomes the 
explora tion of the empirical interrela tionship of production relations at 
enterpr ise level with higher, organizational legal and political, for ms of 
these relations within a concrete social formation (69) . 
. ~ 
.~ 
.~ 
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Althusser's conception of the "economic structure" led him into 
substituting another version of "historicism" (69a) for the historicist 
approaches he attacks (Althusser 1975, pp. 119-143)(70). Because there 
is no conceptual link between Althusser's "economic structure" and 
superstructures, the study of their interrelationship cannot be an object 
for a materialist science. Thus Althusser'model offers no province for a 
Marxian Science (7 o. 
2.B.2 The Relation between the "Economic Structure" and Superstructures 
2.B.2.a The Scope of Existence of Superstructures 
I have defined an economic relation as a relation between two or 
more individuals vis-a-vis their relation to the means of production. An 
"economic relation", as defined above, may, in a societal context, exist 
at different "levels of socialization" (72). It may in particular exist at 
the lowest level of socialization, as a relation between direct producers. 
1't may, at a higher level, exist, in specific societies, as a relation 
between these direct producers on the one hand and other individuals 
who, though not direct producers, are involved in the production process. 
A t further higher levels an economic relation may exist as a relation of 
distr ibu tion, of "roles" (72a) in production and shares of the products, 
a mong the different individuals invol ved in the production process, in 
proportion with their property rights in the means of production. Even 
poli tical relations are social forms which economic reI a tions assume, at 
top "levels of socialization". 
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The analysis of this subject has so far been p"roceeding at a high 
level of abstraction explaining the state of things a priori {i.e. from a 
philosophical materialist perspective}. The interpretation of concrete 
historical formations require however an explanation of the empirical 
inter-rela tionship of concrete phenomena. The social totality described 
apr iori as composed of economic rela tions a t different "levels of 
socializa tion" presents itself in concrete history as definite people with 
definite relations of production and social and political forms. It is 
possible to hypothesise that relations of production at enterprise level, 
collecti ve Capi tal-Labour relations, poli tical relations, labour and 
political organizations, the centralized State and Law are all specific 
forms which economic relations assume at these definite empirical 
"levels of socialization". 
The "I evel of s ocializa tion" of a relation designates the place of 
the relation in the societal hierarchy (i.e. judging by the extent of 
Communality which the relation reflects)(73). There is another 
i'mportant distinction to be made, among relations which ha ve become 
concretized {i.e. structures} and others which are still unmoulded (i.e. 
practices). Thus there are political structures and political practices, 
industr ial relations structures and industrial relations practices and social 
structures and social practices (74). 
I consider all these structures - (e.g. Labour and poli tical 
or ganiza tions, sta te and legal insi ti tu tions and other social and 
educational institutions or establishments) - as historically-material 
structures - {i.e. as opposed to the naturally-material structure which is 
the productive forces at the definite stage of development} - or 
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super s tructu res. Superstructures are accordingly levels of the 
"na turally-ma terial structure". Each superstructure and the practices 
taking place within it interact and in their turn react upon, and are 
influenced by, other superstructures and practices. 
From this perspective the relation between the material structure 
and the superstructures cannot simply be viewed as one between a 
conceptually distinct economic base and a State and Law. The Social 
totality should rather be regarded as composed of these hierarchically 
organized (75) interpenetrating levels of structures and social practices 
determined in the last instance by the stage of development of the 
producti ve forces. The relation between the "economic structure" and 
the Sta te or Law for instance can be established only via other 
intervening superstructures and practices. 
However for purposes of compara ti ve socio-economic studies that 
endea vour to discover the "essential characteristics of specific forms of 
social relations" (75a), the "realist" (75b) transcendence of the historical 
appearances which these "forms" assume in a particular society is 
important. All the superstructures fulfill social and economic functions 
that also incidentally mould and normalize human practices (i.e. reinforce 
a dominant ideology). A study of these historically specific structures 
must not focus solely on the objectively-ascertainable or subjectively-
ascertainable ideological roles they play. In order to introduce a 
historical dimension in the study of ideology and incidentally arrive at a 
non-historicist and non-empiricist conception of the State and Law such a 
study must focus also on the fact of the historical inception and 
rna terializa tion of these same superstructures. 
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2.B.2.b Mechanism of Determina tion VIa the Economic Structure 
I have already defined the "economic structure" and stated that 
each phase of reproduction is a new phase in the development of the 
producti ve forces. I now endeavour to explain the mechanism through 
which correspondence between the productive forces and the economIC 
structure and determination of the superstructures by the latter IS 
effected. As already mentioned the actual shares of the products or 
"roles" (75c) in production and the social forms which distribution of 
"roles" and shares takes at all levels of socialization are merely the 
phenomenal forms of economic relations "their modes of expression". 
An economic relation is "essentially" a power relation whose equilibrium 
or disequilibrium depends on equality or inequality of the parties" 
rela tion to the means of production, but, whose existence depends on a 
balance of power over and above and in spite of that equilibrium or 
disequilibrium. 
The mechanism through which this "natural correspondence" (Marx 
preface 362-63 Idem Capital III 1962 p.772) - is maintained IS one of 
disturbance and re-establishment on new bases of the "balance of power" 
inherent in economic rela tions. The condi tion of the "econom ic 
structure" changes when all or part of its constituent economic relations 
ha ve experienced a movement of disturbance and re-establishment of 
balance. The new economic structure - (i.e. the new balance of power 
a t the lowest level of socialization) does in turn assert itself at "higher 
levels of socialization" (i.e. superstructures and practices). The motor 
of this movement is always the Class struggle (75d). A scientific - (i.e. 
as opposed to a philosophical) - recognition that the productive forces 
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ha ve developed further and tha t the economic structure and the 
superstructures must change to conform to the new phase signifies 
nothing more than "the existence of a stimulus for social action" (76). 
The reason why this is the case is explained below. 
The process of adapa tation by society to a new stage of 
development of its material productive forces proceeds on the basis of 
contradictions, at "different levels of socialization" (77) between 
relations of distributions founded by the social forces of an antecedent 
stage and the relations of distribution necessitated by an imminent stage 
of development of the productive forces. We can carry this further to 
say that this contradiction is one between the determination, from above. 
by the superstructures (e.g. law, form of the State, ideology ... ) and the 
potential determination, from below by an imminent economic structure 
in an imminent stage of development of productive forces. 
The superstructures of an antecedent stage of development of the 
producti ve forces assert their dominance at all levels of socialization in 
society. Likewise new material conditions in order to provoke any 
social change have to first exist in men's consciousness - (i.e. have to be 
strong enough to, overcome the ideological dominance of the existing 
superstructure, and, provoke the knowledge of their sensuous 
consciousness by the actors) - and be, thereafter, transformed. at their 
hands, into social action at higher levels of socialization. Contradiction 
between economic relations of an antecedent stage and economic 
relations of an imminent stage of development of the productive forces, 
in effect, takes place at every level of socialization in societv. 
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Two qualifications need to be made about the mechanism and 
motor of movement of the material determination discussed above. The 
first is that they are described here at the level of social production in 
general - (irrespective of the historical specificity of a social formation 
within which they are taking place). This in its turn means two things, 
the first is that the specificity and functions of the ideological {i.e. 
historical} "forms" which practices materializing as a result of this 
process take depend in each case on the specificity and stage of 
development of the historically dominant "form of economic relations". 
The second thing is that the contradiction described at this level IS 
applicable even to classless societies. However in its application to 
class societies this contradiction becomes conditioned by internal 
di visions within such societies. Ra ther than automatically displacing 
each other - (as they do in classless societies) - the contradiction 
between the superstructures of an antecedent stage of development of 
the productive forces and the potential deter mina tion by the economic 
structure of an imminent stage of development of the productive forces 
present, in class societies, a relationship in which the superstructures 
may, as long as the developmental potential of the mode of production 
remain unexhausted, be "over-determinant" (78). 
The second qualification to be made is that in empirically testing 
the validity of this mechanism and motor of material determination the 
distinction made earlier between validation of philosophical and scientific 
propositions must be borne in mind. 
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2.B.3 Transition 
The capitalist process of production is a historically determined 
form of the social process of production in general (Marx Capital III 798). 
Although the or igina tion of isola ted capi talis t economic relations may, 
under feudal society, have started earlier (79) these capitalist economic 
rela tions became a historically determined form of economic relations -
(i.e. a capitalist mode of production) - only when the development of the 
producti ve forces has reached the pitch of enabling "the beginning of 
their politico-economic for mil (79a). A mode of production, as a 
societo-economic system, begins only at that stage. Transitional periods 
present therefore features, not of origination of individual economic 
rela tions of a mode of production but of beginning of the 
politico-economic form of these relations (80). 
Such a conception of transi tion has Immense logical appeal 
because of the following :-
a) There is the difficulty, prior to this stage of historical beginning, 
of pinpointing a rupture in which an antecedent mode of production 
expIres and a new mode commences. All antecedent developments 
leading to this cuI mina tion, al though they may be claimed as a 
precondi tion facili ta ting that transition, are definitely not stages of 
development of a new mode of production. This is because these same 
develolpments can logically be claimed to be stages in the development 
of the decaying social system whose existence, however continues as long 
as its superstructures persist - (Cf Maurice Dobb pp.61-64; Christopher 
Hill pp.118-121: both in Rodney Hilton 1976). 
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b) The concept of a mode of production finds a content only from 
this moment of historical beginning. Without this location of mode of 
production at the level of historical beginning, the hyposta tiza tion by 
Marx of the capitalist mode of production (or of capitalism and capitalist 
rela tions of production as often used as epithet for that concept) would 
remain a meaningless anthropomorphism. I have already indica ted that 
this hyposta tiza tion is only a metaphorical way of describing the 
movement engendered by the societal forces within a mode of production 
(81). The debate in recent years on the "ability" of capitalism at 
"dissol ving" antecedent "modes of production" conducted with reference 
to Third World Countries is example of the confusion and sterility 
discussion would end at if the concept of a mode of production is to be 
reducti vely used to connote individual or non-societal configurations of 
indi vidual economic relations (82). 
A form of economIC relations becomes historical - (i.e. acqulres 
societal existence) as a culmination of development of historical 
~ubstance antecedent to that becoming. "We see then the means of 
production and of exchange on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built 
itself up, were generated In feudal society (Marx; Communist Manifesto 
in MESW I p.39). 
The structure which emerges at the beginning of a mode of 
production, to represent and consolidate the new form of economlC 
relations, is not simply an economic superstructure - (i.e. is not merely a 
poli tical power of a class resulting solely from organiza tion of bourgeois 
economIC interests previously existing In disparity under the 
superstructures of the decaying feudal system)(83). It is in addition to 
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tha t, the structure destined by the "general movement of the productive 
forces". It is therefore extra-economic in origin (Marx, Grundrisse 1969 
pp.485-9). 
It IS the politico-economic structure of the new historically 
determined form of economic relations which construct both the societal 
form and substance of their sub-system of organization of production and 
distr ibution. It would in particular secure, by force if necessary, the 
labour power, the means and objects of labour, and, determine the roles 
of different individuals In production and their share of the products, 
and, undertake all that IS necessary for the operation of the form of 
economIC relations as a societal system. We are here encountering a 
si tua tion in which the politico-economic structure determining both the 
form and substance of the sub-system of organization of production and 
distribution. This is a type of determination compatible with the stage 
of development of the productive forces at the moment of transition, 
when the social In an antecedent system of production has been ruined 
~nd the social of the new order hasn't been born yet (84). 
The political authority implanted by this revolution is an embryo 
that comprises within itself the elements of the new social system. 
This authority is the State. For the whole period after its establishment 
by the victorious class (or classes) and until the foundation of its 
representa ti ve mode of production has been completed, this transitional 
State exists in absolutism, or, "economic-corporate primitivism" -
(Gramsci, 1971 p.263). 
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The transitional State undertakes re-organiza bon of individuals' 
immediate relations to the means of production, and, their subsumption, 
under capitalist relations of production. In case of capitalist production 
rela tions which had already existed, in isolation, under the doomed feudal 
system, organiza tion by the transi tional Sta te would mean the 
acquirement, by these relations, of an additional juridical and political 
existence. For a whole period after the establishment of the State, 
organization of production could also take the form of using its power in 
furthering the dominant material interest at the expense of other less 
dominant material interests in the social formation. In the early history 
of European Capitalism this was particularly exemplified by the State 
measures aiming at, the liquidation of feudal property - (in Engels, 
principle of communism MECW VI pp.345-46) - the hastening of the 
process of divorcing direct producers from their means of production (Cf 
Marx, Capital I 1983 pp.672-693) and the forcing down of wages by Acts 
of Parliament (Cf Marx Capital I 1983 Chapter XXVIII). 
, An authority which imposes a system of distribution of the means 
of production can a fortiori build its sub-system of organization of 
production and distribution (i.e. sub-system of distribution of "roles" In 
production and shares of the products). Unlike that of consolidating the 
distribution of the means of production, and, because of the perpetuity of 
the production process, safeguarding the smooth functioning of the 
sub-system of distribution - (i.e. guaranteeing the appropriation by 
different agents of production of a share in the products representa ti ve 
of a "balance of power" in the imminent stage of development of the 
productive forces) becomes a permanent function for the State. The 
State not only cannot. in the long run. over-impose an external 
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sub-system of distribution oblivious to the stage of development of the 
productive forces, but it is the stage of development of the productive 
forces and of production and distribution which determine the different 
forms the State has to assume in correspondence with themselves (85). 
3. Historical Relativity of the Superstructures 
The conception of the State as inherently autonomous or law as 
"essentially" rational or objective are products of, inter alia, a tendency 
to treat as "essential" properties of the subject of inquiry - (e.g. Law, 
The State ... ) historically concrete forms which the particular subject 
happens to assu me at the time of inquiry. This conception confers on 
empirical findings about historical forms of law and the State In 
developed Capitalist societies an epistemological status and uni versali ty 
that they do not qualify for. In order to explain why Law and the State 
can in other societies be different I endea vour to show in this part that 
the form of Law and the State and their ideological properties are 
~lways conditioned by the form and stage of development of material 
production. This is true whether these forms are studied In different 
societies or within the same society across different stages of its 
development. In this part however I will focus on the latter possibility. 
In order to identify the "essential" "form of the State" I need to 
investiga te the process through which contemporary State institutions 
ha ve developed across time. The emphasis I place on the development 
of the Sta te through time does not imply tha t the study of the 
contemporary system of the State is unimportant. This is simply the 
approach most suitable for the purpose of the thesis, namely the 
identif ica tion of the "essential" features of the Capitalist for m of Law 
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and the State and utilization of the conclusions for the discussion of Law 
and the State in Sudan. 
The VIew that the State is inherently autonomous is also shared by 
some commentators who are supposedly "anti-historicist" - (Balibar 1975 
pp.209-224), Althusser 1975 pp.163-181, 1969 p.113, Poulantzas 1982). 
The anti-historicism of Althusser and his followers had paradoxically led 
them all the way back into idealism (Clark 1980 p.40. fs.56, 85). 
Whereas historicist interpretations misconceive the concrete historical 
substance which Law and the State assume In developed Capitalist 
societies for the "essential" forms of the Capitalist State and law; some 
of Althusser's followers formulate theories, about allegedly the 
"essential" form of the State, which, although accomplished through 
formalistic analytical deduction, IS a uni versaliza tion and eternaliza tion 
of this same historical substance (86). 
3.A. The State 
I have mentioned elsewhere that the stage of development of the 
producti ve forces determines the form of the State. This needs more 
clarifica tion. To do this let us recall the definition of economic 
rela tions, used throughout the text, as power relations whose equilibr iu m 
or disequilibrium depends on equality or inequality of the parties' relation 
to the means of production. Where the parties are unequally related to 
the means of production (e.g. one owns the means and objects of labour 
and the other owns only his labour power) their powers are bound to be 
unequal. This inequality of power will further be reflected In the 
parties' relations vis-a-vis the process of production (i.e. In the 
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distr ibution of "roles" in production and shares of the products). In 
Capitalist relations of production this further inequality is exemplified by 
on the one hand the privilege of the owners of capital to manage and 
appropr ia te surplus value, and, on the other by the entitlement of the 
workers to wages in an inherently unequal exchange. But this doesn't 
explain everything. A party to an unequal economic relation may, In 
fact, receive less than his share because the other party is, from a 
position of dominance, capable of intensifying his exploitation. The 
political and legal control of the exchange between Capital and Labour, 
may take different ideological forms which depend on the stage of 
development of the productive forces. 
The first of these forms is one in which the acceptance of 
exchange and the terms and conditions of the exchange are directly 
imposed and sustained by a repressive regime of the dominant party. In 
the history of Capitalism in Britain and France the pillars of this form 
could be found in a host of statutes aiming at; the coercion, through 
expropriation, of the agricultural population into accepting the exchange 
of their labour power for whatever share of the products the owners of 
the conditions of production were ready to offer - (Cf. Marx; Capital I 
pp.671-685), compulsory extension of the working-day, and, the lowering 
of wages (87). 
A second form of control of the exchange between capital and 
labour begins when, due to completion of appropr ia tion of the means of 
production. economic necessity replaces external repression in urging the 
labourer to sell his labour-power. This is the stage of the so-called 
"free exchange" between Capital and Labour. Henceforward the 
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labourers may be left to the natural laws of production i.e. to their own 
dependence on capital, a "dependence springing from and guaranteed in 
perpetuity by the conditions of production themselves". The State no 
longer needs to invoke external power for protection of the system of 
distribution of the means of production since it is now internalized as a 
self-evident Law of Nature - Marx Capital I p.689). The terms and 
conditions of exchange between capital and labour, although still fixed by 
the owners of capital, reflect an increased awareness of the natural 
barriers, to capitalist development which the imposition of an unlimited 
working-day for example might create - Marx; Capital I p.447, 253)(88). 
A third form of control of the exchange between capital and 
labour begins when, due to development of the productive forces and 
increased "socialization" of the workforce, the social power of the 
workforce intervenes as a new factor in the determination of the ter ms 
and conditions of the exchange (89), especially with the development of 
trade unions. 
The first form of the political and legal control of the exchange 
between capital and labour is effected by an economic-corporate State 
whose objective and means, as a lever of the capitalist class in the 
course of its formation, are reflective of the conditions of the economic 
structure at a time of transition, and, of primitiveness of the instruments 
of labour, its low productivity and disorganization of the dominated 
classes at this and the immediately subsequent stages. 
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The second form of control corresponds to a stage of development 
of the productive forces in which technical economic performance _ had 
gained relevance as a criterion in the determination of the terms and 
conditions of the exchange. The State, still the sole determinant of the 
terms and conditions of the exchange, acquired a new rationality In the 
interpretation of its authority. For the first time then and there State 
authority appeared as distinct from the partial interest of the dominant 
class. 
The appearance of the autonomy of State authority becomes 
tangible when such authority has become exercisable within institutions 
consisting of the organizations of both the capitalists and the workers. 
This is what takes place in a developed context of the third form of 
control of the exchange between capital and labour. Concretized in the 
institutions within which it has become exercisable State authority 
becomes a "centralized State", whose primary task is the harmonization 
of conflicting interests of the parties to the sub-system of distribution 
(i.e. of "roles" and products) within the dominant socio-economic system 
of distribution of the means of production (i.e. within Capitalist Society). 
To the class which owns the means of production the centralized 
Sta te symbolizes an organized power which may potentially be wielded 
for maintenance of a sub-system of distribution fa vourable to their short 
term and long term interests - (the two interests being not necessarily 
always coincidental) - as appropriators of surplus value and privileged 
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beneficiaries of an established and desirously stable system of 
distribution of the means of production respectively. The fulfilment by 
the centralized State of these objectives is guaranteed by the material 
power of this class (90). As an instrument of this class the centralized 
State does not invoke its power to directly protect the mother system of 
distribution of the means of production because it does not need to - (i.e. 
because civil society or economic relations at the different "levels of 
socializa tion", of which the centralized State is a superficial level, do 
that job) - Cf A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks 1971 p.263. 
For the dominated classes on the other hand the centralized State 
represents an organized power which may equally be utilized In 
promoting their own interest within the existing system of ownership of 
the conditions of production. As an instrument of these classes the 
centralized State may not effectively change the system of distribution 
of the means of production, because, of the many economic relations at 
different "levels of socialization" on which the existence of this system 
is based, it is only a superficial level. 
To recapitulate: (a) relative autonomy of the State means relative 
autonomy of the centralized State; (b) this autonomy is objectified by the 
apparent neutrality of the Institutions of the Centralized State - (the 
judiciary, the legisla ti ve organ and the exec uti ve organ) resulting from 
their placement in a relation with each other whereby they, In their 
interrela tion, appear as representa ti ve of public consensus (91); (c) 
autonomy of the centralized State is neither absolute nor sta tic. It only 
exists as a relation to, that is to say its existence or non-existence 
depends on, the stage of development of the producti ve forces and 
57 
incidentally the stage of class struggle. We have already seen that the 
absolutist State and the State in the secondary form of exchange 
between capital and labour, although forms of the Capitalist State, were 
strictly speaking not autonomous; (d) not every Capitalist State IS a 
rela ti vely autonomous State. 
3.B. Law 
In contrast to the different schools of posi ti vis m which conceive 
law as either an arbitrary will of a sovereign or as having no other than 
a normative existence (92) the Historical and Sociological Schools are 
distinguished by their attempt at discovering a "scientific" explanation to 
law. The Historical School (93) sought to understand the history of law 
as a process which is necessary and therefore "conforming" to law (i.e. 
"conforming" to the laws by which IS determined the historical 
development of a nation). Because of its preoccupation with the 
his tor ical for m - (in disregard to the substance of the historical process) 
- the Historical School failed to discover these laws which, according to 
it, determines the historical development of a nation - (Plekhanov, DM 
1947 p.162). Instead it predicated the "consciousness of a people" or the 
"spir it of a people" - (Sa vigny Vol.I p.14. Puchta Vol.I p.31 German 
Editions) as its final terms of reference. From the point of view of its 
cr i tics this was a recourse to an idealis m "less sol vent" tnan the "much 
more profound idealism of Schelling and Hegel" - (Plekhanov, D~\ 1947 
p.167). 
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The Sociological School of Jurisprudence likewise conceives law as 
a social phenomenon and seeks the application of the sociological method 
- (i.e. observation, experiment comparison and the "historical method" 
Lloyd, 1985 p.550) in its study. In his Rules of Sociological Method 
Ourkheim however rejects the "historical method" from among rules of 
sociological explanation because its inclusion was in the first place due 
to Comte particular conception of sociological laws - (which IS more like 
the approaches under f. 94) - (Ourkheim, 1938 pp.125-126). 
In its modern (94) form the Sociological School focussed on 
expounding the social basis of law and asserting its dependence on social 
"compulsion" Ehrlich, 1936). At the basis of Ehrlich's conception of law 
(95) lies the assumption that social evolution is an autonomous and 
spontaneous process, and, in the search for truth, empir icised society is 
the final authority to which appeal may be made (96). Hence in its 
formula tion of a theory of law the sociological approach mistakes the 
concrete phenomenal form which the "form of law" assumes, for the 
"form of law". This is an approach that is inherently incapable of 
distinguishing between the "form of law" and the ideological appearances 
this form may assume. One commentator has accordingly noticed the 
absence of ideological analysis in the domain of sociological theory both 
old and new - (Hunt, 1984 p.12). 
Ehrlich's idea of law contrasts on the other extreme with Austin's 
theory of "Commands". But they have one thing in common namely 
their empiricism of the subjects of study. Ehrlich substitutes his 
empiricism of society for Austin's empiricism of the form of law. Both 
"Society" and the "State" have their roles in the law-making process. 
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To understand these roles, the idea of society as a concrete given subject 
has to be transcended. What is needed for this understanding is. an 
anatomy of society or its breakdown into its component elements; its 
people, the ir r e la tions and th e ir ma te rial condi tions of ex is tence. 
Pashukanis,(97) starting from presumably Marxist premIse, offers 
his own conception of a general theory of law. He differs from previous 
jurists by his endeavour to relate law to underlying economic relations. 
Although following an historical materialist investigation of law 
(Warrington 1981 p.2) Pashukanis' empiricism or historicism of empirical 
or historical findings about law lead him into idealizing its essence. 
This makes discussion of his theory of law relevant for the purposes 
outlined under Part 3 of this Chapter. Moreover, left uncriticised, 
Pashukanis' theory of law IS a strong Marxist authority that law is 
"essentially" rational. This contradicts the main theme and a conclusion 
posi ted by the weight of empirical evidence in this thesis which are that 
the form of law is determined by the historically dominant form of 
economIC relations and that the ra tionali ty or irra tionali ty of this form IS 
always rela ti ve to the socio-economic historical conditions in which it IS 
dominant. 
Pashukanis' analysis of objectivity of the legal form is, for the 
purposes of the discussion in this part of the thesis, important because it 
is a focussing on the issue to be tackled before any claim as to autonomy 
or non-autonomy of law may be established. Pashukanis, of course, 
provides the ca tegories, which from his point of view concretize the 
legal form. It is essential, therefore. that, before any al terna ti ve 
categories are advanced as grounds for that objectivity. his view be 
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accounted for. 
Pashukanis' emphasis that the assertion of the class content of 
juridical forms does not by itself explain the objectivity of the legal 
form is, undoubtedly, rightly placed. But, instead of seeking objecti vi ty 
of the legal form in the specific stage of the class struggle, he chooses 
to desert class analysis altogether and opt for the commodity-exchange 
epiphenomenon. Pashukanis is not seeking to establish an ideological 
objecti vi ty (i.e. effectiveness) of the legal form, but, rather to empiricise 
the legal form and give it "essential" objectivity (98). It is important to 
understand, therefore that Pashukanis' analyses of the form of law and 
the State are not simply, as they are sometimes mistaken to be (99), 
analyses of ideological forms but a general theory of law and the State. 
All this IS done on supposedly Marxist basis but, not without some 
confusion and misinterpretations. 
Instead of taking the relations of direct producers to the owners 
of the conditions {i.e. means and objects of labour} of production as the 
clue to understanding capitalist society at its different "levels of 
socialization", Pashukanis undertakes the commodity-exchange 
epiphenomenon (l00) as his basic category. Development of the 
producti ve forces does not In Pashukanis model affect the people who 
would in turn change or conserve production relations, but, affects 
market relations (p.92 Ibid) which would in turn accumulate law. 
Commodities (as objectified social relations) are therefore the parties to 
legal relations and men are in turn subject matter of these re la tions (Ibid 
pp.5l, 76, 48). Accordingly historical evolution provides both the form 
and content of legal norms (Ibid p.53) while the State role is reduced to 
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that of injecting clarity and stability into the legal structures (Ibid p.68). 
Pashukanis traces the development of law from an embryonic 
stage and, through an uninterrupted evolution (l01), to a fully developed 
legal form possessing "differentiation and precision" (Ibid 54). He links 
this development with the development of commodity-exchange. With 
the development of the latter, the legal - i.e. rational interpretation of 
authority - becomes possible (Ibid p.92). As the wealth of capitalist 
society assumes, in his VIew, the form of an enormous accumulation of 
commodities, society presents itself as an endless chain of legal 
rela tionships (Ibid p.62). Law is, therefore, a capitalist phenomenon 
(102) (Ibid p.44) while all antecedent forms in which it existed were its 
embryo (Ibid p.54). 
Starting from a premIse In which people are atomized individuals 
(Ibid p.90) brought together by development of market relations, and, a 
conception of the State as an authority, antecedent to economic relations 
(Ibid pp.90-94), constantly moving towards legali ty by opera tion of 
market relations, Pashukanis is unable to explain how come this course of 
evolution has, in certain circumstances (e.g. the circumstance of 
Capitalist society), turned into a relation of domination and subordination 
(103). This is significant because it IS a failure to arrive at the 
land mark tha t separa tes a Marxist theory of law from other sociological 
theories of Law, namely the insertion of law into people's living relations 
of production. Pashukanis has gone a step further to substitute his 
emplrIClSm of market relations for Ehrlich's empiricism of society. 
That is not far enough. 
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My criticism of Pashukanis theory of law can be formulated at 
two levels:-
1) If Pashukanis' analysis were intended as an investigation of the 
development of an ideology of law I would agree with it subject to one 
reservation. The reservation is that the development of commooity~xchange 
is not the proper determinant of development of an ideology of law under 
capitalism. Although it is only when wage-labour is its basis that 
commodity production and commodity exchange impose themselves upon 
society as a whole (Marx, Capital I 1983 p.551) it is also true that they 
are not coterminous with the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 
Capital I 1983 p.167). Thus commodity exchange is too general a 
criterion to be of any explanatory use in contemporary comparative legal 
studies - (e.g. of the Law of Contracts In the Sudan and Britain). 
Taking commodity exchange as a criterion also mIsses the inherent 
quali ty of capi talis t form of economIC rela ti ons which IS one of 
domination by expropriation of the means of production. This IS a 
S'er iou s omIssIon because it obli tera tes the guiding thread for 
distinguishing between ideological historical substance which the "form of 
law" assume and the essential "form of law". It also leads to the 
illusion that the objectivity of the legal form regulating any area of 
social relations (e.g. industrial reI a tions) is explicable by development or 
under-development of commodity-exchange. This is an extreme form of 
economism tha t subordinates living human relations to hypostatized 
economic categories. 
2) Because Pashukanis' analysis is meant to substantiate a claim that 
law is "essentially" rational my disagreement with it IS more 
fundamental. Pashukanis views about the legal order in Medieval Europe 
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- (Cf. supra f.102) suggest his readiness to confine the concept of law to 
rela tions that are rational. This however exposes a methodological error 
in his approach namely his confusion of analysis of forms and analysis of 
substance. Law is "essentially" an instrument of domination. The 
"form of law" and the "substance of law" - (i.e. the historical substance 
which law assumes or what Pashukanis mistakenly calls the legal form or 
the form of law) - are: a) always synchronous and b) must always for 
methodological purposes, be kept distinct in space - i.e. one should not 
be merged into the other even though they appear as indistinguishable. 
The "form of law" corresponds to the form of domination and is 
determined by the historically dominant form of economic relations. 
The substance of law corresponds to the institutional tangible existence 
the "form of law" assumes at a definite stage of development of the 
socio-economic form. The conclusion then is that there has always been 
law though its form and substance considerably vary across different 
stages of human history in correspondence with the material conditions 
of the dominant and the dominated. This also means that there is 
'always within a dominant definite mode of production one form of law 
whose substance may vary in accordance with the stage of development 
of such mode. This does not however mean that all branches of law are 
under capitalism "substantially" uniform. The specificity (i.e. the 
capitalism feudalism or otherwise) of the "form of law" and that of the 
substance of law are not necessarily coincidental. The substance or 
insti tutional form which a legal rei a tion assume may continue to be 
non-capi talist In so far as that is compatible with the new social 
functions of the legal relation under capitalism (I03a). What is 
important is that "forms of legal relations" and substance of such forms 
tha t cannot serve these social functions are ultimately replaced (Renner, 
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1949 pp.52, 75-76). 
Having pointed to the empiricism of some sociological and Marxist 
ideas of law I now elaborate the methodological distinction between the 
"form of law" and the "substance of law" referred to in the introduction 
to this Chapter. However it is important to emphasise that the analyses 
In this section are developed with reference to Labour Law and, their 
extension to other branches of Law, although theoretically possible, (104) 
is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
3.B.l Determination of the "Form of Law" by the "Form of Economic 
Rela tions" 
Not every social relation IS law. Onl y those social reI a tions 
incurred v is-a-vis a mater ial interest are law or poten tial la w. 
Moreover law is only metaphorically a social relation. Law is not the 
social relation itself but only a form of existence which the social 
rela tion assu meso Both the form and content of social relations are 
provided by forces external to law. Moreover, social relations cannot be 
severed from economic relations. I have already defined economic 
rela tions as power relation - (Cf supra Part 2.B.l.a). But this is an 
abstraction. Social relations - interaction between people - are the 
immedia te forms of expression of economic relations. Law in turn is a 
for m of existence of social relations. In other words law is a form of 
manifesta tion of a relation of power inherent 
. . 
In economIC rela tions. 
The for m of law IS deter mined by the for m of the economic relation. 
Development of the form of law depends therefore on development of 
forms of economic relations. The transfor ma tion of \ \an metabolical 
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rela tion to the earth into a relation to the earth as property IS mediated 
through a social interaction of conquest (i.e. of domina tion and 
subordination)(I05). (Marx; Grundriss 1969 pp.485-493). The historical 
form which Men's relations among themselves vis-a-vis the means of 
production assume (i.e. the type of domination, whether domination by 
dispossession of the means of subsistence or by enslavement or servitude) 
and the his tor ical substance of the se re la tions - (the id eological 
appearance which domination has to assume in order to communicate 
effectively with the dominated, or, in other words, the moral 
justifica tion which the exercise of a power of domination assume) - are 
only the modes of expreSSiOn or the phenomenal forms of a power 
rela tion. But, we may also notice that phenomenal forms existing at 
any gIven time are but dominant power relations "concretized". As such 
they solidify the existence of the power relation and are in turn affected 
by the constant disturbance and re-establishment of the balance of power 
on whose existence depends the existence of the power relation (Cf. 
supra Part 2.B.2.b). 
3.B.2 Development of the Form of Law 
The definition of law as, principally, a form of domination, 
irrespective of the ideological substance this domination assumes, means 
tha t, society, is not, a necessary pre-requisite for the existence of law. 
Law, as a relation of domination and subordination, may exist between 
two people living in; (a) geographical isolation, or, (b) social isolation -
(whether abstract or real) from other people. Development of isolated 
social relations into society corresponds to development of the for m of 
law. Development of social relations within society corresponds to the 
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development of the substance of law. 
We may now classify the form of a legal relation with reference 
to a complexity or simplicity of the social relations which it symbolizes. 
To that effect a social relation - {and incidentally a legal relation} is 
simple when it exists between two people or two groups of people 
vis-a-vis their relations to material conditions of human existence (i.e. 
objects and means of production) in its social isolation from other similar 
rela tions. In such state of existence, the terms and conditions of the 
rela tion are set solely by the parties to the relation and the power of 
domination is confined to the power which one of the parties might 
possess over the other. If there are other individuals in the same 
geographical locality the relations which may exist between different 
groups of these individuals, likewise, exist in their isola tedness, as 
rela tions between members of different unrelated social cells (I06). 
Complex social relations {and incidentally complex legal relations} 
appear when, due to development of material productive forces, either of 
the poles of a simple relation increasingly identifies itself with other 
poles, of other si mple rei a tions, corresponding to itself in their specific 
rela tion to Man's material conditions of existence (I07). In a situation 
in which none of them is already dominant, conflict between one unified 
form of social relations and another - {or other} - unified forms may lead 
to one of them establishing a dominance of their forms of relations over 
the other - {or others}. 
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When this has been achieved it is tantamount to the historical 
beginning of a societal form of social relations (i.e. a form of a specific 
organized dominance that would last for a period of history). A 
victorious class (i.e. the class represented by the dominant pole of the 
historically-determined form of social relations) emerges with an 
organized social power in place of the fragmented powers which each of 
its members once possessed in isolation. The isolated forms of social 
rela tions which once existed between the different groups of this class in 
their isolation are henceforward transformed into a system of "societal" 
rela tions. These developments are significant because they relate to a 
process through which law came to gain autonomy. The victory of a 
particular form of social relations without the others may, because of 
the progressiveness of the victorious form when compared with other 
forms - (e.g. capitalist relations when compared with feudal relations or 
the latter when compared with slavery), by itself paves the way for that 
autonomy. Moreover the assumption by the social organization of the 
task, previously undertaken by individual members of the organization in 
their isolation, of protecting the victorious form of social relations lay 
the basis for a juridical separation between the interests of the 
constituent members of the organization as individual owners and their 
interests as a social organization. 
3.B.3 Development of the Substance of Law 
Whereas development of the form of law IS effected by 
interaction of different for ms of social relations, development of the 
substance of law proceeds on the basis of interaction between the poles 
of the same, historically determined, form of social relations. Taking 
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the example of the CMP the form which law assume here is a form of 
domination whereby one class owns the means and objects of labour- and 
another class owns only its labour power. By investigating the substance 
of the form of these legal relations we discover that it has varied 
considerably in correspondence with the stage of development of the 
productive forces and, incidentally, with the stage of class struggle (108). 
We may in particular note that these variations have gone hand in hand 
with the forms of exchange between capital and labour, described earlier 
(supra Part 3.A). 
Before drawing any theoretical conclusions from this concomitance, 
it IS essential however to examine development of the substance of law 
during the secondary and contemporary forms of exchange between 
capital and labour and the extent to which it contrasts with the earlier 
statutes whose primary objective was the consolidation of the forms of 
capitalist relations - (i.e. through expropriation of agricultural population, 
prolonga tion of the working day and the forcing down of wages Cf supra 
£.87.) 
I have already mentioned that the beginning of the second form of 
exchange between capital and labour (the so-called free exchange) also 
marked the beginning of an era in which the State was to rely more and 
more on rational interpretation of its authority (Cf supra £.88 and text 
above). However, this rationality is nothing else than a metaphorical 
descr iption of abandonment of certain restr icti ve laws which had become 
incompatible with the specific stage of the class struggle (109). With 
the development of capitalist production the observance of certain 
minimum conditions of work, essential for the process of reproduction, 
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became inevitable. This is a phase which, in Eng1and, witnessed the 
dying away of the 14th and 15th Century "fixed-wage" legislation (II0). 
From the beginning of the 18th Century gnevances over individual rights 
whenever brought to the attention of the House of Commons were 
frequently redressed (S and B Webb 1920 p.55). According to the Webbs: 
"F or fifty year s fr om 1710 the curr ier s, ha tter s, wools tapler s, 
shipwrights, brushmakers, basketmakers, and calico-printers, who furnish 
prominent instances of 18th Century trade unionism all earned rela ti vely 
high wages and long maintained a very effectual resistance to the 
encroachments of their employers (Ibid p.45). However an interpretation 
that these improvements were exclusively operatives' achievement forced 
by struggle is difficult to accept in the light of the power with which the 
State hit back in 1799 when the operatives had shown their readiness to 
help themselves by unlawful combination instead of laying their 
greivances in a regular way before His Majesty" (Ibid pp.50, 68-72). 
The recognition which the process of production has gradually 
gained as a factor in deter mining the ter ms and condi tions of 
employment was not unrelated to the inception of laisser-faire and the 
influence the latter exerted in institutionalizing a judicial tradition of 
importing the doctrine of freedom of contract into the employment 
rela tionship. To that effect, the Webbs have noticed that "when The 
Wealth of Nations, afterward to be accepted as the English gospel of 
freedom of contract and natural liberty, was published in 1776 it must 
ha ve seemed not so much a novel VIew of industrial economics as the 
explicit generalization of practical conclusions to which experience had 
h tl"me (S and B Webb Ibid p.55)". repeatedly driven statesmen of t e 
Despite its subsequent seizure as a moral justification for the unholy 
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objective of depriving the workers of legal protection whilst denying 
them the benefit of combination the acquirement, by the employment 
rela tionship, of contractual status entrenched its position as an 
emancipa tory specific reciprocal relation. 
What characterized this phase of exchange between capital and 
labour was that until 1825 the law-making process continued to be a 
unitary process imposed on the working population. The interpretation 
placed on freedom of contract meant that Employers Association and the 
judiciary remained the influential participants in the law-making process 
and in its enforcement while the individual worker was to concede to 
their will and to their patronage of his freedom. 
The era of the secondary form of exchange between capital and 
labour terminated, officially, in 1825 when the "Peel's Act" (6 
Geo.IV.C.129) came into effect and established, for the first time, "the 
right of collective bargaining involving the power to withhold labour from 
the market by concerted action" (The Webbs Ibid p.l08). The period 
from 1825 when this "limited existence of trade unionism" was allowed 
(Roy Lewis, 1970) and to 1875 when the scope of that existence was 
widened, along with developments after 1875 belongs to the new and 
third phase of exchange between capital and labour. 
Institutionalized autonomy of law became a reality after 
Parliament under pressure by the working masses (The Webbs Ibid 
pp.113-299) had finally resolved to drop the criminal liability legislation 
against the trade unions (Il1). The existence of free trade unions and 
their participation in the law-making process (whether through collective 
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bargaining or through a unitary political emphasis) marks a new era in 
development of the substance of law. The preoccupation, by the trade 
unions, with collective bargaining and the priority which the latter, as a 
method of setting terms and conditions of employment, had on legislation 
added an ideological dimension to the autonomy of law. "As collective 
organizations become entrenched the nineteenth century doctrine of 
indi vidualistic laissez-faire gave way eventually to a fir m belief In 
collecti vist laissez-faire. Abstentionist legal policy was a central plank 
of the prevailing voluntarist ethos In industry, which in turn seemed 
consistent with a pluralist approach to the philosophy of the State (Roy 
Lewis 1970)(1 Ila). 
Conclusion 
The movement towards autonomy which the historical development 
of the "substance of law" has shown is a reflection of social 
emancipation from a primitive stage of development of the productive 
forces, at which both form and substance of legal relations were imposed 
by a power external to economic conditions (Cf supra fo87) to stages 
when economic conditions of production and distribution began to 
gradually breed their own countervailing determination of the substance 
of economic relations. 
The preceding discussion upheld and demonstrated a distinction 
between the "form of law" and the "substance of law". The form of law 
is determined, directly by the form of the State and, indirectly by the 
form of economic relations. The "substance of law" consists In the 
economic and sociological existence the "form of law" assumes and IS 
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therefore external to the latter. Relying on this formulation we can 
also describe the province of ideology in law. 
Ideology is the normalization which the form of law - (or varIOUS 
prolifera tions of that form) - gain as a consequence of development of 
the substance of law - (i.e. all social practices that can be field for legal 
regula tion). This is an ideology whose development is, dependent upon 
factors external to the "form of law", and, more easily detectable across 
time. As such it is more general and spontaneous than the artefactual 
or "philosophical" ideology which law as a social and academic discipline 
possesses (112). However my emphasis on forms of ideologies that 
prevailed during the reign of definite historical forms of consciousness is 
justified by the concern for establishing the historical rela ti vi ty of 
present day law and its ideology. 
The study of synchronic proliferation of ideology - (i.e. its study 
as a system of beliefs) - is of course also essential for a complete 
understanding of ideology. Both the spontaneous and artefactual 
ideologies exist at various social levels of the totality. They together 
constitute independent levels of ideologies of law. At the highest and 
most superficial social level, law enhances its acceptability by an 
outward appearance of impartiality and other distinct techniques and 
formalities of law making and legal administration (113). At a lower 
level, social relations that constitute the field for legal regulation appear 
as deviations from social practices that are apparently equilibrant, 
spontaneous and rational. A t a still lower level these social practices 
which phenomenalize this equilibrium spontaneity or rationality 
the msel ves take place within moulding socio-economic structures tha t in 
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the ir tur n der i ve the ir ideological in v incib iIi ty fr 0 m the mater ial 
rela tions of production. 
It follows from the above delineation of the province of ideology 
that the latter is a "diachronic/synchronic" phenomena. It also follows 
from discussion of the hierarchical organization and interdependence of 
several levels of ideologies that analysis of the ideology of law that 
presents this ideology as exclusively inherent in anyone of these levels is 
too reductionist. Hence analyses that propagate the superficial ideology 
of formalism as a solo explanation for acceptability of law In the wider 
society (114) or those which overlook all these higher levels of ideologies 
and directly explain law by interests associated with the dominant 
ma ter ial relations of production are both equally reductionist (I15). 
The discussion on development of the substance of law also 
discloses that the centralized state is not exogenous from this process. 
On the contrary, the effect of development of material and social 
production on law appears as always media ted through the centralized 
State. This allows the conclusion that the form of law is determined by 
the form of the State - (e.g. capitalist, feudalist ..• ). But that the 
relative autonomy of that State and the ideology of law depend for their 
development on development of forms of consciousness which is in turn 
dependent upon development of the substance of politics and law - (i.e. 
social practices associated with definite stages of development of 
ma ter ial production). 
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The development of the form and substance of law described is 
also product of autocentric evolutional development of a now developed 
capitalist society. How does it relate to an under-developed social 
formation? The difference is between a situation of historical beginning 
and materialization of the form and substance of law and one of 
imposition of a form of law from without. This has much to do with 
the underlying distinction between capitalism which has had a historical 
transition and an imposed capitalism. The difference between poles of 
the latter situation is that the imposed forms of economic and social 
rela tions depend for their existence and continui ty on descendent 
su per s tructur al con tr ols wh ile an h is tor ically due tr ansi tion is an 
evolutionally due - (though cataclysmically effected) re-organization of 
superstructures of the same society in accordance with a corresponding 
new stage of development of its material productive forces. The extent 
to which this IS a significant distinction in analyses of the form of law 
and the State in Sudan is shown in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOCIETY THE STATE AND LAW 
IN UNDER-DEVELOPED SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
Introduction 
The analyses in Chapter I emphasised the dependence of the form 
and substance of The State and Law on underlying economic relations in 
the respective social formation. The present Chapter is divided into 
three main parts. Part one explores the specificity of economic 
rela tions prevalent in the Sudan against a theoretical background der i ved 
from Chapter I. It is developed and seen here as applicable to analyses 
of other under-developed social formations. The main concern is to 
show how a definite distribution and concentration of specific forms of 
economIC relations affect distribution of social and political power. 
Part II argues that the form and class composition of the State in 
the Sudan are conditioned by (a) imposition of a State apparatus from 
without (i.e. through colonization) and (b) a configuration of social and 
political power conditioned in its turn by the distribution and 
concentration of forms of economic relations discussed in Part I. The 
class movement described as taking place within the social formation as 
a whole reproduces both the form and class composition of the State and 
the configuration of power whilst also widening discrepancies in 
distribution of social and political power and, consequently, of the 
benef i ts of progress. 
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Part III shows the significance of the form and- class composition of 
the State and that of the heterogeneity of the social forms present in the 
social forma tion as a whole, for a study of labour rela tions la w. 
Utilizing the conclusions drawn I then outline the objective and plan that 
will guide the discussion in the rest of the thesis. 
1. The Paradox of the Dual Society 
Long after the Independence of many African States and to 
da te, a gap continues to exist between economic relations in those 
centres which had the first interaction with capitalism, and those 
in the rest of the social formation. It was the theorists of the 
Dualist thesis who first visualized a distinction in the economies of 
under-de vel oped coun tr ies between a rela ti vely de ve loped and 
advanced "capitalist" sector and a traditional archaic "subsistence" 
sector in which the majority of the people dwell (Lewis 1954). 
However, instead of conceiving this duality as an effect of an 
imposed integration, the theorists of dualism understood it as an 
effect of incomplete integra tion, In the na tional and world 
markets. From this wrong basis they prescribed a development 
strategy which would address itself to extending modernization to 
the "subsistence" sector by increased integration of that sector In 
both markets (A G Frank 1969.255). 
The assumptions of the dualist model were challenged by 
many economists (Bauer 1956, Laclau 1971, Frank 1969, Kursany 
1983) who argued that by maintaining this artificial separation 
between capitalist and non-capitalist sectors "Dualism" underestimates 
the degree of commercialization which is possible in the rural 
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areas 0). 
Nevertheless the urban/rural dichotomy of under-developed 
social formations continues to puzzle researchers of all interests. 
Wha t the cr i tics of Dualis t thesis have unani mously and 
convincingly dismissed was the alleged absence of reciprocal 
economic inter-action between the capitalist and the so-called 
subsistence sector. The question whether different sectors of the 
economy of an under-developed social formation are capitalist and 
whether "Capitalism" may coexist with pre-capitalist economic 
rela tions remains controversial. 
However, know ledge of the dominant relations of production 
In an under-developed social formation, and the specificity which 
the class structure peculiar to this formation may confer on these 
rela tions, is essential, to my analysis of the state, labour, and 
labour law and the extent to which they compare with their 
Western counterparts. I adopt as a hypothesis a view that the 
search for a dominant form of relations in an under-developed 
social formation should be conducted at the economic, political and 
other social levels in such formation. Using this methodology, my 
further premise is, that, there is no clear-cut demarcation between 
capi talist and non-capitalist "economic relations" and that the same 
"economic relations" may be capitalist at a certain level but 
non-capi talist at another or other levels. Applying this for mula to 
the rural-urban dichotomy I would further hypothesize that when 
defined by their functions, economic enterprises in rural zones are 
capitalist. but when defined by their forms of social organisa tion 
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they are not. Their existence as functionaries of the politically 
dominant capitalist mode of production (CMP) means that 
non-fully-capitalist economic relations are in effect subordinate to 
the CMP. 
l.A Economic Relations In Rural Communities 
Economic interaction between the capi talist and the 
non-fully-capitalist sectors of the economy takes different forms. 
One such form is that in which the "non-capitalist"(2) sector pays 
the dues of its subordination - (i.e. taxes)- to the "capitalist 
society", presumably to receive it back in form of services. 
Another more important form this interaction takes is that of 
commercial exchange. Commerce has a profound effect on the 
integrity of the "non-capitalist" social formation. This is because 
it operates to distort the function of "pre-capitalist economic 
relations" (2a) and undermine their ability to reproduce and expand 
their forms of organisation (2b). In Sudan this process started on 
a large scale in the post 1820 era following the destruction of the 
peasan ts' com muni ties' organisa tions by the Turko- Egyption 
Invasion. 
Irrespecti ve of the mechanism that the process of dissolution 
might take, it always results in the transformation of the peasants' 
community from an organisation for the production of use-values to 
one for the production of exchange values. To explain this I need 
to return to the example from the Sudan. The gradual 
displacement of traditional schemes of irrigation on the Nile by 
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mechanical schemes - (a process which first evolved through the 
opera tion of collateral economic and human forces but was later 
(1900-1956) hastened through State-sponsored introduction of 
commercial planta tion) - means tha t the peasant - (i.e. the 
small-holding farmer C.f Macfarlane, 1978.9-10) - has had to 
alloca te part of his resources (previously forming part of his 
subsistence) for the production of values to be exchanged for fuel. 
The expansion in the production of exchange-values - an expansion 
dictated by a mechanism of price always operating to extract more 
profit for the Capitalist sector (3) - coupled with the peasant 
inability to expand the cultivated area (4) means that an 
ever-increasing number of peasants households I members ha ve had 
to look for external resources for their subsistence (5) (e.g. seeking 
employment in the "Capitalist Society"). 
All over Sudan this process has been exacerba ted by two 
factors namely:-
1. Active intervention by the political authority In the 
introduction of cash-crops in some regions (e.g. cotton 
planta tion In the Gezera Scheme 1925, the Nuba Mountains 
scheme in South Western Sudan, and N Eastern Sudan)(6); and 
2. Encouragement, by the State, of the large-scale production 
and commercialization of subsistence commodities (e g 
Sorghu m and Whea t in Kassala Gedaref and the Gezera 
Schemes). 
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For the peasant communities, production of subsistence 
commodities on a large-scale in "the Capitalist Sector" (6a), was a 
further encroachment on the autonomy of these communities. It 
means that the peasant can then buy his subsistence-com modi ties 
at a lower cost than he will incur for producing them. In effect 
the peasant-communities have been transferred into small~ommodity 
producers and their subjection to the market has been completed. 
The peasant found himself in a situation where he has had to 
choose between (1) working on the field and scarcely producing his 
subsistence lot, either directly or indirectly by producing values 
and exchanging them for subsistence commodities from the market 
or, (2) deserting his field and looking for employment in the 
Capitalist Sector. This IS a new type of proletar ianiza tion 
effected without dispossessing the direct producer of his means of 
production. 
The transformation of these peasant communities into 
capitalist formations requires more than just their dissolution. It 
further requires that the profits accruing from prevalence of 
exchange-values be invested in capitalist enterprises within the 
village community. But the fact that the appropriators of profit 
belong to the capitalist sector of the economy which IS more 
advantageous to invest in, mili ta tes against such a possibility. In 
effect village-communi ties, while exporting their surplus population 
to the Capitalist sector, stagnate in their secondary for m as 
communi ties of petty producers. Since these producers own and 
possess their means of production and use their own personal labour 
in production these communities present economic rela tions which 
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are hardly describable as Capitalist. However, there are writers 
who argue that these communities are nevertheless Capitalist. 
The reason for this, from the point of VIew of some 
under-development theorists, is that, because the periphery as a 
whole is a base stratum in a hierarchical World Capitalist System 
(Wallerstein 1974), extraction of surplus value, a paramount 
objecti ve of both national and international trade, is Capitalist In 
objective even when it is effected through pre-capitalist forms of 
exploitation (Frank 1967, 1978). 
Another VIew holds that, despite their pre-capitalist forms of 
exploita tion these communities may be capitalist because it is not 
the for m of exploi ta tion (e.g. slavery serfdom free labour, etc.) but 
the "laws of motion" peculiar to each mode of production, and the 
contemporaneity with a definite epoch of production that would 
enable us to deter mine whether the given relations of production 
are capitalist, feudalist or otherwise (Banaji 1977). 
What these VIews overlook is the fact that capitalism is both 
a social and an economIC existence. Existence of a capitalist 
socio-economic form in a geographically defined social formation is 
impossible without the antecedent existence in that formation of 
an aggregate of individual capitalist economic relations enough to 
enable the beginning of at least their politico-economic form (7). 
Moreover the beginning of that capitalist politico-economic for m 
does not necessarily directly transform all other non-capitalist 
economIC relations into capitalist ones. Individual non-capitalist 
economIC relations may at this - {i.e. The Individual} - level survi\e 
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that beginning (8). What the dominant capitalist politico-economic 
form does - (or to put it more precisely, what class struggle wi thin 
the dominant capitalist politico-economic form does) - is that it 
obstructs the agents of these non-capitalist economic relations 
from asserting their relations at higher economic and political 
"levels of socialization" (9). 
Far from being transformed, non-capitalist economic 
relations, albeit their bearers may become exchange-values' 
producers, are thus condemned to stagnate in their "pre-capitalist" 
forms of organisation. While the agents of these non-capitalist 
economic relations exchange on unequal terms (II) with the 
capitalist sector, the for ms of economic and political organisation, 
and incidentally the forms and practices of economic and political 
class struggles which these (their) relations would allow may not 
enable these agents to exert any considerable pressure on the 
dominant capitalist state - (or the capitalist politico-economic 
organiza tion). They in effect end up weaker than any of the 
classes of the "Capitalist Society". The latter classes possess at 
least the for ms of organization (i.e. Capitalist labour organizations 
e.g. trade unions) that are likely to influence the centralized state 
(Ila). 
A conclusion that the rural communities are Capitalist 
because they are subjected to Capitalist exploitation IS 
presumptuous and involves ignoring their taxonomically non-capitalist 
forms of organization. Although subjected to Capitalist 
exploi ta tion these communi ties are also. from my perspecti ve. 
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politically weaker. If the urban nuclei and the rural zones are 
equally capitalist the disparity between the noteably me.agre 
political - (and consequently economic and cultural)(l2) role of 
rural communities, despite their numerical supremacy (13), and 
the disproportionately greater political role of the urban nuclei in 
an under-developed social forma tion remain inexplicable (14). 
Explaining inequali ties while holding to a VIew tha t the 
under-developed social formation is a capitalist social formation 
would necessitate an examination of the internal class structure of 
this alleged capitalist social formation disclosing the characteristic 
fea tures which cause it to produce inequali ties of the type 
prevalent m the Third World and why these inequalities assume a 
geographical polar iza tion between town and country. It is my 
view that a class structure which produces inequalities of the 
enormity and polarization of those prevalent in the Third World 
cannot be a homogeneous class structure (15). Under-development 
theorists (16), while stressing these inequalities, do not however 
even attempt to provide such an examination. They rather offer 
an externally-orientated explanation which largely remains oblivious 
to the specific internal structure of each particular social 
formation. 
Proceeding from a different perspective, Banaji is also ready 
to argue tha t the "economic rela tions" prevalent In rural 
com muni ties of the Third World are capitalist economic relations 
even though they are masked in various forms of exploitation 
(Banaji 1977, 1983). I accept Banaji's view to the extent that 
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economic rei a tions prevalent in rural com munities are only 
functionally capitalist (I6a). This goes in line with my belief _ tha t 
there is no inherently ideologically distinguishable "forms of 
capitalist economic relations" and that the social and ideological 
appearance which the societal form of these relations assume 
differ across time within the same society and from one society to 
another subject to the stage of development of the material 
productive forces and class struggle (l6b). My analysis differs 
from Banaji's In two respects. First, in its emphasis on the 
distinction in the levels of definition between the capitalism of 
urban economic relations and the "Capitalism" of the rural ones. 
Second in its explanation of the "Capitalism" of rural communi ties 
as an effect of their subordination by a politically dominant 
capitalist mode of production. The explanations which Banaji 
offers in both respects are not convincing. 
Despite the array of criticism he launches (Banaji 1977. 6-11) 
against Dobb (Dobb 1946) there is nothing convincing In Banaji's 
analysis to sustain the claim that capitalism unqualifiedly defined 
does exist in non-capitalist forms of exploitation. The quota tions 
he marshalls from classical Marxist texts do not amount to more 
than connoting that surplus value could be produced through 
non-capi talist for ms of exploi ta tion. However this may mean, not 
tha t "Capitalis m" exists in and because of these non-capi talist 
forms of exploitation, but, that it exists geographically external to 
and independent of these forms while creating them through distant 
trade or political domination. Without limiting his analysis to any 
concrete societies Banaji argues that the C[\\P is in existence in 
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the definite totality of its historical "Laws of motion" (Banaji 
1977.10) i e as an epoch of production. The implication of .this, 
is, tha t all rela tions of production existing in an epoch of 
capitalism are capitalist relations of production even though they 
assume non-capitalist forms of exploitation at the enterprise - (or 
indi vidual) - level. But if a mode of production consists In a 
definite totality of the historical laws of motion which Banaji 
enumerates (Banaji 1977.10) from where are these laws of motion 
to be derived to prove the existence of that mode if not from the 
rela tions of production at the enterprise level; the same relations 
which Banaji dismisses as irrelevant? (17) 
l.B Capitalism of the Urban Nuclei 
The urban nuclei of the Third World present aggregates of 
economIc relations which are capitalistic in character. Individual 
economIC relations (i e economic relations at the lowest level of 
socializa tion) in these nuclei are vastly relations of wage labour. 
The different levels of socialization of these nuclei, made up of 
rela tions among agents in the different divisions of production, 
present a homogeneous class structure, I e a class structure 
composed of the divergent and contradictory interests of different 
agents of identical, all formally capitalist, economic relations. 
Together with the bureaucratic apparatus (itself a centralized 
existence of and as such a level of existence of the homogeneous 
class structure) relations of production at different levels of 
socializa tion in the nuclei constitute an organization of capitalist 
production; a "capitalist micro-society" \\' i thin the under-developed 
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social formation. 
However strong the grounds for classification of these urban 
centres as capitalist might be, a conclusion to that effect is bound 
to meet some objections. But the theoretical grounds on which 
the different objections are based are themselves open to question. 
Taking capitalism as a mode of production whose fundamental 
economic relationship IS constituted by the free labourer's sale of 
his labour-power, Laclau (Laclau 1971.25) is ready to argue that 
because the capital In circula tion In La tin America was 
accu mula ted inter nally by the absorption of econom ic surplus 
produced through Labour relationships very different from those of 
free labour the dominant relations of production in that continent 
remain pre-capitalist in character (Laclau 1971.30). 
Laclau's conception of a mode of production as an economIC 
mode of production {i.e. as definite economic relations in their 
isola tion) is an erroneous abstraction and has, in effect, prevented 
him from accounting for economic and social conditions prevailing 
over vast areas of Latin America which he unrealistically 
categorized as pre-capitalist or feudalist - C.f Infra f63 and text 
above. 
To prove that capitalist economIC relations are dominant in a 
particular social formation it is not essential to prove that 
indi vidual economic relations (i.e. economic rei a tions at the lowest 
levels of socialization, e.g. at enterprise level) existing in that 
particular social formation are unanimously capitalist economic 
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rela tions. It is enough tha t there are sufficient capitalist 
economic relations to enable the autochthonous beginning pf a 
politico-economic form. There is, in the specific example of 
under-developed social formation, a further point which is worth 
remembering, namely, that, due to conquest from without (i.e. 
colonization) the politico-economic form of capitalist economic 
rela tions began even before the existence of an aggregate of 
autochthonous capitalist economic relations sufficient to enable an 
autochthonous beginning. Just as the dominance of the 
politico-economic form of capitalist economic relations may not 
af f ec t the pr e -capi tal ist for ms of or gan iza tion of ind i v id ua 1 
non-capitalist economic relations so may not the presence of 
indi vidual non-capitalist economIC relations in a social for ma tion 
mean that the dominant politico-economic form IS not capitalist 
(18). 
Doubts are cast from other different perspectives (19) on the 
capitalism of the Third World and on the description, of the urban 
nuclei in the countries in that part of the world as capitalist 
politico economic forms. These perspectives focus either on the 
pri vileged position which the industrial worker holds vis-a-vis the 
urban sub-proletar ia t and the peasantry to reach the conclusion 
that a working class doesn't exist (20), or, on the type of the 
enterprises and industries that constitute the economic base of 
pr i va te ownership to reach the conclusion that the owners of these 
enterpr ises and industries are not bourgeoisie (21). 
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As to the first VIew, if it is emphasizing the pecuniary aspect 
of the phenomenon and from this perspective expressing symp-a thy 
with the less privileged classes its value remains merely 
sentimental. If, however, it is intended to forecast the political 
orienta tion of the working class and the effect of that on the 
State, its credibility is questionable. It is true that the working 
class in under-developed forma tions might be in a pr i vileged 
position In relation to other classes in the non-capitalist social 
forma tion. But it IS always the definite economic relations of 
indi viduals, to the means of production, and, among themselves 
which determine their class position. From the experience of the 
Sudan, it is this class position, so determined, which determines the 
poli tical orientation of the workers. 
Another related VIew IS that which denies the utility of class 
analysis because of the limited number of the population who can 
be classified as members of classes. This view has as its 
founda tion a tendency of fusing the developed capitalist sector 
(whose agents admittedly constitute a minority) into the 
non-capitalist sector (whose agents are a majority) and 
quantitatively measuring capitalist relations of production In 
rela tion to non-capi talist relations in the national formation. It 
therefore ignores the existence of relations of production, which 
are qualitatively capitalist, in the capitalist formation (i.e. the 
developed sector) and the political domination of the non-capitalist 
formation by that sector. 
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The limited economic and industrial base of a bourgeoisie and 
a working class in the "Capitalist Society" of an under-developed 
country does not change their class character, nor diminish the 
importance of class analysis in the study of social phenomena in 
these formations. This is so for two reasons. The first is that 
political existence and effectiveness of a class (e.g. the workers) is 
tested, not by a universal criterion, but, in relation to the 
existence and effectiveness of other classes (i.e. the bourgeoisie) in 
the same social formation (23). The second reason is that despite 
their superficiality (24) (i.e. under-development of their underlying 
economic structure) class organizations in such a society represent 
social powers whose interaction is worthy of consideration because 
of the impact it has on integrity of the social formation as a whole 
and the limitation it imposes on the success of voluntarist 
development planning. 
The second VIew IS one which emphasises the tertiary and 
consumer ist nature of prevalent industry to deny the existence of 
capitalism and a "capitalist" class. It is held by protagonists of 
"under-development" theory (Amin 1976, Frank 1972). From their 
perspective they end up describing capitalism in the Third World as 
"peripheral capitalism" "dependent capitalism" or a "colonial mode 
of production" (25). To some of them this is not simply a 
transitional capitalism but a qualitatively different form of 
capi talis m (26). 
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The protagonists of "under-development" theory do not deny 
the existence of classes, but their analyses lead to the conclusion 
tha t, because of the dependent nature of the economic structures 
in under-developed countries, external influence is determinant and 
these classes are ineffective in the formulation of economic and 
political policies (27). What are the characteristics of this alleged 
special brand of capitalism? 
The proble ms wh ich under-deve lop ment theor is ts address 
themselves to are not pure economic problems. Rather 
under-development theorists endeavour In many cases to offer 
external economic explanations to what are in fact predominantly 
internal politico-economic phenomena i.e. inequalities. Amin for 
exa mple poses that, "under-development is manifested not in level 
of production per head but in certain characteristic structural 
features which dictate an uneven distribution of income and 
prevent the transmission of the benefits of economic progress from 
the poles of development to the economy as a whole" (28). Like 
his Dependency School colleagues Amin perceives economic 
dependence as the basis for these structures of inequality (Amin 
1976.202). The types of industrialization and capitalist enterprise 
in the Third World are conceived of as part of these structures, 
because they always fit into a model that perpetuates inequality 
(Amin 1976.200, 215-233). Theorists of "under-development" 
emphasise that these inequalities are irremediable because they are 
the mode of reproducing the conditions of externally-orientated 
development (Amin 1976.352). This is, they conclude. peripheral 
capitalism which would ultimately perpetuate stagnation and 
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under-development. 
My own reserva tion towards this interpreta tion IS tha t, 
capitalism seems to be defined here with reference to a social 
well-being which it should, supposedly, bring about (29). This is 
namely, equal division of the benefit of economic progress among 
different regions of the same country and evenness In the 
distr ibution of income (30). The expectation that it is In the 
na ture of capitalism to bring about this well-being is an illusion. 
It is my view that it would help a voiding further confusions if the 
laws and characteristics of the CMP are to be derived by inference 
from a theoretical model of that mode and not from the concrete 
capitalism of Western Europe. European capitalism is a capitalist 
mode of production in its historical specificity. The emergence of 
capitalism in a pre-capitalist class structure peculiar to Europe has 
led to industrialization and the guaranteeing of a rei a ti vely decent 
minimum standard of living. These would not be necessary 
accompaniments of capitalism everywhere else. For this reason 
the phrases "peripheral capitalism" or "dependent capitalism" are 
misleading. It is simply capitalism (i.e. the capitalist mode of 
production) taking root in a class structure different from that In 
which European capitalism has flourished.(3l) 
I.C The Social Formation as a Politically United Whole 
Ha ving outlined the "non-capi talis m" and capitalism of rural 
communities and urban centres respectively I now turn to examine 
the ways in which these two different sets of economic relations 
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are interrelated and the implication of this "for categorization _ 
(i.e. as capitalist or otherwise) - of the social formation as a 
whole. 
why 
Before outlining my position on this issue I need to explain 
the existing theories of these interrela tionship and 
categorization are inadequate. 
There is a group of scholars who characterize the relation 
between these capitalist and non-capitalist economic relations as 
one of articulation of modes of production (32). Their analysis 
commences from a conception, of a mode of production that 
reduces it to production relations at the lowest level of 
socializa tion - (i.e. as consisting in individual economic relations at 
the individual social level) - and, of the social for ma tion as 
COmpriSIng a combination of modes of production equally 
reductively defined. What is epitomized as "non-capitalist 
economic relations" in this thesis is construed by this group of 
wri ters as pre-capitalist "mode or modes of production". Likewise 
investigation of the dominance or non-dominance of the CMP is In 
the majority of cases made only at the individual level of 
indi vidual capitalist economic relations. 
By confining itself to individual economIC relations and failing 
to conceIve as part of a definition of "a mode or production" 
higher levels of socialization (e.g. levels of collective-economic and 
poli tical social relations) at which indi vidual economic relations 
mayor may not assert their presence, this approach presumptuously 
promotes "non-capitalist" economic relations into pre-capitalist 
mode(s) of production and underrates the dominance of the C r-. \P. 
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This approach also pre-empts any theoretical conception of a social 
formation. If the social formation consists of an aggregate of 
reductively conceived modes of production, a descriptive account of 
a chaotic social phenomena and their chaotic existential interaction 
would be the only way for establishing a unity of the social 
formation. This is a methodology which, although acceptable from 
certain other perspective (33), is inappropriate for analysts - like 
members of this group (34) - who approach their subject of study 
from a materialist conception of history. Content with the 
empirical configuration of phenomena makes espousal of a "mode of 
production" and other concepts of Historical Materialism practically 
useless. It also disregards a tenet of the latter theory namely, its 
emphasis on the discovery of the essence of things as a means for 
knowing them (i.e. essentialism)(35). 
The difficul ty the "theory of articula tion" poses for 
establishing a unity of the social formation has led some of its 
supporters to suggest the adoption of an "extended" concept of a 
mode of production and to conceive of articulation as occurring 
either between extended modes of production or between a 
dominant extended mode and "restr icted" subordinate modes within 
the social formation (Wolpe 1980.36-38). An extended conception 
of a mode of production is defined as a conception that allows the 
mechanisms and processes through which individual isolated 
economic relations are brought into relation with one another and 
the relations and forces of production are reproduced to be 
perceived as conditions of existence of a mode of production. 
Examples of such mechanism and processes are "circulation", 
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"distribution" and the "State" (Ibid.36). .i The ··functioning of these 
mechanisms and processes has been referred to as the laws of 
motion (Ibid.36). 
It is only because this so-called extended conception of a 
mode of production is still a reductionist conception of a mode of 
production (36) that the existence of more than one mode of 
production within a social formation is conceived as possible. The 
so-called laws of motion of a mode of production, as defined by 
Wolpe (1980,.36) or Banaji (1977.10) while they may be laws of 
motion are not forces of motion that originate movement of the 
mode of production (37). 
I have mentioned earlier that a mode of production is a 
societal concept that comprises within itself inter alia economic 
ideological and poli tical social levels. Each one of these, 
hierarchically organized strata represents a societal level of 
existence of individual economic relations of that particular mode 
of production. Wi thin this conception "society" is an embodiment 
of a mode of production, or an organization of a specific type of 
production (38). This is a conceptual definition of a type of 
society. A concrete social for ma tion (i.e. any congregation of 
people living in a definite political domain within geographically 
defined boundaries) may not necessarily be an embodiment of a 
mode of production. 
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Movement within a developed capitalist society IS effected, in 
an ascendant evolutionary fashion, through class struggle at those, 
above-mentioned, and other social levels within that society (39). 
However, there are reasons which make movement within a 
post-colonial social for ma tion possibly different. 
African social formations - (as we know them now by their 
political boundaries) - presented before the advent of colonialism 
characteristics typical of those of an Asiatic or village economy 
(Amin, 1976.51). In all cases the conquest of these formations was 
immediately followed by establishment of a relatively powerful 
central administration over the colony and later by an 
unprecedentedly expanded exploration and extraction of mineral and 
natural wealth. In addition to interrupting the autocentric 
development of these formations colonialism has sown the seeds of 
a state and capitalist economIC relations that were subsequently to 
influence economic and social development in these formations. 
In contrast to the preceding approach I believe that the 
concrete form which social and political power assume (e.g. the 
centralized state form) within an under-developed social formation 
should itself be considered as a level and condition of existence of 
a mode of production. If the diagnosis of this concrete form 
establish that it is capitalist both in form and substance then it IS 
the capitalist mode of production which is politically dominant in 
the social formation as a whole (40). This latter conclusion IS 
sanctioned by the empir ical fact that this concrete for m {i.e. the 
centralized state} dominates the entire social for ma tion. However 
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my analysis goes beyond this empirical '-'facade to further 
establishing the interrelation of this dominance with an underlying 
economic and class structure. 
I have already distinguished between the capitalist and 
"non-capi talist" economic relations prevailing in urban and rural 
zones respectively of an under-developed social formation. I also 
emphasised the point that this difference, resides in the different 
for ms of organization prevalent in each zone, and, is, therefore, 
one of degree - (i.e. judging by their economic function all 
economic relations in the social formation are capitalist but 
judging, at a higher level, by their forms of organization only those 
prevalent in urban nuclei are fully capitalist). The relation 
between capitalist and "non-capitalist" economic relations is not 
therefore one of articula tion of modes of production. It is rather 
one of political (or organiza tiona!) domination and subordination. 
Non-capi talist economic relations and their agents are political 
subordinates of capitalist economic relations and their agents. 
The political dominance of capitalist economIC relations and 
their agents (or in other words dominance of the capitalist 
politico-economic form) may not correspond to a numerical 
supremacy of individual capitalist economic relations in the social 
formation as a whole. It stands even though these reI a tions are a 
minority as against a "conglomeration" (41) of individual 
non-capi talist economic relations in the social for ma tion as a 
whole. This ability of capitalist economic relations to subordinate. 
through their politico-economic form. pre-capitalist economic 
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relations despite the possible numerical supremacy of the latter is 
due to the latter's relative historical primitiveness (i.e. their 
rela ti ve pr i mi ti ve social cohesi veness). The "emergence" of 
capitalist economic relations and dominance of their politico-economic 
form in a situation of historical socio-economic primitiveness, a 
si tua tion wh ich cannot by i tse If h is tor icall y gi ve birth to 
capitalism, IS explicable only in the light of colonization and 
imposition of capitalism and a form of a State from without. 
Gi ven the imposition of capitalist economiC relations and their 
centralized form of a State from without the reason for political 
subordina tion of non-capitalist economic relations becomes obvious. 
It is that these relations and their agents lack the forms 'of 
organiza tion essential for enabling them to communica te 
effectively (42) through institutions of a "capitalist society" (43) -
(i.e. institutions which are in essence crystalized social [economic, 
political and ideological] forms which individual capitalist economiC 
rela tions assume at higher levels of socialization). Indi vidual 
capitalist economic relations on the other hand possess their own 
substance and forms of organization that enable their agents to 
further organize at higher levels of socialization into trade unions, 
employers and workers federations and labour or bourgeois parties 
and participate in managing the State. 
This peculiar position of dominance and subordination gives 
rise to a main issue whose discussion and that of its impact on a 
methodology for labour law constitutes the balance of the Chapter. 
The issue relates to the impact which dominance of a capitalist 
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politico-economic form has on the relations of classes of the 
"capitalist society" among themselves and on the integrity of the 
social formation as a whole. The ensuing discussion endeavours 
first to show the extent to which the State structure is capitalist 
and then move to discussing the above issue at various stages of 
development of the State structure and in relation to autonomy or 
non-autonomy of the State. 
2. The State 
2.A Bureaucratic Genesis of the "Sta te" 
Colonialism and its immediate consequence (44) were 
tantamount to appropriation of all feasible agricultural land and 
mineral resources and the subsumption of the respective colonized 
popula tion under definite rela tions of production. A bureaucratic 
appara tus IS In this respect a centralized form of organization 
essen tial for the co mpletion of th is subsu mption. Under 
colonial is m the "bureaucratic apparatus" and the heights of "the 
bureaucracy" (45) possess no more than a functional status. They 
ha ve an intermediary role of enabling the functioning of a system, 
of production and distribution, whose specificity is determined by a 
power external to them (i.e. the metropolitan State). 
The post-colonial social formation inherited a bureaucratic 
apparatus (i.e. a centralized State apparatus) composed mainly of 
an ar my, an ad ministr a tion (i.e. the executive and the judiciary) 
and in the second grade of a constitutional system (i.e. an organic 
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law or creatures of that organic law, such as political parties, a 
Parliament or legislative body and trade unions) to govern the 
interrela tionship of the different institutions of the bureaucratic 
apparatus. The decolonization of these apparatuses which began 
immediately after Independence at the initiative of an educated 
elite, which had joined State administration by the time of 
Independence, initiated the making of the bureaucracy (as a social 
ca tegory) (EI Tayeb 1967). 
The acquisition by the post-colonial State of enterprises and 
plants previously owned by the metropolitan State meant that the 
heights of the bureaucracy in the post-colonial State were to 
assume, in addition to the functional role they inherited from their 
predecessors (i.e. colonial administrators and governors), a principal 
function of appropria ting, supposedly on behalf of the social 
formation, and designing a system of production and distribution for 
utiliza tion of, the means of production. A dominant class of 
owners of the means of production was absent. The classes of the 
"non-capitalist" periphery were unable to undertake supervision of 
bureaucra tic performance (46). Consequently the heights of the 
bureaucracy became a politically independent and dominant power 
(47) by virtue of the managerial status they occupy in relation to 
lower-ranking employees in the bureaucratic apparatus. 
The managerial status of the heights of the bureaucracy 
remained a source of independent power only so long as proper (48) 
classes (i.e. social categories defined by their relation to the 
economic structure e.g. working class, capitalist class) In the 
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"capi talist society" were not strong enough to participa te in 
political decision-making - see infra f.51 and the text above. 
Ha ving said this we can now move to outline a theoretical model 
tha t explains the process through which the heigh ts of the 
bureaucracy have lost their exclusiveness and independence. 
2.A.l Emergence of Class Power within the "Capitalist Society" 
The heights of the bureaucracy presumably on behalf of the 
politically-united social forma tion undertake the twin role of 
exploi ting and of organizing-cum-supervising the labour process. 
Organization and supervision in this broad sense include the tasks 
of governance part of which is the task of reinvesting the surplus -
of the na tional revenue (i.e. after deduction of expendi tures) 
according to priorities determined by the heights of the 
bureaucracy themselves. By fulfilling these economic functions 
the heights of the bureaucracy indirectly increase the material and 
social productive forces and expand "capitalist relations of 
production" in the social formation (49). 
More and more agents are subsequently added to the 
"capitalist society", and, further concentration and centralization of 
existing relations is effected. To a great extent the emergence of 
social classes in the "capitalist society" is conditioned by the 
emphasis the heights of the bureaucracy place on the role of 
pr i va te enterprise and development planning in general or by the 
form which economic exploitation assumed under colonialism. 
Emerging classes (whether workers or bourgeoisie) militate to 
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undermine the heights of the bureaucracy political power by 
acquIring an ever-increasing share of power within the "capitalist 
society". The workers begin to question the manner in which the 
labour process is organized and demand a bigger share m setting 
the terms and conditions of the agency the heights of the 
bureaucracy are assuming allegedly on behalf of the social 
forma tion. As the contribution of the bourgeoisie to the budget of 
the centralized state Increases, through taxation, they demand a 
better climate for investment to sustain that contribution or to 
increase it. In short after accomplishing their role of pioneering 
the Centralized State in under-developed social formations the 
status of the heights of the bureaucracy as an independent political 
power IS lost. Henceforward the heights of the bureaucracy, 
although they may continue to rule, and, although may remam 
autonomous in their bureaucratic capacity, they may never be a 
neutral political power - (i.e. will always rule in alliance with one 
or more of the classes in the social formation). 
During the prommence of the bureaucracy as an independent 
power it rules in a power bloc comprising all agents of the CMP in 
the National formation. At this early stage the overriding interest 
of keeping the integrity of the Capitalist State overshadows the 
potential contradictions among the interests of the forces within 
the power bloc. Keeping the integrity of the Capitalist State is 
an overriding interest even to workers because all agents of the 
CMP are at such stage a privileged minority in the national 
formation. Many factors compound to create this privilege 
including; 
1. 
102 
Extraction of revenue (e.g. through taxa tion) from the 
non-capitalist social formation exempts the CMP from bearing 
the long-term costs of the reproduction of the labour force 
and therefore enable the CMP to support rela ti vely higher 
standards of living for the workers (Meillassoux 1972). 
2. Employment provides a secure income over and above the 
supporting income most of the workers at this stage have 
outside the Capitalist Society (Hussein, 1983.32). 
3. At the social level, employment relationship provides a 
definite reciprocal and emancipa tive relationship as opposed 
to the forms of exploitation (slavery, serfdom or patriarchy in 
case of family labour) which existed before Colonization or 
Independence. 
The emergence of capitalist classes (e.g. workers and 
bourgeoisie) in under-developed formations can therefore be 
theoretically located in the aftermath of a crisis-si tua tion in 
which the functioning of an ever-expanding Capitalist State 
becomes impossible without further sacrifice of economIC 
interests by the forces in the power bloc. It is at this 
conjuncture that, the neutrality of the heights of bureaucracy 
as an independent political power falters, and, the conflicts 
within the bloc polarize along economic interests between 
heights of the bureaucracy and employers in a private sector 
on the one hand and employees in the lowest strata of the 
State bureaucracy and apparatus and employees in the private 
sector on the other. The end of the supervision of the 
production process as a source of power for the heights of the 
2.B 
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bureaucracy does not mean the exclusion of the bureacracy, 
or the heights of the bureaucracy, altogether from politics. 
There is still another role for the bureaucracy to play by 
reason of its class affiliation. 
Class Affiliation of the Bureaucracy and the Present Configuration 
of Power in the Social For ma tion 
Members of State administration - i.e. the bureaucracy - are 
recruited from different social backgrounds. However for the 
purpose of deciding the class affilia tion of members of the 
bureaucracy the latter may be regarded as distinguished into 
certain distinct strata, with different recruitment cr iter ia. In this 
respect we can distinguish between the heights and the subordinate 
strata of the bureaucracy. 
It is peculiar to under-developed African formations that there 
existed no capitalist classes prior to the establishment of colonial 
rule (50). For this reason, class affiliation of the bureaucracy in 
the post-colony, for us, matters only after the conjuncture, 
described before, in which management of the production process 
ceased to be a source of power for the bureaucracy. This is a 
stage, in the experience of many African states, characterized by 
the emergence of poli tics of alliances and counter-alliances 
between the heights of the bureaucratic apparatus and the social 
classes in the social for ma tion (5 I). 
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The polariza tion of conflict along underlying economic 
rela tlons manifested itself first within the bureaucratic apparatus 
between public sector manual workers (i.e. the lowest stratum of 
the bureaucratic apparatus) and the heights of the bureaucracy - In 
their political capacity - when the independence of the latter, In 
tha t capacity, had begun to falter. White collar employees on the 
subordinate strata of the bureaucracy and employees of the private 
sector joined forces onl y later. The delay in case of the latter is 
concomitant with the chronology of development of a private 
Capi talist class. In case of the former it may possibly be due to 
the neutralizing influence which the hierarchical internal 
organiza tion of the bureaucracy may exercise on this category of 
employees. 
The demands put forward by the workers were, in the case of 
Sudan, largely political demands nourished by a workers 
organiza tion 's belief in their right, as representa ti ves of individuals 
" constituting the majority of the population of the "capitalist 
society", to participate in the management of the means of 
production {i.e. affecting both their distribution and utilization 
(Hussein 1983.68). 
There are on the other hand many factors which mould 
orientation of the heights of the bureaucracy towards becoming a 
permanent ally of a bourgeois class in the course of formation, 
including; 
1. 
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The bureaucracy as a political centralized form of Capitalist 
di vision of Labour and Capitalist relations of production (52) 
(i.e. of domination and subordination) imposed on a 
predominantly precapitalist social formation, prescribes a 
course of development that may naturally lead to emergence 
of pr i va te ca pi talis t classes. 
2. The fact that the heights of the bureaucracy were, at the 
inception of the centralized Sta te, holders of unfettered 
political and economic powers enabled many of them to 
accumula te for themselves - {whether through; pursuance of 
elitist policies, high salaries corruption or through these 
means combined} - part of the national wealth and thereby 
form the first fraction of an indigenous bourgeoisie in the 
social for mation (Sandbrook 1975, Shi vji 1976, Seid man 1978). 
3. The fact that the heights of the bureaucracy are without 
exception brought up in bourgeois educational institutions 
(Mazrui 1978 esp.Chap.16) leads many of them to believe 
sincerely in the cause of bourgeois version of economics and 
politics. 
4. The bureaucracy as a system of internal hierarchical 
organiza tion presents an institution of control which, although 
with incumbents recruited from different social background in 
the social formation, pays allegiance only to its heights even 
in their political capacity. 
2.B.1 The Centralized State as a Dominant Allied Force 
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Do minance of the politico-economic for m of capi talist 
economic relations in a social formation that is predominantly 
non-capitalist means that only agents of the capitalist society may 
form effective or effectively participate in dominant class 
organizations. This in effect means that the majority of the 
population (83% in 1973 In Sudan; 110 Sudan 1976) dwell in a 
non-capitalist periphery from which they, although obliged to pay 
taxa tion as its citizens, are inherently incapable of reciprocating 
any political influence on the centralized State. The economic 
re1a tions of the "capitalist society" are histor ically over-developed 
(53) in relation to those of the non-capitalist periphery. The 
centralized State because it is a condensed existence, and. as such, 
a level of existence, of the "capitalist society" is in effect 
over-developed (54) in relation to the non-capitalist classes. 
Moreover the centralized State is also dominant in relation to 
classes of the "capitalist society". The centralized State 
represents the biggest single employer of wage-labour and the 
biggest shareholder in the economy. The dominance of the 
pol i tical for m of Ca pi ta I is t econo m ic r e la tions is lar g e ly a 
reflection of the capitalism of this omnipresent state-sector of the 
economy. The omnipresence of this sector and the hierarchical 
organiza tion of production wi thin it endow the "heights" of this 
organiza tion (i.e. the heights of the bureaucracy)(55) with an 
overriding poli tical-cu m-manager ial influence. 
In the light of inabili ty of the majority of people. In the 
social for ma tion, to exercise any effective political pressure on the 
State bureaucracy, struggle for political domination remains 
, 
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confined within the "capitalist society" between the heights of the 
bureaucracy and their allies - a small Capitalist class largely 
compradorian and dependent in its existence on State sponsorship 
[C.f in relation to Sudan; Mah moud 1983, Kursany 1983] - on the 
one hand, and the lowest strata of the bureaucratic apparatus 
(public sector employees) and the pr i va te sector employees on the 
other hand. 
This polar iza tion presents a relationship In which the heights 
of the State apparatus and their ally {i.e. a Capitalist class} are 
dominant. As long as the pre-colonial bureaucratic institutions 
continue to exist and as long as classes in the social for ma tion 
remain content with expressing their political struggle through 
these institutions, the dominance of this - heights of the 
bureaucracy/a Capitalist class - alliance IS bound to persist no 
matter how variable the political forms it might assume (56). 
It IS the class conflict among classes of the "capitalist 
society" and the resultant behaviourism of the centralized State 
which overridingly influence social economic and political changes 
within the social formation as a whole. I-bwever the extent to 
which this proposition is compatible or incompatible with a "theory" 
of plurality of social forms will be examined later in the Chapter 
(57). The extent to which it could explain contemporary social 
and economic phenomena, in an under-developed social formation, 
as observed and compiled, most noteably ~ by "under-development" 
theory proponents (58), is shown below. 
'T! 
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Whether or not, the social conditions, and, characteristics -
(in Amin 1976.200-290), which "under-development" theorists 
enumerate as incompatible with development, and typical of the 
economies of Third World countries, are reasons for under-development 
is not clear. It is arguable that these characteristics and 
conditions are symptoms of under-development and that the latter's 
cause is still to be sought elsewhere, outside the under-developed 
social formation or at a different (social or political) level inside 
that formation. Those "under-development" theorists who conceive 
of dependence (itself enumerated among the anti-development 
characteristics - in Amin - Ibid) as the cause behind under-development 
and the other anti-development characteristics as consequences of 
that dependence are in effect propounding a vicious circle which 
explains nothing (59). 
Amin tries to break away from that circle by placing the two 
factors he construes as direct reasons for dependence (i.e. unequal 
interna tional specialization and unequal exchange) on foundations 
deeply rooted in history, but his reasoning is not convincing. 
Taking into account the long period since Capitalism has conquered 
the social formations Amin is focusing on (e.g. Black Africa, the 
Arab World and Egypt, Amin 1976.27-58) and the profound 
economic political and social changes which these countries must 
have undergone, Amin's historical analysis may explain the reason 
behind the existence of dependence in the first place, but does not 
account for the alleged contemporary dependence in which 
under-developed countries are supposedly destined to stay. This is 
a weakness in Amin's analysis further exacerbated by his omISSIon 
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of demonstrating any dialectical - (l.e. causal) interrelation 
be tween th e "h is tory" and the "pre sen t" in these for ma tions. 
Many under-development theory critics might agree that 
Capitalist orientated economic development has, in the context of 
many Third World countries, so far led to unevenness in distribution 
social injustice and even mass famines, but disagree that the 
theoretical inferences of the theory's proponents adequa tely 
account for these phenomena (60). 
It is my view that under-development is produced by an 
unequal distribution of political power among different classes In 
the social for ma tion. This inequality is deter mined by a class 
structure that owes its initial existence to imposition of a 
Capitalist bureaucratic form of a State from without at a primitive 
stage of social development in the under-developed social 
formation. The major disagreement with the theses of 
"under-development" is that the perpetuity and reproduction of this 
class structure is, from my point of View, being effected by, 
interaction of social forces within the social formation (61), and 
the instru mentaliza tion of the centralized State by these forces in 
tha t interaction. 
Inequali ty of distribution of political power is manifest at two 
previously identified levels namely, (1) that of the relation between 
the "capitalist society" and the non-capitalist periphery whereat 
classes of the former possess among themselves a disproportionately 
greater share of political power and. (2) that of the relation among 
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classes of the "capitalist society" whereat bourgeois interest (even 
though not a bourgeoisie)(62) are dominant. This unequal 
distribution of political power in its turn entails a further unequal 
distribution of the benefits of technological advancement. 
Dominance of bourgeois interest affects the choice of techniques -
(resulting in preference of Capital-intensive techniques because of 
their profitability) - and types of industrialization. In the latter 
case it results in preference of production of consumption goods 
and tertiary industry over production of capital goods - (i.e. 
because it is profitable and more practicable for an indi vidual 
nascent entrepreneur to follow a process that climbs from the least 
to the most expensive enterprise). Relentless pursuit of 
profitability - (a concomitant of dominance of bourgeois interest) -
would in short entail all the "nega ti ve" economic consequences 
compiled by propounders of under-development theory. 
Furthermore, the economIC struggle of the domina ted classes 
In the capitalist society (i.e. the wage-demands and the 
consu mption needs of the urban population) on the one hand and 
their relatively immense political power (i.e. in comparison with 
that of non-capitalist classes) to influence political decision-making 
on the other, hamper the adoption of a long-term strategy (i.e. a 
strategy for autocentric accumulation Amin 1976.210). The 
adoption of such a strategy while detrimental to the immediate 
consumption and profit needs of the urban classes, is essential for 
extending the benefit of progress to the population of the 
non-capitalist periphery. This class conflict and adjustment within 
the "capitalist society" engenders a movement of the C~,p (63) that 
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confines Capitalist economic reproduction within the politico-social 
boundaries of the CMP - i.e. within the "capitalist society". _This 
confinement IS also the reason why non-capitalist economic 
rela tions, whilst having lost their taxonomical economic function 
through commerce, still preserved their forms of organization. 
The bearers of these non-capitalist relations are thus subjected to a 
double exploi ta tion (64). 
The nega ti ve economic consequences which the pursuit of 
profitability entails are likely to place severe strain on the surplus 
for reinvestment and state balance of payment (Muller, et al 1979). 
Experience has shown that when this had happened the burden of 
domestic sa vings was increasingly placed on the non-profi t-earning 
classes (Hussein 1983.253). In implementing the laws and measures 
imposing this burden the centralized State exhibited immense and 
effecti ve - (at least in the short-ter m) - powers of coercion against 
all non-profit earning classes including the urban workforce -
(Hussein 1983.208-209, 235). This in turn exemplifies the 
dominance of bourgeois interest and the potential of descendent 
control at the disposal of the State. 
Finally there IS evidence to suggest that this dominant 
descendent political and economic change IS In its turn followed by 
a disproportionately wider internalization of Capitalist patterns of 
consumption and Western standards of morality, even among rural 
popula tion, and, at the expense of cuI tural authentici ty (Harrison 
1981, Mason 1970, Tunstall 1977). This In turn mini mises the 
credibility of an even empirical plurality of social forms (65). 
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2.C Why Can't the State be Relatively Autonomous? 
2.C.l Inadequacy of Existing Theories 
Most significant among the theories (66) of the State in 
under-developed social formations is the thesis of the over-developed 
post-colonial State expounded by Ala vi (Ala vi 1972). Alavi's 
analysis is in favour of a power of the "bureaucra ticl military 
oligarchy" deri va ti ve from its relation to a bureaucratized structure 
which, because it was set by a power superior to the colony i.e. the 
Metropoli tan State, was over-developed in relation to the structures 
in the colony at the time of its setting, continues to be 
over-developed in the post-colonial era. Alavi's analysis does not 
articula te the nature (i.e. whether historical or structural) and 
specificity (whether it IS In relation to the pre-capitalist classes or 
" :If 
In relation to the classes within the Capitalist Society or In 
relation to them all, or whether it IS absolute) of this 
over-development. Yet his contribution, in so far as it reinforces 
a thesis of dominance of the centralized Sta te apparatus In 
under-developed social formations, IS valuable and relevant. It IS 
only because Alavi is ready to argue that an "over-developed" State 
is of necessity an autonomous State that his thesis abounds in 
contradiction. He enumerates certain characteristics (67) which, 
from his point of view, are pointers to that autonomy. But we 
may notice that, these characteristics, while they may support a 
thesis of "over-development" do not in any way prove that this 
"over-developed" State is autonomous. Ala vi sees otherwise 
because he conceives that in order to lose its autonomy the State 
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apparatus has to be exclusively dominated by a single class (Alavi 
Ibid pp.71-72). This is a misconception. The State apparatus- may 
be too over-developed to be dominated by a single class, but, 
nevertheless partial because the heights of that apparatus 
voluntarily ally themselves with particular classes to the exclusion 
of others. Or, is Ala vi suggesting that the State apparatus (i.e. as 
a bureaucra tised structure) is too over-developed to be manipulated 
even by its heights? (68) 
Alavi's thesis does not provide any explanation as to how the 
military/bureaucratic oligarchy could act on behalf of three 
propertied classes to preserve a social order in which their interest 
is embedded (Alavi Ibid p.62) and at the same time remaIn 
rela ti vely autonomous (i.e. in relation to classes other than these 
three propertied classes). In reaching the conclusion that the 
post-colonial State is rela ti vely autonomous Ala vi has contented 
himself with examining the relation of the State apparatus to the 
dominant classes while overlooking the relation of the State 
apparatus and these dominant classes to the struggle of other 
classes in the social formation namely, the dominated classes the 
overwhelming majority of the people (i.e. the workers, the peasants 
and the sub-proletariat). In effect, Alavi's conception of the State 
appears peculiar and confused. He formulates a theory of a State 
in isolation, not only from the domina ted classes but also from the 
dominant classes i.e. a State which is only a bureaucra tic-mili tary 
oligarchy (69) in its bureaucratic capacity. 
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The class structure and the class constellation which Ala vi 
describes are not necessarily supportive of a conclusion that the 
post-colonial State is relatively autonomous. It is more plausible 
and logical alternatively to argue that the three propertied classes 
described in Ala vi's model do in fact constitute an alliance whose 
members' interests, although not identical as among themselves, 
are identical in their opposition to that of the majority of the 
people - i.e. the workers and the peasants - in the social formation 
(70). Tha t, the military /bureaucra tic oligarchy, because it "acts 
on behalf of the three propertied classes to maintain the social 
order in which their interest is embedded - Ala vi Ibid p.62", far 
from being an independent power is, in effect, an active member of 
the alliance. If this is accepted we arrive at the conclusion that. 
because it supports the interest of an opulent few at the expense 
of the majority of the people the military /bureaucra tic oligarchy 
can never be an independent political power (71). 
2.C.2 Theoretical Objections to a Theory of Relative Autono~ 
To a great extent the thesis of the rela ti ve autonomy of the 
State in under-developed social formations, as represented by the 
preVIOUS writers, is, in effect, a product of extending, sometimes 
by inaccurate analogy (72), predetermined views about the State in 
developed Capitalist Societies, to its counterpart in post-colonial 
societies. It is my view that for any claim, as to relative 
autonomy of the State in post-colonial societies, to be sustained. 
analysis of the social formations peculiar to these societies is 
indispensable. 
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Ownership and appropriation of the means of production are 
historically unsettled in an under-developed social formation. The 
centralized State in these formations not only symbolizes a 
regulation, from above, of a sub-system of distribution (of roles and 
products) but also represents the only guardian of the system of 
distribution of the means of production. Absence of a historically 
dominant structure of ownership and appropr ia tion of the means of 
production is due to the absence of a historically determined form 
of economic relations. Because there is no "historically 
determined" (73) form of economic relations, development of the 
substance of capitalist economic relations which in histor icaliy 
deter mined capitalism provides the different levels of socialization 
- (across time and space) - that constitute a civil society - (on top 
of which the centralized state, in a historically determined 
capi talist society, is the highest and most superficial level) has not 
begun In the under-developed social for ma tion. The centralized 
State, in this formation, in effect, assumes functions which, in a 
developed Capitalist Society, are carried out by ci vii society and 
the centralized State. 
The dominance of the politico economIC for m of capitalist 
economIC relations I ha ve been describing at different parts of this 
Chapter, is dominance of the heights, of a sub-system of 
distribution, on whose - i.e. the politico economic form's,_ 
presence depends not only the existence of this sub-system of 
distribution but also that of a system of distribution of the means 
of production. In effect, class struggle presents a starkly 
different picture in an under-de\'eloped social formation. It is not 
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a struggle of historically dominant and dominated classes within the 
establishment of a historically dominant class. It is rather a 
struggle of politically created classes (74) each to establish its own 
State i.e. to initiate its historical beginning. 
Because it was not established by any of the national classes 
in the social formation the State apparatus is presumably 
autonomous and may be used by any of these classes towards 
establishing its own State. But we ha ve seen that the hierarchical 
internal organization of the State bureaucratic apparatus makes its 
identif ica tion with a capitalist path of development more probable. 
From this I drew the conclusion that as far as the State apparatus 
retains its characteristic features, as a system of division of 
labour, a coalition of the heights of the State apparatus and a 
capitalist class is likely to be the underlying dominant power in the 
social for ma tiona It is now important to add a qualification that 
this is not a historical dominance (dominance resting on an 
underlying dominant capitalist economic structure in the social 
formation). The dominance of this alliance may at any time be 
undermined by a full-scale revolution i.e. a revolution which aims, 
not only at reforming the State apparatus and its constituent 
institutions, but, at reorganizing them on new class bases in order 
to accommodate classes of the non-capitalist periphery. The only 
guarantee that such a revolution may not take place is the might 
of the State apparatus - i.e. restr icti veness of State control from 
above. 
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Paramountcy of descendent control does not mean tha t 
individual political regimes do not endeavour, for their own stable 
survival, to strike a balance between conflicting politically-pressing 
interests. Generalizing from this phenomenon some writers 
maintain that the "State" is a mechanism of articulation between 
modes of production. The State from this perspective "has to 
secure some integra tion between the modes so tha t the 
precapitalist modes can function in support of the Capitalist mode. 
Yet the State also has to intervene to protect the precapitalist 
modes from some solvent effects of the interaction with the 
Capitalist mode - (Lamb, 1975 p.132), Fitzpatrick, 1983 p.169, 1980 
p.247-255). 
However, if it is accepted that the "State" IS, not an entity 
exogenous from the so-called modes of production but a centralized 
form of the politically dominant mode of production (i.e. the C;\\P) 
and that "State" behaviour is not reducible to that of the persons in 
charge of the political regime but is, beyond that, determined by a 
class movement within the dominant mode of production and the 
social formation as a whole, then this argument is weakened. It 
also follows tha t, volitional reconciliatory measures even when 
adopted are likely to be short-lived (75). This is because on the 
one hand their effectiveness depends on their suitability for the 
momentus state of ever-changing economic conditions and on the 
other, consequential ever-changing balances of interests and powers 
may hamper their updating to respond to these changes. 
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I may now sum up the theoretical objections to a theory of 
rela ti ve autonomy of the state in under-developed social formations 
in the following way: 
1 - Autonomy of the State IS a relation to - I.e. its existence or 
non-existence depends on - the stage of class struggle. A social 
formation in which class struggle has not reached the stage of 
establishing a historical dominance of a class IS a historically 
under-developed social formation (i.e. a society In the course of 
formation), and, as such may not necessarily present features of 
cohesion and coexistence. 
2 - In a situation In which none of them IS "historically dominant" 
the coexistence of classes can only be guaranteed, from above, 
through superstructural - (political, legal and administrative) 
control by representa ti ves of one of these classes or different 
representa ti ves of the different classes. 
3 - Where political control is undertaken by representa ti ves of a 
class whose members constitute a tiny minority in the social 
formation, repression or alternatively "ideologically-procured 
voluntar iness" (76) are likely to be the characteristic features of 
that control. 
4 - That, because of its dependence on inter alia the voluntary 
relinquishment, by the most broadly-based and as a matter of fact 
the best organized (Hussein 1983 p.260/66) of all classes - (i.e. the 
working class) of struggle. for realiza tion of rights. of ownership 
119 
and appropriation of the means of production, that it IS In a 
position to win, voluntary co-existence of a capitalist class and a 
working class in a social formation in which, although the former IS 
politically dominant, neither of them is historically dominant, IS 
ultimately most unlikely. Although the Capitalist minority may 
endeavour to legitimate its rule (e.g. through appeals to 
modernization) its success to that effect IS limited by 
under-development of the wider ideological State apparatus (77). 
Hence there is always present in these formations a relative class 
repression that distinguishes them from developed Capitalist 
Societies. 
5 - Despite the apparent neutrality of its bureaucratized structure 
the State in under-developed social formations cannot in effect be 
autonomous. 
A - While superstructural legal, administrative, bureaucratic and 
public controls might prescribe minimum standards of performance 
tha t purport to secure impartiality of the State apparatus, they are 
inherently incapable of transcending the limitations imposed by the 
class structure I describe (78). 
B - Al though public support is sought after, and political control is 
effected in the name of na tional economic development, and 
although the economic activities of the government may be 
reflective of its commitment to these objectives. It is not simply 
the proclaimed objectives of development planning and its 
execu tion, but, the actual social i mplica tions of that planning and 
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of its execution for the different classes in the social formation 
and the reaction of these classes, that would deter mine whether 
the State is autonomous or not. The State apparatus may be 
partial irrespective of the judg ment and convictions of the people 
in charge of the government. The partiality of the State I have 
endea voured to explain is not a partiality that is effected by a 
class conspiracy but one that is destined by a class movement. 
3. Why a Methodology for "Labour Law" 
The class structure of an under-developed social formation, 
outlined in previous pages, raises two questions that need to be 
answered because they implicate my argument for a dominant form 
of law and a historical rela ti vi ty of the substance and ideology of 
the law. 
(1) From the angel of heterogeneity (79) of its social forms an 
under-developed class structure raises the question as to whether 
the various social fields expected to be found in such a situation 
can be accounted for adequa tely by a totalizing explana tion 
(Fitzpatrick 1983). I explain how my argument for a dominant 
form of law accounts for this supposed plurality of social forms. 
(2) From the perspective of historical under-development and the 
descendent political control necessary for its integrity an 
under-developed social formation offers a space too restrictive for 
the existence of the social institutions of collective bargaining and 
raises the question as to whether the concepts of legal pluralism 
are at all applicable in such a formation. I apply my earlier 
argument regarding the historical rela ti vi ty of the superstructures 
(1) to criticize certain theories which seek to universalize these 
pluralist concepts (2) to outline an alterna ti ve methodology for the 
study of labour law in The Sudan. 
3.A 
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What Does Plurality of "Social Forms" Signify? 
Fitzpatrick analysis is not simply a case-study of under-
developed social formations (80). Ra ther it outlines a pluralist 
model tha t is seen as equally capable of accom moda ting 
comparable legal plurality in the first world (Fizpatrick, 1983 and 
1983b). The radical pluralism" he advocates differs from liberal 
pluralism in that, his, is a counter-monist pluralist view of history, 
whilst the latter, in its legal version is a posi ti vist sociological 
philosophy of Law (81). 
Radical pluralism as a general theoretical model, because it 
does not accept that totalizing Marxist ex plana tion can adequately 
explain social fields, rests on a historical materialism that 
accommodate a plurality of social fields (Fitzpatrick; 1983b p.6). 
However the elements or element of historical materialism that 
constitute the totalizing Marxist explanation that cannot supposedly 
account for social fields are not clear from the analysis. If 
however it is meant that the economic structure (i.e. the aggregate 
of economic relations at the lowest level of socialization in a 
social formation) - cannot account for the different series of social 
phenomena in that formation this may be a cause for disagreement 
(82). 
It is doubtful whether there could be a theory of a historical 
materialism that could accommodate a theoretical plurality of 
social fields. Although Althusser concept of "over-determina tion" 
could be held as giving rise to a possibility of multicausal 
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explanations (Glucksmann 1974 p.155). Taken with his conception 
of "historical time" - (Althusser 1970 p. 96-110) they make it 
extremely difficult to situate Althusser analysis of the social 
totality within a diachronic/synchronic context (83). The extent to 
which Althusser's concept of "over-determination" and his general 
conception of Marxism expressed in the earlier works of "For Marx" 
and "Reading Capi tal" are reconcilable wi th Al thusser 's own 
subsequent writings is also not clear - e.g. C.f (Althusser, 1976 
pp.47-54, 104-105). This weakens the authority of his works and 
its support for Fitzpatrick's view. If Fitzpatrick is suggesting the 
possibility of a phenomenal heterogeneity of social forms I would 
certainly agree with him. The main theme of my argument is 
always, that, this possibility does not mean that phenomenal 
heterogeneous social forms are not monocausally explicable by, 
analytical accentuation of the empirical findings about these forms 
- (i .e. by analyses at higher Ie ve Is of abs tr ac tion) (83a). 
Coming to the particular case of under-developed social 
formations, an admission that these formations provide examples of 
a duality of Capitalist and non-Capitalist economic relations does 
not support an argument for a pluralist approach to the study of 
social phenomena in these for ma tions. This is so because the 
specificity of the economic structure - i.e. the question whether it 
is Capitalist or otherwise - comes at a different level of analysis. 
The Capitalist mode of production - (or any other mode of 
production) - is not the economic structure. It is only a definite 
socio-economic form which the whole or part of the economIC 
structure in a social formation might. at a definite stage of 
'T 
'~ 
123 
I 
development of that formation, assume. It follows from this that 
although there may be a heterogeneity of Capitalist and various 
types of non-Capi talist social relations (and incidentally of 
ideologies of Law) their presence does not support a "theory" of 
plurality of "social forms" because these relations are ultimately 
explicable with reference to one - (though not necessarily 
specifically homogeneous) - economic structure. 
However there are stronger grounds for hypothesising a 
phenomenal heterogeneity of social forms at the level of specificity 
of the economic structure. ha ve In this respect already 
mentioned that economic and - incidentally - social relations (84) 
are divisible into Capitalist and non-Capitalist social relations. 
I now need to determine the implication of this empirical or 
phenomenal heterogeneity for a theory of a dominant "form of 
Law" - which I prefer to one of plurality of legal forms. I shall 
... use the terminology, already defined, of the "form of Law" - (i.e. 
the for m of domination), the "substance of Law" - {i.e. economIC 
and social relations forming the subject matter of legal relations} 
and the "ideology of Law" - (i.e the normalization which different 
forms of the "form of Law" acquIre as a consequence of 
development of social and economic relations). 
Within a politically subjugated social formation the 
ascertainment of the dominant "form of Law" cannot simply be 
established, by assemblage of phenomenal individual social relations 
- (constituting the substance of Law) prevalent among members of 
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a primitive tribe or inhabitants of a remote village in that 
formation. Yet the so-called theories of plurality of modes of 
production (i.e. articulation theory) and social forms are based on 
such an assemblage (85). There are two reasons why evidence 
compiled and conceived in this way cannot support a theory of 
articula tion of modes of production and incidentally of plurality of 
social forms (86). The first reason is that empiricism of 
phenomenal forms of social relations, pre-empts further 
investigation of the function of their underlying economic activity, 
and, in consequence, overlooks the possibility of their being 
precapitalist veils of functionally Capitalist economic acti vi ties. 
The second reason is that by treating the forum (e.g. village - tribe 
_ commune) where these forms of social relations prevail In 
complete isolation from the domain of the State a theory of 
plurality extremely exaggerates, at its own peril, the politico-social 
potential of these relations. 
With regard to the first reason, I have already mentioned that 
although economic relations existing within the domain of a 
Capitalist politico-economic form may assume different social 
forms of organization, they are all functionally Capitalist (87). 
Acquisition of the Capitalist forms of organization IS an 
emancipa tion - as much as stagnation in the precapitalist form IS 
despite the converSIon of underlying economic function, a 
subordination - explicable only in the light of class struggle. My 
definition of the "form of Law" emphasises derivation of the latter 
from the "form of an economIC relation" (88). and its 
instrumentalization by the transitional State {another antecedent -
" 
125 
, 
I.e. to Law - creature of that "form of economIC relations") in the 
consolidation of the pre-historic societal form of that "forms of 
economic relations" (89). Hence I am inclined to believe that 
within a politically unified social formation the "form of Law" is 
determined by the form of the dominant State (90). 
From this perspective the phenomenal heterogeneity of social 
forms does not mean a plurality of "form(s) of Law". This is so 
because this heterogeneity is relevant, not for determination of 
plurality or monism of the "form of Law", but for analyses of the 
ideology or ideologies of the "form of Law". There is, to 
recapitulate, a dominant Capitalist "form of Law" which assumes, 
different forms of social relations - (i.e. substance) or, in effect, 
ideological appearances. There is no reason why the Capitalist 
"form of Law" should not, depending on the stage of development 
of the productive forces and that of class struggle, assume various 
for ms of Capitalist and "non-Capitalist" ideological appearances. I 
ha ve already pointed in this respect to the errors of theories of the 
inherently autonomous (91) or inherently ideologically distinguishable 
Capitalist "form of Law" and the State. I preferred alternatively 
to conceive of the autonomy of the State and Law (i.e. 
development of an ideology of the "form of Law" and the State) as 
depending for its development on the development and 
ma terializa tion of social relations, social classes and class power 
(which in turn depend on the stage of development of material 
pr od uc tion)( 9 2). For example in an under-developed social 
formation where the CMP is politically though not historically 
dominant it is not surprising to encounter a "form of Law" -
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e.g. labour relations legislation - which, al'though indisputably 
Capitalist, possesses a primitive social ideology that makes it 
hardly distinguishable from State's other administrative and 
political actions. 
Coming to the second reason, because they do not exist In 
complete isolation from each other, I do not believe that a 
separa tion between, a "state legal order" (Fi tzpa trick 1983 p.159) 
or "official law" (Bryde 1976 pp.ll0, 113) and a "non-Capitalist 
legal orders" is possible. The under-developed social for ma tion is 
a politically unified whole that contains within itself relations that, 
because of lowness of their level of socialization (i.e. as relations 
affecting two or more individuals in their rela ti ve isolation from 
the larger society) may be decided upon by the parties to the 
rela tions themselves and others that are, because of highness of 
their level of socialization, determined by the dominant form of 
the State (93). From my perspective then the existence of 
definite social relations within a unified social formation must be 
established both horizontally, by identifying a geographical locality 
in which they prevail, and vertically by var ify ing the higher social 
levels, of a conceptually hierarchically composed social formation, 
a t which these rei a tions are able to assert their existence - C.f 
supra fs. 44A, 75 & 77 in Chapter I. 
Ha ving identified the development of an ideology of the for m 
of Law as determined by the stage of development of the 
particular society I now add that the deter mina tion by the latter of 
the former is always effected through the intermediacy of the 
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State. It is always the extent of State inter'vention In economic 
and social relations which is, the direct determinant of the ideology 
of the "form of Law" and, indicative of State autonomy. But, 
because the extent of State intervention 1S, within an 
autocentrically developing society, itself always prescribed by the 
index of development of social forces within that society, the stage 
of development of society is seen as the ultimate determinant. 
However, this may not hold true for a social formation in which 
the centralized State although Capitalist is, because of its colonial 
bureaucratic genesis and parasitism on other, non-Capitalist, 
classes, more than just a superstructure of Capitalist relations of 
production in that formation. In this la tter case, which 
corresponds to that of the Sudan, State intervention, still the direct 
determinant of an ideology of the "form of Law", is not subject to 
any irrevocable limitations. Before outlining a methodology of 
research that treat Labour relations Law as it is in reality, I need 
to explain first that the absence of free institutions of collective 
bargaining in the Sudan is, not an aberration that can be remedied 
by prescription and introduction of a "pluralist ethics", but, the 
condition of existence of a "form of Labour Law" that should be 
treated independently in its own right. 
3.B Pluralism as a Positivist Sociological Philosophy 
The conception of Labour La w as consti tuted In the 
interrelation of Labour Legislation and the institutions of collective 
bargaining, marked its beginning as an independent legal discipline 
(Clark 1983, p.84, Wedderburn 1983 p.3!). 
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Tha t conception was first clear in the works of pIOneers 
(Sinzheimer 1907, 1908, 1916, 1927 Lotmar 1900, 1902, 1908). 
Some of them were influenced in turn by the teachings of 
sociological jurisprudence and Marxism (Kahn-Freund 1981 pp.96-7). 
Ehrlich's idea of real Law - (or Living Law), Ihering's conception of 
Law as social engineering (Kahn-Freund Ibid p.96) and Gierke's 
organic theory of society (Gierke 1950, Hallis 1930 p.140-65) all 
feature in Sinzheimer's view of organizations as spontaneous 
law-creating bodies and in his emphasis on empirical legal research. 
Sinzheimer's recognition of organizations as law-creating 
bodies, his conviction that this autonomous norm-creating process is 
one of the fundamental characteristics of Labour Law and the 
concept of dependence he perceives as inherent in the employment 
relationship (Kahn-Freund 1981, p.78) are the fundamental themes 
tha t were introduced, via Kahn-Freund, into the British tradition of 
Labour Law (Wedderburn 1983 pp.29-33)(94). However, 
Kahn-Freund emphasised the inequality inherent in the employment 
relationship (Kahn-Freund 1972 pp.5-8) and insisted that the 
plurali ty suggested by his model of collective laissez faire 1S 
descr ipti ve not an ideology (95) (Kahn-Freund 1977, p.15 N .30). As 
a description modelled on the phenomenology of conflict and 
reconcilia tion in a developed Capitalist Society "collective laissez 
faire" is perhaps self-consistent. To this extent it may provide 
the answer as to what legal framework for Labour mayor may not, 
in the light of an observed balance of power in a particular society, 
be effective in that society at the stage of its development at the 
time the observation is made. 
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There are however few, among the believers in "collective 
laissez faire" who concede that it is descriptive. "The rest insert 
the collective laissez faire perspective into the wider doctrine of 
pluralism" (96) (Clegg 1975 p.310) and take it upon themselves to 
assert that "men and women are under a moral obligation to behave 
according to the pluralist model ••• and that it is right to allow 
pressure groups wide scope, and - at least within developed 
societies - to introduce the essential features of pluralism where 
they do not exist and to protect them where they are in danger 
(Clegg Ibid p.310)". 
Ha ving accepted pluralism as a description of the phenomenology 
of conflict and reconciliation within a Capitalist Society, Clegg's 
point urges me to identify a certain conception of this 
phenomenology which IS unacceptable. Once it is promoted to the 
rank of an ideology, (or ethics) "pluralism" in effect (1) overlooks 
the underlying equilibrium of power within a Capitalist Society (2) 
isola tes phenomenal consensus from the structure of dominance 
(i.e. the socio-economic system of distribution of the means of 
production which is Capitalist Society) and the stage of the class 
struggle in which it is inserted and (3) eternalizes "pluralist 
behaviour" while presumptuously attributing to it a moral 
persuasiveness. I am not arguing against the morality or 
immorality of a pluralist ideology C.f infra 1.99. My criticism is 
ra ther that because it is based on phenomenology of inter alia 
conflict and reconciliation pluralism thus conceived IS an 
"unscientific" ideology (i.e. based on grounds that are not 
self-existent) and a yearning that may never be earned - C.f infra 
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text above f.99. It is more consistent to let one's beliefs be 
goaded by one's reason. Yet signs of a discrepancy between the 
two are inevitably evident in some pluralist writings (97). 
The findings of the pluralist theory had been based on, at 
least, one plainly accurate observation about European Capitalist 
Societies, namely that they permit and even encourage a multitude 
of groups and associations to organize openly and freely and to 
compete with each other for the advancement of such purposes as 
their members may wish (Miliband 1983 p.13!). One such finding 
is the idea of "equilibrium of power" or "balance of power" which is 
central to pluralist thinking (98). 
If we observe the poli tical and social scene in an 
under-developed social formation the picture we may assemble will 
sharply contrast with that from a developed Capitalist Society. 
The military and unipartist dictatorships we may encounter as 
common phenomena, are however only the prima facie evidence 
against the suitability of a "pluralist model" for industrial rela tions 
in these formations. The substantial cause that makes a poE tical 
and an economic pluralist perspective inapplicable, the cause that 
may frustrate - at least in the case of the Sudan Cf supra £.51 - an 
alterna ti ve liberal mul tipartist or unipartist political model - (and 
incidentally minimises the chances for a pluralist model for 
industrial rela tions) - when either is introduced. is the class 
structure, and, the class movement within that structure, outlined 
before. This however raises the question as to whether the 
so-called pluralist model, being a perspecti \'e based on assemblage 
131 
of observed facts about a definite society at a definite stage of its 
development, can have anymore than a descriptive validity even in 
the context of that society (99). I argue that, this so-called 
pluralist model is in effect only a phenomenal form which an 
ever-unidirectionally changing balance of power, In a developed 
Capitalist Society, assumes at a given point of time in the history 
of that Society. The ostensible concerta tion whim groups-interaction 
might show at this stage does not owe its existence to a pluralist 
model or pluralist ethics which can be abstracted and introduced 
anywhere and at any time to produce a similar concertation. On 
the contrary the "pluralist model" is only an assemblage of 
observed facts about that concerta tion. As such it does not 
possess a ra tionali ty of its own, or, a regulating capacity and 
certainly not an existence independent from the definite stage of 
economic political and ideological class struggle of which it is but 
an indexation. 
The conclusion suggested by preVIOUS analysis IS tha t 
collective bargaining and the social pluralism it implies IS a 
historical substance and an ideology that the relations of 
wage-labour in effect assume in developed Capitalist Societies. 
This his tor ical substance and ideology, while essential for the 
appearance of Labour Law as a relatively autonomous institution 
and an independent legal discipline, are conditions, extrinsic to "the 
form of Law", and, peculiar to developed Capitalist Societies. 
Labour Law in under-developed social formations, because it lacks 
an equally developed historical substance, possesses a little more 
than a formal existence (i.e. exists only, as "formal Law", in 
132 
sta tutes) and is virtually merged into other leg~l disciplines such as 
Administrative and Constitutional Law, the Law of Contracts, and, 
Criminal Law. It IS of course possible, depending on the type of 
political regime, that a limited or even a liberal form of freedom 
of asocia tion may exist in any under-developed country. But it IS 
always the Law, and not the economic and social forces in a 
"Society", which may safeguard that existence in an under-developed 
social formation. Existence of freedom of association and the 
right to organize is not, in effect, an inevitable existence. It may 
at any time be terminated by the force of Law that brought it in 
the first place. 
It may also be true that trade unIOns In under-developed 
social formations possess immense political powers which if left to 
materialize (i.e. if allowed free channels of expression) will 
safeguard that existence. But political power is not by itself 
necessarily sufficient to support a social existence of Labour Law. 
Political power may support that existence when it IS, not simply a 
product of organization and a juridico-political framework granted 
from above, but, also, an irrevocable index of a historical 
evolution. In absence of a definite historical substance that 
concretizes a definite course of historical socio-economic evolution 
and therefore prescribe the province of the political, the political 
itself assumes a dominant and an original role In the 
under-developed social formation. The political which, 
irrespective of the various internal alliances that are possible, 
consists of the organized social power of the different strata of the 
bureaucratic apparatus and the classes to which they are affiliated 
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In the social formation in effect, not only symbolizes the unity and 
coherence of the under-developed social formation, but also 
determines the course of material development in that formation. 
Depending on the specific form of the State (i.e. on the class 
composition of the specific alliance in control of the government) 
the political may determine whether that should be a Capitalist or 
Socialist course of development. It has been emphasised in 
previous analysis that there is at present one form of the political 
which has been dominant namely, that constituted In the alliance 
between the heights of the bureaucracy and a Capitalist class. 
3.C The Methodology 
Since the existing bureaucra tic structure and the class 
structure it has created have been In existence since independence, 
with a difference in the extent of ossification of course, they 
provide the only concrete context of study. Within this class 
structure there are many possible forms of alliances and in effect 
specific forms of regimes - (e.g. right-wing military dictatorships 
1958,1971-1985, left-wing military dictatorship 1969-1971 and 
Parliamentary regimes 1956-1958, 1964-1969). 
Rather than basing a study of industrial relations on a 
transient framework derived from the economic and social policies 
of a definite form of regime, I prefer rather to conceive of the 
class structure I describe and the dominance of the political 
associated with it as the underlying base-structure that as it is and 
through its determination of the multiplicity and durability of these 
different regimes has determined the main features of labour law 
in the Sudan. 
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Ad ministra ti ve solutions for labour disputes, expropriation by 
the State of the machinery for settlement of individual grievances, 
the administration of labour legislation by tribunals and the status 
of these tribunals as strata in the bureaucratic hierarchy are 
characteristics, of labour relations and labour "law", that have 
survi ved political changes in the Sudan. The particular changes 
introduced by different regimes, depending on the type of regIme, 
fea ture only as extreme or modera te versions of this basic 
structure. 
The survival of the politico-economic form of Capitalist 
economIC relations - (as a specific form which the political, in 
under-developed social formations, assumes) is made possible by a 
certain ever-present degree of descendent political control. The 
description of this survival or dominance as "politico-economic", as 
opposed to a socio economic, is meant to emphasize that it is only 
the State structure which symbolizes that dominance (100). The 
Sta te bureaucratized structure is simultaneously the biggest-sized 
Capitalist economic structure in the social formation. The 
overwhelming majority of members of the working class is 
consti tuted by workers and employees of the State. Pr i va te 
employers and their employees exist only in the shadow of the 
State and its employees. There is no indigenous Capitalist class 
outside the State which can manipulate a regime in charge of the 
Sta te - although the latter may voluntarily associate itself with 
such a class. The regime In control of the State confronts 
workers and employees of the State in a double capacity; as their 
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political master and their employer. This confrontation takes 
place at the different strata of the bureaucratic apparatus between 
workers and employees in that strata and executives whose actions 
are carried within the regime's directives (101). 
There is a degree of administrative and bureaucratic control 
which is necessary for the cohesion of the State in its capacity as 
a corporate employer. This is particularly manifest, in the case of 
public employment Laws, in a tendency to concentrate settlement 
of individual grievances and adjudication over these grievances in 
hands within the administrative bureaucratic hierarchy to the 
exclusion of other jurisdictions. 
There is a different type of control necessitated by the 
State's economic and supposed political functions. To that effect 
the Law is in itself a descendent form of control distinguishable, if 
at all, from other actions of the State by the formality of the 
process through which it is made. 
The State as a corporate Capitalist is actively involved in the 
process of production. To that effect the regime in control of the 
State formulates strategies for economic change. Law and in 
particular Labour Law is an essential element of any such strategy. 
The State often provides a reasonable floor of rights for the 
indi vidual employee wi thin the limits sanctioned by the preroga ti ve 
of bureaucratic control in the case of the State employees. At 
the same time the State endeavours to restrain the collective 
power of Labour from frustrating the outlined strategy. Legal 
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control for inducement of economic change affects employees of 
both pr iva te and publ ic sectors. It is also a control that has In 
particular affected the area of collective Labour Law merging it 
completely into administrative Law and excluding the Judiciary 
from participating in its development. 
Although the degree of control varied with the emphasis each 
particular regime placed on economic change the fact of control 
itself has remained unchanged. In effect Labour relations in Sudan 
are, and ha ve always been, regulated and lived in the manner the 
State, and not the trade unions, want them to be. 
The balance of the thesis is devoted to examination of the 
different levels at which political, political-economic and 
bureaucratic controls assert their existence and the effect of these 
controls on an ideology of Labour relations "Law" in Sudan. For 
purposes of determining the effect of State intervention on an 
ideology of the Law of various areas of industrial relations we need 
to know whether various forms of control in different areas of 
industrial relations reflect varying degrees of intervention. Before 
tha t I would need to show these same various for ms of control 
which intervention assume in different areas of industrial relations. 
For purposes of enabling a systematic examination of these 
issues I assume - (an assumption which I hope will be vindicated by 
d iscussi on of for rns of control in the nex t three Chapters) - tha tit 
15 the "level of socialization" (I 02) of industrial relations at a 
particular area (i.e. the seriousness of the threa t which these 
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r e la tions pose to poli tical stabil i ty and Sta te' s ef f ecti ve 
performance of economic and bureaucratic functions respectiv~ly) -
which determines, the degree of State intervention, and, hence, the 
ideology of Law, in that particular area. I, accordingly, classify 
Labour relations according to their levels of socialization into (a) 
collecti ve Labour relations; (b) public individual Labour relations; 
and (c) private individual Labour relations. As clear in few places 
in the next Chapter (103) (a) sometimes appears distinguishable into 
pr i va te and public collective Labour relations. However ~ because 
of its deri va tion from the distinction between underlying individual 
employment Laws in each sector I do not consider this further 
distinction, of (a), as worth separate treatment. 
Among the areas designated, "a" reflects a degree of State 
intervention higher than that reflected by "b", while "c" reflects 
the least. Likewise the ideological content of law IS in each case 
determined by that degree of State intervention. Drawing of 
conclusions regarding ideological content of various Labour 
rela tions Laws or the relation between State intervention and 
ideology would at this stage be premature. It is important 
however (for purpose of delineating the area of discussion) to 
reiterate (104) at this stage that there are various levels of 
ideologies of Law. The discussion under part 3:B of this Chapter 
has purported to identify as reason for the inapplicability of a 
"pluralist model of industrial relations" - which is a most developed 
form of ideology of a Labour Law (105) - the absence of socially 
developed institutions of industrial relations in the Sudan. That is 
in effect. a negation of an ideology of "Labour La v,;" at a certain 
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social level. A question which poses itself is whether there is any 
more ideology of Law to be verified? The affirmative answer to 
this question derives from the above-mentioned remark that there 
are varIOUS levels of ideologies of Law. The exploration of an 
ideology of the Law will in the next three Chapters be conducted 
at the levels of "non-institutionalized" social relations and 
formalism of Law-making and legal-administration. 
For the purposes of clarification I outline here the objective 
and plan that will guide the discussion in the rest of the thesis. 
The discussion will follow an interpretational approach and 
explain the existing state of the law as it is. The materials 
processed in the course of discussion are meant to demonstrate the 
sources, provlslons, fields of application and administration of the 
Law. The aim of the discussion is examination of these varIOUS 
areas of the Law with reference to objectivity and effectiveness of 
La w-making and legal-ad ministra tion. Theoretical conclusions 
regarding the condition of the Law endeavour always to show that 
the Law is in each case the way it is because of a relation which 
the area under legal regulation bears to the structures of the State 
and the economy outlined in this Chapter. These theoretical 
conclusions are however always made on the basis of the empirical 
da ta presented in each Chapter. 
It is not my intention to examine the success or failure of the 
State in achieving definite social and economic objectives through 
the use of Law. Since the causes of this success or failure are 
always primarily extra-legal (i.e. social or economic). An 
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examination of this nature may not be adequately effected by a 
thesis whose main focus is "Labour Law". Moreover I endeavour 
always to avoid, as a means for establishing the supposed 
relationship between Law and the State, the explanation of legal 
details in a particular area of industrial relations by economic and 
poli tical details in this or other areas. I do this for three reasons. 
The first is that, as previously indicated (106), the type of 
empirical data valid for substantiating a specific theory of a State 
is different from the type of data valid for substantiating a theory 
of the development or under-development of the ideology of law 
regula ting a particular area of social relations within that State. 
The second is that a theory of the State, while capable of 
explaining the direction in which Law regulating a particular area 
of social relations is developing, may not necessarily account for 
the internal characteristics which this Law, although developing in 
that direction, possesses, and that these characteristics are in their 
turn explicable by other secondary factors (107). Finally an 
'" approach of this type may also shift the focus of the thesis to 
areas which are external to industrial relations. 
I will always present the empirical legal materials available in 
a particular area of industrial relations as evidence or effect of 
State intervention or abstention vis-a-vis that area and then 
analyse the ideology of the Law regulating this area in the light of 
this evidence and effect. 
Since the discussion alms inter alia at demonstration of the 
jurisprudence of Law-making and legal-administration. It will 
under all Chapters include, in addition to doctrinal analysis of legal 
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rules and their application, examination of the social and economic 
context within which the Law-creating institutions Ji.e. 
governments, trade unions, the courts, and administrative tribunals 
and authorities} have, at variOUS stages of the economic and 
political development of the Sudan been functioning. This will 
inevitably involve discussion of past Laws and conditions. 
The discussion will focus on each specific area of collective 
or individual Labour relations and discuss the Laws applicable to it. 
Although the discussion of the Laws regulating a specific area may 
incidentally proceed in a chronological order my efforts are 
concentra ted more on the coherence of the topical structure I.e. 
the structural interrelationship of the chain of economic social and 
political changes that gave birth to different Laws. 
The extent to which collecti ve Labour rela tions can be 
claimed to be the most pertinent to political stability and economic 
performance and therefore also the most heavily regula ted is shown 
next. Implicit in the discussion are two points. The first is that 
because it is not moulded by underlying historical SOClO economIC 
structures interaction among socially non-developed organizations -
(e.g. be they trade unions, governments or others) - takes place 
wholly at the level of free unmoulded currents of social and 
poli tical acti vi ty and is therefore rela ti vely devoid of a social 
ideology. The second point is that, given the "disequilibr iu m of 
power" within the "capitalist society" and that the State wider -
(i .e. social) - ideological apparatus is too under-developed to create 
and maintain an "ideological balance of power" (l08) an everpresent 
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degree of a partial political control hindering the development of 
even a politically fabricated ideology, is inevitable. Both of these 
points milita te against the possession, by collecti ve Labour 
rela tions Law of an ideology, whether socially-institutionalized or 
superstructurally-fabr ica ted. 
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CHAPTER III 
COLLECTIVE LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 
Introduction 
In contrast to the evolutionism that characterizes social change in 
some developed Capitalist Societies (I), social change in Sudan is largely 
a revolutional process (II). Focussing on the period under examination in 
this thesis - (mainly the period 1948 - 1984) - social change in that 
country has largely been effected from above through interaction of a 
Capitalist economic and political structure of a State, and a largely 
non-Capi talist social for ma tion (111). 
Rather than being tempered by conditions of direct production or 
considera tions of spontaneous optimum economic performance, the 
Centralized State undertakes the political regulation of the economy and 
society from above. It sets beforehand a system of distribution; of roles 
in production and shares of the products, within which production is to 
take place. This system comprises strategies for matters ranging from 
income distribution to political participation and division of power among 
the executive judicial and legisla ti ve organs. 
In practice this means a hegemony of strictly political power 
enabling it occasionally to change in form U.lilitary .. Parliamentarian 
.. ), to assume both legislative and executive powers and functions, and, 
to delimit the freedom of the judiciary and the trade unions (IV). 
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The reason why control, takes a certain orientation, - affecting in 
particular certain social groups and institutions namely, workers and 
trade unions, and varies in degree from one area of industrial relations to 
the other is best explained by recourse to earlier discussion of the State 
and class structure and the politically relevant factors affecting State 
intervention in industrial relations in Sudan (V). Three of the factors 
mentioned there are particularly relevant in this respect. The first is 
tha t control of the State apparatus depends on the outcome of struggle 
among classes of the "Capitalist Society" - whose agents constitute less 
than 20% of the population in Sudan. The second is that the State 
apparatus has been since independence controlled by "heights" of the 
bureaucracy in alliance with a nascent Capitalist class. A further 
deduction from this latter point is that even within the "Capitalist 
Society" control of the State apparatus rests in the hands of a minority -
I.e. the majority being employees in the lowest strata of State 
bureaucracy, employees in the pr i va te Sector and other less privileged 
urban classes. The third point is that the State apparatus and 
State-owned enterprises are employers of the vast majority of the 
workforce. 
These factors together explain why existence of permanent forms 
of control in industrial relations is both essential and possible. The fact 
tha t workers constitute the majority of agents wi thin the "Capitalist 
Society" and rela ti vely the most powerful social class in the social 
formation (VI) makes the ever presence of descendent forms of control a 
pre-requisite for protection of the economic and political lead of the 
classes presently in charge of the State apparatus. Workers 
consciousness with this, their own, potential social power has in case of 
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the Sudan nou r ished trade union move men t a mbi tion for poli tical 
leadership and, in consequence, aggravated the need on the part of the 
ruling alliance for even more descendent control. 
Likewise the position of the State as employer of the vast 
majority of the workforce - whilst itself a result of inter alia the 
hypertrophy of the Services Sector and under-development of other 
Industrial Sectors - necessitates and enables (at different levels) central 
deter mina tion and ad ministra tion of the ter ms and condi tions of 
employment. Moreover the non-Capitalism of the largest part of the 
social formation, a concomitant of its technical backwardness, and the 
need for its modernization {i.e. a need imposed by a superior need for 
social and political integration within national boundaries} provide the 
justification, and, sometimes material support (VII), for descendent 
control. Bearing in mind its position as employer, the State relates to 
its employees also as political subjects and, propagating this need for 
modernization, determines their rights and duties as employees within 
CJverr iding and overall determination of their rights and responsiblli ties as 
poli tical or national subjects. In practice this policy has always meant 
the sacrifice of individual and sectional employment rights for allegedly 
national objectives. 
Influenced by these political and economIC conditions Labour 
rela tions Law in the Sudan has from its inception been interventionist. 
In what follows I shall discuss forms and objectives of intervention, as 
manifest in various areas of collective Labour relations, under two main 
headings namely, (1) - Curtailment of trade Unionism as a political force 
and (2) "Nationalization" of Trade Union economic and industrial 
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functions. 
1. Curtailment of Trade Unionism as a Political Force 
As ear ly as 1921 a Labour Board was set up by order of the then 
Governor General of the Sudan with the purpose, inter alia, of advising 
on all questions of Labour in the Country. There was until 1946 no 
pressures from a workers movement to influence the Board's 
delibera tions. But, in 1946 the Board, conscious of the strain that the 
economic position in the aftermath of the World War II (Fawzi 1957) 
might place on industrial relations in general and on government relation 
with its workforce in particular and influenced from abroad by a British 
Labour Government (Beling 1961, P 51) recommended "the setting up by 
all large-scale employers (whether Government or private) in the Sudan 
of Work Committees wherever practicable in the interest of both the 
workers and the industry (1)". The declared objecti ve of these 
Committees was "to form the bases on which Trade Unions could 
subsequentl y be set up on sound prepared lines (2)". Al though Work 
Committees proved little success (3) the task of setting sound lines for 
the future development of trade unions was relentlessly pursued even 
after the latter were legalized (TUO 1949) (3a). However "soundness" 
from the Colonial administration perspective meant non-interference with 
poli tical administration of the country, non-affiliation to political parties 
or organizations, non-pursuance of political objectives, and, commitment 
to peaceful settlement of industrial disputes (4). 
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The position of the government as employer ·of the majority of 
the workforce and regulator of the economy and that of the State as a 
micro-Capitalist Society, politically dominated over by a minority within 
that Society, renders difficult the attempt to demarcate the sphere of 
the State from that of Society {i.e. the micro-Capitalist Society IS 
indeed a politico economic rather than a societo-economic organization 
(5)). This position blurs the line between political and non-political 
activity. To that effect, because they may in the context of an 
under-developed social forma tion entail the practical though not 
necessarily calculated effect of overthrowing a constitutional authority, 
general strikes launched for purely economic gains are usually construed 
as potentially political (6). 
Government determination to implement its criteria of soundness 
and the wider political implication of trade union economic action in the 
context of the Sudan made the imposition of certain restrictions on the 
freedom of association inevitable. Ra ther than gran ting unconditional 
freedom of association to the workers and subsequently endeavouring to 
dissuade them from politics the very existence of trade unlOns was 
allowed only within a legal framework that was designed to make them 
politically manageable. With only one exception all trade unions came 
into existence only after this legal framework had been standardized for 
them (7). Despite its restrictiveness in certain aspects, the standardized 
legal framework introduced in 1949 failed to restrain the trade Unions 
from forming a national federation that led them, only a few years later, 
into the heart of the political arena. The Colonial ad ministra tion was 
over-optimistic in thinking that the curtailment of trade unions' political 
influence was possible through increased emphasis on orientation of their 
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members to the approach and practices of industrial UniOnism (8) and 
without further restriction of the right to organize in general and to 
strike in particular. 
Successive nationalist governments, military and parliamentarian 
alike, did not however hesitate to Impose these additional restrictions. 
This made the Colonial Collective Labour Relations Law as, in certain 
respects, rela ti vely the most liberal in the history of the country. This 
also meant tha t, despi te the poli tical uphea vals the Country has 
undergone within the last 30 years, Collective Labour Relations Law was 
to possess certain common characteristics that have sur vi ved across 
time. Under this part of the Chapter attention is focussed on three 
politically motivated forms of controls that in their turn reflect 
negatively on workers ability to organize and to bargain collectively. 
These forms are: (a) compulsory registration; (b) restriction of the "right" 
to federate; and (c) restriction of strike action. Before moving to 
discuss the first of these forms it is important however to mention a few 
words about the terminology of "rights" adopted In the Chapter. 
To talk about strike action, freedom of affiliation and freedom of 
organiza tion as rna tters of fIr ights" and to approach the study of 
industrial relations in the Sudan from a conceptual perspective of "rights" 
"freedoms" and other similar notions may lead to formulation of an 
, 
idealist and speculative legal framework that pays little respect to 
histor ical socio-economic conditions in that country. The construction 
of aright to strike, aright to organize and other "trade union rights" as 
pillars of a "system of industrial relations" that is capable of universal 
applica tion is a posi ti vism and systema tiza tion of social phenomena 
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characteristic of a liberal pluralist "ideology". These concepts of rights 
are borrowed from the discipline of Labour Law in a developed Capitalist 
Society and I have previously expressed my reservation about their 
applica tion to Sudan (9). Any such application involves the abstraction 
of these concepts from the substantial existence they possess in their 
place of origin, and, must in turn be adapted to the condition of the 
socio-economic relations they are intended to conceptualize in this new 
position. 
Also worth examining In this context is the ILO endeavour to 
maintain international Labour standards based on respect for freedom of 
associa tion and protection of the right to organize (ILO Conventions No 
87 1948, No 98 1949 and No 84 1947). All forms of Legal restriction on 
freedom of association and the right to organize (e.g. restriction of 
recruitment of members at the primary trade union level, restriction of 
the right to federate, restriction at all trade union levels and monopoly 
through trade union registration) are at variance with Article 2 of the 
e:onvention No 87. Yet such restrictions are imposed in an increasing 
number of countries all over the under-developed world (Erstling 1977, pp 
19-35). This manifest failure of ILO standards in this group of countries 
IS some evidence that these standards are themselves bearers of 
pluralistic assumptions that underlay their European progenitors (9a). 
Ratification of ILO Conventions does not of course guarantee that 
articles of the Conventions will automatically be abided by. However it 
is at least a formal undertaking by the ratifying State to observe these 
standards. Sudan has proved reluctant to commit itself even to such a 
formal undertaking. By January 1985 out of a total of 
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159 ILO Conventions Sudan has signed only 12. 
12 was the ILO Convention No 122 of 1964 (9b). 
,i 
The most recent of the 
To recapitulate, the frequent usage in the text of a phraseology 
of rights - (e.g. right to strike, right to federate, right to organize ... ) 
- should not lead to a preconception that there is a socially-existing right 
to strike which legislation does not recognize, or in case the social 
absence of this right is conceded, to the misconception tha t the 
preaching of these abstract notions of rights is by itself enough to 
establish an effective trade union right or rights. However it IS 
important to point out that to assert the social absence of a right to 
strike and the inability of jurisprudential doctrines to establish one, IS 
wholly distinct from the subjective and speculative question as to 
whether legislation should or should not provide for a "right" to strike. 
A central tenet of the former approach is that the answer to the latter 
and other similar questions, depends not on the wishful thinking of a 
possibly class-opinionated individual, but is ultimately objectively imposed 
by the underlying economic and social power-fabric of the particular 
society (l 0). 
I.A Compulsory Registration 
Compulsory registration In Sudan is an institutionalized for m of 
control (infra Part I.A.2) of which the procedure of actual registration is 
only a phase. Compulsory registration is a restriction on the freedom to 
organize because it makes the trade union existence conditional upon a 
passage through an administra ti ve process whose purpose is to ensure 
tha t the trade union organiza tional and constitutional structure fits 
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T ABLE A (Appendix to f.9b) 
Numbers of ILO Conventions 
Ratified by the Sudan until 1 January 1985 
Serial Number of Year of Subject Matter 
Numbe Convention Convention 
I 2 1919 Unem~lo~ment 
2 19 1925 Equality of Treatment 
(Accident Compensation) 
3 26 1928 Minimum Wage Fixing 
Machinery 
4 29 1930 Forced Labour 
5 81 1947 Labour Inspection 
6 95 1949 Protection of Wages 
7 98 1949 Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining 
8 100 1951 Equal Remuneration 
9 105 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour 
10 III 1958 Discr imina tion (Employ ment 
and Occu~a tion) 
11 117 1962 Social Policy (Basic 
---- --~ 
Aims and Standards) 
12 122 1964 EmQlo~ment Policy 
Compiled from ILO Chart of Ratification of 
International Labour Conventions 1 January 1985. 
Serial 
Numbe 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
TABLE B (Appendix to f.9B) 
Some of the ILO Conventions Not Ratified by the Sudan 
until 1 January 1985 
Convention Year of Sub j ect C\la tter 
Number Convention 
11 1921 Right of Associa tion 
(Agriculture) 
20 1925 Nightwork (Bakeries) 
30 1930 Hours of Work 
(Commerce and Offices) 
47 1935 Forty Hour Week 
63 1938 Statistics of Wages and 
Hours of Work 
64 1939 Contract of Emplovment 
84 1947 Right of Association 
87 1948 Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right 
to Organize 
94 1949 Labour Clauses 
(Public Contracts) 
103 1952 Maternity Protection 
( Revised) 
118 1962 Equality of Treatment 
(Social Secur i ty) 
129 1969 Labour Inspection 
(Agr icul ture) 
130 1969 Medical Care and Sickness 
Benefits 
131 1970 Minimum Wage Fixing 
132 1970 Holiday with Pay (Revised) 
135 1971 Workers ReQresenta ti ves 
144 1976 Tripartite Consultation 
(Interna tional Labour 
Standards) 
151 1978 Labour Relations 
(Public Service) 
154 1981 Collecti ve Bargaining 
158 1982 Termination of Employment 
Compiled from ILO Chart of Ra tifica tion of 
International Labour Conventions 1 January 1985 
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within a predetermined juridico-political framework (11). Compulsory 
registration and the office of a registrar of trade unions are means- of 
political control because they take the initiative of action from the trade 
unions and consolidate it into the hands of administrative authorities. 
Rather than relying solely on a legal policy that seeks to counteract 
trade union economic and political influence through subsequent exposure 
of their funds and members to legal sanctions, this policy in vogue in the 
Sudan enables the adoption of extra pre-emptive measures against the 
trade union - (e.g. ordering reference of a dispute to arbi tra tion, freezing 
a trade union fund or ordering dissolution or suspension of a trade union, 
in order to prevent the carrying out of a declared strike). This enables 
the government always to possess the initiative of action whilst the trade 
unions are, in the best of conditions, left with the option of seeking 
judicial or administrative remedies or in the majority of cases with no 
option but to surrender. 
The first trade union ordinance that came into effect on 15 :'larch 
1949 - the Trade Union Ordinance 1949 (TUO 1949) - allocated 20 out of 
its 35 sections to matters relating to appointment, responsibilities and 
powers of a registrar of trade unions. The registrar of trade unions, is, 
under, the TUO 1949 5.7, and, all the trade union laws that came into 
effect subsequent to this date, a government official appointed by the 
highest political authority be it a Governor General under the TUO 1949 
5.7, a President of a Supreme Military Command TUO 1960 5.7 or a 
President of a Republic - TUO 1966 5.7 and the EAT 1977 S.25( 1). 
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Certified registration has always been a condition precedent to a 
trade Union right to perform its functions. Under all Laws that came 
into effect before 1971 every trade unIOn was required to apply for 
registration within two months of the date of its formation - 55.8(1) 
TUO's 1949, 1960, 1966. 55.8(2) of these three trade union ordinances 
made it an offence punishable with fine for every trade union and every 
officer and member of such trade union which failed to register within 
the time limit specified under 55.8( 1). Likewise all 3 ordinances 
prohibited trade unions and their members from "performing any act in 
furtherance of the purposes for which they have been formed unless and 
until such Trade Unions have been registered in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law" - 55.17. 
Al though the 1971 and 1977 Employees Trade Union Acts (E TU A 
1971, ETUA 1977) did not specifically invoke criminal punishment for 
failure to register. They provide criminal punishment for general 
viola tions of their provisions that may equally apply in case of failure to 
register. Both Acts retained the requirement of registration as a 
condition for trade union right to exist and perform its functions. 
Registra tion retained this legal effect under both Acts not so much for 
the criminal punishment attached as for their careful draft which made 
trade unionism a status attainable only upon receipt of a certificate of 
registration. Under previous laws trade unions could be formed first and 
then apply within a specified period for legal recognition. Employees 
under the E TU A 1971, 1977 could call a general election for the 
forma tion of a trade union only 2 months after an application by a 
provisional Committee of such employees to register as a trade Union 
has been accepted by the Registrar (ETUA 1971, 55.25-27: ETUA 1977. 
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55.26-28). This change enabled the Registrar to regulate and supervIse 
trade union elections - (Cf infra fs. 16, 25, 180 and the text above). 
This regula tion and supervision were in their turn important for 
achievement of the regime's objective of integrating the trade union 
movement into the 5ta te administra ti ve and political appara tusses. 
l.A.l Procedures and Conditions of Registration 
Applications for registration may be made by a number of the 
Trade Union members subscribing their names to its rules or constitution 
and otherwise complying with the provisions of the Law (12). 
Applica tion to register shall be sent to the registrar together with two or 
more copies of the basic constitution or rules of the trade union. Under 
the TUO 1949 and its 1960 and 1966 Amendments the registrar could 
refuse to register a trade union for inter alia any of the following: 
(1) If, upon expiration of 3 months from the date of publication, in 
the Gazette and the press of a notice of the application to register, 
proper objection to the application had been raised before the Registrar 
55.9(4)/10(a) (13). 
(2) If the Registrar was not satisfied that the provlslOns of the Trade 
Union Ordinance or any regulation made thereunder or the provisions of 
the rules or basic constitution of the trade union had been complied with 
55.10(b)/(d) (14). 
(3) All or any of the trade unlOn objectives were unlawful SS.ll(c). 
(4) Any other trade union already registered was sufficiently 
representa ti ve of the interest in respect of which the application to 
register was made 5.ll(d) (15). 
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In addition the Registrar could at any time invoke as further 
conditions for registration any new grounds which he was required, by a 
regula tion made by the Commissioner of Labour, to include as such -
55.32 (16). The Registrar could inspect the rule-books or the basic 
constitution of the Trade Unions and take any other action in order to 
ensure compliance with the Law - (55.19-20 of the TUO, 55.' '/11 of the 
ETUA 1971, 1977). 
Persons aggrieved by the Registrar's refusal to register a trade 
union have always had a right of appeal to a Civil Court (17). However, 
a trade union which had been notified by the Registrar's refusal to 
register it should, unless reference was made to the High Court, or, if 
reference was made but rejected by the High Court, be dissolved within 
3 months of such notification or rejection - (55.15 TUO's 1949, 1960, 
1966). 
As mentioned earlier registration is an institutionalized control of 
which lodging and certification of lodging - (i.e. actual or formal 
"registra tion") are only a phase. The political nature of registration is 
used as description of this institutionalized registration with its different 
phases of "registration" deregistra tion and supervision of trade union 
performance. Furthermore "political" is used in this context not as a 
description of specific situations in which intervention of government 
author ities was politically motivated. It is rather a description of a 
type of legislative and administrative framework that allows 
administra ti ve and political authorities to intervene in the direction of 
the trade union movement. Although there is no express provision which 
confers on these authorities general discretionary powers of intervention 
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(e.g. on grounds of Public or State interest). : ! The' wide discretion of 
these Authorities derive from their possession of both legisla ti ve and 
quasi judicial functions (C1. supra f.16 and infra fs. 25, 180 and the text 
above). Furthermore, the fact that legislation gives a right of appeal to 
the Civil Courts is for the reason shown later - (infra 1.47 and the text 
above) - not necessarily an effective guarantee of trade union and 
workers rights. 
There are few cases from the pre 1969 era In which registration 
of a trade union was refused on political grounds. Both the 1956-1958 
and 1964-1969 Parlia mentary Governments however, while stressing 
registration as a condition for conferment of trade union immunities -
(Cf. infra part l.C.2.b) - told the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation 
(SWTUF) to reconsider its basis of organization in order to qualify for 
registra tion; a condition which the latter could not possibly meet (18). 
The paucity of reported decisions is explicable by two factors. 
The first is that for the reasons mentioned later - (Cf. infra, the text 
above fs. 60-60B) - parliamentary governments could not enforce the Law 
as against the trade unions. Thus the S WTUF, though not registered 
managed to exist in the period 1956-1958, 1964-1966, and, in 
consideration for undertaking to co-operate with the government was 
eventually registered in 1966 without meeting the conditions set for 
registration (I8a). The other reason is that there was no room for 
registration In the period 1958-1960 because trade unIOns had been 
totally outlawed. Although a limited trade union existence was allowed 
in the period 1960-1964 the formation, registration and activity of trade 
unions remained supervised directly by the Ministry of Interior and 
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Labour. The latter did not hesi ta te however to dissol ve trade unIOns 
and imprison trade union officials (I8b). 
1.A.2 Cancellation of Registration 
The authority of the Registrar over the trade unIOns does not end 
upon the issuing of a Certifica te of Registra tion. Even after 
registration has been duly effected the trade union's conduct of its 
internal affairs and performance of its functions remain constantly under 
supervision of the Registrar. The Registrar must be informed to date 
of, any alteration of rules or eonstitution, every new membership and 
annual returns and expenditure. Failure to comply with this requirement 
could render the trade union liable to inter alia dissolution. 
Sudanese trade union laws have always empowered the Registrar 
to cancel the registration of or dissolve any trade union which inter alia 
volun tar il y viola tes the pr ov isions of a tr ade union law in force. 
However the extent of intervention this rule allowed varied in connection 
with two contingencies. The first is the extent to which areas of 
industr ial relations under a particular political regime was subjected to 
legal regulation. The second contingency is the strategy which the 
political regime adopts towards trade unions' performance of their 
economic functions. 
Beginning with the first factor it is noted that although the 
Commissioner of Labour under Colonial administration was empowered to 
make regulations for the purpose of generally gIVing effect to the objects 
of the Trade Union Ordinance - (5.32 TUO 1949) no such regula tions. 
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which would have otherwise added to the corpus of Law administered by 
the Registrar, were in fact made. In effect the Registrar's powers of 
cancella tion remained exerciseable only in instances of violations arising 
under the two main collective Labour Relations Laws na mel y, the TU 0 
1949 and the Regulation of Trade Disputes Ordinance 1949 (RTDO 1949) 
(19). The position of the Law did not change much after Independence 
until 1971. 
Three mam factors coincided to make the 1970s and the first half 
of the 1980s a golden era for legislative intervention in industrial 
rela tions. They were as follows: 
1 - The massive political changes that had taken place on the eve and 
at the beginning of the 1970s decade necessitated this as part of an 
overall governmental intervention in all spheres of political and social 
life m order to maintain the new alignment of power (20). 
2 - A movement to deradicalize the trade union movement through 
patronage of its leadership and the placement of its organizations under 
close supervision and direction of administrative and political authorities. 
3 - Increased emphasis on economic development and on the role of 
the State in its direction. 
This does not mean that before 1971 the registration function was 
less politically directed. The above factors however account for new 
policies (Cf. infra the text above fs 61/63) which the 1971-1985 Regime 
adopted and therefore succeeded in that direction. This distinguished its 
Labour policy from that of the Parlia men tar ian governments - which 
relied mainly on superficial legal control (Cf. infra text abo\'e fs. 
60-60A) and also that of the 1958-1964 r-.. 'iii tary Dictatorship - (\\'hich 
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relied mainly on non-institutionalized repression). As will be shown 
later - (infra text above 1.62) - this also meant that the 1971-1985 -era 
was to be a period during which the Registrar of trade unions and other 
administrative authorities were to assume hegemonic roles in the 
administration of trade union laws. 
As regards the second factor mentioned above it can be noted 
that trade union laws of the military governments are characterized by 
an inclination to place under closer administrative supervision trade 
unions performance of their economic functions. Because the move to 
restrict trade unions from acting in fulfilment of these functions began 
immedia tely after Independence and has continued consistently it is not 
so much the degree of restriction as the strategy invoked for putting 
that restriction into effect which distinguishes trade union law under the 
Military Governments. To that effect the latter extended the Registrar 
powers of cancellation and dissolution to cover instances In which the 
trade union has acted in violation of the statutory procedure prescribed 
for settlement of industrial disputes (21). Parliamentary Governments 
although preserved the Registrar's powers of cancellation and dissolution 
in the instance of poll tical strikes, and adopted compulsory arbi tra tion 
procedures, opted In the latter instance to make violations punishable, 
not by dissolution of the trade union or cancellation of its registration, 
but, with fine against the trade union, and fine and imprisonment against 
members (22). Tightening of administra ti ve control over trade disputes 
under the Military Governments was inseparable characteristic of their 
overall elitist economic planning and political decision-making. 
Although Parliamentary Governments may have equally been conscious of 
the importance, at least for their own stability. of economic planning and 
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performance, the wider and heterogeneous popular base on which 
decision-making depended in their case made such undertaking impossible. 
l.A.2.a Exercise of Discretion for Political Ends 
Under all trade union laws the Registrar exercises both the power 
of determining whether or not there is a cause for dissolution or 
cancella tion and that of passing and enforcing the sentence of dissolution 
or cancellation. Because it is often the case that situations which call 
for exercise of these powers by the Registrar are also ones that have 
wider political i mplica tions, deter mina tion of the issues surrounding a 
dispute and the imposition of a punishment may as shown below depend 
more on the weight of political rather legal policy considerations. In 
spi te of the technical or legal language adopted the Registrar's decision 
IS In such si tua tion an incidental ingredient in a package of political 
reaction dealt by the political authority. Following a threat to strike by 
the Sudan Railway Workers Trade Union (SR WTU) in June 1961 for 
instance, a decision to dissolve the trade union was posed as a 
counter-threat and subsequently carried out, not by the Registrar, but, by 
the Minister of Labour. Likewise a Registrar decision dissolving the 
Accountants and Cashiers Trade Union in 1979 was later described by the 
Court of Appeal as "devoid of judicial reasoning oblivious to established 
judicial practices and meant hastily to pre-empt a strike action by the 
Trade Union" (24). 
The Registrar's decisions in less poli ticall y sensi ti ve disputes are 
also influenced by the general labour policy of the State. It is 
" to mentI" on tha t this ca tegory of dispu tes is less Important however 
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politically sensitive not because it does not disclose the interference of 
political and administrative authorities into trade union affairs but 
because that interference takes place within an already established and 
ins ti tu tionalized j u r idico-poli tical f r a mework and raises ther ef or e 
technical and legal rather than crude political controversies. To explain 
this I will take as specific example some of the labour policies the 
defunct 1969-1985 political regime had imposed in Sudan. 
The overt interference which that regIme attempted, necessitated 
enactment of an enormous corpus of Law aiming inter alia at the setting 
of predeter mined bases of organization and organizational structures for 
the trade unions (Cf infra Part l.B). The Employees Trade Unions :\cts 
(ETUA 1971, 1977) the 1972 Trade Union Basis of Organization and 
Organiza tional Structure Regula tions, and the several Trade Union 
Elections Regulations (25) enacted by the regime incorporated all aspects 
of organization and gave the Registrar full power to ensure compliance 
with these statutory provisions. The Registrar could intervene in 
disputes between a trade union or federation and their constituent bodies 
and affiliates or between a trade union or federation on the one hand and 
an employer (including the State) or employers on the other. In all 
cases the Registrar possessed the power of ordering and enforcing, 
sometimes against the wish of the majority of members of a trade union 
or Federation or even against such members' unanimous will, dissolution 
of trade unions (26), cancellation of their elections (27) and suspension of 
the acti vi ties of their central committees (28). 
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The political na ture of the Registrar's invol vement in this 
ca tegory of disputes is blurred because they are disputes that relate, _ not 
to the ever-recurring and externally influenced trade unions' performance 
of their economic functions, but, rather to the rather relatively stable 
and predeter mined or ganiza tional framework of the trade unIon 
concerned. Hence, although the Registrar's decisions are formally 
appealable to the Civil Courts (Cf infra Part l.A.3). In all the cases 
that were appealed, the Courts could discuss and judge the Registrar's 
decisions not with reference to a general principle of "Labour Law" but 
on the basis of their technical accordance with the statutory powers 
conferred on the Registrar. The width of statutory powers conferred on 
the Registrar on the one hand and the reluctance of the Courts to 
challenge the jurisprudential pre-suppositions of these powers on the 
other left the Courts with a minimal role to play. In consequence the 
jurisdiction of the Registrar as a tribunal was widened considerably 
during the 1970's and early 1980's. 
The widening of the Registrar's jurisdiction incidentally 
illuminated many inherent weaknesses in its position as a tribunal. 
Some of the Registrar's decisions during the 1971-1985 era illustrate the 
need for a judicial tradition to guide its decision-making and for 
guarantees to safeguard its independence. Some of these decisions, 
although made upon similar merits, are reconcilable only in their 
conformity with the State Labour policy. I will examine only few 
examples. First, there is a contradiction between the outcome of 
Ii tiga tions In cases involving trade unions breaking away from federations 
and the legal view the Registrar adopts in cases of sectional or 
subsectional trade unions breaking away from their mother trade unions. 
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" While a trade unlOn breaking away from a Federation IS condemned to 
dissolution, a sectional trade union is, according to the Registrar's view, 
entitled to break away from its mother trade union and the latter may in 
such circumstance lose its capacity to act for the profession or trade for 
which it was initially constituted. However, this vacilla tion of 
individualist and collectivist liberal attitudes (29), coincidentally 
conforms with a State policy that controls the trade union movement, 
through the strengthening of federations' authority over the members of 
their affiliate trade unions and the weakening of the organizational 
integrity of individual trade unions - (Hussein (1983), 160-161, 188). 
Although its position as a tribunal presupposes impartiality there 
are examples in which this was obviously lacking. In all examples cited 
(below fs 30-31) this was occasioned by pressure exerted by the 
Government either in its capacity as employer (30) or political authority. 
In two of the cases cited interference by the Government caused the 
Registrar to gl ve two contradictory decisions on the issue of 
tonstitutional powers of a trade union general assembly. The decision 
was in each case in favour of the party which the Government wanted to 
remain in charge of the trade union (31). 
The cases discussed above may not constitute a large proportion 
of the Registrar's work. However my argument that the objectives of 
registra tion are political depends less on the weight of evidence these 
cases provide than on the orientation of trade union law which confers 
legisla ti ve judicial and ad ministra ti ve jurisdictions on the Registrar. 
Even if the Registrar is immune from all the shortcomings associated 
with the performance of Labour tribunals in Sudan {Cf. infra Part 4.A in 
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Chapter 5} it will still be instrumental in achieving the objectives of this 
tr ade union law which are either poli tical or economic ob j ecti ves 
formulated by the political authority. Furthermore the cases discussed 
are not simply of a descriptive significance. They reflect rather an 
abuse of authority that IS inevitably likely to be associated with the 
performance of tribunals of this type administering Labour Legislation of 
the type in Sudan. This is evidenced by examples of similar abuses In 
other underdeveloped countries with comparable labour legislation 
(Erstling 1977 pp. 61-67). 
l.A.3 Judicial Review of the Registrar's Decisions 
I have mentioned earlier that every Statute affecting registration 
ga ve a right of appeal against the Registrar's decisions (32). The 
Colonial and Parliamentarian Governments' trade union laws made the 
decision of the Court to which the Registrar's decision was immediately 
appealable final and conclusive (33). The Trade Union Ordinance 
('Amend ment) Act passed by General Abboud's Military Dictatorship in 
1960 followed suit in preserving the right of appeal against the 
Registrar's decisions. But by providing that the documents of the 
Registrar should be considered as "official documents" the Amendment 
made the information essential for enabling the Court to evaluate the 
Registrar's decision virtually inaccessible (34). Until 1974 the E TU A 
1971 gave unrestricted right of appeal to the High Court against the 
Registrar's decisions, and, reasserted the finality and conclusiveness of 
the former's decision (35). Following the transfer of the jurisdiction of 
reviewing administrative decisions from the High Court and its 
confer ment on Province Courts in 1974, decisions of the Registrar 
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became automatically appelable to the Province Court. The proviso as 
to finality of the appellate Court decision applied also inadvertently to 
decisions of the Province Court even though the latter was a third grade 
strata in the judicial hierarchy (36). This was an inadvertent procedural 
irregularity that was to be rectified a year later by the Supreme Court 
(37). 
The E TU A 1977 preserved the right of appeal against the 
Registrar's decisions provided that the appeal is made to the Court of 
Appeal within 30 days from the date of the decision (38). However the 
E TU A 1977 regards the Registrar's decisions, relating to application of 
its provisions, the provisions of regulations issued under it and the 
provisions of the basic Cons ti tu tions of Labour Organiza tions, as 
decisions made by a Province Court 55.25(3). The conferment of this 
sta tus on the Registrar does not directly restrict the right of appeal 
against its decisions to the Court of Appeal and thence to the Supreme 
Court. But, one effect IS to make the decisions of the Registrar 
immedia tely executable as a Court decision, although tha t is not 
necessarily always the case in practice (38a). The conferment was 
explicitly intended to produce this effect (39). In practice however this 
judicial status has worked more against the trade unions than in their 
fa vour. 
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Coupled with the Registrar's powers of dissolution this judicial 
status means that members of a trade union ordered to be dissolved may 
automa tically find themsel ves guil ty of Contempt of Court or of 
belonging to an unlawful organization in case they fail to promptly 
comply with the Registrar's decision. The absence on the other hand of 
similar sanctions which the Registrar may take against an employer or 
person found guilty of violating a trade unIOn right has meant that 
grievances of the trade unIOns and their members although remediable 
only at the Registrar's hands go largely unredressed (Hussein 1983, pp 
196-200). This suggests that despite its depiction as a Province Court 
and in spite of its recognition as such by the Supreme Court (40) the 
Registrar of Trade Unions, judging by its mode of appointment and 
remunera tion and its jurisdiction and powers in practice, lacks both the 
independence and judicial powers of a Civil Court. 
Although appointed and remunerated as an ordinary senIOr civil 
ser van t (41), the Regis tr ar exerc ises wide j ud ic ial and leg isla ti ve 
jur isdictions. Its jurisdiction, over disputes arising under, or relating to 
applica tion of the E TU A 1977 and the regulations issued under it, IS 
exclusive of preliminary jurisdiction of ordinary civil Courts, and, 
amounts in case of regulations, to an adjudication of disputes arising 
under rules made by the Registrar itself or by the Ministry of Public 
Service of which the Registrar was until 1981 a subordinate (42). 
The Registrar is also a body that cannot in practice enforce its 
decisions in a definite category of cases falling wi thin its exclusi ve 
jurisdiction (43). Even if the Registrar finds for a trade union or a 
trade union member in a complaint brought by either of them it cannot 
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thereafter enforce its decision against an obstinafe employer except 
through an application for execution made to an ordinary Court (44). In 
some cases the Registrar does not even bother to make such an 
applica tion. Instead it left the trade union to seek enforcement of the 
decision In vain (45). Even when the Registrar was obliged, by the 
sever i ty of the violations in vol ved, to insti tu te proceedings on behalf of 
dismissed trade union officials his efforts failed to reinstate them or 
even to bring the offending employer to justice (46). 
If the question of whether the role the Civil Courts play in Sudan 
IS capable of restraining political and administra ti ve authorities from 
interfering with the privity of industrial relations is to be answered 
partly on the basis of what has so far been said then that answer IS 
bound to be negative. Since administrative authorities have always been 
gl ven substantive statutory powers of control, the scope of judicial 
supervision has remained very limited. This is a problem so common as 
to deserve the attention of the ILO. The Committee of Experts on the 
Applica tion of Conventions and Recommendations has in this respect 
pointed out : "when Legislation makes it possible ..• for the authorities 
• . • to directly or indirectly exercise substantial control . . . the 
existence of a procedure of appeal to the Courts does not appear to be a 
sufficient guarantee; in effect this does not alter the nature of the 
powers conferred on the authorities responsible for effecting registration, 
and the judges hearing such an appeal ... would (ordinarily) only be able 
toe n sur e t hat the leg i s I a t ion had bee nco r r e c t 1 yap p lie d " ( 4 6a ) . 
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However, the Supreme Court in Sudan has always possessed the de 
jure power of declaring as unconstitutional legislation and by-laws that 
infringe basic Constitutional rights. The scope of judicial supervision 
need not therefore necessarily have been limited. In reality this 
limi ta tion exists but only because of restrictions, on this de jure power, 
self-imposed by the Supreme Court (46b). The reluctance of the 
Supreme Court to challenge the constitutional or jur isprudential 
presuppositions of laws conferring unfettered powers on administrative 
authorities is occasioned not necessarily by a common interest that 
uni tes it with the political leadership - (although this cannot always be 
ruled out) - but by a pragmatic realization that the Courts cannot force 
the political authority into accepting anything against its wish (47). 
Compared with the position under earlier Statutes the functions 
which the Registrar is now performing are enormous. The present 
legisla tion has in consequence entrenched the posi !ion of the Registrar as 
an industrial tribunal - (although not by securing the impartiality and 
enforceability of its decisions) - through the addition of the role of 
ad minister ing protective provisions provided for trade unions and their 
members by the ETUA 1977 and the IRA 1976. But to the extent that 
this new function, confiscate the trade unions ini tia ti ve of protecting 
their own interest through means they deem appropriate, and, oust the 
preliminary jurisdiction of the Courts over Collective Labour disputes its 
advantages are, from the trade unions' perspective, doubtful. Hence I 
conclude that these new functions do not substantially change the role of 
the Registrar from that of an institution whose primary objective is and 
has always been the facilitation of political control (47a). 
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1.B Restriction of the Right to Federate 
One of the pillars on which freedom of association stands is the 
workers' right to establish and join federations and confederations and 
the right of such federations or confederations to affiliate with 
interna tional workers organizations (48). Legisla tion which restricts this 
right or makes the acquisition of legal personality by organizations 
subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict this or the 
freedom of associa tion In general has since 1948 been uni versally 
declared unacceptable (49). 
From a different perspective however federations and confederations 
are broadly-based forms of workers organizations that may not rest 
content with wage-Increase bargaining and other industrial functions. 
The likelihood of political involvement of federations and confederations 
is even greater in countries where, due to the rudimentary stage of 
industralization, the government IS employer of the majority of a work 
force of a non socialist economy (49a). 
By examina ting the history of the development of trade uniOn 
federations within Sudan, this section seeks to explain the relation 
between, on the one hand, the social stature and political influence of 
federal trade union organizations and on the other the legal status that 
has been conceded to freedom of association in general and to these 
organiza tions in particular. The theme of the argument is that. judging 
by this development, there are resilient political considerations that have 
made the right to federate always subject to legal restriction. ,,\lthough 
the division of the argument followed assumes that forms of restrictions 
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are affected by political and economic policies of forms of reglme (e.g. 
colonial, military, par lia mentar ian . • .). Yet when viewed within _ the 
historical context of the Sudan", forms of restrictions effected by the 
successi ve regimes are stages of development of the law corresponding 
with respective political and social changes. However although the 
forms of control may vary in connection with the above factors, the fact 
of control and its effect on the law are sufficiently consistent to support 
the conclusions summarized at the end of the section. 
1.B.1 The Formative Stage 
With fears of trade unIOn political involvement in mind the first 
draft of the 1949 Trade Union Ordinance placed certain restrictions on 
freedom of association (50). However following workers' protest some 
of these restrictions were removed only few months after their first 
introduction. The ambivalence with which the Colonial administration 
met the assembly of a workers' congress in August 1949 and the 
reconstitution of that congress a year later into a Sudan Workers Trade 
Unions Federation (S WTUF), was possibly due to the reluctance of the 
administration to influence the course of major political events m a 
country that it was preparmg to leave m only a few years time (51). 
But the "truculent behaviour and militant mood" which the S WTUF 
exhibited immediately after its formation and throughout the 5 years 
tha t preceded Independence proved too much a disruption even for the 
day-to-day running of the colony (52). 
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The Colonial administration withheld de jure· recognition of the 
Federation and refused to extend the immunities provided for individual 
trade unions and their members to the Federation and its officials. 
Since the latter were elected representa ti ves deputed by individual trade 
unions and the Federation was in this capacity a constitutional assembly 
of federating unions the withholding of immunities meant that 
participa tion by individual trade unions in an action concerted by the 
Federation could invalidate the protection and immunities otherwise 
available for a trade union and its members taking individual action (53). 
Despite its democratic facade the first nationalist government 
was less tolerant of the political involvement of the trade unions than its 
colonial predecessor. In March 1956, only two months after the 
declara tion of Independence the ministerial cabinet of the then 
Parliamentary regime issued a statement expressing its dissatisfaction 
with the then existing organizational structure of trade unions and their 
Federation. The Cabinet recommended the enactment of legislation to 
provide for the formation of federations of trade unions along industry or 
establishment bases and the confinement of the rights of association only 
to federations thus established (54). The legislation proposed by the 
Cabinet came into effect four months later in July 1956. 
However despite the enactment of the legislation and the efforts 
exerted in its implementation - including inter alia establishment of 
government-sponsored federations (55) - the Government failed to 
eliminate the influence of the Federation. That failure was possibly a 
reflection of the limitation of the extent to which a supposedly "liberal 
pluralist" Government could go in suppressing the freedom of association 
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before plunging the whole system into CrlSIS. 
, 
It was the internal 
contradictions wi thin the system exacerbated by Government repressive 
labour policy and the reactions of the trade unlOns which led to a 
sweeping decline in the popularity of Abdulla Khalil Government and 
brought the opposition parties to the verge of coalition. To prevent a 
parliamentary take-over by the opposition parties the ruling party Prime 
Minister secretly contacted the army and invited the Generals to take 
over instead - (Beshir 1978, p.207). 
Restriction of the freedom of federation initiated by Abdulla 
Khalil Government was maintained by all nationalist governments that 
came into power after 1958. Moreover learning from the experience of 
the Colonial and Abdulla Khalil's Governments subsequent governments 
realized the futility of attempting to restrict one aspect of organization 
whilst lea ving the other aspects intact. Hence the move subsequent to 
1958 of restricting the right to strike and the right to orgamze at 
indi vidual unions level as a supplement to the restriction of the right to 
federate. 
Because it is a strategy that has been maintained by all political 
regimes and therefore central to a perception of a Sudanese Labour Law 
in general restriction of the right to strike is discussed separately. It 
suffices to mention here that because strikes in the Sudan were up to 
1969 often general strikes staged in a political fashion or with political 
objectives, restriction of the right to strike was intended to, inter alia 
make members and leaderships of individual trade unions taking part In a 
general strike personally responsible for their action and thereby make 
the prevention of general strikes staged by the Federation more 
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effective. 
1.B.2 Common Characteristics of Restriction Under Military Rule 
The further restriction of the right to organize which the 
maintenance of anti-federation policy necessitated In the post 1958 era 
has taken two different forms. The first form IS one in which the 
political authority makes the right to organize a privilege only for a 
special category of employees (56). The second form is revealed where 
all employees are treated equally with regard to their right to organize 
but the basis of organization, and organization itself are respecti vel y 
predetermined by and require prior approval of the political authority. 
It may of course be the case that the use of the first of these forms of 
control may involve elements of predetermination and requirement of 
prior authorization. But they feature there, not as an autonomous 
approach, but, as means for implementation of that form. Both forms 
however amount to restrictions of the freedom of employees to establish 
and join trade unions of their own choice. F or this reason they are 
likely to be opposed, not only by politically orientated trade union 
leaderships, but, also, by the rank and file. From the experience of the 
Sudan both forms could operate effectively only as sub-systems of a 
wider framework of political totalitarianism. 
Through employment of these forms of control the i\\ilitary 
regimes of 1958-1964 and 1969-1985 succeeded in maintaining relatively 
tight control over the trade unions for rela ti vely long periods of time. 
The success in maintaining these forms of control was made possible by 
antecedent political measures that banned trade unionism for periods of 
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time that were sufficient to enable the military regIme to undertake 
organization of trade unions on new bases and under new leaderships (57). 
This is explained below. 
From the first days of the Military Coup of November 1958 and 
for 16 months after that date for instance all trade unions and labour 
organizations were banned and almost all (41/45) the SWTUF officials 
were put on trial and jailed (Beshir 1978, pp. 211-12) (57a). The trade 
union laws that came into effect at the end of the 16 months ban upheld 
the res tr ic tion on the f or rna tion of a tr ade unions f eder a tion or 
federa tions. 55. 27(3) of the TUO 1960 prohibited any worker from 
joining any trade union other than that formed by the workers of the 
establishment in which he is engaged. Likewise any trade union whose 
members are engaged by one employer was prohibited from uniting 
federating or otherwise affiliating with any other trade union - Ibid 
SS.27( 4) (58). 
" 
These provisions were highly effective in practice. No trade 
union did actually survive in the period between imposition of the ban in 
November 1958 and its lifting on 9 February 1960. Likewise trade union 
federations were resurrected only in August 1963 when the ~\ilitary 
Regime felt it was by then secure enough to allow a limited form of 
federal organization (Taha 1970, p.116). 
The present collective Labour Law in the Sudan rests. equally, 
upon a foundation of coercion that was laid down immediately after July 
1971. Following the defeat, in that month, of a Communist putsch. in 
which the complicity of the trade unions was "most likely possible" (,~\L 
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Ahram 13 August 1971) - President Numeri's Regime dissol ved all 
federations and trade unions in the country and announced that the trade 
union movement would "henceforward be sponsored consolidated guided 
and controlled by the State - (ARR August 1971, p. 417). The task of 
putting that announcement into effect was not an easy one. It required 
for its accomplishment a period of 12 months during which trade unlOns 
were practically non-existent. Measures taken by the Regime during 
this period included purges of all known Communist trade union activists 
and opponents of the Regime, (Ibid). Some of those dismissed from 
their jobs in the public and pr i va te sectors were further tried and 
executed or imprisoned (Hussein Ibid 142-145, 155 ) (58a) for their 
alleged part in the abortive coup d 'eta t. It was only after the 
completion of these expedient measures and the resultant exhaustion of 
the trade union movement that long-term measures, in the form of a 
legisla ti ve and an ad ministra ti ve framework, were introduced to complete 
incorporation of the trade unions into the State system. 
LB.3 Restriction Under The Parliamentary Rule 
The fact that they did not go to the extent of restricting 
employees freedom to establish and Jom individual trade unions of their 
choice does not however mean that Parliamentary Governments did not 
otherwise maintain some restrictions on the formation of trade unlons 
federations. The 1966 Parliamentary Government Trade Union 
Ordinance (TUO 1966) contained many such restrictions. SS.30A(2) of 
the Ordinance made the legality of trade unions federations conditional 
upon registration. Moreover no federation was eligible for registr3 tion 
unless the "associating trade unions relate to the same industry or are 
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composed of employees of the same employer 5S.30 A.3.a. Ibid. 
However the harshness of this provision lay in that it was directed 
against a trade union movement which had by tradition rallied itself 
behind the leadership of a single federation (the S WTUF). Since the 
SWTUF could meet neither of the requirements under SS.30.A.(3)a it was 
deemed automatically outlawed. 
But even federations formed in accordance with the provISIOns of 
the law remained vulnerable to criminal and civil liabilities arising 
because of pursuance of a trade dispute. While a trade union taking 
lawful industrial action was immune against such liabilities the same 
trade union was not immune in case the action was taken in arrangement 
with fellow associates of a federation or confederation - TUO 1966 55.30 
D( 2). Nevertheless the Government managed to sponsor the 
establishment along its legislation of three federations, a Public Sector 
Trade Unions Federation (later the Government Salaried Employees Trade 
Unions Federation) a Pr i va te Sector Trade Union Federation and a 
q"eachers Trade Unions Federation - (Taha, 1970 p.132 et seq.). 
The selge on the trade unIOns federal organization directed by the 
TUO 1966 was reinforced by further restrictions on the right to strike 
imposed by the R TDA 1966 S.27.(59). The government was determined 
to take all necessary measures for making both laws fully operative in 
practice. Following the opposition of the SWTUF and its affiliates and 
other trade unions to its labour policies the government followed a policy 
of either dismissing Or' transferring to areas outside the capital and the 
main cities all trade union official and activists in vol ved in organizing 
the opposition. However. when some trade unions loyal to the S \\' TUF 
175 
declared their intention of launching a general strike protesting against 
the government policies the latter did not hesitate to use the full we_ight 
of the new legislation in response - (Taha, 1970 p.132 et seq, Hussein 
1983, pp.92-99). Moreover the Parliamentary Government showed no 
reluctance in using the Police Force in order to disperse strikers or in 
allowing Ministers to take the law in their hands and immediately dismiss 
strikers (60). 
As hinted earlier there IS a limit on the extent to which 
anti-democra tic measures of the type described may be pursued by a 
parliamentary government in Sudan without plunging the supposed 
"system" of parliamentary democracy into crisis. The fact that unlike 
its military predecessor the 1966 Parliamentary Government had not 
taken any legislative measures towards restricting employees right to 
for m or join trade unions, or towards the organization of individual trade 
unions along predetermined bases meant that its task of restricting the 
trade unions freedom of federation was more difficult and its measures 
for the performance of that task were inherently superficial. There was 
nothing the Government could have done, apart perhaps from employing 
contingent and repressive measures, to prevent otherwise strongly 
organized trade unions from taking industr ial action or for ming 
federa tions in defiance of the Law (Cf. supra LI8.A and the text above). 
The escalation of conflict between the Government and the trade unions 
(Hussein 1983 p.146.f( 1) and the resort by the former to coercive 
measures were principal factors in the political and constitutional crisis 
tha t engulfed the Government and led to the do\\'nfall of the 
"Parliamentary System" only three years after the introduction of the 
1966 TUO and R TDA - (Hussein 1983 p.92-99)(60a). 
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Coercive measures cannot be effectively taken" by a parliamentary 
regime in Sudan because from the political experience of that country 
parliamentary regimes are able to assume power only in the aftermath of 
the downfall of a military dictatorship brought about largely by the trade 
union movement (60b). The social power-potential of the trade unions 
manifests itself under democratic rule to such an extent that 
parliamentary governments stay in power only as long as the trade unions 
are willing to co-operate or at least ready and able to communicate their 
opposition through democratic channels. Failure of the parliamentary 
system to allow for the representation of modern political elements of 
which the trade unions are the most broadly-based and the best organized 
has worked to radicalize trade union opposition (Hussein 1983. p.6,9)(6Oc) 
and hasten the downfall of parliamentary governments thus creating a 
vicious circle of alternating parliamentary and military rules. 
l.B.4 Contemporary Determinants of the Present Structure 
In addition to the require ments of prtor au thor iza tion, and 
compliance with a predetermined basis of organization, which the present 
legislative and administrative framework for Labour shares with its 
counterpart under General Abboud's Military Regime, the present 
framework also possesses one pr inc i pal dis ti ng u ish ing character is t ic. 
Rather than directly restricting freedom of federation as a means for 
effecting political subordination of the trade unions, as was done under 
previous regimes, the present framework aims to minimize the political 
influence of the trade union movement through attempted incorporation 
of the trade union leadership into the State system. Instead of banning 
federations or denying them the immunities provided for individual trade 
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umons the Regime has chosen to allow the fedet-a tions to function 
securely whilst ensuring that their leadership is resting in hands that are 
unlikely to lead the trade union movement into confrontation with the 
declared economic and political policies. 
Identifica tion of the reasons behind this change of policy may 
contribute to a better understanding of the present structure, its 
institutions and the conditions in which they had functioned to produce 
their intended results during the last 14- years. The most important 
reason (61) is that following the downfall of the "Parliamentary System" 
in 1969 and the assumption of power by a left-wing military dictatorship 
supported by the working and professional urban classes, a degree of 
co-operation between the trade unions and the regime became essential 
for preserva tion of the new align ment of power. Al though the 
subsequent 1971 political change resulted in the purges of communists 
and communist-sympathizers from within the allied forces, it did not 
change the class structure of the alignment. But it undoubtedly 
'facilitated the path for a right-wing dictatorship that emerged from 
within the alliance which In turn sponsored and promoted a moderate and 
docile trade union leadership. The role which the legislative and 
administrative framework for Labour played in furthering these 
objectives and the extent to which the policy of integration worked in 
practice are explained below. 
The main pillars of the present framework were installed in 1971 
and include the following: 
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a) - An office of a Registrar of Trade Unions· with the tasks of, 
conducting and supervising trade unions elections, thereafter, supervising 
trade unions performance of their economic functions, and, administering 
trade union laws and regulations. 
b) - A Corpus of newly enacted laws and regulations that, specify and 
also give the Registrar the power of making further specification of 
bases of organization, and, the particular sectors industries or professions 
in which trade unions and federations could be formed, and, confer on 
the Registrar the power of determining the numbers, types and internal 
organiza tional structures of such trade unions and federations and the 
description of persons eligible for their membership (62). 
c) - A Department of Labour with the responsibility of inter alia 
settling employers - trade unions disputes, if necessary, through 
compulsory negotiation mediation or arbitration (63). 
From its inception the legisla ti ve and administra ti ve framework 
for Labour possessed certain internal characteristics and opera ted in 
19o1itical surroundings that helped the Regime to pursue its policy of 
integra ting the trade unions leadership with a degree of success. 
Beginning with the political factors, the repression of communists and 
trade union and political activists within the Labour movement that 
followed the July 1971 putsch and continued sporadically throughout the 
1970s and early 1980s consolidated the position of a new breed of union 
leadership sympathetic with the Regime. The wider political 
totalitarianism which characterized the Regime's reign enabled the 
poli tical police to monitor the conduct of trade unions elections and 
trade unions day-to-day running of their internal affairs (64) and, to bar 
the nomination or election of, or to arrest and detain endlessly without 
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, judicial warrant or trial, any person whom they considered a threat to 
State security (65). 
Turning to the internal characteristics of the framework there are 
two main such characteristics. The first is that Trade Unions' 
organizational structure is designed and interpreted in such a manner as 
simultaneously to weaken the central authority of individual trade unions 
over their members and strengthen tha t of Federa tions over the 
executi ves of the individual trade unions (66). The second is that the 
administrative system of dispute resolution provided by the Law, although 
measured to give effect only to individual and collective demands that 
are sustainable by the wider economic and political system, has worked 
to prevent an accumulation of unremedied grievances that may have 
otherw ise hastened the cracking of the legal and ad ministra ti ve 
framework. 
The extent to which General Numeiri's Regime succeeded In 
integra ting the trade unIOn leadership into the poll tical establishment IS 
perhaps evidenced by development in recent years when some federations 
became exponents of the Regime's labour policy praising the method of 
administra ti ve containment of industrial disputes and on few occasions 
directing the Registrar of trade unions to dissolve some of their affiliate 
trade unions because the latter had failed to abide by the ban on strikes 
(67). 
But there is a difference between incorporation of a trade Union 
movement based on a provision of trade unions members with an interest 
in the economic and political establish ment and an integration of a trade 
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Unions leadership into the political system brought about by a catalogue 
of manipula ti ve and corrupting practices (Hussein 1983 p.227)(67a). The 
latter, which is typical of the Sudanese experience under General 
Numeiri's Regime, is a latent control that depends not always on bringing 
the power of the State and Law to bear externally on the trade unions 
but on gammg a footing within the trade union movement and using it to 
effect control from within. From the Regime's perspective this method 
also had a propaganda value in that the Regime, while it was doing in 
clandestine all that was necessary for consolidating its grip on the 
movement, retained a deceptive legisla ti ve facade. 
The preceding analysis posits a conclusion that, in spite of the 
apparent benevolent stance the present legislation has adopted vis-a-vis 
the formation of federations and the enjoyment, for the first time, by 
these federations of immunities and privileges previously confined for 
indi vidual trade unions, the right to form federations and confederations 
of trade unions IS still in reality restricted. The only difference is that 
the restriction IS now, not on the right of a federation to exist or be 
protected, but, on the ability of such federation or federations to become 
truly representa ti ve of the interests and wishes of their rank and file. 
Trade union discontent with the federations' leadership began as early as 
1980 (68) and culminated in the formation, by rebellious individual trade 
unions, of a united front of trade unions and associations which later, in 
April 1985, organized and carried out the general strike that brought 
General Numeri's Regime to an end (69). 
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The front has now reconsti tuted itself into a Trade Union 
Congress calling for the liquid a tion of the leadership of the federa tlons 
inherited from the deposed regime. 
Summary 
The conclusion to be drawn from this part of the chapter is that 
there are overriding political considerations which necessi ta ted i mposi tion 
of certain restrictions on freedom of organization. This happened at the 
expense of development of appropriate institutions of industrial relations. 
In a country where the terms and conditions of employment of the 
majority of the workforce are determined centrally by the government 
and where employing government units, departments or plants have no 
autonomous status to deal with employees' trade unions demands, 
federa tions and other central organizations become the ideal bodies 
which could practically negotiate with employers. The centr ici ty of 
planning affects also all employees in the private sector as far as terms 
and conditions of employment are concerned and a large section of these 
employees in respect of all terms and conditions of their employment 
(70). 
It IS important however to emphasise that the qualification of 
poli tical considerations as overriding is not a value-judgment but a 
conclusion arrived at in the belief that these considerations have within 
the last 30 years empirically proved their superiority. The emphasis on 
poli tical phenomena should not also however be taken as meaning that 
the configuration of these phenomena is not in turn conditioned by 
structures (e.g. economic and social . . .) beneath the poli tical la \C'r. 
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I believe that the "economic" the "political" and the "legal" are 
three hierarchical levels or layers among other numerous intervening 
levels of socialization (71) that together constitute the social totality 
(i.e. the given society or social formation). From the practical 
experience of the Sudan I am also inclined to believe that the impact 
which the "economic" may have on the "legal" (e.g. labour relations law) 
is always mediated through - inter alia - the "political". The 
under-development of capitalist socio-economic structures (i.e. capitalist 
classes and their organizations whether political parties or trade unions) 
while a reflection of the vastly "non-capitalist" social for rna tion does in 
turn allow force and coercion (which are always at the disposal of an 
over-developed and potentially autonomous State) to play major roles in 
shaping society from above. 
In the field of industrial relations this means that the State could 
decree trade unions out of, or allow them only a limited, existence. In 
both cases rules of "Labour Relations Law" enacted by such State may 
prove a far cry from rules of Labour Law created and administered 
through mutual interaction of inevitably socially existing organizations of 
workers and employers in a developed capitalist society. In contrast to 
the latter, labour organizations in the Sudan are themselves creatures 
and subjects of the law. This has been demonstrated by the discussion 
of the forms of restriction of the right to organize in general and to 
federate in particular. This condition of existence of labour 
organizations affect also the status of the individual employment 
rela tionship. The latter is extensively regula ted in such a manner as to 
make the existence of labour organizations either redundant or 
inef fecti ve. The respect which law pays to the autonomy of labour 
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organiza tions and that of the individual employment (72) relationship also 
reflects on the objecti vity of the legal form (i.e. the extent. of 
development of an ideology of law). From this perspective the rules of 
the Sudanese labour relations law so far discussed possess little more 
than the formal existence and are solely judged by their accordance or 
inaccordance with declared technical requirements of rule-making and 
legal administration. 
I.C. Restriction of the Right to Strike 
In Sudan, strikes were, up to the enactment of the TUO and 
R TDO In 1949, unequivocally prohibited. Section 143 of the 1925 (73) 
Penal Code made it a criminal offence for any public servant who 
"wrongfully abandons his duties in pre-arranged agrement with two or 
more other public servants if ..• the effect of such abandonment is to 
interfere with the performance of a public service to an extent that will 
cause injury or damage or grave inconvenience to the community" (74). 
However apart from the general sections of the Code dealing with 
criminal conspiracy (5.94), public nuisance and obstruction (5.216) and 
requirement of notice in case of employees engaged in work connected 
with public health or safety or with services of public utility (5.228) 
there was no specific restriction on employees in private employment to 
strike. But far from being product of a State policy absence of specific 
restrictions on employees in the private sector was rather due to that 
the number and power of employees in that sector of the day were too 
limited to come within contemplation of the legislature (75). 
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In practice criminal punishment was invoked "every time workers 
went on strike (76). This line of policy continued up to the beginning of 
1948 when the colonial administration, for the first time, decided _ 
partly it was understood on the advice of the British Government (Fawzi 
1957 p.74) - not to press criminal charges against the members and 
leadership of the Railway Workers Affairs Association - now the SR WTU) 
- who had gone on a two-day national strike between the 26-28 January 
1948. The same policy was followed regarding a three week general 
strike declared and carried out by the W AA only two months after the 
date its first strike ended (77). 
This change of policy on the part of the colonial administration 
was accompanied by efforts towards introducing a legal framework within 
which a form of trade unions could function. An expert from the 
British Ministry of Labour and National Service of the day (Fawzi 1957 
p.79) was seconded to Sudan for this purpose. By April 1948 a corpus of 
labour legislation had been drafted most of which became law by early 
i 949. 
I.e.1 Trade Union "Immunities" and the Right to Strike. 
The R TOO and the TUO 1949 provided a bulwark of "immunities" 
tha t paved the way for the de facto and de jure existence of trade 
unions (78). The choice of both Ordinances to give a legal status to 
trade unions by way of immunity from the general law - (although 
strictly speaking there was no such anti union common law apart from a 
few sections in the 1925 penal code which anyway remained effective 
even after introduction of the 1949 Labour Ordinances) - is explicable 
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only in the light of the fact tha t the relevant sections of both 
Ordinances were verba tim re-enactment of some of the sections under 
the British, Trade Union Act 1906 and Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act 1875. Both British Acts give the trade union a legal 
status by way of "immunity" from the judge-made doctrines (Wedderburn, 
1971 p.314). 
The protection provided under the RTDO 1949 included immunity 
from liability for simple, criminal and civil conspiracy Ibid SS.4( 1)-( 2) 
(79), immunity from actions for inducing breach of contract or 
interfering with the trade, business or employment of some other person 
(Ibid S.6) (80), and immunity from actions of tort SS.3-( 1). In all cases, 
in order to be immune, an act must be done "in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute" (81). 
It IS important to note however that none of these prOVISIOns 
affected a conspiracy that is "not a simple conspiracy" - {i.e. a 
conspiracy to do an act which, if done by one person would still be 
punishable as a crime". 
The scope of protection afforded is best examined if the relevant 
sections of the Penal Code and the trade union laws are read together. 
It becomes clear upon examination however that although they conferred 
a civil status of existence on the trade unions the trade union la \\'s 
stopped short of providing for a positive right to strike. This is 
explained below. 
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Section 5 of the RTOO 1949 stated that the immunity provided by 
the R TOO and the TUO 1949 should not be construed as exempting from 
disciplinary measures or civil or criminal liability any permanent servant 
of the government who breaks his contract of service in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute. One effect of this section is that S.143 
of the Penal Code (82), which is an embodiment of a "simple" criminal 
conspiracy doctrine made specifically for deterrence of strikes by public 
sector employees remained intact. Although S.143 of the Penal Code 
speaks about "wrongful" abandonment of duty, wrongfulness is not 
confined to "criminal" abandonment of duty. Section 17 of the Penal 
Code defines wrongful as "unlawful", an umbrella description whic'1 may 
cover abandonment of duty in breach of a contract of service. This 
interpretation is moreover consonant with the wording of S.5 of the 
RTOO 1949 which uses the phrase "breaks his contract of service". To 
recapitulate, notwithstanding any immunity provided for under Trade 
Union and Industrial Relations Law, S.143 of the Penal Code makes 
pre-arranged abandonment of duty by three or more public servants in 
breach of their contract of service an offence punishable wi th 
imprisonment and/or fine. 
Taking into account the absence of any procedural collective 
agreements that regulate strike action in the public sector In Sudan and 
the fact that strike action could, at Common Law, in differing 
circumstances be a breach, or in case notice is given, an anticipatory 
breach of the contract of service (83), S.143 of the Penal Code could be 
interpreted as effecting a complete ban on strikes in the public sector . 
. ~ 
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The confinement of immunity from prosecution or civil action to 
instances of simple conspiracy meant also that the provisions of the 
Penal Code regarding the liability of persons involved in certain types of 
strikes are still applicable. Every employee, engaged in any work 
connected with the public health or safety or with any service of public 
utili ty, who ceases from such work in pre-arranged agreement with 2 or 
more other such employees without giving his employer 15 days notice of 
his intention so to do faces criminal punishment (PC, 5.228) (84). 
Likewise strikers may become liable for criminal conviction if their 
conduct amounts to a public obstruction or nuisance (PC, 5.216) 
intimida tion (PC, 5.438 and R TOO, 1949 5.7) sedition (PC, 5.105) or an 
offence against the public tranquility (PC, 55.115-120). 
The provIso that the action In order to be protected must be 
taken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute excludes 
poli tical strikes from protection. In fact 55.27(2) of the TUO 1949 
prohibited every trade union which included persons in the public services 
from federating affiliating or otherwise taking joint action in furtherance 
of its constitutional objectives with any political organization. The 1966 
TUO preserved 55.27(2) and added a new section whereunder federations 
and confedera tions of trade unions were prohibi ted from invol ving 
themselves in politics (55.30 "d" TUO 1966). 5trikes which are political, 
ei ther, because of the political nature of their objectives, or because of 
the fashion in which they are staged could also fall within the net of 
sections of the Penal Code dealing with sedition, offences against public 
tranquility or intimidation. 
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Throughout the years following enactment of the trade unIOn and 
labour relations laws and up to Independence the criminal law was rarely 
invoked against individual trade unions taking genuine industrial action. 
However as against general strikes organized by the 5 WTUF the 
government stance was strict. But even in this case criminal law was 
invoked only against the 5WTUF leadership. One such example of 
strictness occurred in 1952. Following an abortive attempt by the 
5WTUF to mobilize a general strike in April of that year no less than 17 
members of the Executive Committee of the Federation were charged, 
with abetting a strike of public employees without 15 days notice under 
55.82/228 of the Penal Code, and eleven of them severally sentenced to 
two years imprisonment (85). 
The provISIons of the law considered above as effecting a 
complete ban on strikes in the public sector have not themselves been 
changed, although new provisions enforcing the ban have been added In 
subsequent years. The ban has wide implications for labour relations m 
general because the public sector employees have always constituted 
more than 50% of the workforce employed in the modern sector of the 
economy, and the public employees' trade unions are always in the lead 
of the trade union movement in general (Cf infra Chaper V part l.A). 
l.C.2 New Forms of Restrictions m the Post-Colonial Era 
The statutory protection provided by the TUO 1949 and the R TD.\ 
1949 was never consolidated or strengthened by subsequent legislation In 
the post-Independence era. On the contrary the political involvement of 
the trade unions which became more overt in this era (85a) attracted 
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more 1egisla ti ve and administra ti ve intervention a-nd less protection. 
Erosion of the right to strike has, under various nationalist political 
regimes, been effected through one or more of three definite methods. 
These methods are discussed below as: (a) increase of puni ti ve 
provisions; (b) suspension of trade union immunity; and (c) direct 
restriction of strike action. 
l.C.2.a Increase of Puni ti ve Provisions 
Increase of punitive provisions - (i.e. whether creating new 
criminal liabilities or providing extra criminal sanctions) - and their 
invocation against the trade unions' members are strategies of opposition 
that have been adopted by all forms of governments in the Sudan (85b). 
However the rather excessive use and more frequent invocation of 
criminal provisions by the Military Governments are due to the latter's 
eli tist policies referred to earlier (85c). Both aspects came to surface 
in extreme forms in the period 1969-1985 because of massive political 
~hanges that marked the beginning of this period and also because of 
constraints which the social and economic consequences of the 
implementa tion of develolpment planning placed on the economy towards 
the end of the period (85d). 
Poli tical regimes have consistently preserved 5.143 and the other 
provisions of the 1925 Penal Code discussed earlier. This is in spite of 
the fact that the Penal Code has in general been subject to various 
changes since Independence. Some political regimes have moreover 
reinforced the existing punitive provisions either by adding new sections 
under the Penal Code or the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Laws. 
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or by enacting separate state security laws to the same effect. As 
example of the latter Republican Order No.2 of November 1958 dissolved 
all trade unions and federations and banned strikes. Violation of the ban 
on strikes was triable - by a Court Martial - under provisions of the 
Penal Code dealing with offences against the 5tate and public tranquility 
(PC, 55.115-127). The November ban on strikes was lifted in February 
1960 only to be substituted by restrictive trade union and labour relations 
laws. The TUO 1960 made all violations of its provisions punishable as 
criminal offences and provided stiffer sentences for violations (86) which 
had already been listed as offences under the previous Ordinance. The 
RTDA 1966 and the TUO 1966 cancelled most of the severe sentences 
(87) imposed by the 1960 legisla tion. However the R TDA 1966 
preserved both the restriction on strike action and the criminal 
punishment provided against violation of the restriction (RDA, 1966 
55.27 -28). 
On the same line, following the military coup of the 25th May 
, 
1969, Article 5"d" of the Republican Order No.II issued on the same day 
(88) made it an offence triable by Court Martial and punishable with 
death or imprisonment for" ••. any person to go on strike or do any act 
with intent to cause damage or sabotage to the economic system of the 
5ta te". The scope of this prohibition was subsequently widened to 
include "all for ms of work-stoppages refusal to work and mass 
resignation, with or without intention to damage or sabotage the 
economy or interfere with the performance of any general serVice ... if 
such strikes work-stoppages or resignation would in fact have such 
resul ts" (89). This ban on strikes remained until November 1970 when 
trade unions were once more allowed to function under a new 
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consolida ted labour code. However following the suspension of the 1970 
Consolidated Labour Code (CLC 1970) in February 1971 and political 
events that took place in July 1971 (90) a ban on both trade unions and 
strikes was reinstated on the first of August 1971. 
The trade unIOn and industrial relations laws that came into 
effect after July 1971 contained certain restrictions on strikes (9 O. 
Most important was the incorporation into legislation that was to remain 
in effect until 1985 of the 1969 and 1970 Republican Orders' prohibition 
of strikes. Sections 17 of the State Security Act 1973 and the State 
Security Act 1981 (92) - (SSA 1973, 1981) - were verbatim re-enactment 
of the relevant articles of the Republican Orders No.II and No.IV 
respectively. Following the enactment of a new Penal Code in 1983 a 
section 98 "C" of the new code now incorpora tes a consolida ted 
re-enactment of 55.17 of the SSA 1973, 1981. The new section provides 
for the death penalty against or imprisonment and confiscation of 
pr oper ty of any per son who ins tiga tes, or gan izes, par tic ipa tes or 
~ncourages participation in an unlawful strike, work-stoppage or mass 
resignation with the purpose of opposing the legitimate political authority 
or harming the national economy or obstructing the running of a public 
service or utility. 55. 98(b) of the PC, 1983 poses the same penal ties 
for "any person who does any act which is intended or is likely to harm 
the National economy". The Code also widened the scope of sedition so 
that it may now cover instances of continuation with a strike or other 
activity after it has been declared unlawful by a government authority 
(93). 
192 
l.C.2.b Suspension of the Trade Union Immunity 
This was one of the vanous anti-union measures which General 
Abboud's Regime adopted in the period between 1958 and 1964. The 
trade unions and industrial relations laws that came into effect following 
the lifting of a 15 months ban on strikes and trade unions in February 
1960, contained none of the immunities trade unions had enjoyed under 
the TUO 1949 and the R TOO 1949. Section 3 of the TUO (Amendment) 
Act 1960 repealed 5.5 (94) of the TUO 1949 thereby making trade unions 
unlawful as in restraint of trade, and together with their members liable 
to prosecution for simple conspIracy. Likew ise the R TOO 1949 was 
repealed (95) and none of its provisions relating to immunity from 
tortious liability (SS.3( 1)), immunity from civil and criminal conspiracy 
(5.4), or immunity from liability for inducing a breach of contract (5.6) 
was included in its replacement, the TDA 1960. From its part however 
the TDA provided no alternative form of protection. 
l.C.2.c Direct Restriction of Strikes 
While inadequate legal protection of the right to strike was, 
during the colonial era, the only obstacle that hindered the full 
enjoyment of that right by the trade unions, an additional obstacle was 
to be encountered in the post-independence era. This was the 
determination of various nationalist governments to place direct and 
posi ti ve restriction on the strike action. Al though political regimes 
unanimously believed in the need for restriction. the manner in which 
each one of them sought to implement the policy differed giving rise in 
the case of some of them to a third method of excluding the right to 
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strike. Instead of abolishing trade unlOn immunities altogether both the 
Parlia mentary Gover nment of 1964-1969, and its successor General 
Numeiri's Regime chose to spare these immunities but make them 
redundant through introduction of compulsory procedures for disputes 
settlement. The abolition of trade union immunities by General 
Abboud's Regime did not however prevent that regime from also adopting 
compulsory procedures for dispute resolution as principal policy. 
I argue that operation of a compulsory procedure for dispute 
resolution of the type that has been in existence since 1960 in Sudan 
does in practice effect an almost complete prohibition (96) of strikes. 
The adoption by General Abboud's Regime of the additional measure of 
abolition of trade union immunities, albeit in theory makes that regime's 
labour laws the most stringent in the country's legislative history, did not 
in practice produce any results which were not achievable through the 
method of compulsory settlement alone. 
There are two reasons which make provlslOn of a compulsory 
dispute settlement procedure by itself effective a restriction. The first 
reason IS that under both the 1966 and 197 6/77 laws (97), striking in 
viola tion of the procedure makes the trade union and each of its 
members liable for criminal punishment. Although both laws provide for 
immuni ty of trade unions from tortious liability, criminal responsibility 
and actions for inducing breach of contract (98), the immunity does not 
cover actions that are unlawful under the Trade Union and Industrial 
Relations Laws or those punishable as crimes, under the Penal Code. if 
committed by individuals (99). The second reason is that it is almost 
impossible under both laws to take strike action without violating either 
194-
the statutory dispute settlement procedure or the criminal law (100). So 
far the only case in which strike action was held to be legal was _one 
where the Commissioner of Labour and the Minister of Public Service 
had, by failing to refer the dispute to compulsory arbitration within the 
period specified under the law, themselves acted against the law (100. 
In practice however the decision of the Supreme Court in the case 
cited above brings little relief. This is because the bulk of industrial 
disputes is dealt with, not by the Civil Courts, but, by the Commissioner 
of Labour and the Minister responsible for the public service either by 
themsel ves or through reference of these disputes to arbi tra tion (l02). 
Moreover the measures which the Minister, the Commissioner and other 
administrative authorities are empowered to take, in furthering a 
"settlement" of disputes, often inflict damage that is difficult to repair 
even if an appeal against the administra ti ve decision is allowed (I03). 
There is evidence to suggest that strikes have been outlawed by 
the Commissioner, the Minister and other administrative authorities, even 
when they were caused by the failure of these authorities to compel 
employers to engage in negotiation, mediation or arbi tra tion procedures 
for the settlement of the dispute within the statutory schedule. In one 
case the Labour Commissioner declared a strike illegal even though the 
employer and the Commissioner were to blame for the delav in 
negotia tion and reference of the dispute to mediation (104-). In a second 
case a strike was declared illegal and the management was directed to 
take measures against the strikers even though it was the employer and 
the Commissioner who were to blame for the delay in the 
commencement of negotiation (105). In a third case a strike \\3S 
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declared illegal even though it was a result of management refusal to 
negotiate, accept reference to arbitration or abide by the compulsory 
arbitration award (06). 
Together with the already existing restrictions on strike action In 
the public sector these additional forms of restriction in the 
post-independence era have effected a complete formal abrogation of the 
right to strike in general. Although some forms of restriction applied 
only under military rule the direct restriction on strikes has always 
remained in effect. Furthermore, the lifting of certain forms of 
restriction by Parliamentary Governments was practically insignificant 
also because, of the 30 years of Indpendence since 1956 these 
Governments reigned for a total of only 8 years - (compared with a total 
of 22 years of military rule). 
I.C.3 Enforcement of the Laws Against Strikes 
Every nationalist government stood firmly by the letter of its law 
on strikes. Whether or not the legal prohibition and government's 
stance towards its implementation did actually eliminate strikes is a 
different question that will be dealt with later (107). The discussion In 
this section is confined to the methods of forceful resistance and 
repr isals that the State and employers use against workers and trade 
unions taking strike action which the former regard as unlawful. 
consider this subject relevant to the main theme of the Chapter because 
the extent to which the State and employers are In practice ready to go 
in counteracting strike action is also relevant In assessing the 
pre-eminence of political - (i.e. extra-industrial or extra-legal) -
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considera tions. 
Beginning with the State sector it IS noted that the i\Hnister 
responsible for the public service does not usually wai t for the 
Commissioner of Labour or the Registrar of trade unions to declare the 
strike illegal in order for him - (the Minister) - to take action. Since 
both the Registrar of trade unions and the Commissioner of Labour were 
until 1981 subordinate to the Minister responsible for the public service 
it was the Minister who could direct them to act or approve their action 
in spec if ic si tua ti ons. Moreoever even when expressing genUIne 
industrial grievances strikes in the public sector are cause for political 
alarm and intervention of the highest political authority - (be it a 
President of a republic, a Ministerial Cabinet or Military Council). e.g. In 
June 1960 a decision by the SR WTU to strike over a wage-increase 
demand prompted the dissolution of the trade union by order of the 
Minister of Labour. When the SR WTU nevertheless staged the strike -
(El Shiekh 1967, pp.18-20) - the Minister reacted by ordering the arrest 
of the trade union officials. Three of those arrested were tried and 
sentenced to imprisonment for "their failure to observe the compulsory 
dispute resolution procedure". All other members of the trade union 
executive were dismissed and all workers of the Sudan Railways who 
participated in the strike faced disciplinary action (Taha 1970 p.113). 
The Parliamentary Government that reigned between 1964-1969 
was equally determined to ensure compliance with its trade union and 
industrial relations laws. When the SRWTU threatened to strike in 
disregard of the statutory settlement procedure the \linister of Transport 
personally dismissed 43 workers and officials members of the union (l08). 
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Similar measures were adopted, a few months later b"y the same Minister 
against the Mechanical Transport Workers Union and 2 years later by the 
Ministerial Cabinet against the Central Electricity and Water Authority 
Workers' Trade Union (109). 
Similar events continued to dominate the scene of industrial 
relations in Sudan during the late 1970s and early 1980s. A conciliatory 
approach to a rail strike in 1979 by the then Vice-President Abul-Gasim 
M Ibrahim resulted in his sacking from office and necessitated the 
blockage of the deal by announcement of a wage freeze that was to 
subsist until 1981 (110). When, in June 1981, the SRWTU again went on 
strike over wage-increase demands, the President of the Republic 
condemned the strike as illegal and issued an ultima tum to the workers 
warning them to return to work immediately or otherwise evacuate 
government houses with their families. Two days later the Police were 
given the orders to raid the railway headquarters and to break the strike 
by force. 86 of the strike leaders were arrested and a few of them 
including all members of the Central Committee of the SR WTU were 
prosecuted under the State Security Act (111). 
The determination of political authorities to combat strikes was 
exhibited once more during a strike by the Medical Doctors' Trade Union 
in Marchi April 1984. Although the strike was largely over improvement 
of working conditions demands (8 out of 15 demands related to 
improvement in the hygiene and general health standards of the service. 
the rest to payment increase demands) the political authority 
recommended dissolution of the Union. The T r ad e Un ion \\' a s 
accordingly dissolved on 1 April 1984 for its alleged \'iolations of the 
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State Security Act 1981, the Penal Code 1983, the -Industrial Relations 
Act 1976 and the Public Service Act 1973. On 2 April 1984 the Doctors 
were given 72 hours warning to return to work. On the same day the 
security forces were directed by the President to take the necessary 
measures for identifica tion and detention of those responsible for 
organiZing the strike. A few members of the trade union including all 
its officials were accordingly arrested and detained without trial (I 12). 
A trade unlOn which goes on strike In violation of the statutory 
procedures for disputes resolution or In disregard of any order or 
directi ve made by the Commissioner of Labour in exercise of his powers 
under these procedures will also face a penalty of dissolution inflictable 
by the Registrar of Trade Unions in accordance with his powers under 
S.31 of the ETUA 1977. In exercise of their powers under the Trade 
Union and Industrial Relations Laws the Commissioner of Labour referred 
many disputes to the Registrar and the latter did actually dissolve 
several trade unions. Trade unions dissolved on ground of alleged failure 
of compliance with the provisions of the law included the Accountants 
and Cashiers Trade Union, the Medical Doctors' Trade Union, the Sudan 
Railway Workers' Union, and the Customs and Excise Officers' Trade 
Union (I13). On one occasion following a strike by the Teachers' Trade 
Union In the aftermath of employer's repeated failure to fulfill his 
obliga tion under a subsisting collective agreement the strike was declared 
unlawful and the Trade Union dissolved and its property seized (I14). 
Because the dispute occurred In the Southern Region these measures 
were taken not by the Registrar but by a provincial governor in that 
Region (I 15). 
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In addition to a freeze of the trade 
,I 
unIOn fund which would 
automatically ensue upon dissolution, such dissolution will also make all 
strikers severally and jointly liable as accomplices or participants in an 
unlawful association and in the waging of an action that is not immune 
by the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Laws. These are offences 
ser ious enough to warrant arrest trial and sentencing under the section of 
the Penal Code dealing with Sedition (5.105) and breach of Public 
Tranquility - (55.115-120). 
Turning to the position In the private sector it IS noted that the 
measures which employers can personally take against strikers are 
confined to a) dismissal or disciplining of individual employees; and (b) 
prosecution of all or any of the trade union members or of employees on 
strike under the punitive provision of the IRA 1976 5.31 (116). The 
Commissioner of Labour may also report to the Registrar, any private 
sector trade union which fails to comply with the provisions of the IRA 
1976 regarding compulsory settlement of disputes procedure, and the 
Registrar may, if he thinks fit, order dissolution of such trade union. 
Partly because of the relative inability of private employers to influence 
the Registrar's decision there has so far been no incident of dissolution 
of a trade union in this sector. 
Lea ving dismissal and discipline aside for the moment, once a 
strike is declared illegal by the Commissioner, or the employer decides 
tha t the strike is illegal the latter may immediately prosecute all or any 
of the workers or trade union members on strike. Following a two day 
strike by the Company's workers' trade union on 16 and 17 August 1980 
the management of Hilton (Sudan) brought criminal proceedings, under 
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55.29/31 of the IRA 1976, against and, suspended from duty, 11 of its 
workers, 8 of whom were members of the trade union executi vee 
Although their innocence was confirmed a year later by the Supreme 
Court all eleven workers were never reinstated (117). 
In some cases however following the lodging of information 
regarding the strike to the Police or the State Security Department -
(these were two different bodies then) - the strike organizers were 
arrested and detained without trial (118). Many trade unionists detained 
in this fashion spent more than a year In jail and in two cases the 
detention continued for more than five years (119). In another case the 
Company's workers went on strike because of the former's decision to 
postpone the payment of salaries. The Management reacted by 
announcing the closure of the plant and the lay-off of the entire 
workforce apparently in violation of the IRA 1976 5.29. Nevertheless 
the Company's call for intervention of the Police and the security forces 
was responded to immediately with the forces arriving on the (120) scene 
and driving the workers out of the Company's premises. Although the 
Labour Office blamed the employer for causing the trouble the latter 
was adamant that the strike was illegal and that he was not bound to pay 
any wages for any of the strike days. 
The countermeasures most commonly adopted by private 
employers are dismissals and the lock out of employees on strike. The 
employer may with or without the permission of the Commissioner of 
Labour and irrespective of whether the strike IS. from the 
Com missioner's perspective, legal or illegal dismiss all or any of his 
employees on strike. If the strike is unlawful - e.g. because it \'iolates 
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" the statutory provisions regarding compulsory settlement of disputes or 
any order made under these provisions - the employer may apply to the 
Commissioner for dismissal of all or any of the employees on strike on 
the ground of wilful disobedience or deliberate omission to carry their 
obliga tions under the contract of employment (121). In one case the 
Commissioner approved the dismissal, under SS.10(5)a of the 1973 
Employer and Employed Persons Ordinance (EEPO 1973), of eight 
employees including the President, Secretary and Treasurer of the trade 
union even though the dismissals had been made by the employer without 
prior consultation with the Commissioner and before the industrial action 
- subsequently taken by their union in protest against the employer's 
beha viour - which the Commissioner invoked as ground for his approval 
of the dis missals (122). 
Although Since 1969 individual employment law requlres the prior 
approval of the Commissioner before an employee is dismissed on any of 
the grounds aforementioned, and, in spite of the weight of judicial 
~uthorities (123) in favour of a view that failure to do so will, 
irrespecti ve of the grounds contended render dismissal unlawful, there is 
more evidence to suggest that the Commissioner does not in practice 
adhere to the letter of the law - at least in cases where the latent 
reason for dismissal is a strike which he deems unlawful. Following a 
slow-down by the workers of the Sudan Textile Factory in 1974 for 
instance the management reacted by immediately dismissing 800 workers. 
However the Commissioner of Labour condemned the dismissals, but, 
instead of declaring all of them unlawful, as against the requirement of 
prior reference of the dispute to the Commission, ratified the ei"nployer's 
decision to dismiss in 212 out of the 800 original cases (124). In another 
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case the employer's immediate dismissal of four workers did not even 
attract a comment from the Commissioner nor prevent him from 
approving dismissal by the same employer of a fifth worker for his 
participa tion in the same industrial action that led to the arbitrary 
dismissal of his colleagues (125). The Metal Sheet Co. Case - (Ibid 
£.122) - also shows the Commissioner's readiness to declare a strike 
illegal even when it is sparked by employers' violation of the law (126). 
If the Commissioner decides that the strike is not unlawful there 
IS still little which can be done to stop an employer from dismissing all 
or any of his employees on strike under the sections of individual 
employment law aforementioned - (supra £.121). Al though the 
Commissioner does in practice exert considerable efforts in counteracting 
employers' reprisals in cases where the dispute is caused by their 
intransigence to negotiate over genuine and obvious grievances, its 
success to that effect is ultimately limited by the Labour Laws in force. 
This subject is discussed under the next section (127). 
Turning to lock-outs it IS noted that employers are prohibited by 
law from adopting this or any similar measure at or between any of the 
stages of the compulsory disputes settlement procedure that has been in 
effect since 1960 (128). Despite the prohibition however there has been 
many instances of lockouts in none of which the Commissioner took the 
course of action prescribed by the law (129). One reason for this may 
be that, while they may effectively be applied against some trade union 
members and officials, the long imprisonment sentences provided by the 
law against violations of its rules governing compulsory settlement of 
disputes are practically inapplicable as against an employer whose 
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presence on the premIses or plant IS in any way essential for the 
resumption of work. Another reason is that because strikes are scarcely 
ever lawful a lockout by an employer is always treated as consequential 
upon a series of strikes or other actions for whose initiation the trade 
unIons and their members are, in any case, held responsible (130). 
Finally, the theme of the discussion in this section has been that 
legislative restriction on strike action, not only exists on paper but is 
also fully implemented in practice. I am not claiming that leg isla ti ve 
restrictions and their implementation have eliminated strikes. What is 
certain however is that the leg isla ti ve policy in Sudan has so far 
remained impervious to the possible practical limitations and negative 
consequences - (for industrial relations, the economy and the law itself) -
of invoking the criminal law or dissolving trade unions as means for 
maintaining industrial peace (I30a). 
The restriction of collective action also means that the position 
of the inherently weaker party - (i.e. the worker) - is made even worse. 
This is especially true because the prohibition of industrial action, 
although in form equally applicable to lockouts and strikes, IS not in 
practice as equally effective against employers as against the trade 
unions and their members (130b). As explained in the next section the 
law also does not provide any effective protection for trade uniOn 
members and officials. It is ultimately the individual employee in its 
capacity as a trade union member or official which bears the effect of 
this combination of restriction and lack of adequate individual protection. 
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l.C.4 Weaknesses of the Individual Legal Basis of the "Right" to Strike 
The discussion has centred under the previous section on the de 
Jure and de facto positions of strikes that are considered as unlawful by 
the Commissioner of Labour. The discussion under this section examines 
the positions of individual employees and trade unions taking part In a 
strike or industrial action that is deemed as not unlawful by the 
Commissioner. My investigation of relevant issues is specifically guided 
by the question of vulnerability or invulnerability of such employees, to 
dismissal and other forms of discipline taken under the indi vidual 
employment relations laws, and in case a vulnerability is proven, whether 
such vulnerability undermines or is otherwise offset by the immunities 
provided under the trade union and industrial relations laws. 
The discussion under the preceding sub-sections of this Part I.C. 
suggests that all strikes are, under the trade union and industrial 
relations laws and Penal Codes, formally unlawful. However the 
decision of the Commissioner of Labour regarding the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of a strike always depends inter alia on the Commissioner'S 
subjecti ve interpretation and application of the laws governing strikes. 
The strikes implicated under the present subsection were ones which the 
Commissioner applying its own discretion and subjective understanding of 
the law considered as "lawful" - (even though as a matter of law this 
could not be true). My intention is not to evaluate the Commissioner'S 
judicial performance. It is rather to demonstrate that even if the 
Commissioner judging by his own understanding of the trade union and 
industrial relations laws decides that the strike is "lawful" he is 
powerless to stop an employer from taking retaliatory measures against 
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employees taking part m this so-called "lawful" strike. 
The materials to be considered in the course of the discussion 
comprise, provisions scattered under several labour laws the most 
important of which is the individual employment relations law in both the 
private and the public sectors, and decisions of administrative authorities 
and the civil courts in specific cases. Before m:::>ving to examine these 
issues and materials it would be helpful to explain two things namely (a) 
the reason for including a discussion of this nature - (i.e. touching 
overwhel mingly on indi vidual employ ment rela tions law) - in this 
particular chapter, and (b) the relevance of the discussion to the main 
theme of the thesis. 
Employers~ powers of dismissal are in general regulated by 
individual employment law. Indi vidual employment law is in turn 
ad ministered by, the Com missioner of Labour and the ordinary civil 
courts, in case of the private sector, and the Public Service Appeals 
Board (131) in case of the public sector. The dismissals discussed under 
this section were all carried out for allegedly anti-union objectives. 
Cases of this type are, exempted from the jurisdiction of the 
above-mentioned bodies, and, adj udica ted upon exclusi vely by the 
Registrar of trade unions. Hence their discussion under a chapter 
dealing primarily with collective labour relations law. 
I have indica ted at the beginning of the Chapter (I32) that judicial 
recognition of a right to strike is most effective when or where strikes 
have become socially inevitable. The limited right to strike that was 
awarded to the trade unions by the 1949 legislation was of a different 
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type. Far from being an indexation of a stage of autonomous evolution 
of trade unions that limited right possessed little more than the juridical 
existence. It was therefore easy for some nationalist governments to 
revoke that right and suppress trade unions for relatively long periods of 
time. The discussion under this section suggests that to a large extent, 
the terms and conditions of the individual employment relationship 
equally owe their existence to regulation from above. To that effect 
determination and administration of the terms and conditions of the 
employment relationship in the public sector are reflective of external -
(State) - control sometimes at the expense of the interests of the direct 
employer or of both the employer and the employee (133). Although the 
terms and conditions of employment in the private sector are less 
susceptible to government control. A contrast between the provisions of 
the law governing dismissal and the provisions govermng other areas of 
the private individual employment relationship on the one hand and those 
governing trade union immunity on the other reveals that labour relations 
law in general is adversely affected by this superstructural (or external) 
course of development. This IS evident from the following: 
1. Collecti ve labour relations law did not until 1971 provide any 
protection against dismissal for trade union acti vi ty. This illustrates 
that because protective legislation has developed mainly at the initiative 
of the State - (partly under the actual or potential pressure-power of a 
politically-orientated trade union movement) - it applies to areas which 
the trade unions are anxious and the State is wishing to protect. 
Dismissal for trade union acti vi ty is an area of labour relations that has 
so far remained virtually unprotected. 
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2. Although the trade unIOn law has Since 1971 prohibited the 
dismissal of trade union officials and members for trade union acti vi ty. 
The position of the law is still that this immunity does not override the 
provisions of the individual employment law that give the employer the 
power to dismiss in the circumstances to be discussed under this section. 
The ineffecti veness of this trade unIon im muni ty is due to the 
superficiality or externality of the protection it provides. It shows that 
even when trade union law has provided for immunities it has done so as 
a response to trade Union political opposition. This political or 
superstructural orientation of the law disregards the legal obstacles (at 
the level of the individual contract of employment) and the weak de 
facto position of the individual employee (itself being a result of the de 
facto limited industrial power of individual trade unions) which make the 
operation of this immunity virtually impossible. The fact that not even 
the trade unions have successfully called upon the legislature to match 
protection at these three - (i.e. the collective legal, the individual legal, 
and the de facto) - levels itself reveals the disproportionately greater 
importance which the politically-orientated Sudanese trade unions have 
attached to collective labour relations rights (134). 
None of the trade union or industrial relations Acts that existed 
prIor to 197 1 con tained any restr ic tions on dis missal of i nd i v id ua 1 
members or officials of trade unions for trade union activity. On the 
contrary industrial relations law has always emphasised that public 
servants who break their contract of service in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute are not exempt from disciplinary measures 
_ (including dismissal) - and civil or criminal liabilities (135). Likewise 
indi vidual employment law in the public sector has since 1973 given the 
State the right to dismiss any employee on grounds of "public interest" or 
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"service interest" (136). These sections gIve the government new powers 
to inter alia dismiss employees involved in preparation for a strike or 
work stoppage though not in breach of their contract of service. 
The position of employees in the private sector IS a little better 
in the respect that, except for the 6 years reign of General Abboud's 
Regime between 1958-1964 in which all forms of trade union activities 
remained potentially criminal, they have from the inception of Trade 
Union and Industrial Relations Laws been protected against criminal and 
ci viI liabilities by the immunities provided under these laws. As far as 
protection of individual members or officials against dismissal for trade 
union activity is concerned however the position of employees in this 
sector was not any better than that of their colleagues in the public 
sector until 1973. The absence prlOr to 1971 of specific protection for 
individual members or officials from anti-union discrimination practices 
coupled with certain loopholes in individual employment law made 
strikers an easy prey for dismissal. Until 1969 an employer could 
summarily dismiss any of his employees who inter alia omitted to carry 
out his obligations under the contract of employment - (EEPO, 1949 
SS.10(2)d). Likewise the employer could dismiss any of his employees 
for any reason whatsoever subject only to a statutory requirement of 
notice - (EEPO, 1949 55.1 O( 1)). Since 1969 an amendment has been 
introduced to the 1949 EEPO whereby legality of dismissal under 55.10(2) 
is now made subject to obtainment of prior approval of the Commissioner 
of Labour (137). However the 1969 amendment left 55.10(1) of the 
EEPO 1949 untouched. 
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It was not until 1973 that a second amendment of the EEPO 1949 
was passed specifying for the first time only definite instances in which 
employers may terminate the contract of employment with notice (138). 
The 1973 amendment came after widespread resentment among trade 
unions following the suspension of the 1970 CLC and the restoration of 
the 1949 EEPO as amended in 1969. In the three years that elapsed 
between the suspension of the 1970 CLC and the passing of the 1973 
amendment, 55.1 O( 1) of the EEPO 1949 was used frequently by employers 
to rid of trade union activists. The 1973 amendment was in this respect 
an improvement that came at a time where it was most badly needed 
(139). 
Another legisla ti ve change introduced in 1971 has been the 
provision of sta tutory protection for trade union officials against 
dismissal or transfer "for reasons of trade union acti vi ty" (140) and the 
protection of trade unions and their members from interference -
(through enticement or otherwise) - by employers. 
To sum up the hypotheses of the argument: (1) Notwithstanding 
the legisla ti ve changes introduced since 1971 individual employment law 
has always allowed dismissal for wilful disobedience or omission to carry 
out contractual obligations; (2) Because every strike is by def ini tion a 
wilful omlSSlOn to carry contractual obligations employees taking such 
action can be dis missed under this rule. The rule applies irrespecti ve of 
whether the strike is, from the Commissioner's point of view lawful or 
unla wful; (3) The position of the individual employee is vulnerable also 
because of the way in which certain sections of the law, regarding 
"arbi trary dismissal" and reduction of the workforce on economIC or 
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technological grounds are being used or administered; (4) Although the 
trade union law formally prohibits dismissal for trade union acti\ity. 
The protection which this law provides is undermined by the above more 
basic provisions of individual employment law. These hypotheses are 
examined under three main sub-headings namely : (a) the state of the 
law; (b) problems of interpretations; and (c) problems arising from 
administration of the law. 
I.C.4.a The State of the Law 
There is still one section of the law of individual employment 
rela tions which enables the employer, subject only to approval of the 
Commissioner of Labour, to dismiss any of his employees who fail to 
carry out his obligations under the contract of employment - 5.3 7'd' of 
the IERA 1981. The Commissioner's approval of a dismissal under 
SS.37'd' is not difficult to obtain. This is so because, as will be made 
clearer under the next section, there is no solid legal ground on which 
the Commissioner may reject an application for dismissal under this 
section even if he is satisfied that the employee's failure to carry out his 
obliga tions is a result of his participation in a lawful strike. In one case 
the Commissioner approved the dismissal under this section of six 
workers three of whom were trade union officials even though the latent 
reason for the dismissal, as the Commissioner should have known, was 
trade union activism (I4 O. 
The 1973 amendment of the 1949 EEPO has also introduced a new 
rule under 55.10(12) (now incorporated under 5.40 of the IER:\ 1981) 
whereunder an employer is entitled to reduce. subject only to the 
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approval of the Commissioner, any number constituting less than 50% of 
his workforce (142) for technical or economic reasons. There is reason 
to believe that this rule is also used by employers in order to get rid of 
trade union activists. The reason is that there is no legisla ti ve 
restriction and in the vast majority of cases no trade union control on 
employers' freedom to choose both the number and persons of those to 
be made redundant (143). In the three applications of the rule affecting 
trade union members and officials (143a) the employers' application for 
making redundant specific named persons were approved by the 
Commissioner. This was despite the fact that some of those made 
redundant were trade union officials and the others were trade Union 
activists, that the timing of the applications and the circumstances In 
which they were made suggest anti-union moti ves on the part of 
employers or, as In one case, at least cast doubt on the claim that 
genuine economic and technical reasons were to blame. In the first of 
the applications examined the Labour Office approved the dismissal of 8 
employees even though the application was made in the mid of an 
industrial dispute, between the applicant employer and his employees' 
trade union, over the employer's interference with the trade union 
internal affairs through bribery of part of its members and the dismissal 
of others (144). In the second application the dismissal of the employee. 
a trade union executive was approved by the labour office also in the 
mid of an industrial dispute over conditions of work described in a 
separate report by the same labour office as "extremely poor" (145). In 
the th ird case foIl ow i ng prote st by the la bour of f ice aga ins t the 
employer's dismissal of a member of the trade union executive under 
SS.10(2)d of the EEPO 1969 the employer withdrew the dismissal notice 
under that section and instead applied to the Commissioner of Labour 
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complaining about the economic situation in the fadtory and demanding 
the permission to dismiss the same employee under 55.10(12) of the 
EEPO 1973. The Labour Office allowed the dismissal (146). 
The biggest loophole in the law against dismissals and one which 
has a particularly damaging effect on trade union freedom of action is 
that the sanctions provided against unlawful dismissals of all types are 
inadequate and inexpensive (146a) a price which many employers may 
readily pay in order to rid their workforce of trade union activists. In 
spite of all the amendments discussed in previous pages the present 
position of the law is still that an employer may dismiss any of his 
employees for any reason whatsoever and without prior consultations with 
anybody if he is ready to pay the dismissed employee the compensation 
provided for by Statute (147). Until 1981 the compensation payable to 
an employee upon this so called "arbitrary dismissal" was a sum equalling 
three times the amount of his salary at the time of dismissal (148). 
Although the Law provides for, long imprisonment sentences, and, fine in 
t:ase the restrictions regarding dismissals are contravened these puni ti ve 
provisions are deemed applicable only in case the employer refuses to 
both reinstate or compensate the dismissed employee (149). 
Of all legal grounds used for dismissal of trade uniOn officials and 
members reported in 14 firms studied by the author "arbitrary dismissal" 
_ (i.e. dismissal without any ground) - was the ground used in the 
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majority of firms and the one responsible for the' largest number of 
dismissals - c.f. table (1). In some cases arbitrary dismissal was 
resorted to by employers following refusal of the Labour Office to allow 
dismissal under other sections of the Law (150). Wi th only one 
exception all instances of arbitrary dismissals were opposed, albeit in 
vain, by the Commissioner and, in three cases, complaints against 
employers were filed with the Registrar of Trade Unions (151). 
Although the compensation payable to an arbitrarily dismissed 
employee has, since June 1981, been increased to a sum equalling six 
times the employee's monthly payment at the time of dismissal (152), 
this has not by itself stopped the continued dismissals of trade Union 
members and officials. Some of the arbitrary dismissals shown on Table 
, I took place after June 1981. 
1.C.4.b Problems of Interpretation 
Ha ving pointed to their vulnerability to dismissal under individual 
employment law this section examines the position of trade union 
officials and members as shown under the latter law in its 
interrelationship with the protection, provided by 5.21 of the ETUA 1977 
(153), of trade union officials against "any penalty whatsoever imposed 
because of their trade union activities". Practice of the Labour 
Department has established that trade union officials who organize an 
unlawful strike cannot benefit from 5.21 of the ETUA 1977 and escape 
responsibili ty for "failing to carry out their obliga tions under the 
Contract of Employment" (154). 
Year of 1981 
Dismissal 
Kusu 
Auto-
Firm Bakery 
No. of 
Dismissals 
under 
SS.I 0(1 2) 
S.40 1981 
No. of 
Dismissals 
under 5 
SS.10(5)d 
I SS.37d 198 
No. of 
Dismissals 
under 
SS.10(2)d 
SS39(6)198 
Total 5 
Comment AAD 
55.10(2)d = 
55.10(5)d = 
55.10(12) = 
AOF = 
AOR = 
AAD = 
Source: 
TABLE I 
Appendix to fs. 141-151 and the text above 
Unremedied Cases of Dismissals for Trade Union Activity in Individual Firms 
Distributed Among Legal Grounds for Dismissal Under the EEPO 1973 and the IERA 1981 
1980 - 1983 1983 1979 1973, 1982 1980 
1983 1979 
Bata Marples Rubi Salwa Metal Hilton Coldair 
(Sudan) Ridgway Trans- Botique Sheets (Sudan) Engineer 
port Industrie< 
Limited 
I 1 
3 
100 3 1 9 11 
100 1 3 2 12 11 
AAD AAD AAD AAD AAD AOF 
AOF 
Arbitrary dismissal i.e. with compensation irrespective of reasons 
Negligent or wilful omission to carry contractual obligations 
Reduction of the workforce for economic or technical reasons 
Authorities opposed dismissals but failed to reinstate 
Authorities opposed and forced reinstatement 
Authorities approved dismissaHs) 
ing 
3 
3 
AAD 
Compiled by the author from Khartoum North Labour Office statistics 
1976 1974 
National Sudan 
Footwear Textile 
Factory 
8 
2 
14 212 
24 212 
AAD AAD 
1983 1983 
CerTlLlirLi \krlical 
SpinnIng Prodtj( t5 
and Limited 
WeLl ving 
FLlctory 
41 
3 
41 3 
AOF AOF 
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However there is nothing in the individual employment law which 
prevents an employer from dismissing under this rule -i.e. for failure to 
carry out obligations under the contract of employment - any trade union 
official organizing or taking part in a strike which the Commissioner may 
regard as "Lawful". Moreover, even if the Commissioner convinces an 
employer that the strike is "Lawful" and that the latter cannot 
accordingly dismiss a trade union official or member under the rule 
aforementioned, the employer may, if he wish, still dismiss the employee 
under his powers of "arbitrary dismissal" (155). This inability of the law 
to protect trade union officials and members from dismissal or to 
reinsta te them in case they have already been dismissed applies even if 
these officials and members are dismissed for trade union activity not 
invol ving strike or other industrial action. 
This contrast between on the one hand SS.21 of the ETUA 
1971/1977 and on the other the sections of individual employment law 
dealing with arbitrary dismissal and dismissal for failure to carry out the 
obliga tions under the contract of employment has led some trade 
unionists to complain of a contradiction between the two (156). In a 
recent dispute however the Trade Unions Federation -(The SWTUF) - on 
behalf of the contending trade union argued that the provision of S.21 of 
the E TUA 1977 should be interpreted as prevailing over those of the 
individual employment law. In that case (157) following the Supreme 
Court confirmation of the lower Courts' decisions challenging the alleged 
unlawfulness of the (l57a) strike and acquitting the defendants of all 
offences charged the employer in complete disregard of directives made 
accordingly by the Registrar of trade unions (158) and the Commissioner 
(159) of Labour refused to end the suspension of the 11 trade unionists 
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concerned and eventually dismissed them giving each the six-months-wages 
compensation payable upon arbitrary dismissal. 
The 5WTUF supported the defendants' demand for reinstatement 
and claimed that they were dismissed because of lawful trade union 
activity. The defendants applied to the Attorney General demanding 
enforcement of the Registrar's - (which is a subordinate of the Attorney 
General''' Champers) - directive concerning their reinstatement. The 
Attorney General advised the applicants that their dismissals were In 
accordance with the provisions of 55.39(3), (6) of the IERA 1981 and that 
there was nothing it could do to prevent or invalidate an employer's 
action taken under either of these subsections (160). Upon reception of 
its copy of the Attorney General letter the 5WTUF wrote back to him 
demanding his comment on the 5WTUF's own view that the provision of 
5.21 of the ETUA 1977 restricts employers' powers of arbitrary dismissal 
provided for by the individual employment law (161). 
In a language that suggests his unsuspecting readiness to accept as 
the true reason for the dismissal the label that the employer attaches to 
it the Attorney General replied that the reason for the dismissal was "as 
sta ted by the employer in the papers before me" not trade union activity. 
The Attorney General added that individual employment law "provides 
only pecuniary guarantees against dismissal and that reinstatement is 
neither desirable nor possible under present Laws" (162). Despite its 
relevance for determination of the issue under consideration the SWTUF 
0-
sta tement of opinion, about the relation between 5.21 of E TU A 1977 and 
the sections of individual employment law regarding breach of Contract 
and arbitrary dismissal, went largely uncommented upon. 
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I believe that, as the law of individual and collective labour 
rela tions stand at the moment, 5.21 of the E TU A 1977 does not restrict 
the powers of dismissals which employers possess under individual 
employment law. One reason for this is that 5.21 of the ETUA 1977 
creates, not an independent and extra-contractual obligation on the 
employer not to dismiss a trade union official, but, only an obligation not 
to dismiss such official when his employment as an ordinary employee is 
not otherw ise deter minable under the indi vidual employ ment law. 
Attempts at establishing a supremacy of 5.21 of the ETUA 1977 on basis 
of general principles of interpretation of statutes are also futile because 
the IERA 1981 is the latest law and is therefore the one which should 
prevail (163). 
In support of an interpretation that would allow the restriction of 
employers' powers of arbitrary and other dismissals by 5.21 of the ETUA 
1977 could also alternatively be argued that the criminal sanctions 
provided under that Act - (5.33) - make its commands autonomous public 
law obligations whose violations are punishable as crimes. However such 
an argument is technically unsound. There are few courts which will 
incrimina te a person for an act which he is fully empowered to take 
under another, and a more recent, law in force. Moreover, the opinion 
of the Registrar of trade unions regarding the legality or illegality of 
dismissal is, because of the role he is empowered to play in the 
administra tion of trade union law, also relevant for enabling a conviction 
under 5.21 of the E TUA 1977. It is illuminating to add that the 
Registrar of Trade Unions has decided in a recent case that he could not 
judge as unlawful the dismissal by an employer of three members of a 
prepara tory committee of a trade union because. in his view, the 
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dismissals were made under the employer's powers of arbitrary dismissal 
(164). 
The questions of adequacy of protection and interpretation so far 
identified under this and the preceding sections are not relevant in case 
of public sector trade unions. There is not even any common ground for 
comparison of the legal positions of employees of the private and the 
public sectors with regard to these questions. The preceding discussion 
suggests that the difficulties of the workers In the private sector stem 
from a reluctance of various governments to impose any substantial 
legislative and administrative restrictions on the wider freedom which 
the contract of employment gives to employers and because of which 
employees are left without adequate protection. The weakness of the 
position of public sector employees is in contrast due to an inclination on 
the part of the government to erode even the contractual bases of their 
employment increasingly converting it into a unila teral rela tionship 
determinable at the initiative of the government. 
Knowledge of the legal posi tion of public sector employees 
involved in any form of industrial action does not require examination of 
a legisla ti ve protection provided or performance of bodies vested with 
administration of such legislation as in the case of private sector 
employees. The search for such knowledge begins and ends with 
provisions of public service laws which give the government unreviewable 
(165) powers of dismissal on "public interest" and "service interest" 
grounds (166). Both grounds are widely used in practice and were 
actually responsible for the dismissal of l05 trade unlOn officials and 820 
trade union members in the period between December 1980 and \\arch 
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1984 alone (167). 
Likewise there is no obscurity in the relation between 5.21 of the 
ETUA 1977 and the provisions of public service laws that gIve the 
government absolute powers of dismissal. In contrast with its silence in 
case of private sector employees the law of collective labour relations 
quite unequivocally asserts the liability of public service employees for 
disciplinary measures including dismissal (168). 
The different treatment, of public and pri va te sector employees, 
before the law is a phenomenon more conspicuous in the area of 
individual employment relations. At both the individual and collective 
levels of industrial rela tions tighter control is placed on public 
employees. But control over the same employees, whether public or 
private, also grows tighter as one climbs, from the strata of individual 
employment relations, up the hierarchy of collective labour relations 
(169). 
l.C.4.c Problems Associated with Ad ministra tion of the Law (I 69a} 
I have already mentioned that the law against dismissals IS 
administered by the Commissioner of Labour and ordinary Civil Courts In 
case of the private sector and by employing government units and the 
Public Service Appeals Board (PSAB) (170) in case of the public sector. 
Cases of dismissal for trade union activity in particular from both 
sectors, are dealt with by the Registrar of trade unions. As mentioned 
earlier dismissal of trade union officials or members from public 
employment are formally made under the powers of dismissals for "public 
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interest" and "service interest". The PSAB does not In practice review 
cases of dismissals arising under these grounds (171). From his side the 
Registrar of trade unions is also known to have referred trade unionists, 
who were dismissed because of their trade union activity but whose 
dismissals were formally labelled as in the public interest, to complain to 
the PSAB. The reason for the reference was, according to the 
Registrar, that the dismissals were made under sections of the public 
service laws which it is not his jurisdiction to administer (172). In 
effect complaints by trade union officials or members dismissed from 
public service go unheeded. 
The Registrar does receIve and adjudicate on complaints of 
anti-union discrimination by employees of the private sector. A 
complaint may be, either referred to the Registrar by the Commissioner 
of Labour, or, brought directly to the former by the aggrieved member 
or official of the trade union concerned. Even if a dismissed official or 
member of a trade union succeeds in negotiating the obstacles presented 
by various loopholes in the law against dismissals and convinces the 
Registrar to decide in his favour he will encounter other new obstacles 
associated with a system of administrative justice which while exclusive 
of the jurisdiction of the Courts is virtually incapable of enforcing its 
own decisions in this type of complaint (173). The cases examined 
earlier, under discussion of the general powers of the Registrar, 
exemplify not only the ineffectiveness of the Registrar's intervention -
as far as enforcement of these decisions is concerned - but also that this 
intervention estopps the claimants from seeking the more effecti ve 
intervention of the Civil Courts (174). 
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Conclusion 
The mam focus of the preceding part, 1 was on leg isla ti ve and 
ad m inistra ti ve for ms of interven tion in the deter mina tion and 
administra tion of collective labour relations. Attention was also drawn 
to a tendency of the law to discriminate between private and public 
sector employees in this respect. These two focuses, explaining the 
extent of control and examining its effect on the specific relationships 
under consideration, are meant to illu:l1inate a reciprocal relationship 
between the autonomy or non autonomy of the relationships regula ted 
and the development or-- under-development of the ideological content of 
sta tutory regulation. The more autonomous the employment relationship 
- (whether collective or individual) - the more developed the ideology of 
the law "regulating" this relationship. Regulation in this latter sense IS 
nothing more than a proclamation of a socially existing relationship. I 
argue that industrial relations in the Sudan are regulated from without 
and the ideology of "Labour Law" is therefore under-developed - (i.e. 
"'Labour Law" is indistinguishable from ad ministra ti ve and poli tical 
regula tion) - because of a Class and a State structure which make 
descendent political control both necessary and possible. 
Against the possibility of descendent political control could be 
advanced the argument that strikes do in fact occur from time to time 
and military dictatorships are sometimes overthrown notwithstanding all 
legal and political restrictions. The extent to which a thesis of 
descendent political control is reconcilable with analyses, in the previous 
chapters, assigning a deter minant role for "the economic structure" 
(I74a) might not also be immediately clear. Because of its relevance 
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for similar questions the next section might pose, the comment on these 
points will be made In conclusion of the Chapter. The next section 
explains how for ms of control discussed in the preceding section are 
tactically supported by a control of trade union economic and industrial 
functions. The section provides further explanation of forms of control 
and examination of their effect on given industrial relations. The two 
sections are hoped to provide the bases for, isola ting the factors 
determining the degree of State intervention in various areas of labour 
relations, and assessing the impact of this intervention on the ideology of 
the law in each particular area. 
2. Monopolization of Trade Union Economic and Industrial Functions 
I begin this section by an explanation of the mode in which 
control of trade union economic and industrial functions fits into a thesis 
of dominance of political - (i.e. human superstructural . • . (175))-
control. All preceding sections dealt with forms of control that, judging 
by their functions, are directly political. What distinguishes forms of 
control in the area under discussion is that they fulfill certain economIC 
functions and through this fulfillment act as stabilizers of the direct and 
rei a ti vely contingent political for ms of control. 
I consider the forms of control under discussion also to be 
political forms (albeit indirect) not because they are instrumental m 
achieving definite political and economIC gams (although they could be)~ 
but, largely because they show little respect for the autonomy of the 
relations they are intended to control. To that effect they reflect a 
conscious regulation of the economy, a role which the centralized State 
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in an under-developed social formation usually undertakes. 
Regulation of the economy is undertaken by the State, in Sudan, 
In fulfillment of its role as a lever of capitalist accumulation (175a). 
Successful performance of this role is for every political regime the 
condition for existence and continuity. Parliamentary governments were 
overthrown after rela ti vely short reigns partly because they had failed 
(I76) to work out definite State-pioneered capitalist development 
programmes in fulfillment of this inherent (I77) role. Military 
governments stayed for relatively long periods because they had adopted 
definite development programmes and exerted considerable pressure for 
their implementation. They were in their turn overthrown because they 
failed to adapt their initial descendent control of production and 
distribution to social and economic needs subsequently generated by 
implementa tion of this capitalist development planning. These unfulfilled 
needs were responsible for that overthrowing because they reflected 
badly on economic performance (Cf. supra reference cited under f.(l30a) 
and the text above) and exacerbated discontent. This incidentally 
provokes the hypothesis, to be dealt with later, that descendent political 
control while effective in initiation of a definite social structure may 
gradually lose its initiative (or autonomy) to emerging economic 
determinism within that structure (178). 
The centralized state (be it under military or parliamentary 
controls) is itself employer of the biggest percentage of the workforce 
and has always undertaken regulation of the employment relationship as 
part of its overall regulation of the economy. This primacy of State 
regulation is manifest at two levels. At the first level it is manifest in 
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a comprehensiveness of legislation in all matters affecting deter mina tion 
of the terms and conditions of employment in both the private and the 
public sectors. At the second level it is manifest in extensive 
jurisdiction and powers of administrative authorities enabling them to 
undertake administration of both disputes over statutory rights and those 
over new demands (so-called disputes over interest). 
Control at both levels reflects negatively on the autonomy and 
effecti vi ty of collective negotiation. It in particular implies limitation 
of the area of the employment relationship that can be regulated through 
collecti ve negotiation. It also implies considerable leg isla ti ve control 
over the collecti ve neg otia tion pr ocedure so that ad ministr a ti ve 
authorities could intervene in its direction. I shall examine this 
legisla ti ve and administra ti ve intrusion in its relation to (A) the scope of 
collecti ve negotia tion and (B) procedure of collecti ve negotia tion. 
2.A The Scope of Collective Negotiation 
As mentioned earlier the extent of sta te control varies in 
accordance with, the individuality or collectivity of the labour relations 
under consideration, and the identity of employing sector (whether public 
or private) (179). Al though all collective the Labour relations under 
discussion vary in the degree of their subjection to state control in 
accordance with their location in the pri va te or the public sector. 
Hence my preference to discuss each separately. 
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2.A.l Public Sector Employees , / 
There is hardly an area of employment in the public sector which 
is not extensively regulated by statute. As will be shown in Chapter 4, 
the position of individual employees in the public sector is such that the 
government has always remained the sole determinant and administrator 
of the terms and conditions of their employment. To be more specific I 
shall examine the effect of this on two separate types of disputes namely 
: (a) disputes arising from or relating to application of public service 
laws and regulations embodying the terms and conditions of public 
employment; and (b) disputes arising from or relating to demands for 
terms and conditions of service better or other than those provided for 
by leg isla tion. 
2.A.l.a Disputes over "Rights" 
A dispute of this nature may arise because a trade Union or an 
~mploying government unit has actually or allegedly acted against the 
law. Bearing in mind that it is a conventional duty of Civil Courts, in 
certain countries, to settle controversies of this type, it might not be 
immediately clear why a dispute over applicability of the law should lead 
to an industrial conflict. This peculiar situation exists in Sudan because 
the law penetrates deep into the heart of industrial relations thus 
blurring any demarcation between its own and the territory of the 
negotia ting parties. A second and most important explanation IS that 
employing governmental units themselves assume a considerable role both 
in the determination and administration of the law and their decisions in 
both capacities are appealable to higher administrative authorities whose 
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jurisdiction is exclusive of that of the Civil Courts. 
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It also follows from the above situation that the procedure _ 
(whether legal or extra-legal) - applicable in case of a violation of the 
law varies depending on whether the party to blame is a trade union or a 
government unit. Whereas a trade union taking strike action in defiance 
of a law or order governing the terms and conditions of employment of 
its members is liable to criminal prosecution, civil suit and dissolution, 
the government and its units may act "against" the existing law with 
impunity. This is so because the government action is, from its own 
perspective, itself a law which should be obeyed as amending the existing 
law. But government actions possess force of the law also because of 
powers conferred, by Labour and other legislation, on the President of 
the Republic, the Minister responsible for the Public Service, the 
Registrar of Trade Unions and the Commission of Labour to make 
amendments, regulations, or orders having such power (180). 
To illustrate the points aforementioned I will gIve the following 
example. S.126 of the Public Service Regulation 1975 (PSR 1975) 
provides for the entitlement of certain employees to a housing allowance. 
Following a surge in the number of employees qualifying for the 
allowance and a complaint by the Treasury a Presidential Order was 
issued in 1979 (No. 338) banning all public sector units from approving 
any further demands, by any class of employees, for housing or other 
allowances. The ban was imposed at a time when a few trade unions 
had already managed to obtain the housing allowance for their members 
and some were still fighting for its realization. Two of the trade unions 
which had been negotiating with employers for realization of inter alia 
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the housing allowance when the ban was imposed were then told to drop 
their demands for the housing allowance. The trade unions (181) 
contended tha t they were si mply demanding i mplementa tion of a 
sta tutory right that had, moreover, already been implemented in favour 
of employees of the same rank as their members. The employers were 
adamant that the housing allowance demand was against the express 
provIsIon of an order which the President of the Republic was empowered 
to make under the Public Service Laws and was therefore not negotiable. 
Both disputes were referred to arbitration under 5.11 of the IRA 1976. 
In both cases the arbitration tribunal recommended the payment of the 
housing allowance to members of the trade unions. The Tribunal's 
decision in the Bank's Employees Case, was not complied with, and 
together with other similar cases led the Ministry of Public Service into 
preparing a memorandum recommending the authorization of the Ministry 
to veto any arbitration award that inter alia contradict a law regulation 
or order in effect (182). Acting on the basis of this recommendation -
(even before its proclamation as law) - the Minister of Public Service 
tlecided on 23rd July 1980 (183) that his Ministry could not abide by the 
decision of the arbitration tribunal, in the CEW A's Case ordering either 
provision of accommodation for or payment of housing allowances to 
members of the trade union. 
Consequential upon the ability of government and its units to act 
above the Law is also the fact that the majority of disputes arising from 
or in rei a tion to application of public service laws and regulations are 
caused by actual or alleged failure of government units to act in 
accordance with the law. The dispute between a trade union and a 
government unit may arise because of, a violation that affects only the 
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rights of an individual employee who is a member of "the trade Union, or, 
one that affects the rights of all employees members of the trade union. 
Example of the first case is the arbitrary dismissal or disciplining of an 
employee. Example of the second case is the situation where the 
employing government unit fails to secure for its own employees rights 
of employment tha t are provided for by the public service laws. 
The VIew upheld by the government is that redress of individual 
grievances must be sought by the injured employee himself through the 
channels available under the law. under no circumstance would the 
government or any of its units negotiate with a trade union over 
dismissal, disciplining, reinstatement, or compensation of an employee 
member of the trade Union. This was a practice that had been 
established by the governments that reigned in the pre 1973 era (184). 
It is also a principle that has been proclaimed by the public service laws 
and regulations, and the practice of the authorities vested with their 
administration since 1973 (185). In the words of the Commissioner of 
labour (which is one of several bodies vested with the administration of 
publice service law) "It is i mpera ti ve that trade unions should not 
concern the msel ves with the handling of indi vidual gr levances. 
Disregard of this rule may mean illegality of any form of industrial 
action taken by the trade union for that purpose" (186). To 
recapitula te, measures taken against indi vidual employees and the 
remedies that might be available In the circumstance are, from 
government perspective, not subjects for collective negotiation. There 
are two reasons inherent in the legal structure which support this 
government stance. The first is that government units possess 
discretionary powers of dismissal which not even the Courts - let alone 
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the trade UnIons - are allowed to interfere with. The second reason is 
that even when the measures taken are reviewable the employee's search 
for a remedy consists of an action to specified administrative authority _ 
(be it the PSAB, the Commissioner of Labour or the Registrar of Trade 
Union) - whose jurisdiction under the public service laws is exclusive, of 
that of the Civil Courts, and, also of voluntary settlement procedures 
and trade union representation (187). 
Disputes that centre around failure of government units to secure 
for their employees rights that are provided for under the public service 
laws and regulations constitute the vast majority of disputes that go 
through the state managed tripartite negotiation procedure (l87a). The 
higher percentage (I87b) of this type of dispute is partly due to the 
financial inability of certain government and public sector units to meet 
annual or occasional central planning decisions affecting the terms and 
conditions of public employees (188) in general. But the failure of units 
to implement terms and conditions of employment recognized by public 
~ervice laws and regulations which have been in effect since 1975 has 
also remained a substantial subject matter of the negotiation procedure 
(189) - until at least early 1984 when fieldwork for this thesis was being 
completed. 
Ra ther than being excluded from the scope of collecti ve 
negotia tions, disputes over, rights affecting each and every member of 
the trade union constitute then the lawful subject matter of, and in 
practice, the main raw material for collective negotiations in the public 
sector. From its part the government see nothing wrong with this 
arrangement. A memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Public 
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Service in 1979 emphasised the importance of keeping the limitation of 
collective negotiations In the public sector to disputes arising from or 
relating to application of public service laws and regulations in effect. 
The memorandum demanded the amendment of 5.4 of the IRA 1976 In 
order to make clearer the limitation of "trade disputes" to disputes of 
the type the memorandum is contemplating. However the Ministry was 
demanding more than just the exclusion of "disputes over interest". 
Demands made by a trade unIon to a public sector unit for 
i mplementa tion of terms and conditions of service which, al though 
provided for by the public serVIce laws and regulations, are not yet 
implemented by this unit are for purposes of the Ministry's memorandum 
demands for new conditions of service which should also be excluded 
(190). 
2.A.l.b Disputes over "Interests" 
There are two reasons which make inclusion of this type of 
dispute into the scope of collective negotiations extremely difficult. 
The first reason IS that, even when it relates to payment-increase 
demands a dispute of this nature comes into conflict with an established 
principle of central governmental determination of wages and salaries of 
all public employees. The second reason is that where they involve 
demands for new or better conditions of work other than payment, 
disputes of this nature come into conflict with a detailed and 
comprehensi ve statutory statement of the ter ms and conditions of public 
employment. Notw i thstanding this, except for the six years military 
1958 1964 (19 1) trade unions have rule of General Abboud between - , 
never been expressly prohibited from making peaceful demands for new 
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conditions of service. Moreover the Commissioner of Labour does not 
usually reject an applica tion, by a union demanding assistance in 
commencing negotiation with an employer, or mediation, simply because 
it involves demands for new conditions of service. 
However judging by the scope of manoeuvre available to the 
parties to collective negotiation in this type of disputes possess, it may 
be said that disputes over interests are impossible to resolve through 
negotia tion. Where any trade dispute involves questions of wages or 
hours of work or other terms or conditions of service that are "regulated 
by law regulations or precedents" the negotiating government body or the 
arbitration tribunal are requested not to make awards that contradict 
these "laws, regulations or precedents" (I92). The extent to which this 
restriction affects autonomy of collective negotiation should be evaluated 
in the light of the fact that there IS seldom an area of individual 
employment in the public sector which is not regulated by statute. It is 
important however to add that this restriction does not in practice stop 
"Heads" of government units and the Commissioner of Labour from 
engagmg In negotiation with trade unions and even making concessions 
and compromises they are not authorized to implement in order to avoid 
imminent industrial action. The practical effect of the restriction 
comes to surface when trade unions press for i mplementa tion of 
agreements arrived at in this fashion. 
Judged by their practical effect, disputes over interests fall 
outside the scope of collective negotiation. As shown below they 
ultimately end up unresolved. Although the Head of a government unit 
is free to accept, either directly or through media tion of the 
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Commissioner of Labour, demands over interest, put forward by a trade 
union, the central government does not abandon its policy of central 
planning in order to honour obligations which a Head of a unit or the 
Commissioner may have pledged. From their part the Commissioner of 
Labour and the Head of a unit are helpless without this governmental 
endorsement of their actions. Thus in one case the Customs and Excise 
Officers' Trade Union managed to conclude an agreement over all its 
demands with the Head of the Customs Department. Three months 
later when implementation of the first part of the agreement became 
due the Head of the Department insisted that his initial acceptance of 
the Union demands ought to have been understood as conditional upon the 
approval of both the Ministers of Finance and Public Service and that 
until such approval had been obtained he could not commit himself to 
implementing any part of the agreement referred to (I93). 
Government units break their agreements with impunity 
irrespective of whether such agreements are arrived at through direct 
bila teral negotia tion or thr ough media tion of the Com missioner in 
accordance with the tripartite negotiation procedure set by the IRA 1976 
(I94). Likewise, although arbitration awards are on paper final and 
conclusive, arbitration awards that uphold trade union demands for new 
conditions of service are likely to be disregarded by the Government on 
grounds of ultra vires (cf. Supra f. 192 and the text above) (195). 
The key to implementation of any agreement affecting existing 
conditions of service lies with the Public Service Affairs Champer and 
the Ministry of Finance. However pressing the need for improvement of 
service conditions might be, such improvement is impossible to undertake 
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unless these two authorities have agreed to bear the financial burden 
involved. Alarmed by the repercussion on the Civil Service of too many 
unfulfillable promises which Heads of units make with their employees 
trade unions and the impact which responding to arbitration awards 
affecting conditions of service of any employees of one unit might have 
on employees in other public sector units the Director of the PSAC, 
wr i ting in the memorandum referred to earlier, - supra f. 183 _ 
recommended inter alia the following : 
(a) - "The exclusion from the scope of 'collective negotiations' of all 
demands for new or better conditions of service" - (Ibid P .2). 
(b) - "A trade unIOn or federation desirous of realizing new or improved 
conditions of service for its members shall apply to the employing 
government unit showing reasons, substantiated by statistics and field 
studies, for the demands. The employing unit shall then study the 
application and make its recommendation to the Central Government. 
Federations and trade unions shall not at any stage participate In or 
influence the process of consultation over demands thus submitted" - Ibid 
P.5. 
(c) - "Until such major changes have been introduced the PSAC shall be 
represented at all present stages of collective negotiations" - Ibid P .4. 
Although the Director's recommendation did not formally become 
law, it influenced certain structural and legal changes that took place 
subsequent to April 1980. In 1981 the Minister of Finance and National 
Economy became ex-officio the Minister responsible for the Public 
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Service. This consolidated the administration of public serVIce and the 
disposition of its financial burden in one and the same hands thus ending 
the lack of co-ordination previously thrive between the two Ministries. 
It was this lack of co-ordina tion which had enabled public sector 
employees to engage themsel ves In a lengthy, expensi ve and 
state-managed system of negotiation for resolution of disputes which, 
given the destined financial deadlock, are unsolvable. Moreover a Bill 
prospectively abolishing the IRA 1976 and introducing a 1982 Regulation 
of Collective Labour Relations Act was being prepared. S.12 of the Bill 
provided for the right of a representative of the Ministry of Finance to 
a ttend all stages of collective negotiation. Likewise S.25 gave the 
President of the Republic the right to veto any arbitration award if the 
implementa tion of such award may, in his view, have serious impact on 
the national wage-policy or balance of payment. 
The Bill was, from the start, opposed by the ex-Minister for the 
public service (i.e. in his new capacity as State Minister (196) for the 
public service) and the Director of the PSAC because of its prospective 
lifting of the ban, imposed by the IRA 1981 (Amendment) Act, on strikes, 
and, failure to give effect to the Director's recommendations previously 
stated (197). The Bill, was eventually rejected by the President of the 
Republic, and never put before the then People's Assembly. From its 
part however the PSAC memorandum continued, until April 1985, to be 
the main source of guidance in the conduct of collective negotiations in 
the Public Sector. 
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2.A.2 The Private Sector ,I 
There are numerous areas of the individual employment 
rela tionship, in the pr i va te sector, that are regula ted by sta tu teo 
However when compared with its counterpart for the public sector 
individual employment legislation for the private sector is different both 
in the extent of comprehensiveness and in respect of the underlying 
legislative policy. An area, where this relative lack of comprehensiveness 
is manifest, and, which is largely left to agreement of employers and 
employees in the private sector is that of discipline at work (l97a). 
More important is the underlying legislative policy which in the private 
sector aims at setting a floor of rights whilst leaving the door open for 
realiza tion of terms and conditions of employment better than those 
provided by statute (198). Nevertheless, because of restriction of the 
right to strike, common to all employees, it is doubtful whether private 
sector trade unions do in practice gain any advantage from this 
ambivalence - (Hussein 1983, pp. 212 - 215). 
However, for purposes of examination of the scope of collective 
negotia tion, the position in the pr i va te sector requires a treatment tha t 
ignores a distinction between disputes over "rights" and disputes over 
"interests". The fact that there is no such distinction in practice, while 
the reason for this plan of writing, is itself due to the underlying policy 
of private employment legislation mentioned above. The discussion 
proceeds instead on the basis of a different typology of disputes namely 
(a) disputes over collective demands whether of rights or interests, and 
(b) disputes over individual right of a member or members of the trade 
unlOn. 
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2.A.2.a Disputes over Collective Demands 
A trade uniOn demanding a wage Increase above the statutory 
minimum wage or conditions of work other or better than those 
recognized under employment legislation can negotiate, directly with the 
employer, or through mediation of the Commissioner of Labour for 
realization of these demands. Failure to implement the statutory terms 
and conditions of employment provided for the private sector amounts on 
the part of employer to a criminal offence (199). Hence they do not, 
unlike the position in the public sector, need intervention of a trade 
union for their enforcement. This has enabled some private sector trade 
unions to invest their time in negotiating agreements, covering issues or 
details not provided for by legislation, and, in case of some big firms, 
providing for formation of joint management-union, production councils, 
industrial safety committees and disciplinary boards (200). 
In contrast to its position in case of disputes over statutory rights 
the Commissioner has not so far established a sufficiently consistent 
practice in case of disputes over rights accruing under a collective 
agreement. The Commissioner's position on this issue oscillates between 
belief in the bindingness of the collective agreement and refusal to see a 
need for negotiation on the one hand and disregard of the agreement and 
attempt of mediating for a settlement at any price on the other. The 
Commissioner often adopts the former position where the trade union is 
the party to blame, and the latter where it is the employer which is to 
blame, for the violation of the agreement (20 O. However there is no 
consistent logical theme which underlies this approach. One possibly 
practical explanation for it is that the trade union's act constituting the 
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breach often takes the form of an industrial action '~(which IS of course 
unlawful per se). Hence the castigation of the trade union's act by the 
Commissioner reflects not his stance towards the b" d" In mgness of the 
agreement but his concern for the form Whl"ch the" the actIOn causing 
breach has taken. 
The Commissioner's stance towards disputes over rights accruing 
under collective agreements applies even in case the agreement is in fact 
an arbitration award (202). 
2.A.2.b Disputes over Individual Grievances 
The official VIew IS that, resolution of disputes over individual 
grievances should be sought by the aggrieved indi vidual through 
application to the Commissioner of Labour or the Civil Courts. This rule 
is strictly adhered to in practice at least by the Commissioner. 
According to one Labour Officer, "if a dispute over an individual 
grievance is brought to the office by representatives of a trade union on 
behalf of its aggrieved member(s) the office will immediately dismiss the 
complaint directing to hear from the immediate parties to the dispute 
personally" (203). 
The same rule applies afortiori where the trade union decides to 
settle the individual grievance with the employer and without recourse to 
the Commissioner. Following a slow down by the Coldair Engineering 
Plant Workers' Trade Union in an effort to press for reinstatement of 
three of their colleagues dismissed by the Management in November 1982 
the latter reported the incident to the Commissioner. The Union was 
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immediately warned that its action was in contraven'tion of the rule that 
disputes of this na ture should be referred to the C .. ommlSSloner. 
Acceding to the warning the trade union agreed to call off the str ike 
immediately (204). In another case (205) the initial decision of the 
aggrieved employees to leave the Issue of their reinstatement entirely to 
their trade union did not dissuade the Commissioner from applying the 
above rule. The Commissioner even refused to recognize that the 
continuous contention, by the trade union, of the dismissals from the 
first day and for three consecutive months could operate to stop the 
period of limitation running, as against the aggrieved employees right of 
action (206), from the first day of the dismissals -(instead of from the 
time the trade union had failed and the employees decided to personally 
fight for reinstatement) (207). 
To conclude this discussion of collective negotiation in the private 
sector I need to only elaborate on a point previously mentioned. To 
assert that different types of disputes are not formally excluded from 
lhe scope of collective negotiation does not mean that the issues 
contested are always settled or effecti vely processed wi thin the 
procedure. Although private sector employment law does not prevent 
demands for terms and conditions of employment better than those 
guaranteed by its provisions and in spite of the negotiability of such 
demands there are other legal and extra-legal constraints that obstruct 
realiza tion of such ter ms and condi tions. Bearing in mind the 
restrictions on strike and freedom of association in general, it is only in 
relatively big and stable firms where both trade unions and managements 
are desirous of voluntarily regulating their relationship that prevail terms 
and conditions of employment better than those provided by the law. 
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Here also if we are to determine the scope of collecti ve 
negotiation not by the types of disputes that are formally processable but 
by the types and numbers of those that are actually processed and 
effectively settled under the system, we will find that the position of 
private sector's employees is hardly better than that of their colleagues 
in the public sector. There is evidence (Cf below) which supports this 
finding. The evidence includes (a) the poor quality and contents of the 
collective agreements that trade unions could conclude with employers; 
and (b) the difficul ties encountered in bringing employers to the 
negotia ting table; and (c) the impotence of the trade unions and other 
institutions of collective negotiations In securIng compliance with 
collecti ve agreements in force (208) - (cf. Table 2). 
Of the 23 Collective Agreements between trade unions and 
private employers studied by the author all but three dealt exclusively 
with issues of working hours and timing, overtime work and pay, rate of 
payment, transportation, holidays and leaves, medical treatment, 
t>romotions, facilities at the place of work and discipline (208a). The 
three exceptions included in addition provisions for joint management-union 
councils (supra f.200 and text above). Even within the issues covered 
the following are obvious shortcomings 
(a) None of the agreements provides any procedural or substantive 
control over redundancy and dismissal. 
(b) With only two exceptions, none of the agreements provides for a 
procedure to be followed in case of violation. 
Causes for 
Dispute 
Number of 
Disputes 
Reported 
% 
.. 
TABLE 2 
(Appendix to f.208 and text above) 
Share of Responsibility in Industrial Disputes Expressed in % 
Refusal to Breach of an Discipline Dismissal Others 
Negotiate Existing Agreement Excluding 
By Emp- By Trade By Emp- By Trade Dismissal 
loyers Union loyers Union 
14 - 27 - 8 8 6 
100 a 100 a 12.7 12.7 9.5 
22.2 42.9 
I I 
Figures for the Khartoum North District covering the period May 1977 - October 1982 
Compiled by the author from Khartoum North Labour Office Monthly Reports 
of Collective Disputes for the Area. File No. KNLO-37-IR-3. 
Total 
63 
100% 
..""",. 
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(c) With the exception of two none of th 
, e agreements gives the 
(d) 
(e) 
trade union a right to participate or be consulted in matters of 
discipline at work. 
With one exception the agreements provide for employers' 
exclusive right of handling individual grievances. 
Rating of the terms and conditions of employment covered by all 
agreements is not generally higher to that of those guaranteed by 
the law - cf. table below. 
TABLE 3 
Rating of the Contents of Agreements with the Minimum Legal 
Rating In Some Equal in Worse 
Respects Better Some Respects (209) 
Number of 4 16 3 
Agreements 
2.B The Procedure of Collective Negotiations 
Tripartite collective negotiation procedure in the Sudan owes its 
existence to General Abboud's military regime that reigned between 1958 
- 1964. Immediately after it had taken over that regime outlawed all 
labour organizations and forms of trade union activity. These were -
judging by their objective - political measures that had been provoked 
largely by the political experience of the regime's predecessor in power 
(Beshir 1978 pp. 206 - 212). Following its initiation of a ten year 
economic-development-plan the regime enacted new leg isla tion in 1960 
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amid propaganda featuring the role the trade 
,I 
union should play in 
realiza tion of the envisaged development. In addition to other 
restrictions previously discussed (210) the 1960 Trade Disputes Act (1960 
TDA) abolished the 1949 Trade Disputes Legislation (211) and introduced 
a compulsory procedure of collective negotiations that was to remain, to 
da te, the standard legal framework for industrial relations In the Sudan. 
The 1960 TDA was repealed by the 1966 R TD A, and the latter was in 
turn repealed by the IRA 1976 which is still in effect. Despi te these 
legislative changes however the tripartite negotiation procedure has 
remained basically the same under all Acts. 
The negotiations procedure consists of a definite number of stages 
and has as its apex ad hoc arbitration tribunals. From the first stage to 
the last, and, irrespective of whether it is a public sector or pri va te 
sector dispute that is being negotiated the State is always directly or 
indirectly involved in the process. In addition to its tripartitism the 
collecti ve negotia tions procedure IS also compulsory at all stages. 
Collective agreements are In effect arbitration awards, minutes of 
tripartite negotiations or sets of resolutions arrived at through these 
negotia tions. 
Where a trade dispute occurs the parties to the dispute shall, 
within a period not exceeding two weeks, enter into direct negotiation 
with the purpose of settling the dispute - 55. II( l)IRA 1976 (212). 
Negotia tions shall continue for a period of a t most two weeks -
(extendable upon agreement of the parties to another two weeks) - from 
the date of its commencement. The Commissioner of Labour may. as 
an observer attend negotiations and, subject to approval of the parties 
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participate in them. If an agreement is reached it must be made in 
writing drawn in three copies and signed by the parties. Such an 
agreement shall come into effect from the date the Commissioner has 
approved it. 
Failure to, start negotiation within the specified period, comply 
with the formalities of the process of negotiation or abide by an 
agreement during the period of its currency is an offence punishable with 
imprisonment and fine (213). In practice however the Commissioner 
does not need to bring prosecutions against trade unions under this rule. 
One reason for this is that he can often prevent a breach of the law by 
interfering in advance. Another reason IS tha t even when such 
prevention is not possible it is easier for the Commissioner to take the 
faster and more effective course of administra ti ve sanctions against the 
trade union - (e.g. dissolution, suspension ••• ) (214). Although there is 
no administrative measure that could be taken against employers and in 
spite of the fact that employers are responsible for the majority of 
violations under the law the Commissioner has not so far brought any 
prosecution against any such employer (215). 
If the parties to the dispute have failed to reach an agreement 
under SS.ll(l)(IRA 1976) each of them "may" apply to the Commissioner 
demanding his intervention. In case no such applica tion is made by 
either party the Commissioner reserves the right of ordering submission 
of the dispute before himself. Once an application for intervention of 
the Commissioner is made by either party, or the Commissioner has 
summoned the parties to present their dispute before him his intervention 
shall be binding (IRA 1976, S.12). The Commissioner shall within a 
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period not exceeding three weeks from the date of hl"S " t " In erventlOn 
endeavour to settle the dispute amicably. Any agreement reached at 
this second stage of negotiation shall likewise be produced In three 
written and signed copies one of which to be retained by the 
Commissioner. Every agreement shall provide for a duration of its 
currency which must not exceed, three years, or five years in case the 
agreement is dealing with rates of payment and working hours. The 
agreement shall remain binding on the parties during the period of its 
currency (216). 
The third stage of negotiations involves arbi tra tion. If the 
Commissioner has failed to settle a dispute within the period specified 
under IRA 1976, S.14,the dispute may with or without the consent of the 
parties be referred to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal. Arbitra tion 
tribunals are usually constituted by order of the Minister responsible for 
the Public Service -(irrespective of whether the dispute is in the public 
or the private sector). The disputing employer and the trade union may, 
subject to approval of the Minister respectively nominate one employer 
and one trade unionist who are not parties to the dispute to sit on the 
arbitration tribunal. The tribunal must include in addition a judge as 
Chairman, and a representative of the Department of Labour and an 
expert in industrial relations as members (217). The parties to the 
dispute may attend the hearing either personally or through their 
representa ti ves. The arbitration tribunal must decide the dispute and 
make an award within a period not exceeding four weeks from the date 
of reference of the dispute to arbitration. The arbi tra tion a ward shall 
be final and conclusive (218). 
--------'--
243 
This procedure of "negotiation, mediation and arbitration" (219) 
operates as an official alternative for strikes and all other forms of 
industrial action. From the moment a dispute arises and up to the time 
it has been resolved trade unions and employers are under the obligation 
of negotiating a settlement without recourse to any form of industrial 
action whatsoever. Once it has developed into a strike, slow-down, a 
mass resignation or a lock-out, the dispute comes into conflict with the 
Law of Strikes and it is then left to the Commissioner and other 
administrative authorities to determine the course of action to be taken 
in the circumstances. 
Although leg isla tion does not define "dispute" or specify the time 
and circumstance in which a "dispute" IS deemed to have arIsen, the 
Commissioner does in practice take the view that a dispute begins, and 
the negotiations procedure becomes therefore applicable, once demands 
by either party to an industrial dispute are made to the other (220). 
This was also the view held by the Court of Appeal two years later in 
the Trial of El Fatih Muhyeddin and Others (221). The Court had there 
to decide whether a dispute had started from the moment the trade 
union carried out strike action or a few months earlier when the 
contested demands were put to the employer for the first time. The 
Court opted for the latter view justifying its decision by the argument 
tha t "a dispute arises from the moment demands are made and 
irrespecti ve of whether the demands submitted are contested or accepted 
without contention by the other party" (222). 
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The obligation to negotiate peacefully persists irrespective of 
whether the dispute is over "rights" or over "interests". A trade union 
which succeeds in obtaining a favourable settlement to the dispute at the 
stage of negotiation, mediation or arbitration but fails to realize any 
benefit because of employer's refusal to abide by the agreement or the 
award, will have to once again go through all or some of these same 
stages of collective negotiations in order to compel the employer to 
fulfill his obligations (223). 
The law prohibits, employees from staging or taking part in any 
total or partial work stoppage, and, employers from totally or partially 
closing down the place of work by reason of a trade dispute in the 
following cases (224): 
(1) Before entering into negotiation. 
(2) 1m media tely after any party applies for media tion of the 
Commissioner or the latter decides to intervene on its own 
volition. 
(3) During the mediation proceedings. 
(4) Immediately after the decision IS made to refer a dispute to 
arbitra tion. 
(5) During the arbi tra tion proceedings. 
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The Law makes it an offence punishable with imprisonment and 
fine for any person to violate any of these provisions. There is also the 
additional penalty of dissolution in case the culprit is a trade union. 
I have mentioned earlier that all types of industrial disputes must 
pass through the statutory collective negotiations procedure. Disputes 
over "interests" are however particularly difficult effectively to settle 
within this procedure. Many trade unions especially those of public 
sector employees are forced to follow the settlement procedure though 
knowing in advance the futile outcome. The procedure is a lengthy 
bureaucratic tunnel with a wide entrance that sucks in all disputes. 
Few of the disputes drawn into the tunnel are processed through its 
bottlenecks while the rest remaIn stranded at anyone or another of the 
stages of the procedure. Since a dispute may remam unsettled even 
after it has been formally processed (e.g. because the government as 
employer is not willing to abide by the settlement) some of the few 
disputes processed may find their way back into the entrance. Part of 
lhe annual case-load of the Department of Labour is in fact made up of 
familiar industrial disputes that have remained unsettled - (either 
because of failure to reach an agreement or to implement one) - and 
kept coming to the Department in monthly or annual succession for 
relatively long periods of time (224a). 
The formal coverage of all types of disputes by the statutory 
negotia tions procedure on the one hand and the inability of the latter 
effectively to process these disputes on the other makes operation of the 
procedure conducive to containment and control rather than resolution of 
industr ial disputes. 
I 
Employer 
KSW Co. Ltd 
STF Ltd 
Bata (Sudan) 
National Footwear 
Limited 
Hilton (Sudan) 
Metal Sheet 
Indus tr ies Ltd 
Cotton Textile 
Industr ies Ltd 
Customs & Excise 
Department 
Wa ter & Electr ici ty 
Authority 
State Banks 
Ministry of Health 
Years of 
Sta tistics 
1973-29.4.1982 
1973-30.12.1982 
13.3.1979-14.12.1983 
19.9.1974 -
March 1977 
February 1980 -
March 1984 
16.9.1973 -
October 1979 
7.4.1977 -
December 1979 
September 1979 -
15.7.1982 
1979 - 17.12.1981 
1978-May 1979 
1979 - April 1984 
TABLE 4 
Appendix to text above f.224Ia" 
Unsolved Repetitive Industrial Disputes 
Total of No. of Disputes Demands 
Disputes Contesting the Contested 
Reported Same Demand(s) 
14 12 Pay arrears 
Pay increase 
9 6 Pa y_ increase 
4 4 Applica tion of a law 
more beneficial to 
Union 
5 5 Reinsta tement 
4 4 Reinsta tement 
2 2 Pay increase and 
reinstatement 
2 2 Pay arrears 
5 4 Pay increase 
2 2 Promotion & accomm-
oda tion or allowance 
for it 
2 2 Improving conditions 
of service generally 
3 3 Improving conditions 
of service 
----
Where the number of disputes dealing with the same issue(s) 
equals the total of disputes reported the disputes were over one single issue 
Stages of Settlement 
and Measures Tried 
Media tion, negotiation 
Negotia tion, mediation 
Negotia tion, media tion 
Arbitration, rearbitration 
Media tion - criminal 
prosecution 
Negotia tion, mediation, 
& civil & criminal proced 
Mediation 
Mediation 
Negotia tion, mediation 
Negotiation, mediation, 
arbi tra tion 
Negotia tion, media tion, 
arbi tra tion 
Media tion, arbi tra tion & 
dissoJgtion_of the Union 
or package of demands, but kept erupting for the number of times and in the period shown, 
because of failure effectively to seTtle the issue(s) contested. 
Compiled by the author from monthly statistics 
of the Khartoum North District Labour Office February 1984 
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Some of the structural weaknesses that ma' ke th f e system 0 
collecti ve negotiations incapable, at least in case of the public sector 
employees, of providing solutions for industrial disputes were pointed to 
by some members of an Industrial Relations Law Commission set up in 
1981. "Even if the Commissioner of Labour can resolve a dispute 
between a Head of a government unit and its employees' trade union, 
implementation of such resolution will ultimately depend", argue the 
critics, "on several other resolutions including those of, the Ministry of 
which that unit is a subordinate, the Minister responsible for the public 
service and the Minister of Finance. The ranking of all Ministers in the 
bureaucra tic hierarchy is always higher to that of the Commissioner of 
Labour (224b)." Indeed, the Minister responsible for the public service 
ex officio heads the Department of Labour in so far as administration of 
collecti ve Labour Relations Law is concerned. Investment of the 
Department of Labour time and effort in working out conciliations and 
resolutions that are, because of their wider implication, likely to be 
ignored or overruled by Ministers is however a waste of public funds. 
'fhe critics also add that the vesting of the authority of referring 
disputes to arbitration in the same hands as these that on behalf of the 
State employ all public servants (i.e. the Minister responsible for the 
public service) and endeavour to keep the expenditure of running the 
service within targeted limits tarnishes the procedure image and 
undermines employees' confidence in its impartiality (225). 
Although members of the Commission unanimously agreed on the 
inadequacy of the internal structure of the existing procedure and on the 
importance of limiting themselves to reforming internal malfunctions 
within the boundaries of the system of tripartite negotiations there was a 
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difference of opinion on the appropriate prescription to be recommended. 
Some members advised tha t the administra tion and resolution_ of 
industrial disputes should be vested with a National Commission which 
should include representatives of "the trade union movement", the 
employers and the National Legislative Authority. Disputes should, 
according to this view, be referred to arbitration only by resolution of 
the National Legislative Authority (225a). Another group dismissed the 
above view as unrealistic arguing that shortcomings of the existing 
procedure could be a voided if disputes over "interests" were to be 
excluded from within the scope of coUecti ve negotiation. This was the 
same group, which as mentioned earlier (226), refused to support the 
recommendation for lifting the ban on strikes, and, whose reservations 
regarding considerable parts of the Commission Report persuaded the 
President of the Republic to shelve it. 
Conclusion 
The preceding discussion has identified forms of descendent 
control affecting both the morphology and functioning of labour 
organizations. The overall descendent control of industrial relations has 
been observed as sub-divided into two closely interrelated direct and 
indirect controls. The political, administrative and other circumstances 
that condition control vary in type and strength from one area of 
col1ecti ve labour relations to another. Hence control itself and its 
effect on the autonomy of the area regula ted also vary accordingly. To 
explain aU this it was inevitable that the discussion examined in detail 
different areas and the manner in which a type of control of anyone of 
them affects the others. 
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The issues I intend to discuss in this conclusion could be classified 
as referring to (a) viability of a case for descendent control in the light 
of some empirical facts which seem to challenge effectivity of such 
control; (b) the implication of a thesis of descendent control on a theory 
of determinism by the economic structure implied by the previous 
Chapters; (c) the methodology most suitable for the study of this control 
and its effects on various social disciplines and; (d) its effect on "Labour 
Law". 
Notwithstanding the extreme length to which some governments 
had gone in counteracting them strikes were never eliminated under any 
political regime (227). For purposes of determining the implication on 
descendent control I shall distinguish between industrial strikes that take 
place during the reign of a particular political regime and general strikes 
that are launched as a final onslaught on a political regime. Beginning 
with the first I believe that their occurrence is insignificant, for the 
viability of descendent control, because it never practically reached the 
stage of threatening the overall authority of the law or forcing or 
persuading the political regime to change its labour policy. Moreoever 
the fact that all political regimes stood stubbornly by their laws even 
when strikes provoked by, and in spite of, these laws placed serious 
strain on production - (e.g. Cf Hussein 1983 pp.236-239) - itself discloses 
the contempt which political-decision-making holds for considerations of 
optimum economic performance. 
Moving to the second type of strikes although the fact that trade 
Unions were always directly or indirectly involved in successfully wielding 
final onslaughts on political regimes provokes a "hypothesis" tha t 
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descendent control is ineffective in the long run, it does not however 
affect the finding tha t this control persisted under the reigns" of 
individual political regimes, sometimes for relatively long periods of 
time. There is moreover a further verification which will falsify the 
above-quoted hypothesis. It consists in that, forms of control discussed 
in this Chapter ha ve survived all the political uphea vals the country has 
experienced. This in turn suggests that there is a degree of descendent 
control which is effective even in the long run - i.e. because of its 
determination by underlying Class and State structures which have so far 
remained unchanged (except in the degree of ossification of course). 
This takes us to the second major issue in this conclusion. 
I do not believe that descendent (political legal and social) control 
IS asymmetrical to determination by the "economic structure". The 
condition of the "economic structure" in Sudan enables the class in 
charge of the State apparatus and its ally to play a dominant role in the 
direction of social and economic change in tha t country. The 
phenomenon of descendent control is in itself, therefore explicable In 
relation to - and in this sense determined by - the specific condition of 
the "economic structure". But as mentioned elsewhere (228) the 
"economic structure" is not static and economic determinism IS an ever 
continuous dialectic between the ma terial and social forces of 
production. How does material determinism assert itself in a context in 
which distribution of shares of the products and "roles" in production 
appear as momentously determined by voluntarist human or subjects 
interaction? 
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To a great extent the success of economic development planning _ 
(which, by its nature, includes elements of descendent wage and incQme 
distribution) depends inter alia on the flexibility of planning in adapting 
with social and economic changes brought about by partial implementation 
of such planning or by external world surroundings. The experience of 
the Sudan has shown that failure to account for social and economic 
needs generated by these factors does hamper further development and 
contribute to the undermining of political and legal authorities which 
obstruct this adaptation - (Hussein 1983 pp.224-239). From this I draw 
the conclusion that when control, although descendent, is responsive to 
economic and social needs, generated by economic change, the dynamics 
of material determinism and that of human intervention become 
coincidental. "Control" would In such situation cease to be "control" 
and become adaptation. This would be a typical example of a 
"mechanical" socio-economic evolutionism (229). 
A study of development planning and its implementation and 
labour relations law under President Numeiri's regime in Sudan has shown 
that this process of adaptation although essential for the continuity of 
tha t regl me, could not be sustained in view of certain interest 
considerations that underlay political-decision-making - (Hussein 1983 
pp.224-253). The experience of that regime - (and indeed also that of 
the 1958-1964 regime) - suggests two things, namely (a) that descendent 
control by a particular regime persists stubbornly throughout the latter's 
reign (230); and (b) that adaptation is effected not mechanically in the 
fashion earlier described but by a political eruption of previously 
suppressed social needs which overthrow political authority as a first step 
towards that adaptation. 
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However such political eruptions took place'! 0 th b 0 WI out aSlcally 
affecting the State and class structures described in Chapter 2. This 
meant that there are forms of control which have survived all political 
changes.------It could also mean that, in order to contribute to a more 
profound knowledge of the State and Law in Sudan, scientific research 
should always endeavour to examine this structural Class foundation of 
Law and the State. 
It has been suggested that analysis which explains Sta te 
intervention in terms of furtherance of the interest of certain dominant 
classes or the bureaucracy are "instrumentalist" (Abdin et al 1983 p.72). 
Adopting a different perspective some Sudanese economists endeavour to 
evaluate industrial relations law in Sudan on the basis of its compatibility 
or incompa tibili ty with supposed social and economic development 
objectives (231). The narrow definition which some of these economists 
give to "development" (232), and their assumption that law can 
unproblematically be used as an instrument of social and economIC 
Change are themselves open to criticism. But there is a much more 
fundamental methodological challenge to this type of analysis. 
The problem with these Sudanese economists' analysis is that it 
adopts, as its terms of reference (i.e. for evaluation of the law), either a 
speculative and value-judged view of what the role of the State and Law 
should be, or, alternatively, the pronouncements which a particular 
regime makes about the objective of its economIC and social policies 
(232a) . Wha t is over looked in both cases IS the concrete real 
10 0 I °thin the Sudanese social distribution of economic and po ItlCa powers, WI 
formation, that has remained virtually unchanged in spite of the changes 
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m political regImes. The examination of this distribution IS important 
because it enables the researcher to reveal by empirical evidence 
obtainable from concrete reality the roles which the State and Law have, 
since their inception, been playing. This will also enable the researcher 
to examine whether these empirically-grounded and. economically and 
socially structuralized "roles" do impose certain constraints on the 
voluntarist development planning of individual political regimes. Far 
from being "instrumentalist" class analyses - (i.e. analyses that focus on 
the underlying distribution of economic and social power within a society) 
focus on the real structural foundation of phenomena and therefore avoid 
both the idealism of speculation and the superficiality of analysis based 
on the pronouncements or voluntarist planning of a particular political 
regIme. 
Having defended empirical and philosophical credibilities of 
descendent control and outlined the methodology most suitable for its 
examination I now turn to examination of its effect on the ideology of 
labour relations law. I have indica ted at the end of Chapter II tha t 
labour relations law in Sudan is devoid of an economically-institutionalized 
or structuralized social ideology. Nevertheless it may have been 
possible for labour relations law to gain some ideological substance at 
the more superficial and themselves distinct levels of rule-making and 
legal-ad minis tr a ti on. This would ha ve been the case had the 
level or igina ted and maintained a system of governments at one 
collective negotiations capable of determining and administering the rules 
terms and conditions of employment and/or at the other governmg 
entrusted the administration of present Labour Relations Law with the 
judiciary. 
.~ 
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In respect of rule-making we have seen th~/t collective labour 
relations legislation, the industrial practices of public employers and the 
comprehensiveness and express provisions of public sector individual 
employment law all militate against the operation of such a system. 
Although collective labour relations legislation equally applies to the 
private sector. Industrial relations in the latter are distinguished by, 
the practices of some private employers, the absence of exclusionary 
legislative provisions - (i.e. provisions which exclude certain issues from 
the scope of collective negotiation ) - and the legislative policy of 
setting minimum standards whilst leaving the door open for further 
improvement. 
With regard to the second level (i.e. that of legal administration) 
we have also seen that collective labour relations legislation is wholly 
administered by administrative bodies. Although the Civil Courts are 
not excluded from reviewing the decisions of these bodies. The fact 
that administrative authorities always have the initiative to exercise 
substantial statutory powers marginalize the practical effect of judicial 
reVIew. Public Sector indi vidual employment la w is also wholly 
administered by ad ministra ti ve au thor i ties and the preli minar y 
jurisdiction of these authorities IS exclusive of the jurisdiction of the 
Ci viI Courts. Private sector individual employment law is however 
administered by the Civil Courts with intervention of administrative 
authorities available as an optional at the choice of the employee. 
Notwithstandingly, the decisions of these authorities are always 
appealable to the Civil Courts. 
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Social practices and rituals that may take place at both levels are 
important for development of an ideology of law. Participa tion. of 
employers and employees in the rule-making process may enhance the 
effecti veness of rules. This is so because people are more likely to 
obey rules which they have themselves made. Another reason is that, 
because these are the parties directly involved in the production process 
they are more aware of everchanging capital and labour market 
condi tions and endeavour to adapt the rules to new needs. 
Likewise, the Civil Courts enjoy a relatively high degree of 
independence (i.e. more than quasi judicial or administrative authorities) 
from the administrative hierarchy. They also follow techniques, and a 
discipline of decision-making that ensure rela ti ve consistency, 
predictability certainty and outward appearance of impartiality. A 
bigger role for the Courts in the administration of labour leg isla tion 
would have therefore meant a better facilitation of its acceptance or to 
put it in different words more enhancement of ideological content of 
leg isla tion. 
Because the private sector's labour relations law is relatively free 
from "commandeering" (233) state-intervention at these two levels, 
indi vidual employment law in this sector is substantively rich, technically 
and practically meaningful and appears as a rational self-subsistent 
discourse. This position of the law sharply contrasts with that of the 
public sector individual employment law. As shown in the next Chapter 
the latter appears as a form of unilateral State regulation that concerns 
itself mainly with the interest of the public service. The manner in 
which rules are made and administered is not conducive to development 
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of their ideological content. Th I h ese ru es ave no self -ra tionali ty to gl ve 
them a wisdom independent f th t f h' rom a 0 t elr blatant economic and 
poli tical thrust. 
However the above discussion should not give the impression that 
private sector individual employment law is perfect. Because of the 
applicabili ty of collecti ve labour relations and State intervention 
(commandeering in case of the public sector and protectionist in case of 
the private sector) to both sectors, individual employment law in general 
bears certain characteristics that are symptomatic of the "superstructural" 
or "external" course of development of labour relations law in Sudan. 
One such characteristic is that the terms and conditions of employment 
provided by statute for a particular sector are not necessar il y 
representative of the economic conditions of employment in that sector. 
Thus, findings from Sudan and some other African countries have 
confirmed that pay-structures in the public sector cannot be accounted 
for by a market theory of salary determination (Abdin, 1983 p.83). 
Likewise an ILO investigation has also confirmed that wage-structure in 
both the public and the private sectors in Sudan is substantially affected 
by the government which does not operate according to supply and 
demand criteria - ILO, Sudan 1984 pp.143-145 (234). However the type 
and extent of State control of the individual employment relationship 
vary with regard to the public and the private sectors. Although the de 
jure terms and conditions of employment in each sector are at variance 
with the counterfactual terms and conditions sustainable by the economic 
position of employers and the industrial power of the trade unions in that 
sector. The senSe in which the former terms and conditions vary with 
the latter is different in case of both sectors. Judging by the 
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size-diversity and financial insecurity of private employers and weakness 
of individual trade unions, the de jure terms and conditions of 
employment m the private sector are disproportionately favourable to the 
employees. Notwithstanding the strength of individual trade unions and 
the larger size of employing units in the public sector the statutory 
terms and conditions of public employment are quite modest and even 
more so if compared with those in the private sector. How and to what 
extent this si tua tion is maintained by a leg isla ti ve policy that 
discriminates between employees on sectoral basis is explained in the 
next 2 Chapters. 
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CHAPTER N 
THE STATE-INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP AND THE LAW 
1. Introduction 
There are two systems of individual employment Laws in the 
Sudan; one for State employees, and the other for employees of 
the private sector (1). This Chapter discusses the substance and 
administration of the Law relating to regulation of two main 
stages of individual employment In the public sector. The 
first of these stages is selection for employment and the second 
is security of employees' rights and their tenure of office. The 
discussion follows the plan outlined at the end of Chapter II. 
The Chapter is divided into four main parts namely (1) an 
introduction; (2) selection for employment; (3) security of rights 
and tenure of office; and (4) administration of the Law. 
The two mam stages under examination do of course cover 
aspects of employment from the moment an application is made 
for a job to that of termination of the relationship. They also 
comprise matters and materials that are impossible to cover from 
all perspectives in one single chapter. The discussion of these 
matters and materials shall therefore be comprehensive only in so 
far as is relevant - {i.e. either because it supports, contradicts or 
is otherwise related} - to the main theme of the Thesis. The 
separate discussion of the substance and administration of the 
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Law - made solely for the sake of ttl: s ruc ura organization of the 
chapter - does not however mean tha t the two are not 
inter-rela ted. The two are so merged in practice that any 
delimitation of the legal scope of bl· 1 pu IC emp oyment rights and 
duties in Sudan is bound to be incomplete unless done within this 
inter-rela tionship (2). 
LA Origin and Scope of Dual Classification 
On the two different stages under exa mina tion sta tutes 
provide different patterns of protection for the employees in each 
of the public and private sectors. However the difference 
between the two patterns is not only formalistic or procedural 
but also detectable In the degree of effecti veness of the 
protection provided. Under present legislation the private 
sector's employees enjoy a relatively more effective measure of 
administrative protection that is "supplementary to and in turn 
reinforced by judicial protection (3). Moreover because the 
control of the private sector employment is relatively relaxed if 
compared with that of the public sector's (Cf. Supra part 2.A.2 
Chapter 3) - employees of the former sector have on a few 
occasions managed to negotiate and bargain with employers for 
comprehensive enforcement of statutory protection or for 
realiza tion of procedural disciplinary arrangements more 
favourable than those contemplated by Statute (4) Statutory 
provision for compulsory disciplinary procedure in the public 
sector has on the other hand hindered development of similar 
voluntary procedures in this sector. 
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However the discrepancy between individual employment 
legislation in the public and the private sector is not symmetrical 
with the respective strength of the trade unions in each sector. 
The rela ti vely ineffecti ve sta tutory machinery provided for 
settlement of individual employment disputes in the public sector 
contrasts with the relative strength and numerical supremacy of 
trade unions in this sector. Nor can the discrepancy be 
explained by suggestions of a supposed legislative policy that may 
be said to have aimed at allowing public sector's trade unions to 
develop their own voluntary protective schemes. Such allegation 
is pre-empted by the fact that these schemes have no formal 
status under present Laws (5). 
The explanation I put forward is that public employees whilst 
a first target for political control on economic grounds (6), are 
also subject to tight bureaucratic control that has so far proved 
indispensable for the existence of an integral State apparatus in 
the Sudan. A view similar to this interpretation was expressed 
by the Ministry of Justice during the reign of a government most 
sympathetic to the cause of trade unIOnlsm. In reply to a 
request, by the Treasury Minister, as to whether the provisions of 
the Consolidated Labour Code 1970 (CLC 1970) were applicable 
to Government employees the Ministry of Justice gave a nega ti ve 
reply. The Ministry'S conviction was that; "A government and 
employee relationship is totally different from that of a pr i va te 
employer and employee relationship. Whereas the latter is a 
mutual contractual relationship between two juridically equal 
parties the former is a relation governed by public service Laws. 
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Regulations and Circulars whose prlmary objective has always 
been the maintenance of the interest of public utili ties and. the 
tranquility of public administration. The government may at any 
time unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment 
of any of its employees and the employee would not in any case 
have a right to object to such changes. The public employment 
relationship is not therefore a contractual but a unilateral 
statutory relationship whose terms and conditions are set and 
subject to varification by the government" (7). 
It is also the VIew prevalent in judicial circles that pr iva te 
employment Laws are "public" or "general" Laws (Hassan 1979, 
pp.17-19) whilst public employment "Laws" are special "Laws" (8). 
The description of private employment legislation as "public" or 
"general" Law is based on the mandatory nature of its provision 
(9) and its invocation of punitive sanctions (Hassan 1979, p.17). 
The description of public service "Laws" as special "Laws" was 
coined by the Court of Appeal, in the Ministry of Irrigation 1982 
Case, on the conviction tha t ordinary ci vii courts ha ve no 
jur isdiction to entertain claims made under these La ws. 
Not all public employees irrespective of grade and skill have 
always been covered by public serVIce legislation. The 
Employers and Employed Persons Ordinance 1949 (EEPO 1949) 
which was enacted primarily for protection of employees in the 
private sector exempted from its field of application only Civil 
Servants who held posts in the first or second divisions of the 
"Sudan Civil Service" (10). The practical effect of the 
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exemption was that the clerical staff, which constitutes the third 
division of the Sudan Civil Service and employees in unclassHied 
posts remained under the protection of the (EEPO 1949) until 
1970 when this Ordinance was repealed and a Consolidated Labour 
Code (CLC 1970) (II) covering only employees of the private 
sector was enacted. 
A question which poses itself IS, why, if a certain degree of 
central control is necessary for public employees, were these 
classes of employees left outside the jurisdiction of the public 
serVICe Laws that existed prior to 1970 such as the Officials 
Discipline Ordinance 000 1927 and the Officials' Affairs 
Regulations 1938? The two most important reasons for this 
were: 
1 - The floor of rights and the extent of protection against 
different forms of dismissals which the EEPO 1949 provided for 
employees covered by its provisions posed until 1969 no 
impediments on the prerogatives of employers to dismiss (12). 
For this reason it was not deemed necessary by the government 
to bring the classes of public employees covered by the EEPO 
1949 under employment Laws of its own. 
2 - The relaxed control over determination and administration of 
individual rights of certain classes of public employees was 
compensa ted for by an emphasis of the legisla ti ve policy on 
maintaining the segregation between public and pr i va te employees 
in the area of Collective Labour relations. Traces of this policy 
could be found in Laws such as the Trade Union Ordinance 1949 
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(TUO 1949), the Trade Union Ordinance 1960, the Trade Disputes 
Act 1960 and the Trade Union Ordinance 1966 (13). 
The CLC 1970 referred to earlier (Supra Lll) was suspended 
on 9 February 1971 (Hussein 1983, p.123) (14) and following that 
suspension the EEPO 1949 once again came into effect. This 
time the EEPO 1949 applied with full effect but as amended in 
1969. The 1969 amendment had introduced an obligation on the 
parties to an employment relationship to refer their disputes to 
the Commissioner of Labour before any decision to dismiss or 
resign is taken (15). This was a development that was also to 
contribute to consolidating a dual system of determination and 
administra tion of individual employment rights for both the public 
and private sectors. The obligation to refer a dispute to the 
Commissioner of Labour before any decision to dismiss is taken 
and the subsequent weight of judicial interpretations to the effect 
that failure to do so will, irrespective of the grounds contended 
render dismissal prejudicial (16) could ha ve proved also too 
restr icti ve on the govern mental prer oga ti ve stressed by the 
Ministry of Justice memorandum (17) only few weeks prior to 
suspension of the 1970 CLC. Hence the enactment since 1973 
(18) of Laws (19) that have brought all government employees, 
irrespective of skill or grade, under their ambit. The autonomy 
of public employment Laws and that of their administration is 
now firmly accepted and the Civil Courts may no longer assume 
jurisdiction over actions brought by public sector employees (20). 
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The rigid boundary between the Laws r~gula ting public and 
private employment in the Sudan contrasts with the position in 
Br i tain where both Labour Legisla tion and Com mon Law 
employment principles have been applied equally to Crown 
employees (Wedderburn 1983, p.35) (21). Nevertheless it IS also 
true that the Sudan is not the only country where public and 
private employees are treated differently. What is rather 
uncommon about the Sudanese and some other under-developed 
countries' (22) experiences is the extension of differential 
trea tment to the field of individual employment relations and the 
introduction of a statutory machinery, for handling individual 
employment disputes in the public sector, which, excludes both 
voluntary procedures and the jurisdiction of the Courts, and is 
integrated in the administra ti ve hierarchy (23). In developed 
Capitalist Societies where the statutes or the Courts distinguish 
between "public" and "private" employment Law the practical 
effect of the policy is minimal either, because the distinction 
exists only in the area of collective Labour relations, or, because 
of the marginal role which Law in all cases plays in controlling 
the employ ment rela tionship in these Societies (24). The 
prohibition of collective offensive economic action by public 
officials in West Germany, although not in practice eliminating 
such actions (ELL Supp., 1979, (25) pp.33, 193, Wedderburn 1972, 
p.365) is also, counterbalanced by a security of the tenure of 
office (Wedderburn Ibid; ELL Supp. 1979, pp.209-210) and 
existence of a Labour legal system that does safeguard fair 
resolution of individual employment disputes (26). Likewise 
prohibi tion of strikes by Government employees in the United 
------~- ----
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States (27) has not prevented the growth, urider auspices of the 
Law, of a system of collective negotiation capable of producing 
legally-binding agreements on issues ranging from determination 
of the Terms and Conditions of Employment to dismissal and 
disciplinary actions in general. Indeed SS.204(2) of "The Taylor 
Law" (28) imposes an obligation on the public employer "to 
negotiate collectively with employee organization for determination 
and administration of grievances arising under the terms and 
conditions of employment of the public employee - (Smith Edward 
& Clark 1974, pp.491-492) (29). 
l.B Public Employment Defined (30) 
Government service In Sudan is usually referred to as the 
Civil Service. Technically however the Civil Service is graded 
into three main classes and a number of superscale posts. The 
three main classes are: (1) the administrative and professional (A 
& P); (2) the sub-professional and technical (SP & T); and (3) the 
cler ical (C). The superscale posts (known as Groups) are filled 
by senior officials and their deputies, and the provincial 
commissioners and their deputies and assistants - (AI-Teraifi 
1980). Public employment is in contrast a wider, legisla ti ve 
concept that covers, in addition to employees in scale and 
superscale posts, public employees In unclassified posts - (i.e. 
non-pensionable, lower level posts usually filled by manual 
workers) (31). Under present legislation public employment is 
defined for all purposes as covering all employees irrespective of 
grade or skill, In ministries, government departments. 
- ~--------- -----' 
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ad ministra tions of the Central Government, the Regional 
Government, Khartoum Province Administration, bodies of the 
People's Local Government and organizations and public 
corpora tions (32). Public employment so defined covers the 
great majority of the workforce in the modern "organized" sector 
of the economy in Sudan (33). 
Following a decision by the Supreme Court in 1980 the scope 
of public employment even extends to include persons employed 
In an enterpr ise whose capi tal is owned by two or more 
governmental departments or units even though the enterprise is 
a registered private company under the Companies Act 1925. 
The question before the Court of Appeal In that Case (34) was 
whether service In Ennielane Bank, being a State enterprise 
jointly owned by the Bank of Sudan and the Finance Ministry, 
constituted public serVICe. The Court of Appeal considered that 
it is the juridical status of the Bank and not the identity of its 
... shareholders which should guide the Court in reaching its 
decision. Reasserting the independent legal personality a 
company possesses and presumably its capacity to do all that is 
authorized by its Memorandum of Association, including the 
setting of terms and conditions of employment, the Court of 
Appeal ruled that service in the plaintiff bank is not public 
service. The decision was reversed on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the latter's judgment being based on two grounds. The 
first ground was that Ennielane Bank is a "unit" within the 
meaning of the PSA 1973, S.2. The second was that the Court 
of Appeal did not have the jurisdiction to review a decision by 
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the Public Service Appeals Board (PSAB) - c.f. infra part 4.C.6. 
The Supreme Court decision affects the position not only of 
all employees of the Plaintiff Bank but also that of employees In 
many other similar public sector "pri va te companies". However 
due to a lack of co-ordination among the various institutions 
engaged in the administration of Labour legislation in the 
country, the decision of the Supreme Court, has not yet had full 
effect. Indeed the taking by the Attorney General in 1979 of 
Ennielane Bank Case to the Supreme Court and its defence of the 
position of the Bank's employees as public employees did not 
prevent the Attorney General's Chambers from gi ving a 
diametrically opposite advice on the same issue in a subsequent 
case in 1981 (35). 
In addition to its potentially wide effect the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Ennielane Bank Case also exemplifies the 
orienta tion of judicial intervention In the development of public 
employment Law and the extent to which this orientation is 
guided by an autonomous legal doctrine. This is explained below. 
The section on which the Supreme Court in order to reach its 
decision, relied, reads; " ... unit means any ministry department 
or administration in the Central Government, Regional 
Government, Khartoum Province Administraiton, People's Local 
Government Bodies and Public Corpora tions and Organiza tions". 
The Court of Appeal did not deny that the Bank in question is an 
administration subordinate to the Bank of Sudan and the Finance 
--------
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Ministry (p.89 Per Zaki A/Rahman CAJ). It considered this as 
the de facto position of the Bank. In reaching its decision 
however the Court of Appeal considered the de facto position as 
irrelevant. Wha t mattered to the Court of Appeal was the 
intention of the promoters who despite their knowledge of the de 
facto position of the enterprise decided to promote it into a 
company. To base a decision on the de facto position would 
involve going beyond the intention of the parties. The Supreme 
Court did not address itself to the legal argument advanced by 
the Court of Appeal nor explain how a Company registered under 
the CA 1925 may be a unit within the meaning of the PSA 1973 
S(2). The Case touched on issues re1a ting to regulation of the 
rela tionship among different government departments and 
ministries and on the prestige of the PSAB. The reluctance of 
the Supreme Court to follow a line of conceptual legal reasoning 
in reaching a decision and its invocation of public interest as an 
alterna ti ve guidance in that direction reveals the place which 
poli tical considera tions occupy In the jur isprudence of 
decision-making, often at the expense of an independent legal 
rationality. "It may have been just a coincidence that the 
decision of the Supreme Court came only a few days after the 
President of the Republic, in total disregard of the Court of 
Appeal decision on the matter, ordered that the Bank should 
abide by the PSAB's decision" (36). 
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2. Selection for Employment 
There are many factors which make legal control over 
selection for employment in general very much more limited than 
legal control over accrued rights and obliga tions after the 
employment relationship has been created (37). However these 
factors have not prevented the enactment in many European 
countries, of legisla tion for comba ting unfair discrimina tion. 
One reason for this is that the sanctity of group-interests which 
is essential as a moral necessity for this type of legislation (c.t. 
Da vies and Freedland, Ibid.) in a Capitalist Society is widely 
recognized in historically concrete developed Capitalist Societies. 
It is this associa tion of anti-discr imina tion legisla tion wi th 
group-interests and the scant veneration which the latter provoke 
in under-developed social formations that explain the virtual 
absence of such leg isla tion in the Sudan. 
For many reasons, controlling selection for employment is of 
greater significance in under-developed social formations. 
Because the State is the biggest employer, provision of objective 
control over selection for employment may enhance the 
impartiality and consequently ideological effectivity of the State 
apparatus. From another perspective the ethnic heterogeneity, 
nepotism and economic inequalities prevalent in these social 
formations constitute the social environment where unfair 
discrimination practices, are more likely to prosper. Moreover 
due to the origins (38) and hegemony of the political, the role 
which legislation, like any other State action, may play in 
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comba ting the portion of these practices that is not due to 
exercise of political power itself, is likely to be more impressive. 
Having made these preliminary remarks I will now examine the 
position in Sudan. 
2.A A Historical Background 
Immedia tely after the reconquest of the Sudan in 1899, a 
system of administration, in which the supreme military and civil 
command vested in one officer termed the Governor General of 
the Sudan, was adopted for the country (39). For a long time 
after 1899 appointment and promotion of officials in the Sudan 
remained, in effect, vested in the Governor General (A-ET 1936, 
Article 2). In 1938 a regulation stipulating the responsibilities 
and rights of officials but saying little about selection for 
employment was enacted (OAR 1938). Even after independence 
appointment to government posts of all grades was regulated 
internally wi thin each unit by ad ministra ti ve directi ves and 
circulars that were not publishable in the Official Gazette and in 
effect difficult to trace (40). 
There are two reasons that made reform of the public serVIce 
an important agenda in the programmes of the Government 
between 1969-1976. One reason was those political upheavals In 
1969, 1970, 1971, 1973 which inter alia exposed the extent of 
poli ticiza tion of the public service and made it subject for even 
tighter bureaucratic and political control thereafter. The other 
reason was expansion of the public sector and centralization of 
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economic planning following the na tionaliza tion and confisca tion 
of all big industries and enterprises in 1969-1970. In 1971 the 
task of reforming the public service was alloca ted to a 
newly-established Ministry of Public Service and Administrative 
Reform. 
Because it was up to that time the least regulated and also 
possibly because of its significance for political monitoring the 
area of selection for employment received the greatest attention. 
The Ministry of Public Service managed with the assistance of a 
team of British experts to report its recommendations by 
December 1973 (41). The report recommended inter alia the 
establishment of new recruitment boards and the widening of 
jurisdiction of already existing Employment Exchanges (42). By 
1976 various pIeces of legislation which in their entirety 
constitute the present public service Law had been enacted. The 
two main Acts that matter for the discussion in this part are the 
Public Service Act 1973 and the Manpower Act 1974. The 
discussion shall however focus on the powers and performance of 
the institutions which these Acts and their subsidiary regulations 
provide for. 
2.B Recruitment Institutions 
2.B.1 Recruitment Boards 
The Public Service Act 1973 (PSA 1973) provides for 
establishing one Central and five regional recruitment boards with 
the function of - inter alia - selection of would-be officials to fill 
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vacant posts in the starting and other sectors of scale (A and P) 
oft he C i vi 1 5 e r vic e ( P 5 A 1 97 3 , 5 • 3 3 , P 5 R 1 9 7 5, 5 • 1 4~ 6» . 
Moreover the Law also provides that selection for public posts 
shall be made on the basis of free competition in accordance with 
a merit system (P5A 1973, 5.12) that disregards all considerations 
other than qualifica tion and competence (P5R 1975, 5.15). 
The Public Service Recruitment Boards provided for under the 
P5A 1973 were established in 1974 by Presidential Decree No. 
1569. Government departments and units wanting to appoint 
officials in scale (A and P) shall if, falling within the jurisdiction 
of Recruitment Boards, send a list of adequately described vacant 
posts to the Boards. The Boards shall, after advertising those 
vacant posts and interviewing the applicants, prepare a list of 
possible appointees and send it back to the department or unit 
concerned. 55.33(4)e of the P5A 1973 provides that in exercising 
their functions the Boards shall ha ve the power to ensure that 
their decisions are abided by. However as explained later (43) 
this power has not been institutionalized and for the time being 
exists only on paper. This is also the case with 5.14 of the 
Public Service Recruitment Boards' Regulation (P5RBR 1982) 
which provides tha t the decisions of the Boards regarding 
selection are binding on the departments and units concerned. 
2.B.l.a Constitution and Power of the Boards 
By its Constitution (P5A 1973, 5.33(2» the Central Public 
Service Recruitment Board (CP5RB) is a government department 
subordinate to the Minister responsible for the public service and 
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the President of the Republic. Likew ise the Regional 
Recrui tment Boards are constituted by and subordina te to 
Regional Governors who are in turn subject to control by the 
Central Government (PSA 1973, S.33A). The Boards are neither 
tribunals or quasi-judicial commissions nor agencIes for 
enforcement or administration of anti-discrimination Laws 
because there are no such Laws in the country. The Boards are 
intended primarily to enhance efficiency of the public service and 
any protection against discrimination or abuse of authority that 
may acrrue to individuals is incidental. Yet the Boards together 
with the offices of the Labour Department constitute the only 
(44) available control on selection for employment. Because it is 
a State-provided protection it applies only to categories of 
employees the State is ready to protect and, to the extent 
allowable by the exigencies of political control. This 
centraliza tion of recrui tment may not by itself necessar ily 
operate to further the cause of fair competition emphasised by 
the Law (PSA 1973, S.12). In the absence of administrative and 
financial guarantees to support their autonomy, and a legal source 
to nourish normative development of their decision-making and 
thereby institutionalize that autonomy, recruitment centres may 
easily be used to further not the interest of the Civil Service but 
that of the political regime in control of the State (45). 
There are still several points that ha ve to be mentioned to 
enable us to assess the degree of protection which recruitment 
Boards afford to prospective employees. There is first of all the 
fact that; because the posts Recruitment Boards are empowered 
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to select for constitute only 20% of the Civil Service posts in the 
Sudan (AI-Teraifi 1980), the applicants falling within statl!tory 
jurisdiction of Recruitment Boards (46) are a minority among 
applicants for public employment in general. Secondly, even 
within this minority, the Boards are not empowered to deal with 
applications for posts in government units, department or public 
corporations that are exempted by the President of the Republic 
or the Minister responsible for the Public Service (PSA 1973, 
SS.33-3(b». Until 28 July 1976 all public corporations and Banks 
remained outside the jurisdiction of Recruitment Boards. The 
same order which then brought these bodies within jurisdiction of 
the Boards (47) empowers the Minister responsible for the Public 
service to exclude any of these bodies from that jurisdiction. In 
exerCIse of these powers the Minister has issued a list of 
excepted bodies including State Commercial Banks, Universities 
and High Educa tion Insti tutions and public corpora tions or 
establishment transacting in joint ventures with the private 
sector. The Judiciary and the Attorney General's Champers 
were later empowered by resolution of the Supreme Judicial 
Council (No.2, 28th June 1979) to establish their own "Joint 
Recruitment Board". 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the performance of 
the Boards within the limited scope left for them is still retarded 
by their powerlessness to enforce their decisions. Consequently, 
there is no effective remedy for an applicant who, ha ving been 
selected by a Board is rejected by the employing department or 
unit in contra vention of S.14 of the PSRBR 1982 (48). Equally 
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there is no effective measure which the Boards may take against 
a department or unit which in disregard of the Board's authority, 
advertises vacancies and itself selects applicants. In both Cases 
the Central Recruitment Board may under the CPSRBR 1982, 
S.15 submit a report on the case to the Minister responsible for 
the Public Service. But the Minister is neither required by Law 
to take action towards enforcement of the Board's directive nor 
possesses any special powers to order a unit or department 
outside the Jurisdiction of his ministry to comply with the 
Board's decision (49). 
An example of a Case where an employee selected by the 
Central Board is rejected by the employing department is the 
PSCRB -v- the Ministry of Construction and Public Works. The 
Ministry concerned sent a list of engineers to the Board asking 
for appointment of four of them for filling vacant posts at the 
Ministry. The Board rejected the list - (on the ground that it is 
for the Board to make lists of candidates and selectees) - and 
selected and sent to the Ministry, for appointment, four engineers 
from among those on its own waiting lists. The Ministry of 
Construction appointed only one engineer and rejected the other 
three. The Board wrote back to the Ministry contending that 
the latter could, only accept or reject the list in "toto" and not 
discriminate against any of those listed. The Ministry ignored 
the Board's letter. Five months later the Issue was reported to 
the Minister of Finance and National Economy under the PSCRBR 
1982, S.15. The Ministry insisted on its position and the Minister 
failed to enforce the Board's decision (51). The names of the 
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rejected engmeers were simply reinserted on the Board's lists of 
waiting applicants. In this, and other similar Cases the inj~red 
party has neither a right of action against the guilty employer 
nor one for judicial enforcement of the Board's decision (52). 
All that can be done is to wait for the Board to settle the 
dispute with the unit or department concerned. 
The above and other enforcement problems are perhaps best 
illustrated by the Board's own report for the period 25 April 1978 
- 24 April 1981. The report outlines a number of problems 
which surround the Board's relations with other State units and 
departments (Ibid pp.l0-17). 
the following: 
These problems include inter alia 
1 - Many units and departments adopt the practice of themselves 
nominating candidates to fill vacant posts. This, according to 
the report tends to defeat the ideal of fair competition. 
2 - Many State corporations establishments and banks within the 
jurisdiction of the Board appoint graduates without reference to 
the Board. Because these are often financially independent 
corporate units the Board is unable to check the appointments 
they make in oblivion to its supposed power (53). 
3 - Many units do not appoint applicants selected by the Board. 
The Board has also noticed that female graduates constitute a 
majority among those rejected by these units. In all cases 
female applicants have either been rejected ab initio on ground of 
their sex or, when the Board has succeeded in securing their 
appointment have been "constructively dismissed" (54) (e.g. 
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through immediate transfer to a remote area) om similar grounds. 
Table (5) shows that the performance of Regional Selection 
Boards is equally unimpressive. Secondment which in the table 
accounts for 50% of all recruitments covers employees whose 
initial appointments in the Civil Service were either made 
through the Central Recruitment Board or even before the 
establishment of recruitment boards of any type (i.e. before 
1974). In both cases secondment is not a method of recruitment 
determined by the Regional Boards. It is therefore inadmissible 
in evalua ting the actual perf or mance of Regional Boards. 
Excluding secondment, personal selection is the method through 
which the majority of the remaining respondents - (i.e. those who 
answered the questionnaire) have been recruited. This happens 
at the expense of the method of advertisement and fair 
competi tion which Recrui tment Boards are supposed to 
consolida teo 
Table (5) - Methods of Recruitment Compared 
Method Personal Advertised Others Do Not Number of 
Region Selection Job (Secondment) Know Participants 
% % % % 
Kordofan 4.54 9.09 72.73 13.64 28 
Darfur 44.82 6.90 37.93 10.35 23 
Eastern 45.45 - 50.00 4.55 17 
Northern 53.19 6.38 40.43 - 28 
Average 37.00 5.00 50.27 7.13 24 
Source - Mohamed Osman el Ga 'ali: Recruitment policies and 
decentraliza tion; reflections on empirical findings. Dept. of 
Business Administration, University of Khartoum, Sudan -
unpublished research 1980. 
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The obvious weakness of the recruitment institutions described 
under this part is that their performance is totally dependent on 
administrative discretion. This in its turn is due to the lack of 
substanti ve anti-discrimination Law. However read together S.15 
of the PSR 1975 and S.12 of the PSA 1973 make competition and 
selection on fair grounds theoretically a right for all Sudanese 
and a requirement that all public bodies must observe. But 
neither the PSR 1975 nor the PSA 1973 specifically provide a 
right of action for individuals aggrieved as a result of 
non-observance of this requirement. Were it not for the 
additional procedural barriers mentioned under f.52 such 
individuals would have a right of action, against the government 
body concerned, under the Sudanese Administrative Law - (CPA 
1974, SS.309, 312). As explained later these procedural barriers 
distinguish the applica tion of the Laws on selection for 
employment in the public sector from that of their counterpart in 
the private sector (55). 
2.B.2 Employment Exchanges 
The Manpower Act 1974 (MA 1974) repealed the Employment 
Exchange Ordinance 1955 (EEO 1955) and bestowed upon the 
Employment Exchanges new powers that, whilst preserving their 
previous function as manpower statistics centres under the EEO 
1955, made them State agencies responsible for enforcement of 
employment policies. However like that exerted by Recruitment 
Boards the Control which the MA 1974 and the Employment 
Exchanges provide over selection for employment is mainly 
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procedural. 
The Jurisdiction of the Employment Exchanges covers a wider 
range of employees including those in Scales (SP and T) and (C) 
and those in Sub-Scale posts. Scale (SP and T) covers the 
sub-professional and technical classes while Scale "C" covers the 
clerical class. Classes of the two scales together constitute 60% 
of those employed in the Civil Service as a whole (Al-Teraifi 
1980). Sub-Scale posts are occupied by manual workers who 
although State employees, were not traditionally treated as part 
of the Ci vi! Service (56). 
Every unemployed person willing and able to work and every 
worker wishing to change employment may apply for registration, 
for such purposes, with the employment exchange concerned (MA 
1974, 5.9). The Act prohibits the employment of any person, 
falling within jurisdiction of the Employment Exchanges, who is 
not a holder of a Certificate of Registration under 5.9 (MA 1974, 
5.11). Likewise advertisement, through any means of 
communica tion, of vacancies or new posts is prohibited unless the 
written permission of the competent Employment Exchange has 
been obtained in advance (MA 1974, S.13(I)a). Most importantly 
the Act, prohibits direct appointment, and requires employers to 
apply to the competent Employment Exchange for nomination of 
a person or persons with the required qualifications. The 
applicant or applicants appointed by employers must always be 
from among those nominated by the competent Employment 
Exchange (MA 1974,55. 13(l)b). 
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The Commissioner of the Labour Department may authorize 
any officials in the Department to carry out inspection inside any 
plant's premises in order to make sure that the provisions of the 
Act are complied with (MA 1974, 5.25(1)). These officials shall 
have the power to inspect, examine and investigate documents, 
records and files and to summon employers to give evidence or 
explain matters relating to application of the Law. Section 26 
of the Act makes it a criminal offence punishable with fine and 
imprisonment for any person to act in contravention of the Act 
or any regulations or orders made under it. Likewise although 
the Act provides no right of action for a person whose application 
for a job is rejected in contravention of its provisions, such 
person may, in theory, ha ve a right of action under 
Administrative Law (CPA 1974, 55.309-312). 
These three possible methods of enforcement - (i.e. 
administrative inspection, criminal prosecution and judicial review 
of administrative decision) - may suggest that the MA 1974 is 
fully implementable. However this is not necessarily true. 
The prOViSiOns of the MPA 1974 apply to the classes of public 
employees enu mera ted ear lier and to all pr i va te sector 
employees. However when we investigate the methods of 
enforcement of the Act available to the Labour Department and 
to the individual employee - (i.e. in case an applicant or 
applicants nominated by the Employment Exchange are rejected 
by the employer in contravention of 5S. 13(1)b) - in relation to 
each sector we find that both the Labour Department and the 
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individual applicant are, in case of public employees, trapped in a 
net of bureaucratic control that may not allow them to seek 
judicial enforcement of decisions, or, judicial redress. A 
government department or unit which acts in contravention of the 
Act may not be taken to court by the Labour Department, 
because the cause of action, although a contravention of a Law in 
force, IS, also, a dispute between two government departments 
which it is for the A ttorney General to resolve under the 
Attorney General Acts 1981, 1983, 55.8. Chances of success of 
the aggrieved applicant are also minimal. The aggrieved 
candidate cannot by himself prosecute a government unit under 
the MA 1974 5.26 because a magistrate or criminal court will not 
in such a case "take cognizance" except with the antecedent 
sanction of or upon complaint by the Labour Department (CCP 
1974, 5.130( l)a). 
If the aggrieved candidate decides to initiate a civil suit 
against unlawful exercise of power by the public employer the 
civil courts may not assume jurisdiction because the cause of 
action is related to application of the public service Laws and 
Regula tions, and, therefore, within exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Appeals Board (P5AB) (57). If the aggrieved 
candida te make his petition before the P5AB, the latter may 
decline to assume jurisdiction because a candidate (i.e. a 
prospecti ve employee) is not an employee wi thin the P5 A 1973, 
5.30(1) and the P5R 1975, 5.25 (58). Furthermore, there is 
evidence to suggest that the powers of inspection given to the 
Labour Department under the MA 1974 are seldom exercised 
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vis-a-vis public employers. None of the Department of Labour 
1978-1982 Annual Reports contains a single inspection in the 
public sector. Although this is partly due to the common 
problem of staff shortage (59), it is also explicable by 
assumptions about fairness of public employment practices (60). 
Finally, as will be shown later (61) the PSAB and the Attorney 
General's Chambers although playing the above-mentioned roles in 
administration of public employment Law do not themselves have 
an independent judicial S ta tus and a power to enforce their 
decisions. 
2.B.3 The Political Establishment 
Appointment to "high level Leadership" and some "superscale 
posts" is made by political authority. To determine the identity 
of holders of such authority that participate in appointment and 
the number of employees affected I need to define the phrases in 
parenthesis. Superscale posts include the seven "Groups" posts 
above Scale (A and P) of the Civil Service in Sudan. "Groups" 
posts constituted less than 2% of the Civil Service Posts in 1973 
(AI Teraifi 1980) and the percentage has not considerably 
increased since then - (estimated at 3% for 1984) (62). High 
level leadership posts include posts of under-secretaries or deputy 
under-secretaries of Ministries and others having equivalent 
S ta tus, chair men of board of directors of public corporations and 
organiza tions, executi ve directors of public Corpora tions, 
directors of department under direct supervision of Ministers. 
provincial Commissioners and any other posts declared, as high 
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level leadership posts, by the President of the Republic (PSA 
1973, S.2). 
"Groups" posts from the first to the fifth are usually filled by 
scale-to-"Groups" or Group-to-Group promotions. Appointment 
in Groups posts from the highest seventh to the fifth (inclusive) 
are made by the Minister responsible for the Civil Service on 
recommendation of the Minister demanding the appointment PSR 
1975, S.27(2). Appointment in high level leadership posts may 
only be made by order of the highest political authority be it a 
President of the Republic (PSR 1975, S. 27) or a Council of 
Ministers (Officials Affairs' Regulation 1969, S.29). 
Appointment in high level leadership posts is excepted from all 
Sta tutory regulation of selection for employment and subject only 
to political discretion. Likewise appointment In "7-5 Group 
posts" is exceptable from such regulation PSR 1975, SS.18( 1). 
2.B.4 Employers 
Even if the Army the Police and other regular forces (63) are 
excluded there are still public sector units in which selection for 
appointment is left entirely to discretion of the management or 
heads of units. These include all public service units that are 
excepted, from jurisdiction of Recruitment Boards and 
Employment Exchanges, by order of the Minister responsible for 
the Public Service, under the PSA 1973, S.33(3)b and the MA 
1974, S.13(2) respectively. Bearing in mind the absence of any 
substantive Law controlling selection for employment, the 
position of prospective employees in these units is, in theory 
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weaker, because there is no Law whose alleged breach may 
support even an application for judicial review of the decisions of 
this class of public employers. The functions which Recruitment 
Boards, Employment Exchanges, and the Laws they administer, 
fulfill, with regard to employees falling within their jurisdiction 
may possibly reduce the situations in which discrimination would 
otherw ise unabatedly occur. In cases where such discrimination 
nevertheless occurs the breach of the Law involved may in theory 
however support an application by the person affected for judicial 
review of an unlawful exercise of power by the public body 
concerned. However because of the procedural and bureaucratic 
restrictions (64) that impede recourse to Judicial enforcement and 
review the position of different classes of public employees, 
although legally theoretically different, is practically the same. 
The exception of public corpora tions and establish men ts 
transacting in partnersh ip with the pr i va te sector from the 
jurisdiction of Recruitment Boards and Employment Exchanges 
may in practice mean that a majority of public corporations and 
establishments are In effect excluded. There are few public 
corpora tions which are not transacting business in the manner 
described and there is none which is not entitled by statute to do 
exactly that - (the Public Corporations Act 1976, 5.5). Given 
the absence of any form of control on selection for employment 
on the one hand and the lucrative salaries and wages which public 
corporations - (compared with other Government departments) -
pay on the other, it is not surprising that some of them had under 
the previous regime in Sudan, turned into financial stronghold of 
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the President's men, their relatives and supporters (65). 
Summary 
------
A general observation about legislation on selection for 
employment is that it has as its main objective the protection of 
public service interest. Reflective of this objective is also that 
legisla tion which sets detailed substantive and procedural rules is 
made and administered by administrative authorities. Neither 
the judiciary nor the trade unions participate in determination 
and administration of rules in this area. All these factors 
reflect on objectivity or impartiality of the law (66) and its 
enforceabili ty (67). 
3. Security of Employment Rights and Tenure of Office 
Individual employment legislation in the public sector owed its 
initial existence not to a trade union movement that fought for 
its realization but to voluntary resolution of the then Governor 
General of the Sudan to introduce it as part of the overall effort 
towards establishing a civil administration in the Country after 
its reconquest in 1899. That introduction was important for 
defining the rights and privileges (68) of members of the Civil 
Service who continued, for a long time after 1899, to be mostly 
British together with a few Egyptians. 
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" Even after the sanctioning of trade Unions and Independence, 
different political regimes viewed the setting of terms and 
conditions of employment in the public sector as a State 
prerogative, and, changes in the terms and conditions of public 
employment always remained an initiative of the State. The 
continuation of this course of development to date is made 
possible by political dominance of the State and the absence of 
any considerable Capitalist economic structure external to the 
State own structure (which is simultaneously an economic and 
bureaucratic structure c.f. Supra, Part 2, Chapter 2) which may 
have supported a social movement to obstruct or change the 
direction of that course of development. 
The area of public employment under examination IS one 
where leg isla tion is the main source of legal control of the 
employment relationship. Because this leg isla tion is wholly 
administered by non-judicial bodies, Common Law principles 
whether substantive or interpretational do not at all compete or 
interfere with it for regula tion of the public employment 
rela tionship. This area is also, like all other areas of public 
employment, one where legislative control either through its 
comprehensi veness or express provIsiOn undermines any social or 
collective control parallel to itself. There have always been 
various pieces of legislation which in their entirety provided 
detailed statements of terms and conditions of the area of public 
employment under examination. 
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3.A Employment Rights 
Until 1975 vanous terms and conditions of this area of 
employment were provided for by three main sta tutory 
instruments namely, the Officials Affairs Regulation 1938, the 
Transfer and Transportation Allowances Regulation 1934 and the 
Holidays and Leaves Regulation 1934. Up to 1948 when trade 
unions were, for the first time legalized these instruments 
re mained the exclusive source of legal control of the public 
employment relationship. But the sanctioning of trade unionism 
did not end the hegemony of legislative provision. Stipulations 
were made under the trade unions and the trade disputes 
ordinances, promulgated in March 1949, with the effect of 
maintaining exclusiveness of legislation (69). 
In 1973 a public serVICe Act stipulating the general principles 
of public employment was enacted (PSA 1973). The dominance 
of legislation as a method of control is reiterated in several 
provisions in the Act (70). In 1975 a public service regulation 
(PSR 1975), elaborating the general principles stipulated under the 
PSA 1973 and, consolidating, with certain amendments the terms 
and conditions of public employment previously contained under 
the Regulations of 1934 and 1938, came into effect. The PSA 
1973 and the PSR 1975 have been in effect since their 
enactment. 
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The P5R 1975 contains 166 sections and 38 tables and 
supplementaries. The Regulation stipulates, defines or specifies, 
inter alia, the duties of employees (5.13), the date of 
commencement of service (55.24-27), wo(king hours (55.28-32), 
the mode and rate of remuneration (55.33-39), the bases and 
procedures of promotion (55.40-52), entitlement to and calcualtion 
of holidays and leaves (55.65-95) and allowances, overtimes, 
bonuses and promotions (55.96-166). Comprehensi veness, 
provision of both conceptual definition and quantification of 
rights and generality of application are characteristic features of 
the P5R 1975. The various rights and obligations of the 
employment rela tionship are drawn in such a detail and 
particularity (71) as to cover every profession, craft or type of 
industry in the public sector and in effect leave little or no scope 
of manoeuvre for individual 5tate units in their negotiation with 
employees trade unions (72). 
5ection 4 of the P5R 1975 provides that it applies to all 
"employees In Ministries, Government Departments and 
Administrations subordinate to the Central or Local Government". 
Exemption from the Regulation may only be made by order of the 
President of the Republic (P5A 1973, 5.4(e)). 
3.B 5ecurity of the Tenure of Office 
5ubstanti ve and procedural provlslOns relating to protection of 
employee's interest in the job and the security of after-service 
benefits are to be found in the P5A 1973, the Employees 
, 
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Discipline Act 1976 (EDA 1976), the Public Service Pensions Act 
1975 (PSPA 1975) and the Social Security Act 1974 (SSA 1974). 
A general observation however is that, in contrast to the private 
sector, individual employment Law in the public sector provides 
rela ti vely inadequate protection against, and largely no remedies 
for, dismissal and loss of employment in general. 
3.B.A Grounds for Termination of Office 
Under the PSA 1973 serVIces of an employee may be 
terminated for inter alia any of the following: 
I - Retirement or dismissal from Service In the public interest, 
SS.22'g' • 
2 - Abolition of post, SS.22'f'. 
3 - Dismissal by a Board of Discipline, SS.22'e'. 
3.B.A.I Retirement or Dismissal in the Public Interest 
In addition to SS.22g of the PSA 1973, which applies to all 
public employees, the PSPA 1975, SS.26(l)b provides that a 
pensionable official may be retired at any time during his serVICe 
if the President of the Republic on recommendation of the 
Minister responsible for the public service has decided to retire 
him in the interest of the serVICe. Both grounds of public 
interest (PSA 1973, SS.22g) and interest of the Service (PSPA 
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1975, SS.26(l)b) were introduced in Amendments to the Acts in 
1974 (1974 Act No. 40) and 1981 (PO No 36, 15.12.1981) 
respecti vely (73). This does not of course mean that public 
employees were immune, before these dates, from dismissal on 
grounds cloaked In public interest or other legal phraseology. 
Various political regimes exercised that power, as a matter of 
right or might to dismiss undesirable persons, without feeling the 
need to institutionalise it by statute. Trade Union officials and 
political activists have always been the most vulnerable to 
dismissal on these grounds. On the occasions of dismissals in the 
period 1958-1984 referred to earlier (74) the direct cause of 
dismissal was always participation in or launching of a strike 
which the concerned regime perceived as political. 
Since the Civil Courts are not allowed to reView claims 
relating to or arising from application of public service Laws -
(see infra Part 4:AB) - determination of whether or not a 
retirement is in the public or service interest is left to discretion 
of the President of the Republic, the Minister responsible for the 
Civil Service and ministers and other officials to whom they may 
delegate their powers - Bashir Hamad El Bashir -v- Dept. of 
Customs and Excise (75). Experience has shown that retirement 
in the interest of the political regime is construed by these 
executi ves as retirement in the public or service interest even 
though that was not always necessarily the case. More than 89% 
of the 925 Public employees reported retired under these 
provisions in the period between December 1980 - March 1984 
were in fact picked upon because of their political beliefs or 
290 
trade union activism (76). ,I , 
In respect of employees in high level leadership posts the PSA 
1973, S.24 also provides that they may be dismissed by the 
President of the Republic, in accordance with the procedure he 
deems appropriate, if in his opinion a public interest would be 
achieved thereby. 
An employee dismissed or retired on "public interest" or 
"service interest" grounds may appeal against such measure but 
only to the authority that recommended or approved his dismissal 
or retirement (PSPA 1975, S.26( l)b). The Public Service Appeals 
Board (PSAB) which deals with public employees' complaints (77) 
does not assume jurisdiction over claims brought by employees 
dismissed under the PSA 1973, SS.22g, 24 or the PSP A 1975, 
SS.26( l)b (78). 
"3.B.A.2 Abolition of Post 
Unless a pensionable official, an employee whose service IS 
terminated due to abolition of the post he is holding (PSA 1973, 
SS.22£) IS not enti tIed to any redundancy, after-service or 
gratuity payments. If the redundant employee is a pensionable 
official however he may be compensated by an addition, for the 
purpose of calculating his pension to his effective service at the 
ra te of one year for each four years of the period between the 
date of his retirement and the period of his attaining 60 years 
and by payment of an amount equalling three times the pay he 
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was drawing per month immediately before his retirement PSP A 
1975, SS.26( l)a. 
However because there IS no concept of unlawful dismissal in 
public sector employment Law this entitlement of pensionable 
employees is vulnerable. Whereas private employment law 
imposes a general obligation on employers not to dismiss and lists 
only exceptional cases where dismissal will subject to the 
conditions provided be Lawful (79) public employment Law 
provides no such obligation. Hence an employee whose post has 
been abolished may not get this Statutory or any other 
compensa tion if his employer, in order to evade the financial 
burden, chooses to frame as ground for the dismissal a reason 
other than this real cause - I.e. abolition of post. There IS also 
at least one case (80) where dismissal was labelled as "for 
aboli tion of post" even though this was not the accura te 
descr ip tion of the si tua tion. 
In situations like these the PSAB can, upon receiving a 
complaint, always give its view regarding the proper application 
of the public employment leg isla tion and consequently of the 
legality or illegality of employer's action. The fact remainS 
however that it is not within the statutory powers of the PSAB to 
order reinstatement or award any remedy. The fate of the 
dismissed employee is ultimately determined by the willingness or 
unwillingness of the unit or department concerned to abide by the 
PSAB's decision (81). 
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The position of a non-pensionable employee dismissed on 
grounds of "abolition of post" is even worse. Such an employee 
is not en titled to an after-service gra tui ty under the PSP A 1975, 
S.31 because that Act applies only to Civil Servants holding posts 
in the first, second or third divisions of the Sudan Civil Service. 
For the reason shown earlier the employee will not be entitled to 
a compensation for arbitrary dismissal. The decision of the 
PSAB awarding the plaintiff in the Sudan Estate Bank's case (Cf. 
supra f.80) compensation for arbitrary dismissal was In this 
respect not a policy-motivated extension of protection against 
dismissal to public employees. The text of the judgment shows 
that the PSAB is not even aware that the Individual Employment 
Rela tions Act (IERA 1981, SS.39( 6» - which provides for such 
compensation - applies only to private sector employees. Had it 
been aware of this the PSAB could have at least demonstrated its 
knowledge of the IERA 1981, SS.4(b) which asserts this limitation 
- (i.e. limitation of the IERA 1981 to Private Sector employees) -
and explained its reasons for circumventing it. The PSAB did 
neither the first or the second nor even explain why it overlooked 
also the PSA 1973, SS.2-3 and the EDA 1976, S.3 both of which 
asserting application of their provisions to all public sector 
employees. 
If the employer is a subscriber to the Social Insurance Fund -
(as was the case in the Sudan Estates' Bank's Case) - entitlement 
of the non-pensionable employee to any after-service benefit is 
governed by the provisions of the SIA 1974. However that Act 
does not provide any compensation, gra tui ty or after-service 
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benefits for loss of employment. 
3.B.A.3 Disciplinary Dismissal 
Disciplinary dismissal could be for any of the reasons 
mentioned under the Employees Discipline Act 1976, S.6, which is 
a verbatim re-enactment of S.6 of the Officials' Discipline 
Ordinance 1927. The offences provided for in general terms 
under the EDA 1976, S.6 are elaborated upon by the PSR 1975, 
S.13 and may also be subject to further elaboration by the 
internal disciplinary regulation of the department, unit or industry 
concerned. In contrast to the position in the pr i va te sector, 
public sector disciplinary dismissal is not restricted to only 
specific violations (82). The choice of the penalty to be 
inflicted is irrespective of the violation always left to the head 
of department or the Disciplinary Boards (83). The powers of 
Disciplinary Boards may derive, from departmental regulations 
elaborated upon the EDA 1976, departmental regulations made 
principally by the department or unit concerned (84), or, directly 
from the manner in which heads of departments and Disciplinary 
Boards interpret the EDA 1976 and other public employment Acts 
in specific situations. 
The offences provided for by the EDA 1976, S.6 include inter 
alia neglect or disobedience of orders, regulations and Laws, 
refusal or failure to perform duties, abandonment of service, acts 
or omiSSlOns incompatible with the proper performance of duties 
and criminal misconduct. SS.31(0-(10) of the PSR 1975 provide 
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an elaborated statement of the duties of public employees and 
authorize the heads of departments to take any action _ for 
ensuring compliance with the orders they make SS.13(6}. 
It is because of this duality of the jurisdiction of these 
Disciplinary Boards and employers - {i.e. as both administrators 
and makers of rules} - that no line of demarcation can easily be 
drawn between substantive and procedural rules of disciplinary 
dismissal. Both are ascertainable only through investigation of 
the performance and practices of these administrative bodies. 
Hence the discussion in this part will be complete only after that 
investiga tion has been effected. 
Chapter. 
Summary 
This is done in Part 4 of this 
I have pointed out that public employment Law provides no 
general protection against dismissal. The grounds of dismissal I 
examined together with other grounds mentioned under SS.22(a}-{j} 
of the PSA 1973 that ha ve not been examined clearly do not 
support a conclusion that public employment Law is from 
employees' perspecti ve protectionist in or ienta tion. The 
subsections that have not been examined cover instances of 
termination by reasons of "compulsory or voluntary retirement on 
ground of age", "resignation", "medical unfitness" and "political 
appointment in the manner specified under 5.77 of the PSPA 
1975. The discretion given to departments in interpreting and 
applying the Law and the over-emphasis on interest of the public 
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service testify to the regula tory nature of public employment 
Law. Coupled with the exclusive jurisdiction wl)ich 
administra ti ve au thor i ties assume over indi vidual employ men t 
disputes in the public sector this discretion reflects also on the 
objectivity and effectiveness of the Law. These are issues 
examined in detail in the next section. 
For the reasons explained at the end of Chapter II, the 
discussion in the following sections continues by focusing also on 
development of legisla tion across time and explaining this 
development in terms of political social and economic changes. 
The same rule mentioned at the end of that Chapter as governing 
the relation between chronological and topical analyses applies 
also here. 
4. Statutory Machinery for the Settlement of Employment Claims 
4.A Heads of Units and Ministers as Tribunals (85) 
Public employment Laws specify the terms and conditions of 
the individual employment relationship and set up the machinery 
for resolving disputes arising from application, interpretation or 
non-observance of these Laws. Employees and managements of 
different State units are required to conduct themselves In 
accordance with the Law. At plant or unit level the task of 
ascertaining that employees are carrying out their obligations in 
accordance with the Law is assigned to "Heads of Units" and 
Ministers. Non-observance of employment Laws and Regulations 
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or of management orders, directives and internal Regulations, 
empowers the management to put on trial and punish the offender 
In accordance with the provisions of the EDA 1976. The Head 
of Unit may do this summarily under the EDA 1976 5.10(1) or, if 
a penalty more severe than those imposable under 5.10(1) IS 
sought, he may constitute a Disciplinary Board to try the accused 
employee EDA 1976, 5.11. 
However, compared with the powers of summary dismissal 
which Heads of departments and Governors of provinces possessed 
under the 000 1927, 5.11(1), powers that are exercisable 
summarily by Heads of Units under the EDA 1976 are minimal. 
Heads of Units and Governors of provinces possessed, under the 
000 1927, 5.1 I( 1), powers summarily to dismiss employees who 
are not officials or reduce their pay. Under the EOA 1976 
however dismissal may only be imposed by decision of a 
Disciplinary Board. The position of non-official employees under 
the 000 1927 contrasts with that of officials under the same 
Act. Dismissal of officials under the 000 1927 even when 
imposed by a Disciplinary Board is subject to approval by the 
Central Board of Discipline and by the Governor General 
respectively. This discrimination between employees who are 
officials and others who are not was partly due to that officials 
were overwhelmingly British whilst non-official employees were 
Sudanese. 
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Nevertheless, "Heads of Units" In questioning accused 
employees, in determining whether or not a specific conduct or 
situation constitute a ground for disciplinary or other actions 
under existing Laws and Regulations, and in imposing penalties, 
are in effect, under present Laws exercising quasi-judicial powers 
over what could be genuine employment disputes to which they 
are themselves a party. Although these are powers which 
employers inevitably hold In the area of discipline at work the 
fact that disciplinary rules are formulated and administered, 
without participation from the trade unions, and in such a manner 
as to leave the legal categorization (i.e. its description as 
offence, serious offence, misconduct .•. ) of the act or omission 
imputed to the employee and the choice of the sanction to be 
imposed, largely to the discretion of employers, (86) neutralizes 
the i mpartiali ty of the Sudanese pr ocedure even fur ther. 
Moreover public employment Law and its administration do not 
offer safeguards that employees unlawfully dismissed whether as 
a result of improper interpretation or application of the Law or 
exerCIse of the powers given to employers will be reinstated or 
compensated (87). 
A recent case (88) however has shown tha t penalties 
summarily imposable by the "Head of a Unit" may extend beyond 
those stipulated under the EDA 1976, 5.10(1) to include e.g. 
dismissal of an employee during the probationary period of his 
service (89). The case also indicates that decisions summarily 
taken are often construed as an expression of managerial 
prerogative which the PSAB is sometimes reluctant to subject to 
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any external rationality-criterion. In that case the Plaintiff who 
had been appointed a teaching assistant at the Institute on 21 
July 1978 was summarily dismissed by the dean, a year later on 
21 July 1979, on grounds of incompetence. The Plaintiff's 
appeal to the PSAB was rejected because the latter saw no 
reason for interfering with the dean's decision. The Plaintiff's 
petition to the Court of Appeal for a judicial review of the 
dean's and the PSAB's decisions was summarily dismissed because 
the PSAB's decision is, in the Court of Appeal's view, final. 
Before the Supreme Court the Plaintiff's Counsel demanded the 
reversal of both the Court of Appeal's and the PSAB's decisions 
on the grounds that: (1) the PSAB did not provide any reasonmg 
for its decision of upholding the dean's action; and (2) his client 
was dismissed summarily by the dean whilst the Law demands the 
constitution of a Disciplinary Board and non-summary procedures 
for imposition of such penalty; and (3) non-observance of these 
procedures had deprived the Plaintiff of the rights to know the 
charge against him, to be heard and to be gIven a chance to 
defend himself. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal on the 
grounds that the case lay within jurisdiction of the PSAB and the 
latter's decision was therefore final (90). 
4.B Disciplinary Boards as Second Grade Tribunals 
Disciplinary Boards are adhoc tribunals constituted by the 
orders of Heads of Units or Ministers, in accordance with a 
statutory procedure, to deal with all disciplinary offences and 
impose any of the penalties provided for by the EDA 1976 (91) or 
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the Regulations and directives made thereunder. As did the 
000 1927 before it, the EDA 1976 provides for a formal 
procedure that Disciplinary Boards have to follow whilst 
performing their functions. The statutory procedure requires 
that the accused employee be notified in writing with the date of 
assembly of the Board and given a reasonably sufficient notice of 
the matter with which he is being charged at least 48 hours prior 
to the date of such assembly - (EDA, SS.22(3)-(5), ODO 1927, 
S.27). The Law also provides for the right of the accused 
employee to be heard, cross-examine all witnesses in support of 
the charge and be accompanied by an advocate or friend to help 
him defend himself (EDA 1976, SS.23, 30, aDO 1927, S.28). The 
Boards are requested to adhere to the charges framed or if they 
have to alter them, to adjourn the trial if proceeding with trial 
on the new charges might prejudice the accused. The Boards 
may take evidence on oath - (EDA 1976i, S.23(3), aDO 1927, 
S.28(3)) and must keep a record of all proceedings and findings -
(EDA 1976, S.24, 000 1927, S.29). 
Disciplinary Boards have jurisdiction over all employees, within 
a ministry, or, if constituted by a Commissioner of a province, 
within the administrative boundaries of that province, who hold 
posts in Scale I, II, III or in the sub-scales of the Public Service 
in the Sudan. Employees in super-scale posts from Group I to 
VII have always remained outside jurisdiction of the Disciplinary 
Boards consti tutable by Heads of Units or departments. Under 
the aDO 1927, S.19 an employee holding a super-scale post may 
only be tried before the Central Board of Discipline. 
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Under the EDA 1976, 5.14 such an employee may now be tried by 
a High Disciplinary Board. High Disciplinary Boards -are 
constitutable by, either the order of the Minister responsible for 
the public service at the request of the Minister within whose 
ministry the accused employee falls, or, if the accused employee 
is not holder of a post in groups VII, VI or V; by the order of the 
la tter Minister. 
4.B.1 Appeals 
An employee may appeal to the Central Board of Discipline -
(Now the Public Service Appeals Board under the EDA 1976, 5.15) 
against any decision passed upon him by a Disciplinary Board. 
For the purposes of this right of Appeal the ODO 1927 did not 
distinguish between different officials on the basis of their class 
or grade. But the ODO 1927, 5.25 made all decisions of the 
Central Board itself subject to confirmation by the Governor 
General. Under this section the Governor General could inter 
alia confirm the finding and sentence or annul the proceeding 
with or without ordering a fresh trial. 
The EDA 1976 restricts the right of appeal by employees in 
high level leadership posts. Section 19 of the Act provides that 
an employee in a high level leadership post aggrieved by any 
measure taken against him may submit a petition to his minister 
who shall In turn submit the same to the President of the 
Republic. It is only upon the direction of the President of the 
Republic that the petition of such employee may be submitted to 
4.B.2 
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the PSAB for advice (92). Likewise no decision of a High 
Disciplinary Board in respect of any employee holding a high level 
leadership post is enforceable unless confirmed by the President 
of the Republic. Decisions of the PSAB in respect of all other 
public sector's employees are, under the EDA 1976, 55.15 deemed 
final. 
Judicial Review of Disciplinary Boards' and Heads' of 
Departments Decisions 
The existence under both the ODO 1927 and EDA 1976 of 
central bodies to which disciplinary measures and decisions taken 
by Heads of Departments or Disciplinary Boards are appealable-, 
together with other legal procedures - (discussed below) - that 
are applicable in Ii tiga tion invol ving the Government., ha ve 
confined settlement of individual employment claims within the 
boundar ies of the Statutory machinery, to the exclusion of other 
jurisdictions. A Civil Court may not assume jurisdiction if an 
employee aggrieved by decision of a Head of Department or a 
Disciplinary Board directly applies to it for a remedy. Since the 
action is in such circumstances one against the Government or a 
public servant the Court will not assume jurisdiction unless it is 
sa tisf ied that a per iod of a t least two months has elapsed since 
notice of the intended claim or of the intended institution of 
proceedings has been served on the Attorney General - (Civil 
Justice Ordinance 1929, 5.109, CPA 1974, 5.33(3» (93). 
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The Court may summarily dismiss an application by an 
aggrieved employee, even after the satisfaction of the condition 
of notice, because in taking his claim to the Civil Court the 
Plaintiff has done so before exhausting the means of 
administra ti ve redress a vailable for him (94) {i.e. has not 
exercised his right of appeal to the Public Service Appeals 
Board). One case where this rule was applied is Mekki Ali 
el-Azharry -v- Ministry of Health (1976) (95). In this Case the 
Plaintiff a surgeon refused to abide by an order of the Ministry 
transferring him from his present place of work at Khartoum 
Hospital to Wau Hospital in Southern Sudan. The Ministry 
reacted by withholding his salary. Against the Ministry's 
decision the Plaintiff appealed to the Province Court. The 
Province Court accepted the application and ordered the release 
of the Plaintiff's salary. On behalf of the Ministry of Health 
the Attorney General appealed against the Province Court's 
decision. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the 
grounds that, assumption of jurisdiction by the Province Court 
was In contravention of the PSA 1973, S.30, which gIves 
jur isdiction over disputes arising out of the application of the 
public service Laws to the PSAB, and the CPA 1974, S.312(b) 
which makes the allowance of applications for j Jdicial review of 
administrative action conditional upon prior exhaustion by the 
applicant of the channels of redress available to him - (Cf Supra 
f.68). The decision of the Court of Appeal was unanimously 
upheld by the Supreme Court. 
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Five years later both the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeal found a chance to reaffirm the position they have adopted 
in the Ministry of Health's case. The case was this time 
Mudawi Mohamed Ismail -v- Ministry of Education 1982 (96). In 
his thirtieth year of service as a teacher the Plaintiff was 
dismissed, for absenteeism, by decision of a Disciplinary Board 
convened in his absence. His claim for recovery of a three year 
salary and a compensation was allowed by the Province Court. 
Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court saw that 
neither they nor the Province Judge had jurisdiction and 
accordingly directed the Plaintiff to first seek the administra ti ve 
remedies available for him. 
As shown later (it.C.6 - it.C.6.d) the reluctance of the Courts 
to interfere with public employment claims applies, whether or 
not the Plaintiff has exhausted all the channels of administrative 
redress a vailable to hi m. 
Summary 
Disciplinary Boards, Heads of Units and Ministers constitute 
the lower strata of a quasi-judicial statutory machinery provided 
for adjudicating on disciplinary matters at departmental, 
ministerial and appellate levels. This quasi-judicial machinery, 
whils t assu ming exclusi ve control over disputes re la ting to 
application of or arising under the EDA 1976, is virtually 
integrated into the administrative hierarchy of the State. The 
extent to which the statutory machinery is integrated into the 
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State administrative hierarchy may be show'n by examining the 
mode of constitution of the appellate authority of this machinery 
(i.e. the PSAB), the extent of both its jurisdiction and powers and 
its relation vis-a-vis other administrative authorities. These are 
aspects examined in the next section. 
Independence of the Statutory machinery from both judicial 
and collective labour control is detectable at various levels, some 
of which (e.g. finality of the PSAB's decisions) are discussed also 
In the next section. I examine here the effect which the 
operation of the machinery of administration and determination 
of employment rights and obligations at this level - (i.e. that of 
Heads of Departments and Disciplinary Boards) - has on the 
handling of disciplinary matters at work. I do not believe that 
disciplinary matters in public or private employment in the Sudan 
do necessarily conform with pre-determined views - (possibly 
based on experiences of other countries) - about these matters. 
However for this and also for the difference between public and 
private employment Law to be grasped this section needs to be 
recalled whilst reading Part 3.B.3 of Chapter 5. 
The comprehensive statutory machinery and statutory control 
provided at the different stages of a hierarchical system of 
litigation, and the constitution and composition of the different 
tr ibunals of this machinery, by order of and from among State 
representa ti ves, have worked to exclude trade unions and the 
Ci vii Courts from participating in the control of discipline at 
work. Trade unions and government departments may not 
" 
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negotia te on the substantive or procedural aspects of discipline at 
work because it is the Laws and Regulations of the Public Service 
which should (PSA 1973, S.21) govern this issue (97). There is 
evidence to suggest that it is the Statutory procedure which does 
in practice regulate matters of discipline at work in the public 
sector. Of all public sector disputes tha t resol ved into 
agreements or arbitration awards in the period between 
1973-1981, none had questioned the exclusiveness of legislation 
and the machinery provided by it in matters relating to discipline 
at work (98). Likewise Labour disputes that resolved into 
agreements between Governments and the S WTWF (99) before 
1973 did not include issues on discipline a t work. The 
Agreements of March 1950 (100) and January 29, 1968 (101) 
although extensive on matters of wages, trade union immunities 
and job evaluation contained nothing on substantive or procedural 
aspects of discipline at work. 
The absence of detailed agreements on matters of discipline 
may in certain countries not necessarily indicate that discipline IS 
not a focus of industrial conflict - (e.g. because neither side IS 
willing to incor pora te its r igh ts and ob liga tions re gard ing 
discipline in terms of substantive agreements). However 
irrespecti ve of whether it involves the proper application of 
public service Laws and regula tions or their misapplica tion 
discipline cannot be a focus of industrial conflict in the Sudan 
also because of the reasons discussed in Chapter 3 (102). 
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" 4.C The Public Service Appeals Board (PSAB) 
4.C.l 
" 
So far the discussion has centred around tribunals with the 
limited jurisdiction of handling disputes under disciplinary Laws at 
departmental and ministerial levels. Employment disputes 
ariSIng under other public indi vidual e mploymen t Laws and 
appeals against disciplinary decisions taken at departmental and 
ministerial levels now lie to the PSAB. Before examining the 
present position of the PSAB a brief review of its history, and, 
inciden tall y, the h istor y of ad m in is tr a tion of ind i v id ual 
employment Law m the Public Sector in general is, for the 
reasons mentioned at the end of Chapter 2 and reiterated at the 
end of Part 3 of this Chapter, relevant. 
A Historical Background 
As early as 1927 provlslOn was made for the constitution of a 
Central Board of Discipline (CBO) consisting of the Civil 
Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Legal Secretary or 
their representatives appointed by them; together with such other 
member or members as the Governor General shall appoint -
(000 1927, S.17). The CBO possessed original and appeUa te 
jurisdiction over claims arising under the 000 1927. The CBO 
did not possess jurisdiction to deal with employment claims 
arising under other public service Laws. One of the few public 
employment Laws that existed prior to 1927 provided for its own 
administra tion. The Sudan Government Pensions Ordinance 1919 
provided tha t a Council of the Ci viI Secretary, the Legal 
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Secretary and the Financial Secretary should have the final say 
on all matters covered by the Ordinance and in case they did not 
agree the matter should be referred to the Governor General 
(SGPO 1919, S.4). Neither the Officials Salaries Ordinance 1905 
nor the Regulations which came into effect in 1934 and 1938 
(103) provided for a machinery for settlement of employment 
claims arising under their provisions. However under the general 
provlsIOns of the A-ET 1899 Article 4 the appointment and 
promotion of officials and presumably the settlement of their 
claims under the terms and conditions of their service was vested 
in the Governor General or any person or persons to whom he 
could delegate his powers. In practice however it was the Civil 
Secretary who assumed responsibility for the Civil Service and 
who was in turn most involved in its affairs. 
Establishment of a public serVlce commlssIOn to be endowed 
with inter alia the administration of public employment Laws was 
statutorily provided for in 1953. The inclusion of such provision 
in the Statutes mentioned below was a result of many factors. 
These factors were the vast expansion and "Sudaniza tion" of the 
Civil Service that had begun from as early as 1936 (104), the 
need for a body to replace the colonial bodies described below 
and the efforts of the Sudanese officials - (which did not however 
exceed submission of memorandums) (105). The government and 
poli tical parties chose an administra ti ve body to handle 
employment grievances because this was compatible with the 
form and practices of inherited institutions of a once "autocratic 
government" (106). 
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The Self-Government Statute (1953)" and the Interim 
Constitutions of (1953), (1956) and (1964) all provided for 
establishment of the Commission. A public service commission 
was urgently needed to fill the vacancy created by the cessation, 
on the eve of Independence, of the trisecretarial Central Board of 
Discipline to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under the ODO 
1927. That cessation was consequential upon the abolition of the 
Governor General's office and trisecretarial Council and the 
assembling of a new political formula that was to govern the 
post-independence Sudan. Another function which the 
Commission was intended to perform was that of providing, a 
preliminary jurisdiction over, and resolution of disputes arising 
under or relating to application of other individual employment 
Laws in the Public Sector. This task was before Independence 
part of the executive responsibilities of the Civil Secretar ia t 
(107). 
The Commission envisaged by the various Statutes aforementioned 
was to consist of a president and members to be appointed by 
order of the President of the Republic (l08). The functions of 
the Commission included, inter alia, the exercise of the 
jurisdiction previously assumed by the Central Board of Discipline 
under the ODO 1927, and the review of complaints submitted to 
the Commission by public sector employees. In reviewing 
complaints the Commission was to possess powers of ordering the 
production of documents and information necessary for enabling it 
to reach a decision and it was to be the duty of government 
departments and units to abide by such orders. However the 
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Commission was not to possess powers of making decisions for or 
against the complainants. The Commission could only make a 
recommenda tion, of the course of action to be taken In the 
particular circumstance, to the minister concerned, or, if the 
Complaint was one against a minister to the Council of Ministers. 
If in any case the Council of Ministers had resolved not to accept 
a recommendation of the Commission the former was to 
immediately file its resolution and the reasons thereof with the 
President of the Republic whose decision was final (CS 1958, 
Article 75). The Commission was to submit an annual report on 
its performance to the President of the Republic which was in 
turn required to submit a copy of the same before Parliament (CS 
1958, A.77). 
Despite urgent need for its serVIces and the recognition of 
that need by the various statutes cited the Public Service 
Commission was never constituted (09). The Military Regime 
of General Abboud which took over at the end of 1958 discarded 
all interim and recommended Constitutions that contained the 
proVIsIons on the proposed Commission, and from its part 
provided no alternative solution. Likewise none of the Party -
Governments that reigned between 1964-1969 following the 
overthrowal of the Military regime stayed long enough, or felt 
secure, enough (10) to review and determine the fate of the 
statutory provisions relating to constitution of the Commission. 
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From the moment of declaration of Independence In 1956 and 
up to 1969 public employment disciplinary claims, in effect, 
remained without a formal specialized appellate authority to 
handle them. Likewise no statutory machinery was provided for 
the settlement of employment grievances under other Public 
Service Laws. However bearing in mind the restr icti ve 
amendments which the 1956-1969 Military and Parliamentary 
Governments introduced - (C.f Supra Part l.C.2, Chapter 3) - to 
collective labour relations law and the political character which 
Industrial conflict assumed over the same period (Hussein 1983, 
63-107) the positions of the public service and that of the 
indi vidual employee had, judging by their colonial standards, 
deteriora ted. This was so because these legal restrictions and 
political confrontation retarded all governmental or voluntary 
reforms (i.e. the latter being improvement that may accrue 
across time as result of bilateral or tripartite collective 
negotiations) at a time when the need for reform had been 
accentuated by changing economIC conditions and expansion of 
the Civil Service (111). 
Individual employment claims tha t arose under public 
employment Laws and regulations were dealt with by individual 
ministers or their representa ti ves. Indi vidual ministers were 
empowered to exercise, the confirmatory powers previously held 
by the Central Board of Discipline (112) (000 1927, S.16) in 
dealing with matters falling under this Ordinance, and, powers 
previously exercisable by the Civil, Financial or Legal Secretaries 
in matters falling under other public employment Laws. In both 
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cases the Council of Ministers (113) possess'ed the confirmatory 
and over-riding powers previously held by the Governor General. 
It was also the case that as the legal representa ti ve of the 5ta te 
the Attorney General's Chambers often had a say over matters 
relating to application of public employment Laws by government 
units. The Chambers played this role, upon, petition by the 
aggrieved employee, or, notification by the aggrieved employee of 
his intention to institute proceedings against a government unit or 
servant or upon prior application for consultation by a ministry or 
department intending to take a course of action under existing 
Laws (I14). 
In November 1970 a Labour Code (CLC 1970) amending and 
consolidating, all individual employment Laws in the private 
sector, and, all collective labour relations laws (115) came into 
effect. Despite the efforts which public sector trade Unions had 
thrown behind the enactment of the CLC 1970 none of the 
comprehensi ve chapters of the CLC 1970 relating to determination 
and administration of the terms and conditions of the individual 
employment relationship (CLC 1970, 55.55-94) was deemed 
applicable to public sector employees (116). In effect, 
administration of individual employment legislation in the public 
sector remained, until 1973, as it had been during the 1960's. 
The preceding description of historical development suggests 
that an administrative body was always considered as the ideal 
body for adjudicating on individual employment disputes In the 
public sector. This however is understandable In VIew of my 
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earlier argument that there are features of employment relations 
Law in Sudan that, owe their existence not to the type of 
political regIme in power but to the class structure and form of 
the State, and, therefore, have survived all political changes _ 
(supra Part 3 in Chapter 2). 
The establishment of the PSAB in 1973 with its present 
powers and jurisdiction is explicable partly by the durable factors 
aforementioned and partly by accompanying circumstances 
mentioned in Part 2.A of this Chapter. The accompanying 
circumstances explain why reform of the Civil Service and 
establishment of an authority to deal with public employment 
grievances were needed. The durable factors account for why 
the specific ad ministra ti ve for m was chosen. The PSAB 
officially existed upon promulgation of the PSA 1973 (PSA 1973, 
SS.28(3)b). 
'4.C.2 Constitution and Jurisdiction of the PSAB 
The PSAB consists of a president and members appointed and 
ha ving their emoluments specified by the President of the 
Republic. To cope with a huge volume of litigation the PSAB 
,j}-:;' 
sits in ~'ircuits each consisting of three members selected by the 
president of the PSAB from among its appointed members. The 
PSAB is a central unit, situate in Khartoum, with no circuits, 
branches or counterparts in the six regions of the country. Until 
1981 the PSAB was one of the institutions of the Public Service 
Commission which was in turn a subordinate of the Ministry of 
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Public Ser v ice and Ad minis tr a ti ve Ref or m. Following the 
abolition of that Ministry and the subordination of some of its 
institutions to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in 
1981 the PSAB is now a division of a Public Service Commission 
which is autonomous from ministerial control and directly 
accountable to the President of the Republic (117). The 
president of the Public Service Commission is ex-officio the 
president of the PSAB. 
The PSAB has jurisdiction in respect of appeals submitted by 
all employees, except those holding high level leadership posts, 
against any decision rei a ting to appointment promotion or the 
application of public service Laws and regulations PSA 1973, 
S.30( 1). The PSAB may also advise on complaints by holders of 
high level leadership posts referred to it by the President of the 
Republic PSA 1973, S.30(2). 
The PSAB may, for the proper execution of its functions, 
summon any person or persons in order to give evidence before it, 
take evidence on oath, and, order the production of documents, 
information, records and files connected with the appeal or 
complaint (118). A person who unreasonably refuses to abide by 
a PSAB order to appear in person, or to produce documents, 
information, records or files, commits an offence punishable with 
imprisonment and fine PSCR 1982, S.34, PSABR 1973, S.22. 
" 
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4.C.3 Powers of the PSAB , ! 
Existing statutes do not expressly or implicitly provide for 
remedies which the PSAB may give to an employee aggrieved by a 
non-observance or misapplication of the Law. This however has 
not in practice prevented the PSAB from ordering various forms 
of redress depending on the merits of each particular case. 
Although the nature of the decisions which the PSAB may make is 
not made clea~ these decisions are by the letter of the Law final 
and obligatory PSA 1973, S.30(2). Likewise the PSCR 1982, 
S.34( 1) makes it a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment, 
fine or both for any person to refuse to carry out a PSAB's 
decision. 
The effect which these puni ti ve provIsIons have on 
enforceability of the PSAB's decisions should not be exaggerated 
and judged in the awareness that their culprits are often 
government ministers or senior officials whose ranks are equal to 
or higher than those of the president and members of the PSAB 
and who are always in a position to defend their stance as in the 
interest of the service - (an allegation which, bearing in mind 
their intimate knowledge of the ministry or department they are 
presiding over, it is not always easy to contest). 
The PSAB, aware of the difficulties associated with Legal 
enforcement does not in practice prosecute obstinate government 
units or departments. Instead it writes to the Presidency of the 
Republic concerning the facts and its findings in each particular 
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case and it is entirely for the former to deter"mine what should be 
done. In some cases plaintiffs who complained against the 
refusal of government units to abide by the decision of the PSAB 
were directed either by the latter or by the Presidency of the 
Republic to complain to the Attorney General (119). 
I have already mentioned that dismissals on alleged public 
interest or serVICe interest grounds are not reviewable by the 
PSAB (120). The allegation of public or service interest may 
further be made by a minister or any person to whom he may 
delegate his authority, subsequent to and as excuse for rejecting a 
PSAB's decision, even though the original grounds of the dismissal, 
adjudicated upon by the PSAB contained no reference to public or 
service interest. In Beshir Hamad El Beshir -v- the Department 
of Customs and Excise (l21) for instance, the Plaintiff, a customs 
officer was tried and dismissed by a Departmental Disciplinary 
Board on charges of smuggling and disobedience. On appeal to 
the PSAB the la tter found tha t the evidence adduced was 
insufficient and the trial proceedings were erroneous. The PSAB 
accordingly annulled the trial proceedings and directed the retrial 
of the Plaintiff by a new Disciplinary Board in case the Customs 
Department still wanted to discipline him. Upon presentation, by 
the Plaintiff, of the PSAB's decision to the defendant Department 
the latter gave him a letter signed by the head of the Customs 
Department conferring to the Plaintiff the decision of the 
Minister of Finance and National Economy to retire him In the 
interest of the service under the (PSP A 1975, S.26b). The 
Plaintiff's subsequent complaint to the PSAB was in vain as the 
4.C.4 
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latter does not assume jurisdiction over clairhs arIsmg under the 
section referred to. 
The PSAB as a Stratum in the Bureaucratic Hierarchy and the 
Implications of this Position for Enforceability of its Decisions 
The mode of composition of the Public Service Commission, 
the source of emolument of its president and members and their 
tenure of office (122) make the Commission - (of which the PSAB 
is only a Subsidiary) a government ministry that is directly 
subordina te to the President of the Republic (123). This 
subordination is demonstrated by the PSAB's inability to enforce 
its decisions (124). It also reflects on the impartiality of the 
PSAB's legal OpinIOn (125). Although there are cases in which 
the PSAB's decisions were not necessarily partial this type of 
empirical evidence does not, in absence of institutionalized 
safeguards of autonomy, support a conclusion that the PSAB is 
autonomous. The autonomy of any institution should from the 
legal point of view always be tested at both the institutional and 
the practical empirical levels. 
In addition to its subordination to the political hierarchy the 
PSAB does not possess any legal immunity or privileges that 
distinguish its status from that of other ministries and government 
units. Furthermore, members of the PSAB possess no exceptional 
legal qualifications that distinguish their expertise from that of 
other ordinary senior civil servants. This means that their 
decisions have little impression upon, and are open to challenge by 
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other State units. Moreover every go'~ernment unit and 
department has as its own employee a qualified legal adviser that 
advises the unit or department on legal issues arising in the 
course of performance of its functions; including issues relating to 
discipline and employment claims in general. These legal 
advisers are generally better qualified (126) than the president and 
members of the PSAB and have stronger influence on the opinion 
of their employers. As experience has shown these legal advisers 
although government employees do not necessarily always adhere 
to "the official legal policy" (126) of the State as represented 
always by the stance of the Attorney General's Champers. 
Although "the official legal policy" has always maintained the 
finality and obligatory nature of the PSAB's decisions some 
government units have, under the guidance of their own legal 
advisers, and, in pursuance of their own particularistic interests, 
gone to extreme length in contesting this finality. It is of course 
" always the official legal policy - (i.e. a politicised legality that is 
not always coincidental with legal or objective legality) which 
ultimately prevails. 
The points mentioned above are illustrated by the facts in 
Anwar Ali Hussni -v- Ennielane Bank. In his application to the 
PSAB the plaintiff in this case complained that he was unlawfully 
over looked by two consecuti ve promotion decisions in two 
consecutive years. The PSAB ordered the defendant Bank to 
produce the secret personnel records of the plaintiff and those of 
his promoted colleagues for inspection. Upon examination of the 
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secret reports wr i tten about the plaintiff in compar ison \\ i th those 
of other employees and the commutation of these reports into an 
evaluative numerical record for the purpose of determining 
eligibility for promotion, the PSAB found for the plaintiff and 
accordingly directed the Bank to rectify his position. The Bank 
refused to abide by the PSAB's decision for two reasons. The 
first reason was that the Bank did not accept the PSAB's VIew 
that serVICe in the Bank is public service, and consequently was 
not convinced that the PSAB had jurisdiction. The second reason 
was that the PSAB reached its decision through varification of the 
evaluative numerical record submitted to it by the Bank whilst, 
from the Bank's view, unaware of the details on which numerical 
evalua tion is based. A letter by the Attorney General (128) to 
the Minister of Finance and national economy, explaining that the 
decision of the PSAB was in accordance with the "official legal 
policy" and requesting him to direct the Bank accordingly, and a 
directi ve made by the Minister to that effect, failed to move the 
Bank a way from the position it had adopted. Moreover, the Bank 
applied to the Court of Appeal for a judicial review of the PSAB's 
decision on the grounds mentioned above. The Court of Appeal 
quashed the PSAB's decision for lack of jurisdiction. The Court 
of Appeal decision was in turn overruled on appeal to the Supreme 
Court (129). 
The PSAB's original decision in Ennielane Bank's case \\as 
passed on 31 October 1977. The refusal of the Bank to abide by 
the decision and the course of appeal which the case subsequently 
took meant that the plaintiff had to wait until after the Supreme 
" 
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Court had passed its decision on 26 March 1980. However had it 
not been for the personal intervention by the President of the 
Republic - (C.f Supra text above f.36) the plaintiff's period of 
wai ting might have lasted well beyond this date or endlessly. A 
decision by the Supreme Court upholding a decision of the PSAB 
in circumstances similar to the case before us merely returns the 
plaintiff to his original position with the problem of enforcement 
of the PSAB's decision unresolved (130). 
Lack of statutory authorization, and the position of the PSAB 
as astra tum in the bureaucratic hierarchy allow it to interfere 
with other government ministries' and units' actions only to the 
extent essential for declaration of the plaintiff's right. The 
PSAB does in practice maintain a curb on the extent of its 
interference even In cases where the Plaintiff's grievance IS 
consequential upon a faulty main course of action which unless 
declared void makes rectification of the Plaintiff's position almost 
impossible. It is in such cases that the PSAB's inability to 
invalida te the principal course of action is directly felt on 
enforceability of the Plaintiff's right. To illustrate this I will 
give as example the range of cases relating to violation by 
government units of Plaintiff's promotional rights. Under the 
public service Laws promotion is a right for all employees and 
eligibili ty for promotion is determined on objective statutory 
bases (PSR 1975, 55.40-46). The commonest complaint among 
these cases is where an employee or employees ha ve been 
wrongfully promoted to a higher scale sector or group while the 
plaintiffs or plaintiff, more eligible for promotion, have been 
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passed over (131). The VIew which the PSAB adheres to In such 
complaints is that whilst it may make a declaration as to the 
plaintiff's or plaintiffs' rights to promotion it cannot invalidate 
the ministry's or unit's resolution that caused some of the 
plaintiffs' colleagues to wrongfully occupy the formers' positions 
on the promotion list (132). The obstacle that faces the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs seeking enforcement of the PSAB's declaration is 
that their fate is left entirely to the defendant unit or 
department which, if it has decided not to ignore the PSAB's 
decision, has to either relegate some of its employees already 
promoted in order to give space for the promotion of the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs or to create a new vacancy or vacancies, in the scale 
sector or group to which the plaintiff or plaintiffs are demanding 
promotion, in order to accommodate them. Even for the bona 
fide department or unit desirous of rectifying a bona fide mistake 
the adoption of either alternative presents problems and requires 
the prlOr approval of, depending on the scale of the plaintiffs' 
posts, the Public Service (Financial) Affairs Champer, the minister 
responsible for the public service or the President of the 
Republic. However, a government unit or department which, by 
knowingly acting against the Law, has deliberately denied an 
employee's right to promotion may not feel obliged to adopt 
either alternative (133). 
4.C.5 Dependence of the PSAB's Legal Opinion 
The grievances the PSAB deals with reqUire for their proper 
redress a competent authority that is capable of reaching the 
right decision and enforcing it. Enforcement problems however 
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are not the only ones that face the PSAB. It is also the case 
that deciding on an employment grievance or claim may involve 
intricate legal issues and centre around legal rights that need for 
their decipherment and appreciation an authority whose legal 
training is comprehensive. A Board that is composed of ex-civil 
servants whose legal training is marginal may not be capable of 
for mula ting an independent approach that strikes a balance 
between interest of the public service and that of individual 
employees. 
Lack of judicial and legal expertise drives the PSAB into 
relying on the line of official legal policy represented by the 
Attorney General's Champers (134). Like any other government 
unit or department the PSAB may seek legal advice from the 
Attorney General Champers and is bound by such advice (AGA 
1981, 1982 55.7). Since the Attorney General represents and 
defends the legal interests of the State from the perspective of 
the State, reliance by the PSAB on advice provided by the 
Attorney General's Chambers can influence the policy orientation 
of the former (135). The considerable detriment this orientation 
might impose on the interests of individual employees is most 
evident in a situation where the plaintiff seeking the assistance of 
the PSAB is an employee of the Attorney General's Chambers 
itself. The PSAB is potentially incapable of providing any relief 
in such a situation because the Attorney General's decision 
regarding the employee's claim, although that of a litigant is also 
simultaneously a legal opinion which the PSAB may not disregard 
(136). 
4.C.6 
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Exclusiveness of the PSAB Jurisidiction and! the Finality of its 
Decisions 
4.C.6.a Exclusiveness of Jurisdiction 
The widom of asserting exclusiveness of jurisdiction and 
finality of decisions of the PSAB may not from the employees' 
perspective be self-evident (137). It has been suggested from the 
government side, however that this assertion "aims at confining 
the settlement of public employment disputes within the 
administra ti ve hierarchy of the State and thereby guaranteeing 
the efficient and spontaneous functioning of public utilities" (138). 
Restricting the settlement of employment claims to the PSAB 
does in fact in many ways work towards the achievement of the 
objestives identified above. The marginal legal training and civil 
service background of the president and members of the PSAB see 
to it that the application of public employment Laws, themselves 
as a general rule maintaining a balance in the employment 
rela tionship favourable to the State, is effected on the basis of a 
non-legal approach and, with the convenience of the public service 
as a paramount consideration. There are in this respect cases in 
which judges of the Civil Courts, with their comprehensive legal 
training and acquaintance with broader concepts of legal rights 
and duties, may have reached decisions different from those 
reached by the PSAB (139). 
The approach of the PSAB towards employment claims -(C.f 
Supra £.94) - and the informal means the PSAB follows in seeking 
enforcement of its decisions - (C.f Supra F .81 and text above) -
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provide a form of control that is capable of gQaranteeing interests 
of individual employees only to the extent and within the limits 
that the convenience of the administrative authorities would 
require or allow respectively. Intervention of the ci vii courts 
may produce, decisions that are oblivious to the particularistic 
interests of ad ministra ti ve author i ties, and, methods of 
enforcement whose effectiveness may not depend on the outcome 
of consultation among the various institutions of the State (140). 
The will ingness of ad minis tr a ti ve inst i tu tions to settle 
employment claims, on the one hand, and their determination that 
this should be done within the boundaries of the administrative 
hierarchy, on the other, is illustra ted by the facts of the 
Graduates of the Telecommunications Institute 1983 case Ibid -
(Supra f.139). Upon complaint, by the plaintiffs, to the Attorney 
General, the latter upheld their view and wrote (141) to the 
Telecommunica tion Corporation and the Public Service (Financial) 
Affairs Chamber advising that they could not lawfully reduce the 
scale of the plaintiffs' posts. However when the plaintiffs' 
counsel took the matter to the Supreme Court demanding 
annulment of the relegation decision and enforcement of the 
Attorney General's advice in support of the plaintiffs, the 
Attorney General abandoned the defence of the plaintiffs' cause. 
Instead, acting on behalf of the Corporation and the Public 
Service Champer the Attorney General submitted that the 
Supreme Court had neither the jurisdiction to review the case nor 
to enforce the legal advice given by the Attorney General (142). 
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We ha ve already seen tha t the PSAB has exclusi ve 
jur isdiction over appeals against disciplinary measures taken by 
Disciplinary Boards or Heads of Units (143). Exclusi veness of 
the PSAB's jurisdiction covers in addition, all claims and 
complaints arising from or relating to application of the Laws 
and regulations governing the individual employment relationship 
in the public sector (144). Moreover, exclusiveness of the 
PSAB's jurisdiction applies irrespective of the geographical 
10ca tion of the dispute. An employee aggrieved by a decision 
of the Governor of the Northern Region for example, may have 
to travel hundreds of miles to the PSAB in Khartoum so that his 
complaint may be heard (145). 
4.C.6.b Finality of Decisions 
The grounds and occasions on or 10 spite of which the 
Courts have consistently upheld the finality of the PSAB's 
... decisions can be summarized as falling into (1) express statutory 
provision; (2) excess of jurisdiction; (3) status of the PSAB as a 
constitutional body; and (4) breach of the rules of natural 
justice. These are examined below. 
4.C.6.b.l Express Statutory Provision 
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have 
always invoked the CPA 1974 S.312-b read with the PSA 1973 
S.30 as justification for their acquiescence into the Attorney 
General's advocacy of exclusiveness of the PSAB's jurisdiction 
, 
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(146). I; However when it comes to the iss·ue of finality of the 
PSAB's decisions the CPA 1974 S.312-b is irrelevant. The 
central issue in this latter instance is whether a decision passed 
by the PSAB is subject to judicial review at all. To that effect 
the PSA 1973 S.30-(3) however provides that "the decisions of 
the PSAB shall be final and their execution shall be obligatory". 
Civil Courts in Sudan did on occaSIon review administrative 
decisions subject to the conditions set by the Law (147). On its 
apparent face however the recent controversy over the finality 
of the PSAB's decisions centres not so much around whether the 
Courts can review administra ti ve decisions as around whether 
the PSAB is an administrative authority. However rather than 
the express provision about finality of the PSAB's decisions 
being treated as a conditional provision whose binding nature 
should depend on whether, judging by other criteria, the PSAB IS 
an administrative authority it has by itself been taken as a 
factor in determining the status of the PSAB. 
In the first two cases that came before it on the issue the 
Court of Appeal decided that the express statutory provision as 
to finali ty of the PSAB's decisions makes these decisions 
unreviewable (148). It was only after invoking the express 
sta tutory prOVIsIon as a first ground for its decisions that the 
Court of Appeal in both cases apologetically expressed as the 
other ground the view that decisions passed by the PSAB in 
lawful exercise of its authority under the public service laws 
and regulations are not administrative but quasi-judicial 
" 
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decisions which the Courts are power less to -revise. In the case 
that went on appeal (149) to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff 
counsel contested the construction of the PSAB's decisions as 
quasi-judicial on the ground that - inter alia - the PSAB is, a 
sub or dina te of the Ministry of Public Service, and therefore an 
administrative commission with advisory rather than judicial 
functions. Unimpressed by counsel's argument the Supreme 
Court ruled that "the express and uncondi tional statutory 
provision regarding the finality of the PSAB's decisions means 
that the legislature has intended to distance claims relating to 
the ter ms and conditions of public employment from the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts - Ibid P.3" (150). Public 
employment claims are, according to the Supreme Court, "a 
special category of claims in which the administrative element 
is overriding, and, which need for their proper disposal access to 
information and facts that are not easily accessible to the Civil 
Courts - Ibid P.4". 
4.C.6.b.2 Excess of Jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the application in 
Saddar's case cited above even before making sure that the 
PSAB had acted within its jurisdiction. In its confirmation of 
the decision the Supreme Court endorsed this position taken by 
the Court of Appeal. Although there was no claim that the 
PSAB had acted outside its jurisdiction In this particular case. 
The omission of both Courts to investigate this possibility (151) 
demonstrated their lack of concern with excess of jurisdiction as 
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ground for review and was controversial enough to warrant a 
dissenting judgment (152). 
A year later in Anwar Ali Hussni -v- Ennielane Bank 1979 
the Court of Appeal allowed an application against a PSAB 
decision in which the latter had directed the defendant Bank to 
treat the plaintiff as promoted retrospectively from the date of 
his colleagues' promotion. The Court of Appeal overruled the 
PSAB decision on the ground that the Bank's employees were 
not subject to the PSAB's juridiction (153). Regarding the 
finality of the PSAB's decisions the Court commented: "the 
PSAB's decisions are final in so far as the PSAB has acted 
within its juridiction. Excess of jurisdiction empowers this 
Court, under both the PSA 1974 S.309 and the general principles 
of the Law to review the PSAB's as it does any other 
administrative decision - Ibid "(154). The respondents applied 
to the Supreme Court for nullification of the Court of Appeal 
judgment and restoration of the PSAB's decision. Upon 
admission of their joint appeal the Attorney General and the 
plaintiff's counsel questioned the presupposition on which the 
Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction, namely that the PSAB is 
an administrative authority, and contended that the PSAB IS a 
quasi-judicial author i ty tha t exercises judicial powers and 
derives its authority directly from the Constitution (156). The 
Supreme Court upheld the applicant's view and added that the 
unequivocal provision of the PSA 1973 S.30 makes the finality of 
the PSAB's decision binding, not only within the administrative 
hierarchy, but, also, upon the judiciary. However the Court 
... 
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was quick to point out that "this may not mkan that the PSAB's 
decisions would be protected even when the latter has exceeded 
its jurisdiction or acted against the Law ••• "(157). With 
regard to this particular case the Supreme Court considered 
Bank employees as public employees and as such subject to the 
jurisdiction of the PSAB. The Supreme Court's decision was In 
this respect however arbi trary and also possibly externally 
influenced (158). 
There are two reasons which weaken the weight of the 
above-quoted Supreme Court com ment as author i ty for 
reviewability of the PSAB's decisions on grounds of excess of 
jurisdiction. The first reason is that the Supreme Court based 
its reversal of the Court of Appeal decision partly on the 
separate ground that the Courts have no jurisdiction to reVIew 
these decisions in the first place. The second reason is that 
the Supreme Court made no comment on its earlier endorsem~nt 
of the approach the Court of Appeal had followed in Saddar's 
case - (Supra. Part 4.C.6.b). Both reasons make it unclear how 
such excess of jurisdiction or violation of the Law can be 
ascertained if the decisions of the PSAB are abinitio not subject 
to review by the Civil Courts. The practical effect of this 
approach came to surface a year later in Mohamed Elmamoon 
Babikr Zerroog -v- the Dean, Institute of Theatrical and Musical 
Studies 1981 (159). Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court dismissed the plaintiff's application on ground of finality 
of the PSAB's decisions even before thorough examination of the 
facts. The plaintiff in effect walked without a remedy even 
... 
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though his grIevance was consequential upon breaches of the 
rules of natural justice (160). 
4.C.6.b.3Status of the PSAB as a "Constitutional" Entity 
The alleged quasi-judicial status of the PSAB and the 
alleged derivation of its powers from the Constitution were the 
main grounds on which the Supreme Court defended the finality 
of the PSAB's decisions in principle in Ennielane Bank's case. 
These were also the same grounds that were to be reinvoked and 
elaborated upon by the Court in subsequent decisions. 
A year after its rebellious decision in Ennielane Bank's 1979 
case the Court of Appeal accepted as Law the finality of the 
PSAB's decisions and, In 1980, summarily dismissed on this 
ground the application by the plaintiff in Mohamed Elmamoon 
Babikr Zerroog -v- The Dean, Institute of Theatrical and Musical 
Studies (161). The Court's decision was upheld on appeal to the 
Supr eme Court. Rejecting the plaintiff's applica tion the 
Supreme Court once more reasserted the finality of the PSAB's 
decisions. The PSAB "is", in the opinion of the Supreme Court; 
"a Court of Law even though it is referred to with a different 
epithet (i.e. Board) ..• "(162). In reaching this conclusion the 
Supreme Court, did not consider, the mode of constitution of 
the PSAB, the appointment of its members, their tenure of 
office and their legal qualification, and, paid no attention to the 
PSAB's position vis-a-vis other administrative authorities or its 
powers of enforcement. The Supreme Court cited instead the 
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historical background of the PSAB (163) and its status under the 
then Permanent Constitution of the Sudan 1973 (164) to sup.port 
the conclusion tha t "the legisla ture in Sudan has always 
intended, for public policy considera tions, to alloca te 
adjudication of claims over the terms and conditions of public 
employment to a special authority •.• Ibid P.3". 
4.C.6.b.4 Breach of the Rules of Natural Justice 
Summary 
In reaching the conclusion that the PSAB's decision in 
Zerroog case was final the Supreme Court ignored the plaintiff's 
complaint that he was not given a chance to be heard, to defend 
himself and that his dismissal was against the Law (165). 
Although this was partly due to the procedure of summary 
rejection which the Courts follow in dealing with applications 
against the PSAB's decisions it was also due to the reluctance 
which the Supreme Court showed in challenging express 
provisions of Laws and by-Laws on whatever ground. This is 
explained in the Summary below - (C.f infra the text above 
£.168). 
Few concluding remarks are essential for completion of the 
discussion in this section. The first thing to be noted however IS that 
the reasoning of the Courts in defending the finality of the PSAB's 
decisions do to some extent contradict their reasoning concerning the 
exclusiveness of the PSAB's jurisdiction. We have seen that both the 
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Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court ha ve al ways upheld the 
exclusi veness of the PSAB's jurisdiction, over all claims relating to or 
arIsing from application of public service Laws and regulations, on the 
ground that the PSAB is an administrative authority whose remedies 
should be sought before such claims are taken to the Civil Court (166). 
Yet this has not prevented the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal 
from holding, in the cases discussed above, that the PSAB IS a 
quasi-judicial authority or a "Court of Law even though referred to as a 
Board" • 
Another observation is that the stance of the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal confers on the PSAB a status, not only of a competent 
civil court whose decisions are not subject to review by either of them, 
but, also, of a court which, together with the Departmental Disciplinary 
Boards and Heads of Units as its subordinate strata, represents a system 
of administra tion of justice parallel to and independent from the 
judiciary. 
Although the Supreme Court hinted in one case that the finality of 
the PSAB decisions would not au thor ize the la tter to exceed its 
jurisdiction or act against the Law the practical outcome, for 
administration of the Law, of these limitations is minimal. This is so 
partly for the reason shown earlier (Supra part 4.C.6.b.2) and also for 
another reason. The other reason is that given the too wide jurisdiction 
which the PSAB possesses under statute, excess of juridiction is, of all 
the mishaps that befall its performance, the least frequent (167). 
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Finally, the decisions of the Supreme Court vindicating the statutory 
pr ov ISlons, tha t assert f inali ty of the P SA B' s decisions, and, its 
reluctance to invoke or accept any jurisprudential arguments, whether of, 
natural Law justice, general principles of the Law or fundamental human 
rights (168), challenging or contradicting these express provisions go hand 
in hand with a line of policy that the Supreme Court in Sudan had 
adopted since the early 1970s. The question whether this line 
represented a change from a previous stance and the reasons for the 
change in case it did and the identification of the common-denomina tor 
of the areas of the Law that this line affected are examined elsewhere 
(infra. Part 4.B of Chapter 5). I state here the main pillars of this 
judicial policy as were made clear in one case (169). These main pillars 
were as follows: 
1. The Courts should not invoke the general principles of Law, natural 
justice or fundamental rights as justification for contradicting a Law 
that the legislature has enacted. In the words of the Surpreme 
Court " •.• to allow the Judge deduce principles from the idealist 
notions of 'good conscience' 'fundamental rights' and 'natural justice' 
is, to endow it with legislative powers which it is not entitled to 
hold, and to introduce an objectively unascertainable source of the 
Law and methods of deduction that will lead to confusion •.. Ibid 
P.162.". 
2. In invoking the principle of separation of powers or any other 
Common or Civil Law principle as a source of guidance and in 
arriving at conclusions through comparison of various constitutional 
systems regard must always be paid to the modifications that have 
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been introduced upon these constitutional or general principles in the 
economic and political context of certain developing countries in 
general - (the Court was referring explicitly to the Egyptian and 
Indian Constitutional and legal traditions) - and that of the Sudan in 
par ticular. Hence the Court to distinguish the Sudanese 
Consti tu tion from the "Br i tish" and "A mer ican" "Cons ti tu tions" 
considered the Sudanese 1973 Constitution as identical with a 
"Socialist Constitutional Tradition" ••• "endowing the Courts with 
power to judge constitutionality of Laws but only in accordance with 
this written Constitution and without questioning the wisdom of 
legisla ti ve policy" Ibid P .148. 
3. "The right of individuals to litigate before Civil Courts is, unless it 
is otherwise stated under the Constitution, not a fund3.mental right, 
and is therefore liable to restriction by by-Laws. Ibid Pp.138, 
160-161." 
4.D The Attorney General's Chambers 
From its inception the Attorney General's Chambers was a 
department of the Ministry of Justice. In 1968-69 the office was 
abolished and its duties were assigned to the Under-Secretary of 
the Ministry of Justice. In 1972 the office was re-established 
within the Ministry of Justice. Following its abolition in 1973 
most of the functions of the Ministry of Justice have since been 
allocated to the Attorney General's Chambers. The latter 
performs In addition to these functions its original role as 
advocate of the State. 
Table 6 : Appendix to fs.171-174 and Text Above 
Disputes Adjudicated on by the Attorney General in the Period 1980- 1983 
Distributed on the Basis of their Subject Matter and Indentity of Applicants 
No Subject of "Fetwa" (2) Date and No. Identity of The Law No . of Comments Total 
of "Fe twa" Applicant Applicable other 
applica t 
ions on 
the sam( 
Issue. 
1 Whe ther dismissal with confiscation AG/7/5/12 : A Government ODO 1927, EDA 3 All "Fe twas" 4 
of pension within powers of 17/11/80 Unit 1976, SS.7 consistent 
Disc iplinary Boards 
2 (3) DB Decision whether subject to AG/7/3/32 : Head of EDA 1976, S.15 5 Fetwa No.7/ 6 
review by head of unit 24/10/1979 Government unit 13/875/1976 
distingUished 
3 Management no-right of appeal 7/2/45 : PSAB EDA 1976 1 Consistent 2 
agai nst DB decisions 12/4/1 983 
4 Def inition and effect of inexcusabl e AG/3/ A/ 864 Employee PSR 1975 S.38 5 Fetwa No .7/ 6 
absenteeism; stoppage of salary 20/5/1980 EDA 1976, SS.6,7(J)i 13/858 : 9/12 
12/75 is 
contradictory 
5 Contracting out of public service AG/7/6 : Employees PSA 1973, SS.4,30 I 
Laws; not allowed 14/2/1979 
6 Definition of Public Service 3A/ 1759 : Management PSA 1973, S.3 4 Fetwa No. 5 
18/11/ 1982 507/81 
contradictory 
7 Rights of Probationary Employees 7/2/23 : Head of PSR 1975, SS .23-25 3 All 4 
61/4/1981 Government unit consistent 
8 Pensionsable Officials rights to 57/25 : Employee WICA 1981, SIA 197 1 Contradictory 2 
injury compensation 17/4/1983 and PSPA, 1975 with No.7/43/9 : 
31/3/1981 
9 Rights and obligations of Sta te- IA/2682 : Head of National Training 3 All consistent 4 
sponsored trainees and scholars 10/4/1982 Government unit Act 1974, NTR 1976 
10 Social Insurance Act when 3/ A/828 : Head of SIA 1974 1 Consistent 2 
ap~licable 9/3/1983 Government unit 
11 Suspension from duty, its AG/3A/I055 : Employee EDA 1976, S.7(d) 1 2 
conditions and limitations 19/1/1981 
12 Retirement in the Public or service 2A/1688 : Employee PSPA 1975, S.26 1 2 
interests 
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(1) Compiled by the Author from - Reyad 1981-83 and Other Sources. 
(2) "Fetwa" - Authoritative piece of advice. 
(3) DB- Disciplinary Boards. I 
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Finally a public employment dispute may come to the attention of 
the Attorney General because the aggrieved employee has chosen 
or, been directed to take his complaint against the offending 
government unit to the Attorney General (173). 
For purposes of resolving disputes that come before it the 
Attorney General has the powers, equalling those of the Civil 
Courts in similar circumstances, to call any public servant for 
gIVIng evidence or order him to offer any information or 
explanation or to submit documents. Moreoever, legal advice 
tendered by the Attorney General's Chambers and its decisions 
concerning any arbi tra tion award gi ven in the process of 
settlement of a dispute are binding on all State institutions and 
"shall not be rejected save with the consent of the President of 
the Repulbic - AGA 1981, 1983 55.7-8". 
Disputes with which the Attorney General's Chambers deal 
under the judicial powers discussed above are not confined to 
disputes arising from or relating to the application of individual 
employment legislation in the public sector. But among the 
various State legal disputes that the Chambers handle, those 
arising from or relating to application of individual employment 
Laws in the public sector constitute an overwhelming majority 
(174). One reason for this is that, although the State-provided 
PSAB is the sole machinery for the settlement of such disputes, it 
is a single central body that is too small to cope with the 
expected annual case-load. Another reason is that due to the 
difficulties encountered in enforcing decisions against government 
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untis, a dispute may remain unresolved even after it has been 
adjudica ted upon or reviewed by the PSAB, the Central 
Recruitment Board, or the Employment Exchange. What these 
bodies do when faced with obstinate government units is to direct 
the aggrieved employee to complain to the Attorney General 
(175). 
However the vigorousness with which the Attorney General 
has defended the exclusiveness of the PSAB's jurisdiction as 
against the Civil Courts, has not prevented the Chambers from 
assuming both original and appellate jurisdiction over disputes 
arising from or relating to application of public employment Laws. 
This however reinforces the thesis that exclusiveness of the 
PSAB's jurisdiction is defended not for its own sake but as a 
means for confining settlement of individual employment disputes 
in the public sector within the administrative hierarchy of the 
State. 
Bearing in mind the original and supportive roles which the 
Chambers plays in the administration of public employment Laws, 
examination of enforceability of the Chambers' decisions and 
consulta tions IS essential for assessing the effectiveness of the 
Champers' intervention in particular and the effectiveness of the 
system of administration of public employment laws in general. 
Oespi te the existence of express statutory provisions that make a 
decision or legal advice given by the Attorney Generar Chambers 
binding upon all Sta te institutions - (AG A 1981, 1983 SS.7 -8). It 
has been decided by the Supreme Court that these provisions do 
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not transform the legal advice or decision into legal rights that 
are judicially enforceable at the intitative of the person or 
persons in whose favour they are made. Delivering the judgment 
of the Supreme Court in that case (176) Zeki Abdul Rahman SCJ 
emphasised that; "no authority other than the Attorney General 
itself is entitled to follow up supervise or seek the enforcement 
of a legal advice given by the Attorney General and the latter is 
absolutely free not to seek the enforcement of its legal advice 
and decisions through the Court ••• " (I77). 
Conclusion 
There are many reasons which make the protection provided by 
indi vidual employment legislation in the public sector inadequate. These 
reasons may be summarized in the following: 
1. Absence of leg isla ti ve restriction on dismissal and other forms of 
termina tion of the employment relationship. 
2. The introduction by statutes of various extra grounds for dismissal 
and termination of the employment relationship, e.g. the PSPA 1975 
5.26 and the PSA 1973 S.22(g). 
3. Absence of legisla ti ve control and the inefficiency of the 
ad minis tra ti ve control provided on selection for employ men t. 
4. Exclusion of the Civil Courts and the trade unions from participating 
in the control or regula tion of the employment rela tionship. 
5. The position of the administra ti ve machinery provided for resolution 
of employment disputes as a stratum in the State administrative 
hierarchy and the resultant ineffectiveness of its intervention. 
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All these reaons are either direct or indirect creatures of a legal 
policy whose intervention in or abstention towards the field of _ the 
Sta te -indi vidual employment rela tionship are deter mined, not by a 
commitment to a sovereignty of the rule of Law or individual freedom 
and individual rights, but, by considerations of political control. The 
emphasis on administrative control, the enactment of rights and 
obligations whose scope differs with relation to employees of each sector 
and the provision of various sytems of tribunals whose orientation and 
commitment towards protection of indidi vual rights is dependent on the 
identi ty of the employer - (i.e. whether the State or a pr i va te employer) 
- or the nature of the rights involved, are elements of a form of legaility 
tha t is consonant with and reflective of exigencies of political control. 
It IS more likely that it IS the special position of public employees 
which makes them more adversely affected by these political policy 
considera tions. There are two factors which make the control of the 
public employment relationships, in particular, essential both for enabling 
the functioning of the State apparatus and for implementing, and, 
a ttaining the specified objectives of economic planning. These factors 
are: 
(1) The position of the State, as, holder of the biggest share of the 
economy, proprietor of the most strategic economic activities, and, 
as an active and principal regulator of the economy. 
(2) The position of State employees as employees constituting, the vast 
majority of the working population, and, the brain nerves and limbs 
of the corporate centralized State. 
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While the satisfaction of political policy considerations may require 
a consolidation of State prerogative in matters relating to recruitment, 
discipline and termination of the employment relationship, it does not 
necessarily require that public employees' wages, salaries, holidays, leave 
and income supplements, should be kept below that of their colleagues in 
the pr i va te sector. It is rather the case that the State whilst 
monopolizing wages and salaries determination, endeavour, as far as the 
economic situation would permit, to obtain employees' complaisance to 
its command - (on the three strategic areas of employment mentioned 
above) - by frequently revising their payments and income supplements. 
Notwithstandingly, both because economic and policy considerations (178) 
do not always permit such revision in case of public employees and 
because private sector trade unions are relatively actively involved in the 
determination and administration of employment rights and grievances 
(179) recent findings have confirmed that the position of private sector 
employees is better (180). The position of the government as the 
sovereign power in the country concerned and tha t of public 
administra tions as guardians of the interest of the community at large 
are everywhere partly accountable for the rela ti vely - (i.e. in relation to 
the private sector in the country concerned) - different position of public 
employees (181). However, for the reasons explained below the 
experience of the Sudan is rather uncommon. 
The scope of public employment subject to special Laws and 
administration in Sudan, is extremely wide, covermg both fields of 
indi vidual and collective labour relations and also all types of public 
employment. It has been noticed in respect of some other countries 
tha t, the extent of State intervention in Labour relations, and the scope 
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of collective negotiations depend inter alia on whether the employer is a 
government administration, a publicly-owned utility or a publicly-o\yned 
industrial or other undertaking. Workers' participation and collective 
bargaining are common practice in case of the latter two (Schregle 1974, 
392-96). Furthermore there is rarely a country where the form and 
extent of State intervention . . VIs-a-VIS the indi vidual employ ment 
relationship in the public sector is more obvious. The position in Sudan 
contradicts the general assumption (182) that the terms and conditions of 
public employment are better than those of employment in the private 
sector. Judging by the security of the tenure of office, the rate of 
payment and the way in which legislation providing for these rights IS 
administered, the position of public employees in Sudan is worse (183). 
The "trend towards a wider participation of public servants in the 
determination of their conditions of employment" observed by the ILO in 
1970 as "in progress In many parts of the World" (184) has not yet 
materialized in Sudan (185). 
Another peculiarity of the Sudanese industrial relations is that 
"public interest", (l85A)usually invoked by the Government as 
justifica tion for intervention in any particular area of industrial relations, 
is ne i ther s ta tu tor ily defined nor subject to j udic ial inter preta tion. 
Likewise the manner in which administra ti ve authorities interpret and 
apply the Law in specific situations is not subject to judicial review. 
Bearing in mind the shortcomings that are associated with performance 
of administra ti ve tribunals in Sudan (186) arbitrary interpreta tion and 
misapplication of the Law are likely to be unavoidable. 
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For reasons mentioned elsewhere (187) the Courts in Sudan may not 
dare to challenge the express provisions of leg isla tion ousting ;heir 
jurisdiction. However the judicial approach to the issue of managerial 
prerogative and to the contract of employment in general discussed in 
Chapter 5 suggests that the public sector employees would have been 
more extensi vely protected had the Ci v il Cour ts been allowed to 
participate in administration of public employment legislation. Although 
this may apparently contradict my argument that the Supreme Court had 
adopted the stance discussed earlier there is really no contradiction. It 
is arguable that there is a lot which the Courts could have done without 
necessarily circumventing express statutory provision. Moreover the 
stance of the Supreme Court is not always representative of the attitude 
of the Civil Courts in general (188). 
The extent to which some of the political policy - considerations 
referred to in this conclusion also affect employees of the private sector, 
the position of individual employment in the private sector as being a 
relatively less likely object for political control and the effect these 
considera tions have on the orientation of individual employment Law in 
the pr i va te sector is exam ined in the following Chapter. Tha t 
examination is conducted, with reference to the three areas of 
employment and against the background outlined in this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
INDIVIDUAL LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 
1. Introduction 
Private sector individual employment law derives from several 
sources, mainly statutory but also collective negotiations and common 
law. It is administered partly by the Civil Courts partly by 
ad ministra ti ve author i ties and in certain areas of the employ men t 
relationship by joint employer/trade-union arbitration. How these 
sources and administration of the law influence its development is 
explained at (l.C below). But first it IS necessary to consider two 
preliminary issues. The first (l.A below) is why employees of the 
private sector are almost free from State's "commandeering-intervention"O) 
and indeed in certain areas of employment appear to be protected by the 
State. The second (l.B below) is the extent to which the analysis of 
some commentators on private individual employment law in the Sudan 
can adequa tel y account for the present state of the law. Exa mina tion 
of the first issue is important because differential treatment of the 
workers in the public and private divisions of capital might not, in the 
light of previous analyses of the class composition of the State in the 
Sudan, be anticipated. Critical examination of the second issue is 
necessary because the analyses advanced offer an empirical monocausal 
ex plana tion that sharply differs from my own. 
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I.A. Factors Influencing State "Commandeer ing-Inte;vention" 
As a prelude to the discussion I argue that the commonality of 
State "commandeering-intervention" at the level of collective labour 
relations testifies to the uniformity of the interest of employers and the 
Sta te in so far as the minimization of the power of organized labour is 
concerned. 
As explanation for the peculiar legal position of public sector 
employees the conclusion to Chapter IV has pointed to the bureaucratic 
governmental control over these employees. Although control is an 
essential element of the employment relationship in all sectors of the 
economy, the control which legislation gives to the private employer over 
his workforce does not, in contrast to that gi ven to the Sta te, 
particularly in areas of dismissal and discipline alter the contractual 
na ture of the employment rela tionship in fa vour of the employer. 
, Any explanation of the differential treatment of public and private 
sector employees must start from the position of the centralized State as 
a force superior to all social and political powers including that of the 
nascent capitalist class. It is this superiority which enables the State to 
reject any notion of contractual reciprocity of the employment 
relationship In dealing with its own employees and to impose it or even 
override it In favour of employees in the case of the private sector 
employment. However this does not contradict my view regarding the 
relative autonomy of the State expressed in Chapter II. It rather means 
that for State control of collective labour relations, which is more 
politically and economically significant for both the State and employers 
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and therefore applied to all employees, to be effective a degree of 
protection of individual employees is in case of the private sector 
important not least because it undermines the pressure towards collective 
resistance •. The question why this protection is a sensi ti ve issue 
particularly In case of the private sector is explained below. The 
further question why protection of employees has become such a 
characteristic feature of private sector law is in turn explicable by the 
discussion under Part I.C. 
There are factors which make this differential trea tment 
practically possible. One such factor is the existence of a general 
assumption on the part of both the government and employees that, as 
guardian of a supposedly "public interest" residing In public utili ties 
enterprises and assets, it is not unreasonable for the government to 
tighten its control on employment of persons involved in the 
administration of these public bodies. However the perverted (2) 
interpreta tion which has been put on "public interest" in the last few 
years has weakened the faith of the workers in the moral commitment of 
political regimes to the cause of the public interest. Thus, while the 
above assumption may explain certain trends (3) that characterized the 
development of individual employment law in general in late 1960s and 
early 1970s it may not adequately explain later trends. 
In contrast with the above perception of public employment, 
private employment is viewed as a relationship between two juridically 
equal State subjects (4). The privacy of interest involved and the 
relaxed government control enabled the courts to intervene in the 
regulation of the private employment relationship from as early as 1914 
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(5). However the Civil Courts in the post-independence era advanced 
the position of private employment even further. They recognized that 
juridical or contractual equality is an inadequate criterion for purposes of 
conceptualizing the rights and obligations of the employment relationship. 
Instead the courts appear to have taken into account the underlying 
economic inequality of the parties (6). 
It was also the privacy of interest involved coupled with a distrust 
which the trade unions and some factions of the middle class in Sudan 
held for private enterprise (7) which made terms and conditions of 
employment in the private sector a ground for - inter alia -
government-union confrontation throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. 
This distrust was further accentuated by the real insecurity of 
employment caused by the financial insecurity of small enterprises 
employing among themselves the vast majority of the workforce in the 
private sector (EI Hassan, 1975.189-200). Although it was the public 
sector trade unions which were more influentially involved in bringing 
about changes in the individual employment law in 1969, 1970 and 1973 it 
was employees in the private sector who were to benefit most from this 
involvement and the changes it produced. This was to be the case both 
because the majority of public employees were (EEPO 1969), and later 
(CLC 1970, EEPO 1973/PSA 1973) all of them were to be, formally 
excluded from the application of the EEPO 1973 and its subsequent 
amendments, and also because of the operation of factors - (discussed 
infra Part I.C) - that have to date improved the practical operation of 
the law in case of the private sector. To recapitulate, the stance of the 
State towards private employment is influenced, directly by the political 
or ienta tion of the trade unions and some fractions of the middle class, 
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the position of private employment as a possible source of friction, the 
distance of private sector employees from State bureaucratic control, and 
only indirectly, by the class composition of the State. 
I.B. Inadequacies of Existing Analyses 
All commentators (8) see the development of labour relations law 
as product of and concomitant with the struggle of the Sudanese labour 
movement. Some commentators have attempted to periodize the 
development of labour relations law on the basis of its correspondence 
with specific events in the political history of the Sudan (9). Yet this 
association cannot, without some qualification, adequately account for 
specific characteristics of both the form and content of labour relations 
law. In this sub-section I point to some of the questions which such an 
approach may not be able to answer. 
Explaining the gradual emancipation which the law governing for 
~xa mple sickness lea ve and holidays has effected (lO), solely with 
reference to trade union struggle leaves unanswered the question why the 
dura tion and payment of sickness leave for instance increased In 1969 
while the law governing dismissal with notice remained unchanged until 
1973 effectively nullifying the advantages gained from the increase of 
sickness leave pay (Cf. infra Part 3.A.1). One commentator registered 
his surprise that the EEPO 1949's dismissal with notice provisions 
(55.10(1» had escaped the attention of the 1969 Amendment although 
repugnant to international standards of labour legislation" (11), but is 
uncertain as to whether that was due on the one hand to weakness of the 
labour movement and the superior influence exerted by other social 
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classes or on the other to trade unIOn satisfaction with the prevailing law 
(Hassan, 1979.139-141). However any assumption of trade unIon 
satisfaction with that law IS difficult to accept In VIew of ample 
evidence (12) that the trade unions were, from as early as 1955, 
conscious of the effect which 55.1 O( 1) had had in practice on other 
protecti ve provisions of the law. It is I believe reasonable to conclude 
that, although it was a factor in attracting attention to the inadequacy 
of the law, trade union struggle by itself proved insufficient to bring 
about a change in the law (13). 
A second question which the associa tion of the trade unIon 
struggle with the development of individual labour relations law cannot 
answer is why the terms and conditions of employment have vastly 
improved during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the collective powers of 
individual trade unions and the labour movement in general had been 
crippled by collective labour relations and State security laws. This IS a 
period that was marked by the introduction of social insurance and 
minimum wage legislation and a comprehensive revision of all individual 
employment laws that has vastly improved the position of the employee. 
An association of trade unIOn struggle and individual employment 
law also does not explain why legisla ti ve protection has been provided for 
special rela ti vely organizationally weak classes of employees. In this 
respect, the 1952 Wages Tribunals Ordinance, The Employment of 
Children Ordinance 1930 and the special protection provided for female 
employees by The Industrial Safety Legislation (14) cannot be accounted 
for simply by trade union struggle. Indeed some of these Statutes 
pre-da ted the existence of trade unions and the rest were introduced at a 
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time when the terms and conditions of employment of the best organized 
workers had been quite modest. 
This alleged association also simplifies the processes - (examined 
infra Part I.C) - which influence the legislative policy in the particular 
case of the pri va te sector and by so doing also does not explain the 
rather different path of development which individual employment law in 
the public sector has, in contrast with the strength of trade union in this 
sector, been travelling. 
I would further argue tha t this associa tion also grossly 
underestimates the relevance of the stage of development and expansion 
of the material industrial base in the country (15). 
The foregoing discussion suggests the alternative hypothesis that, 
bearing in mind the relative absence of commandeering State intervention 
in this area of employment, the properties of the form and content of 
the law are explicable by reasons derived from the operation of the 
factors discussed under Part I.C below. The reasons are the following:-
1. The dominant judicial and political ideology. In this respect one 
commentator, a member of the judiciary, believed that the then dominant 
common law doctrine of contract with its conception of termination with 
notice as a contractual right (16) was to blame for the survival, for the 
25 years - (i.e. between 1948 - 1973) of the EEPO 1949 SS.IO(1) -
(Hassan, 1979.140) (I7). 
2. The willingness of the State to adopt as law proposals made by the 
trade unions. It is often this willingness which ultimately determines 
both the form and content of the law. The State is never coerced into 
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accepting proposals for reform. 
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Among many considerations intervening 
to deter mine the State 1 s willingness to act are: (a) the political 
significance of the amendment proposed; (b) the moral and social 
necessity of the amendment proposed; and (c) the class composition of 
the political regime in charge of the State apparatus at the time. I 
have pointed out that some of these considerations account for the 
different treatment which each of the areas of collective labour relations 
and individual employment relations in general and that which the public 
and private divisions of the latter receive from legislation (I8). Grounds 
(a) and (b) also account for, the strong protection which employees are 
given in respect of their health and safety in both the public and the 
private sectors, and for the rather relatively inadequate and sectorally 
discrimina tory protection afforded to these employees as against 
dismissals. The extent to which political ideology of the regime in 
charge of the State apparatus can influence development of labour 
relations law is best illustrated by the political events that surrounded 
(i.e. preceded, accompanied and followed!) the enactment and withdrawal 
~f the 1970 Consolidated Labour Code (CLC 1970) in Sudan (19). 
3. The economic significance is also relevant in so far as the 
proposed or existing legislation may affect what influential employers and 
the State consider as optimum economic performance. Emancipation of 
terms and conditions of individual employment in the private sector 
during the 1970s and 1980s could In fact be attributed inter alia to the 
expansion in the industrial sector and appearance of big indigenous and 
immigrant capital which could willingly afford terms and conditions of 
service better than those that had been guaranteed by the pre-1981 
leg isla tion (20). 
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4. :.i To say that trade unIOn struggle is not the determinant factor is 
not to deny that it is a factor partly accounting for the present condition 
of individual employment law. The terms and conditions of employment 
and administration of the rules governing them in the private sector are 
in many respects better than that in the public sector, inter alia, because 
trade unions in the former sector perform, within the framework of the 
la w, functions - (e .g. collecti ve negotia tions with employers and 
law-enforcement agencies) - that contribute to improvement of their 
members' position (21). Moreover, my argument does not mean that 
apprehension of the potential political power of the trade unions has not 
always been a latent reason for the apparently voluntary legislative 
protection which some governments ha ve provided. My analysis 
endea vours to show that there are other factors which in the case of the 
pr i va te sector, influence both the mode and practical significance of this 
protection. 
I.C. The Main Hypothesis of the Chapter 
LC.l The Factors Influencing the Development of the Law 
The frontiers of the juridico-political framework within which 
private sector individual employment law has been developing are drawn 
by the policy of the State vis-a-vis this area of employment. The 
internal characteristics (i.e. the specific features of the detailed rules) of 
this law within this framework are shaped by a multiplicity of secondary 
factors. These factors reflect on law not because of their inherent 
pre-eminence or because the economic position of employment in the 
private sector endows them with special influence but largely because of 
the stance of the State towards this area of employment and towards the 
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participa tion of these factors in its regulation. 
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This' is explained below. 
Neither at the level of rule-making nor at the level of legal 
administration are the rights and obligations of private sector employees 
subjected to a State "commandeering intervention" of the type affecting 
the conditions of service of public employees. At the level of 
rule-making this is significant for exa mple in understanding the 
distinction between dis missal in the pr i va te sector where leg isla tion 
endeavours to restrict employers' common law contractual rights of 
termination and in the public sector where legislation, while preserving 
these contractual rights unrestricted, gives extra-contractual powers of 
dismissal on "public interest" grounds. It is also important In 
understanding why private sector trade unions, although governed by the 
sa me collecti ve labour relations laws that govern trade unlOns In the 
public sector, can participate in the rule-crea tion process. The reason is 
of course that private sector individual employment law sets minimum 
standards whilst leaving the door open for further improvement through 
troluntary negotia tions (22). This in tur n pa ves the way for 
standard-setting by large employers and for some strong trade unions to 
influence the terms and conditions of employment for the whole sector. 
At the level of administration the inapplicability of State 
"commandeering-intervention" allows the Civil Courts to participate in 
administration and development of the law. In contrast to the position 
in the public sector the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts over all private 
sector individual employment grievances is not at any stage ousted by 
legisla tion. The labour offices which supervise the implementation and 
administration of the law do so free from "commandeering-intervention". 
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Furthermore the decisions of these offices are In consequence always 
appealable to the Civil Courts. 
In addition to these secondary factors of standard setting by big 
employers, trade union participation, judicial administration and practices 
of the labour offices, the development of private sector individual 
employment law is also influenced by State's protectionist-intervention. 
The question why this protection is in certain areas (e.g. dismissals) 
confined only to private sector employees is answerable by the previous 
discussion of the extra legal considerations that affect determination of 
the terms and conditions of public employees (23). The reason why 
protection, even where in areas such as selection for employment, 
holidays and sickness leave it applies to both sectors, in practice more 
positively affect the terms and conditions of private sector employees 
can be explained by the follow ing:-
1. The manner in which private sector individual employment law is 
administered always ensures that protective provisions are effectively 
enforced. 
2. The decisions, agreements and views of the different bodies 
involved in the administration of the law are at any given time, practical 
conclusions regarding the practical state of the law and its compatibility 
with ever-changing social and economic conditions. These practical 
conclusions often feature as proposals for reform made mainly by the 
Department of Labour but also sometimes by employers' and workers' 
organiza tions (24). Many such proposals made by these three bodies 
were eventually incorporated into each and everyone of the statutes 
enacted in the period 1969-1981 (25). 
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It is because of this responsi veness of pr i va te indi vidual 
employment law to extra legal changes that it has been subjected to Jive 
major reVlSIOns since 1968 - (i.e. in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1974 and 1981), 
compared with a single revision of public employment law during the 
whole period. This responsiveness to change also inheres in the 
legislative schemes (i.e. wage-tribunals and minimum wage) that 
determine the level of wages in the private sector. These schemes are 
by their nature generally less centralized and therefore more easily 
influenced by the trade unions than the Public Sector's Job Evaluation 
and Classification Scheme. In contrast with the position (26) in the 
private sector the level of wages and salaries of public employees has 
been revised only once since 1968. 
The interplay of the secondary factors aforementioned might well 
produce a smooth and consistent development of the law. The reason 
why this is not in fact the case is explained by the influence which 
political considerations exert on the operation of these factors. This is 
demonstrated by the following:-
1. The 1970 Consolidated Labour Code (CLC 1970) - which it is 
claimed; " ••• proved to be unworkable mainly due to the unrealistically 
generous benefits it provided for workers . • . (Taha 1982.156 f.16) -
featured as an item in a programme of social and political reform that 
had been launched by a socialist government and included among its other 
. . 
agenda the minimization of the role of the private sector In economIC 
deve lop men t. Although it is claimed that the Sudan Employers' 
Consultative Association (SECA) (27) was "instrumental in bringing about 
its ultimate and prema ture abolition (Taha 1982.145)" the CLC 1970 was 
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suspended mainly due to a political rift within the ruling - (communists 
and non-communists) - alliance and was officially abolished only after _ the 
military defeat of the communists and their supporters in July 1971 (28). 
2. The Employers and Employed Persons Ordinance 1973 (EEPO.1973) 
also gave employees protection which exceeded limits considered by some 
commenta tors as adequate compromises between the interests of the 
parties involved (Taha & EI Jack, 1973.39). The question why Numeiri's 
regime conceded to the trade unions' and labour offices' recommendations 
on the issue of this protection is also answerable by a poli tical 
explana tion. The introduction of the 1973 Amendment could not be 
separated from the political events of 1970-1971 and the patronage that 
the incumbent political regime, in order to mitigate the impact of 
withdrawal of the 1970 CLC (Consolidated Labour Code)(29) and weaken 
communist foothold, pledged for the trade unions thereafter. 
3. To the dismay of many employers the 1981 Individual Employment 
Relations Act (IERA 1981) signalled the terms and conditions of 
employment in the private sector for even further qualitative and 
quantita tive improvements. However these improvements were made 
possible as a result of the operation for 8 years between 1973-1981 of 
some of the factors I have identified earlier namely, standard-setting by 
big employers and some strong trade unions and the efforts of the Labour 
Department. There are three ex plana tions as to why these 
improvements were enacted in spite of their opposition by some 
employers. The first is that recommendations for reform made by the 
Labour Department are more influential on government policy. Although 
the Sudan Employers Federation (SEF) would like to believe that the 
Department is biased towards the workers (30), there is another possible 
explana tion as to why the recommendations of the Department may not 
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be welcomed by all employers. These recommendations are usually 
made on the basis of the contents of collective agreements deposjted 
with the Department. These agreements usually however come from big 
and stable firms (31). Although the Department of Labour is possibly 
aware of this situation, the fact that the majority of employers in Sudan 
do not care to conclude written agreements with their employees or to 
deposit copies of these agreements with the Department, itself deprives 
the latter of the sources of information on the basis of which to make 
the appropriate recommendations. 
The second explanation is on the one hand the "emphasis" which 
Sudanese trade unions have always placed on political bargaining - (i.e. 
negotiating with the government through the Federation for improvement 
of terms and conditions of all private sector employees) - and on the 
other the crucial "position" which the trade unions occupy as potential 
stabilizers or destabilizers of the political regime. The "emphasis" in 
the first limb of the argument produces demands that might not be 
compatible with the economic conditions of the majority of individual 
firms (32), while the "position" in the second limb persuades the 
government to buy off the trade union opposition at any affordable price. 
The third explanation is that the multi -na tional corporations and 
Sudanese financial and other capitalists which are strong enough to 
influence the government labour policy are also simultaneously viable 
enough to observe at least the minimum legal standards of the terms and 
conditions of employment. Experience has shown that the interests of 
the "financial", "services" and "multi-national" capitals on the one hand 
and that of the average Sudanese industrialist on the other are not 
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necessarily coincidental (Kursany; 1983.119-123)(33). 
I.C.2. The Effect on the Law 
I mentioned at the end of Chapter I that there are varIOUS levels 
of ideologies of Law. I also in this respect mentioned that labour 
relations law in the Sudan is devoid of an economically-institutionalized 
or structuralized social ideology (34) and that I intended therefore to 
confine analysis of the ideology of individual employment law at the 
more superficial levels of rule-making and legal-administration (35). As 
a basis for further verification in the rest of the Chapter, I stated under 
Part I.C.l above that there are certain factors which influence the 
development of private individual employment law. The hypothesis of 
this part is that the operation of these factors affects this law in the 
two ideological respects explained below. 
The plurality of the factors influencing the development of the 
law both at the levels of rule-making and legal-administration also 
affects the "formal" and "social" ideology of the law. The "formal" 
ideology of the law connotes; (a) the rationality which the law acquires 
as a result of the apparent impartiality of the bodies involved in its 
enactment and administration; (b) formal effectiveness of the law i.e. 
respect for the law deriving from an expectation that it will in fact be 
enforced; and (c) the technically and practically meaningful existence 
which the law assumes as a result of its insertion into the practices rites 
and rituals of the bodies invol ved in its administration and enactment and 
also as a result of accumulation of precedents decided on the basis of the 
law. 
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The "social" ideology of the law connotes the "social" 
effectiveness of the law i.e. the effectiveness depending on the objective 
expectation that the law would, irrespective of its potential formal 
enforceability, in fact be widely observed. The law would be socially 
effecti ve if (a) its rules are accurately representa ti ve of the de facto 
balances of powers of the individual social relations they are purporting 
to regulate, and (b) the rights and obligations which the law provides are 
accordingly symmetrical with the economic and social position of the 
bearers - (i.e. the parties to the social relation). These two conditions 
are interdependent because the balance of the powers of the parties to a 
social relation and consequently the phenomenal form of this balance -
(i.e. the substance of the terms and condi tions tha t govern the 
rela tionship) - are always directly affected by the technical economic and 
social changes in material production (36). 
Implicit in the discussion of the materials in the rest of the 
Chapter is that as a result of the plurality of factors influencing its 
development private sector individual employment law possesses all the 
ingredients of a "formal ideology" noted above. 
With regard to "the social ideology" I argue that because these 
factors affect law at the superficial levels of rule-making and legal 
ad ministra tion their opera tion IS not necessar ily conduci ve to 
development of a social ideology of the law. The latter needs for its 
existence an ascendent process of regulation of the terms and conditions 
of the employ ment relationship - i.e. regulation which is ini tia ted by the 
interaction of employers and workers at the level of individual firms, 
and, through the interaction of the economic and political organizations 
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of these parties proceeds to assert itself as a societal fact before it is 
enacted as a "law". In contrast to this position the following _are 
characteristics of the private sector individual employment law in Sudan:-
1. The stance of the State towards this area of employment and 
towards the various factors influencing its regulation is largely 
conditioned by political considerations. 
2. The ability of trade unions and some employers to influence the 
legislative process derives not from the industrial powers of individual 
trade unions or numerical supremacy of these employers but from their 
disproportiona tel y greater political power. 
3. The judicial conception of the employ ment relationship and the 
techniques devised for the elucidation and elaboration of this conception 
are not necessarily an indigenous juridical expression of the social and 
economic condition of an indigenous employment rela tionship but 
crea tures of a legal system that owes its existence to colonialism and 
practices to the English Common Law Tradition. 
All these superstructural influences coincided to produce a 
pr i va te indi vidual employ ment law tha t is "f or mally ideologically 
developed" but one which IS also hardly representative of the economic 
condition of the majority of firms in the private sector. Even within 
the "organized" (37) private sector the number of employees who can 
practically - i.e. judging by workers organizational strength in and 
economic viability of individual firms - benefit from the law even 
without taking their employers to courts or tribunals is limited. This 
dependence of operation of the terms and conditions of employment on 
judicial and administra ti ve enforcement has flooded the "Labour Courts" 
and the Labour Offices with a permanent overload of litigations (38). 
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The law appears formally ideologically developed and expanded, despite 
the tiny - (less than 15%)(39) - percentage of urban wage-employment 
which the "organized" private sector accounts for, only because of this 
largely juridical determinc:d:.lon. of the ter ms and condi tions of 
employment. 
However there is a further dimension to this superficiality of the 
law. The "organized" private sector (i.e. registered establishments with 
a permanent workforce of whatever size) to which individual employment 
legisla tion usually applies accounts for a small percentage of total 
employment in the "formal" (40) private sector as a whole. The latter 
covers in addition to employment in organized industries; casual 
employment in these industries, employment in construction, commerce, 
services and the formal agricultural sector. The law excludes these 
categories of employment either directly through express provision - (e.g. 
IERA 1981 SS.4(d) excluding agricultural workers) - or indirectly through 
imposition of a definite period of service, or a definite number of 
employees In the establishment, as minimum qualification for application 
of the law. Employees affected by this exclusion are politically weak 
either because, they are situated outside the urban centres or although 
within these centres, the casual nature of their work or the smallness and 
multiplicity of their employers make these employees organizationally 
weak. 
I.C.3. The Method of Researching 
Whereas I have argued in the two previOUS Chapters that the 
ideology of the law IS directly explicable by the commandeeringly 
interventionist stance of the State towards collective, and public sector 
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individual, labour relations; I argue here that the ideology of the present 
law is explicable directly by the operation of numerous secondary factors 
and only indirectly by the stance of the State vis-a-vis individual labour 
relations in the private sector. However for purposes of a thesis on 
Labour Law and the State this does not make examination of the corpus 
of private sector individual employment law and its administration less 
important. This is so because the focus of the thesis has always been on 
examining the effect, which a stance of the State towards a particular 
area of labour relations has, on the ideology of the law regulating this 
area. Findings such as, that this stance is commandeeringly 
interventionist, protectively interventionist or sometimes abstentionist, 
and consequently, that the law regulating the particular area of labour 
relations is ideologically under-developed or developed are all directly 
relevant to the main theme of the thesis. 
As with Chapter IV this chapter discusses the two broad areas or 
stages of the employment relationship subject to legal regulation, namely; 
(a) selection for employment and (b) the security of employment rights 
and tenure of office, and the machineries through which this regulation is 
administered. The matters and materials examined in the course of 
discussion include the sources, provisions, fields of application and 
administration of the law. The discussion endeavours to demonstrate the 
following:-
1. The extent to which the corpus and operation of the law reflect 
the contributions of the various factors claimed as influencing 
development of the law. 
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2. Whether development of the law is in consequence reflective of a 
particular mode of employment protection law (e.g. one which places 
more emphasis on the interests of the workers). 
3. The "formal ideological" development, of the process through 
which the contributions of the various and sometimes contradictory 
factors become law, and, of the juridical discourse through which this law 
is communicated to its subjects and audience. 
4. The extent to which the "social ideology" of the law IS 
under-developed. 
5. To the extent that the law is reflective of the particular mode 
noted above - (i.e. supra 2), the special characteristics of the factors 
responsible for this development. In so far as it is explicable by special 
characteristics of the Civil Courts and the Labour Offices this point will 
be considered under Part 4 of the Chapter. 
2. Selection for Employment 
I have mentioned earlier - supra text above £.37 Chapter IV - the 
reason for the virtual absence of control on selection for employment in 
the Sudan. I also indica ted that any protection which accrues to 
prospective public sector employees is in fact consequential upon a policy 
of centralization of recruitment intended principally for the good of the 
public service. Although the need for centralization of recruitment in 
the pr i va te sector may be less urgent from government perspective, 
selection for employment in this sector has not remained without control. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that the social and 
economic significance of manpower planning and statistics make a degree 
of central control important even in case of the pr i va te sector. The 
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second reason is that control on selection for employ'tnent In the private 
sector derives from the practice of an administrative machinery that 
contemplates as one of its principal objectives the protection of 
prospective employees. 
2.A. Scope of Application and Administration of the Law 
The provisions of the Manpower Act 1974 (MA 1974) relating to, 
registration with Employment Exchanges (MA SS.9, 11), the conditions for 
advertise ment of vacancies by employer s (SS .13( l)a), nomina tion of 
prospective employees by the Employment Exchanges and the obligation 
on employers to appoint from among those nominees (SS.13(l)b), apply to 
both public and private sector employees. The wordings of these 
provisions have already been examined in Chapter IV (41). However the 
scope of application and the conditions of administration of the law are 
different in the case of the private sector. 
next. 
2.A.l The Scope 
Both aspects are explained 
Determination of the scope of application of the MPA 1974 
requires (a) examination of the classes of private employees to which it 
applies and (b) the number and type of private sector units to which it 
applies. 
2.A.l.a Employees Governed by The MA 1974 
With the exception of principal posts the holders of which are 
under The Agency Act 1974 considered as ostensible representa ti ves of 
their employers (MA 1974 SS.l3(b)-3) The MA 1974 governs the selection 
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for employment of all applicants irrespective of qui:dification grade or 
skill. Although the Minister responsible for labour is empowered to 
make exceptions no such exception has been made. 
2.A.l.b Establishments Exempted 
The MA 1974 exempts only employing units with less than ten 
employees (SS.13( l)-b). Likewise no additional criterion for exemption 
from The MA 1974 has in this respect yet been made by the Minister in 
exercise of his general powers referred to above (supra Part l.A.l.a). 
One other possible exemption however is tha t of a company or 
corpora tion whose Act of association provides for its exemption from the 
MA 1974. I did not find an example of a company specifically exempted 
in this manner. In one case however a bank which is exempted by its 
Act from "the laws regulating service and post-service benefits" (42) 
invoked this exemption as defence against the Commissioner of Labour's 
charge that, by directly appointing applicants, it was violating the 
provisions of the MA 1974 (43). The Commissioner mistakenly accepted 
this as defence. Neither the Arabic nor the English citations -
especially the former - of the MA 1974 would seem to justify its 
inclusion into the laws referred to by the wording of the exception (44). 
2.A.2. Administration of the Law 
There are two administrative bodies entrusted with administration 
of all provisions of the MA 1974 including those relating to selection. 
One is the Commissioner of Labour Department concerned inter alia with 
registration, nomination, and employment of applicants with at least 
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uni versi ty qualification. ,; The second is the Em-ployment Exchange 
performing the same functions in relation to other classes of applicants. 
Both bodies fulfil their duties of selection and nomination on fair 
competition bases. They are empowered to nominate and direct the 
employment of applicants and determine the number of members of any 
special group - (determined with reference to sex disability race or 
otherwise) - to be employed by any employer (45). 
There are factors which enhance effectiveness and comprehensiveness 
of statutory control over selection for employment in the private sector 
of applicants with university or higher qualifications. With respect to 
effectiveness it must be borne in mind that the law which governs the 
selection for employment of this class of applicants is the MA 1974. In 
contrast to the (P5R 1975), the (P5A 1973) and the (P5BR 1982) which 
govern the selection, for public serVIce, of applicants with similar 
qualifications (46), the MA 1974 provides punitive sanctions against 
breaches both of its provisions and of regulations made under them - (MA 
1974 5.26). 
Although private employers as a matter of principle oppose the 
inclusion of punitive sanctions in employment law in general and have in 
particular complained about the discriminatory tendency of the law to 
reserve these sanctions for them (47), the view which the Labour Offices 
hold, at least in so far as selection for employment is concerned is 
different. According to one Director of a Labour Office; "puni ti ve 
provlslOns have proved valuable and effective ••. and anyway in practice 
we invoke them only after all chances for an amicable solution have been 
exhausted" (48). However this may not mean that the existence of the 
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punitive sanctions may not itself effect the form of amicable solutions 
arrived at. 
The scope of application of the MA 1974 has already been 
referred to. Suffice to mention as evidence of comprehensiveness that 
the jurisdiction which the MA 1974 gives to the Labour Commissariat 
over selection of private sector prospective employees with university or 
higher qualifications, contrasts with the limited jurisdiction which public 
service laws and the classification and exceptions made by them leave 
for the PSRBs in their dealing with prospective employees of similar 
qualifica tion (49). 
There are also reasons which make the application of the MA 
1974 to all prospective private sector employees more effective than its 
applica tion, and that of the other relevant public service laws, to 
prospective public sector employees. Public Service Laws and their 
ad ministra tors emphasise as the objective of control on selection for 
~mployment the interest of the public service. In contrast, the 
regulations subject to which the MA applies, and the practice of the 
bodies entrusted with their application, place much more emphasis on 
equality of job-opportunities for all unemployed, in case of the private 
sector (50). 
Most important is the fact that many of the procedural lacunae 
that impede implementation of legislative control on selection for public 
servIce are peculiar to that sector. Any employment exchange or 
district Labour Office may prosecute any private employer who fails to 
comply with any of the provisions of the Act or its regulations. The 
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office or exchange may prosecute, either, upon receipt of complaint by a 
person who having been nominated by them is rejected by an employer In 
contravention of the MA 1974 SS.13(1)-b (51), or, on their own motion In 
respect of violations uncovered in the course of an inspection carried 
under the MA 1974 SS.25( 1) (52). However instead of prosecuting 
the Labour Offices sometimes refer the complaint to the 
geographically jurisdictionally competent Civil District Court. These 
District Courts may hear the dispute afresh, summon the labour officers 
as witnesses, order specific performances or inflict the punitive penalties 
provided for under the law (53). 
Summary 
Selection for employment is an area that in so far as the 
majority of employees in both the public and the private sectors are 
concered is governed by the same Act although the regulations subject to 
which the Act is administered are different. However because there is 
tlo State commandeEf'ring intervention with the autonomy of the agencies 
"oJ 
involved in the administration of the law in case of the private sector 
the Act and its regulations are "formally" effective. Hence although 
they theoretically apply to both sectors the provisions of the MA 1974 
restricting direct recruitment and making mandatory the employment of 
members of special groups are potentially more likely to be enforced 
against private employers. However, notw i thstanding th is for mal 
enforceabili ty of the Law, it has been noticed tha t Employmen t 
Exchanges make no contact with potential employers or school and 
training institutions in their areas of jurisdiction, and themselves lack the 
facili ties, for the testing of skills and aptitudes. In effect, "there is a 
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facade of matching workers with jobs by means of public action but there 
is little substance behind it ••. ILO Sudan 1976.118". "The Manpower 
Act 1974 ••• is excessively ambitious ••• and should either be amended 
or abrogated •.• Ibid." 
Judging by the number of people who can actually benefit from 
the operation of this system of control on selection the MA 1974 and its 
ad ministra ti ve machinery are hardly "socially effective". The exception 
of establishments with less than 10 employees in effect excludes the 
majority of the urban labour force (ILO Sudan 1984.177). Moreover 
although employers subject to the MA 1974 are prohibited from directly 
appointing any applicant there is evidence to suggest that the exchanges 
have failed to fulfill employers' requests for casual or temporary work -
ILO Sudan 1976.372. The reason for this is that the seekers of casual 
labour - (either because in fear of the possible delay involved or of the 
procedural requirements which placement through the exchange might 
entail in case the casual labourer so placed desires to change employers) 
~ have so far shown no interest in benefitting from the system. Even 
among seekers of permanent employment, who constitute the vast 
majority on the exchange register, only a minority is actually placed each 
year - Cf Table 7. There are two possible reasons for this. The first 
is that, - (bearing in mind that there are only 28 exchanges for the whole 
country) - there could be huge operations of direct hiring of which the 
exchanges are not even aware. The second is that people apply to 
employment exchanges only after they have unsuccessfully exhausted 
their own personal efforts to find a job on the free market. 
,/ 
TABLE 7 
The Rate of Placements to Outstanding Registrations 
Year No. of Regis tered No. of Those % 
Applicants Placed 
1977-1978 102445 15016 14.7% 
1978-1979 97288 11728 12 
1979-1980 83956 16361 19.5 
1980-1981 89970 11643 12.9 
1981-1982 77369 8696 1 1 
Total 451028 63444 14.1 
Sources: Compiled by the Author from the statistics 
of the Labour Department Annual Reports 1977-1981. 
, 
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In spite of what has been said, the are~ of selection for 
employment is, compared with other areas, the least protected. This 
will be clearer the moment other areas have been examined. 
3. Security of Employment Rights and Tenure of Office 
Introduction 
The pri va te individual employment rei a tionship has become a 
subject for official- i.e. as opposed to customary- regula tion since the 
beginning of this century only. But, unlike that of public employment 
the regulation of the private employment relationship proceeded until 
1948 on the basis of case-law. The fact that the judiciary was staffed 
by British judges (Hassan 1979.12) and that the permissibility of importing 
English common law principles and doctrines had been established by the 
year 1900 (54) meant that the content of case law derived wholly from 
the English Common Law of Contract. Due to, the short period of time 
involved (i.e. 1900-1948), the scarcity of litigation at that time and the 
tendency of Ii tiga tion to recur more in certain areas than in others, 
judicial regulation was not comprehensive in anyone single area let alone 
all areas of the private employment relationship. 
The promulgation in 1949 of the first individual employment 
legislation - (The Employers and Employed Persons Ordinance, EEPO 
1949) - did not put an end to the role of the judiciary in the regulation 
of the employment relationship. This is because the EEPO 1949 did not 
oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. Although workers' struggle was 
a factor (55), it was not the decisive factor in the introduction of the 
EEPO 1949. The EEPO 1949 was like other contemporaneous ordinances 
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introduced by a colonial administration influenced In its turn by a myriad 
of external and internal conditions (56). 
The provISIOn In the Ordinance of penal sanctions (57), seen by 
some commentators (58) as a "most striking change brought about", 
marked the beginning of the duality of public and pr i va te law referred to 
ear lier (59). Until now the practical significance of these sanctions lies 
In that they allow administrative authorities to inspect and effect 
implementa tion of the law on their own motion. Equally important 
however is the practical effect which these puni ti ve provisions and the 
EEPO 1949 in general produced on the judicial perception of the 
employment relationship. 
The weight of judicial authorities has Since 1949 alwavs tilted In 
fa vour of treating the EEPO 1949 as an enactment of public law (60). It 
is now fir mly settled that the pri va te individual employment legislation 
provides a minImUm floor of rights whose maintenance is mandatory. 
This, in the words of the Supreme Court, is, "the interpretation 
compatible with the objective of the EEPO which, is, the protection of 
the weaker party against possible exploitation by employers. Hence. it 
is as a matter of public policy, mandatory to abide by i t5 provisions Lind 
the courts are bound to declare any contract not so abiding 3.S void ... '1 
(61). 
Carried to its legally logical conclu::ions this judical VIew has th~ 
following two implications: (d) in d(~'ter',linin))) the :ega!tT\! or illegalitv of 
c..l contract of empl(\\'mcn~- the court m:l\' i:':;l~ure the mutual and express 
intention of the partie~. 
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Central Trading Co. -v- S Diryas (62) - demonstrate this point. In both 
cases employers were held liable for unlawful dismissal under the EEPO 
1973 55.10(2) even though their contracts with the plaintiffs expressly 
stressed the probationary nature of the employment (63). Rejecting the 
argument that such contract is by its nature conditional the Supreme 
Court reasserted in the latter case; "remedying the de facto economic 
inequality inherent in the employment relationship was the crucial 
objecti ve behind introduction of the EEPO 1949 and its subsequent 
amendments, and that, that introduction has transformed employment 
from a pri va te contractual into a publicly-regula ted relationship . . Ibid 
pp.171-172". (b) The construction of private employment as a 
Sta te-regula ted relationship does not and should not prevent the Courts 
from holding employers bound by their own undertakings of providing 
terms and conditions of employment better than those guaranteed by 
statute (64). 
As a brief background this introduction has sketched in the 
~eneral orientation of employment protection law and the role which 
legislation and the judiciary play in influencing this orientation. But the 
judiciary and legislation are not the only factors which influence 
development of the law. The following discussion of employment rights 
elabora tes more on the contributions of these and other factors to the 
development of the law. It also reveals that either because, of the 
moral necessity of some of the rights involved or in anticipatory fear of 
the potential political influence of the trade unions, legisla ti ve protection 
of this area began a t a ti me when the pr i va te sector was too 
under-developed to sustain standardized terms and conditions of 
employment. This discussion also suggests that the EEPO 1949 was the 
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source for the classification of these terms and conditions of employment 
as matters of "rights". All subsequent changes in the law - (including 
those effected through subsequent legislation) - were either quantitative 
improvements or remedies of technical flaws which the operation of the 
other factors or of some of them has respectively demanded or exposed. 
The EEPO 1949 was, amended In 1969 and 1973 and finally 
repealed by the Individual Employment Relations Act (IERA 1981) in 
1981. I will examine the rules governing the security of employment 
rights and those governing employees tenure of office under two main 
separate headings. 
3.A. Security of Employment Rights 
Judging by the contemporaneous economiC and employment 
conditions of the private sector the pro mulga tion of the EEPO 1949 was 
a considerable advancement for employees in this sector. The total 
tlumber of persons employed in the private sector was then approximately 
40,000. The vast majority of this tiny workforce was engaged in 
construction, commerce and other tertiary industries (65). The naturally 
temporary employment some of these industries provide, the smallness 
and financial insecurity of some of them and the then strong social and 
economic links the workforce had with their rural background (Fawzi, 
1957.10) all combined to produce an uncommitted workforce, unstable 
employment and a high labour turnover. The latter were in turn factors 
militating against the adoption, as statutory minimum standard, of terms 
and conditions of employment advantageous to the workers. 
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The terms and conditions of employment introduced by the EEPO 
1949 are advantageous to the workers also if judged by the condition of 
organized labour prior to promulgation of the Ordinance. Only one trade 
union with a then modest membership of 11,611 existed prior to the 
introduction of the Ordinance (66). Apart from strikes staged by this 
trade union there had been no organized labour unrest in the years that 
immediately preceded the introduction of the Ordinance. The strikes 
launched by the WAA had aimed only at realization of particularistic 
industrial gains (67). 
The EEPO 1949 also introduced terms and conditions of 
employment that were until that time deemed extra-contractual. Had it 
not been for the EEPO 1949 the pre-independence courts in the Sudan 
might have hesitated for some time before recognizing as a matter of 
r igh tempi oyee' s en ti tIe ment to "r igh ts" (68) such as pa id holiday, 
sickness leave and an 8.1/2 hour working day. One cause for such 
hesita tion would have been that, English precedents on which Sudanese 
tourts used to rely were, at least in respect of the first two rights, 
themselves equivocal (69). Moreover the courts in Sudan were until 1948 
ready to apply English Common Law precedents but not the British 
statutes providing statutory protection for or extra contractual rights in 
fa vour of employee. In the case in which this pr inciple was laid down 
(70) the employee claim for compensation was rejected by the High Court 
because; "there was neither proof of negligence on the part of the 
employer nor a term in the plaintiff's contract of employment to justify 
such a claim" (7 O. The court refused to import the principle behind the 
then English Workmen's Compensation Legislation (72) which allowed such 
claims for compensation. The reason for the refusal was that English 
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legislation "did not arise out of English Common Law, but introduced 
novel principles". Ibid. 
In what follows I examine the floor of rights founded by the 
EEPO 1949 and supplemented by subsequent legislation" (73). 
3.A.1. Employee's Right to Pay During Illness 
The EEPO 1949 SS.21( 1) introduced as right for employees who 
had completed two years of continuous service, a biannual 2 months -
(one fully paid and the other half paid) - sickness leave. In spite of the 
"vast expansion of commercial and industrial activities, and the resultant 
increase in the urban workforce, that took place between 1948-1969" (74), 
the leave and the amount of payment introduced by SS.2l( 1) survived 
unaltered until 1969. Political campaigning by the trade unions between 
1967-1969 (75) on the one hand and the economic conditions referred to 
above on the other urged the government to introduce an amendment, to 
the EEPO 1949, in 1969 (76). The EEPO 1949 SS.210) was affected only 
in two respects. In the first respect both the duration and the paid 
proportion of leave were increased. In the second respect a new 
SS.21(3) codified women's right to a fully paid 8 weeks maternity leave 
and, in case a woman is unable to resume work after expiration of the 
eighth week, to the sickness leave provided for by the EEPO 1969 
SS.2l( 1). 
Following the repeal of the EEPO in 1981, sickness and maternity 
lea ves are now provided for under SS.26 and 25 of the Individual 
Employment Rela tions Act (IERA 1981) respecti vely. S.26 has 
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considerably improved both the qualitative and quantitative ingredients of 
sickness leave. Except for its SS.25"d" which prohibits dismissal of 
women during the maternity leave the IERA 1981 has not substantially 
changed the relationship between the law of sickness leave and that of 
dismissals. The reason why the clarification of this relationship is of 
practical importance is explained below. 
From the time paid sickness leave was introduced and up to 1974 
there existed no State-provided social insurance in Sudan. Furthermore 
the Social Insurance Act (SIA 1974) enacted in 1974 covers only 
employees who sustain "industrial injuries". Employers therefore, 
although they are free to discharge their liabili ty through pr i va te 
Insurance schemes or insurance with commercial companies, ultimately 
remain responsible to make the sickness leave payment provided for 
under the law. However the law of dismissals had for some time 
provided employers with an escape from this responsibility. 
The inter-relationship between the provIsIOns of the EEPO 1949 
governmg sickness leave and those governing dismissals always posed a 
problem. With the exception of the IERA 1981 SS.25(d), referred to 
above, the law of sickness leave does not place any restriction on 
employer's right to dismiss while the employee is on such leave. 
Although it gave an employee a two months paid sickness leave the EEPO 
1949 also gave employers, subject to giving the necessary statutory 
notice (one week, two weeks, or one month) the right of terminating 
employment without any substantial reason whatsoever (EEPO 1949, 1969. 
55.1 O( 1»(77). 
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Writing in 1966 one commentator believed that; "forbidding an 
employer giving notice while his employee is absent on account of illness 
might unreasonably restrict employer's freedom of action. The answer 
of course could be for the State to make provision for payment of 
unemployment or sickness benefits ••• " (Kidd, 1966.205). However the 
State has not yet provided any such benefits. Moreover although, the 
IERA S.25(d) notwithstanding, no prohibition of dismissal specifically 
while the employee is on sickness leave has yet been made. The 1973 
Amendment of the EEPO 5.10(1) has restricted employer's powers of 
dismissal (78) with notice and, in effect, wiped out the negative effect 
the section previously had on sickness leave. 
Moreover there is another part of the law which Increases still 
the financial burden on private employers. Until 1981 the sickness leave 
provided for under the EEPO SS.2l( 1) was deemed to apply whether the 
illness was in fact a general one or an industrial injury or disease within 
the meaning of the WCA - (Workmen's Compensation Act) - 1973.5.32. 
The compensation provided for under the WCO 1949 and its subsequent 
amendments were on the other hand payable to the injured employee in 
addition to and independent of his entitlement under the EEPO SS.2l( O. 
This was and, subject to changes introduced in 1981, is still the view held 
also by offices of the Labour Department (79). Under the WICA - (The 
Work Injuries Compensation Act) - 1981 SS.7( 1) an employee whose 
inability to work is due to an industrial injury or disease is now entitled 
to a paid sickness leave to be calculated as follows: 
1. full wages for the first 6 months; 
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2. half wages for the next 6 months plus the annual leave due with 
full pay; 
3. one third of his wages for any remaining period until full 
recovery or medical proof of total disability. 
An employee on sickness leave is not statutorily entitled to any 
payment other than his salary. There are however instances in which 
collective agreements provided for repayment to employees of all or part 
of expenses incurred in medical treatment for themselves or their 
dependents (80). Moreover, there is at least one case where a trade 
union demand for the recognition of such rights was upheld and awarded 
against the employer by an arbitration tribunal (81). 
Summary 
Bearing In mind that the SIA 1974 covers only occupational 
Injuries causing a disability of at least 30% and provides insurance 
payment that IS in the majority of cases lower than the compensation 
payable under WICA 1981, employers still take the greatest share of the 
responsibility for the occasional failures of safety precautions at work 
and full responsibility to pay during a non-occupational illness. This 
however reflects a development of the law that, in certain respects, is 
impervious to the economic position and possibly individual demands of 
the majority of private sector employers. This is partly due to the fact 
tha t the governments, conscious of the potential threat which the trade 
unions might pose for their stability often conceded these rights without 
much regard to their practical implications. Moreover the fact that 
Sudanese trade unions - (both public and private sectors) - have always 
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preferred political bargaining with the governments to bila teral 
negotiations with employers makes the private sector prone to descendent 
regulation and in a manner that imposes on this sector terms and 
conditions of employment fought for by the trade union movement at 
large. Bearing in mind that large numbers (82) of employees in the 
pr i va te sector are working In s mall and financially Insecure 
establishments, lack of State-provided social security is bound to affect 
the practical implementation of the law and ultimately the employees. 
The preceding discussion also suggests that different aspects of 
the employment relationship may attract variant degrees of protection -
(e.g. as apparent in the comparison of dismissal and sick pay rules). 
This supports my view that the nature of the "right" involved is itself 
relevant in explaining the stance of the law towards this right. 
The law appears as formally effectively enforceable whenever 
grievances have come to the knowledge of the authorities. Moreover 
despite its emphasis on employee's interest the law appears as since 1973 
to have been evolving through the mutual efforts of the labour offices, 
the governments, the trade unions, and some employers. This however 
does not mean that the law is socially effective. Because of the 
qualifica tion period it imposes - (IERA 1981 55.26(1)) - the law benefits 
only permanent employees in "organized" industry {i.e. less than 15% of 
the urban labour force}(83}. Even though totally unprotected casual 
labour is numerically significant. "Most firms employ up to 5096 of their 
labour on casual basis. Moreoever because of the high turnover rates of 
labour many workers do not stay long enough with one employer to get 
beyond this casual status - ILO Sudan, 1984.144-145". 
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3.A.2. Paid Holiday 
The right to a paid holiday was introduced in 1949 and has been 
qualitatively and quantitatively improving ever since (the EEPO 1949, 
1969, 1973 55.22; the IERA 1981 5.22). The 1969 Amendment introduced 
a new 55.22(2) whereunder, employees who with approval of their 
employers postponed their annual holiday for one year were entitled to a 
double annual leave for the year after. 
The 1981 IERA which repealed the EEPO improved and 
re-enacted under its 55.22( 0-22( 4) these same rights. 55.22(3) of the 
IERA 1981 provides moreover for payment to an employee, upon 
termina tion of employment, of the equivalent in cash "of any holiday or 
proportion thereof to which such employee might then be entitled. The 
IERA (1981) 55.22(4) by unequivocally prohibiting the postponement of the 
annual holiday for more than one year also put an end to the ambiguity 
previously inherent in its predecessor the EEPO 55.22(2). The latter 
made clear neither the legality of postponement of a holiday for more 
than one year nor the legal rights of an e:Jlployee whose holiday was thus 
postponed. The reason why the articulation of these points is of 
practical importance is explained below. 
Bearing in mind a chronic shortage of skilled labour In Sudan it is 
the employers who usually demand postponement of or withhold 
permission to the annual holiday (84). Although the choice under the 
EEPO 55.22(2) was legally theirs, employees acceptance of proposed 
postponement was a tacit realization that there was nothing in the law 
effecti vely to stop employers from retaliating by dismissal where their 
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demands were not met. 
Moreover, the position of the law was such that an employee who 
had accepted postponement of his annual leave for more than a year did 
actually run the risk of losing it or its equivalent in cash for good! This 
was so for two reasons. The first reason was that there was no 
obligation on employers to pay holiday pay arrears upon termination of 
employment. The second reason was that actions for recovery of 
arrears of payment due under a contract of employment were governed 
by the general law of limitation - i.e. (the Prescription and Limitation 
Ordinance PLO 1928) - which prescribed only one year for initiation of 
such actions. The interpretation put on this provision of the PLO 1928 
was that the one year limitation period runs, not from the date of 
termination of employment, but, from the date of origination of the right 
claimed (85). This meant inter alia that a person could not claim 
arrears of payment over a period of more than one year even though he 
had been and was, at the time of initiation of the suit, still employed by 
the defendant (86). These two loopholes have now been adequately 
remedied by 55.23(3) (87) and 55.57(b) of the IERA 1981. Claims for 
"wages and other entitlements" can, according to the latter subsection, 
now be initiated within one year from the date of termination of the 
contract of service. This means that, as long as the contract of 
employment is legally in effect, employment claims are no longer 
extinguishable by lapse of time. 
The guarantees provided for private sector employees by the 
IERA 1981 55.22(4) and its predecessor the EEPO 1969 55.22(2) are more 
fa vourable to these employees, than those given by the 5ta te to its own 
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employees (88). Moreover the provisions of the private individual 
employment legislation on holidays do not of course prevent private 
sector employees from providing more favourable holiday schemes -
(EEPO 5.23; IERA 1981 5.58). Some employers in the private sector do 
in fact offer many types of holidays (e.g. non-paid educational lea ve, paid 
emergency leaves, non-paid free leaves •.• ) that are not even provided 
for by individual employment legislation (89). 
As complement to the annual holiday provided for under the IERA 
5.22 an employee is also entitled to an extra annual fully paid leave for 
the number of days he usually needs to make a return journey to his 
original home provided that such leave shall not exceed 10 days - (IERA 
5.24). In a memorandum to the Presidency of the Republic the Sudan 
Employers Federation expressed its discontent with this "so-called leave" 
calling it, instead, "a novelty that distinguishes Sudanese leg isla tion from 
labour legislation all over the World" (90). However this same right has 
been provided for public sector employees since as early as 1975 - (PSR 
1975 5.74). In both sectors it is justified by the vastness of the Sudan, 
the poor condition of roads and transportation, the centralization of 
employment opportunities in the Greater Khartoum area and the 
urban-rural seasonal movement of the workforce. 
Employees are also entitled to a leave with full pay on "official 
holidays and occasions" (IERA 1981 5.23). Moreover, apart from all 
these properly so-called holidays there are other instances in which the 
employee may absent himself and still remain entitled to his wage under 
the law IERA 1981 55.13(2) (9 O. 
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Most of the points mentioned in the conclusion to Part 3.A.1 are 
also relevant in a conclusion of the present section. Although _ the 
provision of holidays for government salaried employees predated and 
possibly influenced the introduction of holidays for public sector manual 
workers and pri va te sector employees - (both remained until 1973 
governed largely by the same individual employment relations law; the 
EEPO). Subsequent development has in case of the private sector been 
influenced by the roles which the judiciary, the labour offices and some 
employers and the trade unions have been playing. This is evidenced by 
the way in which the law has been developing. Legislative changes were 
always introduced to remedy certain defects which the practical 
operation of the law had exposed. 
As to the social ideology of the law it is obvious that the one 
year qualification period (IERA 1981 55.22(1» confines the benefit of the 
legisla tion to permanent employees in organized industries - (less than 
15% of the urban workforce ••• ILO Sudan 1976.110). The implication 
of this confinement for the various aspects of social ideology of the law 
is examined in the summary of this Part 3.A. 
3.A.3. Working Hours 
The EEPO 1949 SS.13( 1) introduced a maXImum of 8.1/2 hours as 
the normal working day for adult males "employed on a daily-wage basis. 
Subsequent amendments of the EEPO 1949 generalized the limitation of 
the working day to all but few classes of employees - (EEPO 1969 
55.13(1); IERA 1981 SS.19( 1). They also reduced work hours, changed 
the method of calculating, and, increased, the rate of overtime payment 
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(IERA 1981 55.19-21), made overtime work largely optional and provided 
special protection for women and children (IERA 1981 55.20-21, -27). 
Non-manual workers whether technical, clerical or managerial 
staffs are excepted from the 8 hour working day now provided for under 
the IERA 1981 55.2l( 1). However with this single exception the IERA 
1981, in contrast to its predecessor (i.e. the EEPO 1973), gives only 
limited power to the Government to override its provisions. The vast 
powers, of excepting any industry or class of employees from the ambit 
of the EEPO 1973 55.13(1), which the latter ordinance conferred on the 
Ministry of Public Service and the President of the Republic (EEPO 1973 
55.13(2)) was coincidental with the application of that ordinance to some 
public sector employees. Following the total separation of private and 
public employment laws accomplished in late 1973 and the enactment in 
1981 of an exclusively private sector IERA, the EEPO 1973 55.13(2) died 
with the official repeal of its ordinance in June 1981. 
The prerogatives which the provisiOn of the EEPO 1973 55.13(2) 
once upheld for the government are now upheld by separate public 
service legislation. The counterpart provisions governing overtime work 
in the public sector are some evidence to that effect. The P5 R 1975 
55.32( 1)-(2) for instance give the Head of Department the power to ask 
any public sector employee to do overtime work at any time - 55.32( 1). 
Moreover 55.32(2) provides that with the exception of cases enumerated 
under Table 7 of the P5R 1975 employees who do overtime work shall not 
be entitled to overtime payment. Although the employees excepted 
under Table 7 constitute a majority of public sector employees the rate 
of overtime payment fixed is in all cases less than that fixed by the 
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IERA 1981 SS.2 I( 1)-(3). 
For all private sector manual workers overtime payment IS now a 
"statutory right". This according to judicial interpretation means that 
all work in excess of the normal working hours is overtime work and 
automatically entitles the claimant to overtime payment. Unless it is 
expressly stated otherwise the courts are also ready to regard employee's 
regular salary or wage, no matter how high it is, as exclusive of overtime 
payment (92). 
Overtime work is one of the areas of labour relations commonly 
dealt with under collective agreements. This was the rule In 19 out of 
the 24 Collective Agreements (93) seen by the author. With few 
exceptions the substance of the agreements provide only a detailed 
account and methods of implementation of the rights already guaranteed 
by statute. One exceptional agreement makes overtime work always and 
in all cases optional (94). Other exceptions to the general rule are also 
5 collective agreements (95) between employers and white-collar 
employees giving the latter overtime rights equal to those given to the 
manual workers. This could mean that although excepted by the IERA 
1981 SS.2 I( 4) this class of employees is in practice treated at least on 
'J 
equal footing with other protected classes. The sa me is not true of 
public sector white collar employees who although excepted from 
overtime pay - (Table 7 PSR 1975) are also not protected by collective 
( 96) 
agreements. 
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It is worth mentioning however that although almost all 
agreements (97) guarantee rights that are at least equal to the miniroum 
set by the IERA 1981, the majority of the agreements had in fact 
predated the enactment of the IERA 1981! Bearing in mind that all 
these agreements I researched in the Labour Department happen to be 
indigenous to big and relatively stable industries, the above finding may 
justify the Sudanese Employers' Federation complaint that the provisions 
of the IERA 1981 5.21 has codified provisions of collective agreements 
prevalent in big industries at the time (98). 
The work-hours provISIons of the IERA 1981 do not specifically 
exempt in this respect any category of manual workers. It is rather 
idiosyncratic of work-hours law that its initial enactment contemplated 
the protection of only the least organized of the urban labour force (i.e. 
casual labour). The vast changes, in the scope of application and 
standards of protection of the law, that have materialized since 1949 are 
not unrelated to this idiosyncrasy. These changes are vast because they 
feature as influences which stronger classes of manual workers, bigger 
employers and increased in vol vement of the Labour Department have 
exerted on the law in subsequent years. 
The law is fully operational, through joint employer - trade Union 
arbitration, in big and economically stable establishments. It is also 
formally effectively enforceable whenever grievances are brought to the 
attention of the authorities. This does not however mean that the law 
is socially ideologically developed. 
385 
" There are many establishements which, although small, usually 
require overtime work - (e.g. bakeries, restaurants and others In the 
transport and serViCes sectors). Whether these establishments can 
afford, or do actually pay, the statutory minima is arguable. Such 
payment is not however reflected in the amount of normal and overtime 
earnings of employees working in these establishments (99). The law can 
do nothing about this because many workers, in fear of unemployment 
and retalia tory measures by employers, are coerced into accepting 
over-demanding and under-paid jobs. The inspection which the Labour 
Offices conduct on their own motion cannot posibly affect this result. 
There are only three regional Labour Offices in Greater Khartoum area 
compared with more than 2000 (IOO) establishments employing less than 
10 workers for the same area. 
Although the work-hours law exempts only salaried employees. 
The three months period of service specified as qualification for the 
applica tion of the IERA 1981 - (in which work-hours law is embodied) - In 
effect excludes casual (l 0 1) labour. Hence the superstructural 
development of the law has totally reversed the wisdom, of protecting 
the weakest category of all employees, that underlay the introduction of 
the progenitor EEPO 1949 SS.13( O. 
3.A.4. Wages 
Both the mode of payment and the level of wages are subject to 
legislative control. The mode of payment covers two aspects. The 
first being the periodicity {i.e. length of intervals at which wages are 
paid) and the second being the medium of payment. Both aspects are 
Size of No. of 
Establish- Establish-
ments ments 
5-9 867 
10-14 265 
15-19 118 
20-29 132 
30-39 74 
40-49 36 
50-59 106 
100 + 124 
.. 
TABLE 8 
Appendix to fs. 32, 82, 99, 214 
Average weekly earning for wage earners and salaried employees in establishments 
with five or more employees, classified by size of establishment, 
March 1973 (0 (£s) 
Wage earners Salaried employees Total 
No. of Average earnings No. of A verage Earnings No. of Average Earnings 
Employees Normal Overtime Total Employees Normal Overtime Total Employees Normal Overtime 
5,125 
2,670 
1,636 
2,411 
1,927 
1,106 
5,926 
37,356 
2.97 0.07 3.04 518 11.65 0.06 11.71 5,643 3.77 
3.43 0.09 3.52 377 12.97 0.04 13.01 3,047 4.61 
3.55 0.06 3.617 359 12.52 0.17 12.69 1,995 5.24 
3.77 0.16 3.93 727 13.29 0.14 13.43 3,138 5.97 
3.91 0.25 4.16 607 15.61 0.19 15.80 2,534 6.77 
4.35 0.22 4.57 455 18.00 0.21 18.21 1,561 8.32 
4.26 0.27 4.53 1,433 16.82 0.12 16.94 7,329 6.724 
4.97 O·~L ___ ~.~9 6,591 15.81 0.29 16.10 43,947 6.16 
Source: ILO Sudan 1976.369 
(1) The Low Level of payment in smaller establishments is to some extent confirmed 
by more recent findings; ILO Sudan 1984.173. 
0.72 
0.09 
0.08 
0.16·:. 
0.25 
0.22 
0.24 
0.32 
---
.-
Total 
4.49 
4.70 
5.32 
6.13 
7.02 
8.54 
6.96 
~.48~_ 
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extensively regulated (IERA 1981 55.12(1)-(6». :.1 Moreover In contrast 
with its predecessor - (i.e. EEPO 1973 55.14-15) - the IERA 1981 
55.12( 1)-(6) endeavours, in the few cases in which it leaves regulation 
inter alia of the mode of payment to the agreement of the parties, 
always to prescribe a statutory limit beyond which this freedom must not 
carry its bearers. 
Because it IS conditioned largely by extra-legal factors, 
determination of the level of wages is a phenomenon that may pose a 
challenge to statutory regulation. However this has not prevented the 
introduction of two statutory schemes - (Wages-Tribunals and minimum 
wage legisla tion) - purporting to effect such regula tion. The 
Wages-Tribunals' has been in existence since 1952 - (The Wages-Tribunals 
Ordinance; WTO 1952). Following the repeal of the WTO 1952 and the 
re-enactment of a Wages and Condi tions of Service Tr ibunals Act 
(WC5T A 1976) In 1976 Tribunals have since then been empowered to 
review both the wages and conditions of service and recommend minimum 
standards for both. Once they have been approved by the Minister 
responsible for labour the recommended minimum standards become law. 
In addition to the penal ties imposed upon an employer violating such a 
law (WC5T A, 1976 55.10(1» and without prejudice to employee's right of 
action (5.10(2) Ibid) the Criminal Court shall order repayment, to the 
employee affected, of any balance of payment he has been deprived of as 
a result of employer's non-compliance with the law over any period of 
time not exceeding three years (Ibid 55.1 O( 1). 
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The Tribunals' scheme apply to employees, definable by industry, 
profession or geographical locality, who because of their division among 
multiple employing units - (e.g. bakery workers, lorry drivers loading and 
unloading workers • • .) are deemed organizationally weak (Hussein, 
1983.211-212). Some of these workers are in fact organized and do 
actually participate in enforcement of the WCST A (102). 
The second and more recent scheme governing wage deter mina tion 
IS the minimum wage legislation. Minimum wage legislation has been 
enacted only since 1974 - Minimum Wages Act MWA 1974. The MWA 
provides for a quantified minImUm wage that must apply to all such 
regions as specified in Ministerial Orders published in the Gazette 
(55.3-4). Since the introduction of the Act the minimum wage specified 
under it has been revised (103) twice and it is now under revision for a 
possible third time. The regions to which the MW A has so far been 
applied cover all the industrial centres and almost all cities and towns in 
the country. Al though the ra tionali ty of discr imina ting against 
~mployees on regional basis might not be immediately clear this policy 
was initiated by a reasonable fear against imposing the wage standard of 
the highly industrialized and rela ti vely highly expensl ve Grea ter 
Khartou m area on the rest of a vast and, largely agricultural country. 
The M W A IS administered by the offices of the Labour 
Department (104). The decisions of these offices are appealable or 
referrable to the Civil Courts in the manner explained under Section 4 of 
this Chapter (105). 
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Both the WCSTA 1976 and the MWA 1974 apply only to 
employees in the private sector (MWA 1974 SS.3(2)a). This may give the 
impression that the State is confident of voluntarily providing for its own 
employees wages above the average standard in the private sector or the 
sta tutory minimum provided for this sector. However this IS not 
necessarily always the case. There are complaints by public sector 
employees to the Commissioner of Labour that their employers are 
paying them salaries below the statutory minimum (106). Since it is not 
within his jurisdiction to deal with complaints by public sector employees 
the Commissioner refused to accept these complaints. There IS even 
more evidence to suggest that workers in private employment receIve 
wages that are generally higher than those received by employees in the 
public sector (107). 
An important feature of Wages Orders made under the M W A 1974 
is that they not only increase the minimum for low-paid workers but also 
ra tionalize pay differentials throughout the wage and salary structure In 
the light of such (108) increase. The ILO has recommended that In 
order to reduce the distortion of the structure of earnings on the urban 
labour market the MW A "must, be restricted to its protective function 
for low-paid workers and abandon for the time being efforts to 
rationalize pay differentials (109) .•• " ILO Sudan 1976.120. 
The MWA 1974 " was a product of the tripartite discussion and 
determina tion of the government, the trade unions and employers" (ILO 
Sudan 1976.391). The Wages and Conditions of Service Orders that have 
been issued since the enactment of the MWA 1974 and the WCSTA 1976 
are some evidence that the trade unions have managed to use the 
" 
,I 
TABLE 9 
Wage Rates by Type of Employer 
(£s per year) 
Appendix to Footnote 107 
Type of Public 
Occupation 
Professional 
Mean 1,608 
Max. 4-,800 
Min. 336 
White Collar 
Mean 1,193 
Max. 3,600 
Min. 4-80 
Skilled 
Mean 1,4-4-8 
Max. 7,200 
Min. 24-0 
Unskilled 
Production 
Mean 923 
Max. 2,160 
Min. 336 
Unskilled 
Service 
Mean 762 
Max. 1,800 
Min. 360 
Private 
4-,855 
36,000 
900 
2,4-70 
24-,000 
300 
1,84-8 
14-,4-00 
200 
1,105 
4-,800 
280 
1,195 
7,200 
200 
Source: ILO Labour Markets 10 The Sudan - Geneva 1984-
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ad ministra ti ve machinery set up under these Acts for purposes of 
improving the level of wages. Trade Union struggle appears as an 
important factor in this area of employment only because the legal and 
administrative frameworks drawn by both Acts have allowed them a wide 
legal scope within which they could freely move to influence legislative 
standards. 
The law is formally effective, i.e. enforceable whenever 
grievances are brought to the attention of the authorities. Moreover 
there is some evidence that the law is widely observed among those to 
whom it applies. Thus it is suggested that the government wage policy 
is clearly felt in the labour market and that it is only within categories 
of workers excepted from the law that the wage structure tends to be 
more flexible and responsive to market pressures (ILO Sudan 1984 
143-144). Nevertheless the M W A 1974 is largely superficial. 
"The law does not formally cover 'seasonal agricultural workers', 
workers outside stipulated urban areas, workers in establishments which 
employ fewer than 10 persons, or workers in all establishments who are 
below the age of 18. Together these exceptions cover about 
three-quarters of the wage-earning population in the Sudan . • . ILO 
Sudan 1976.111." Pointing out that much more attention should be given 
to improving the wages and working conditions of employees in smaller 
establishments the ILO concluded; "we are far from decrying the 
sophistica ted system of industrial relations existing in the Sudan, but so 
far as the welfare of the mass of the urban population is concerned it is 
largely irrelevant" ILO Sudan 1976.121. 
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Summary ,I 
The discussion under the preceding Part 3.A has endeavoured to 
identify the various factors claimed as influencing the development of 
the law. The materials examined reveal that the role of the courts is 
rather modest. The reason for this is possibly that regulation, whether 
legislative, voluntary or administrative, of the terms and conditions of 
employment discussed under this part largely affects not the legal form 
but the economic standards of these terms and conditions. 
pre-eminence of the roles which the trade unions some 
legisla tion and to a less extent the Labour Department play. 
Hence the 
employers, 
The latter 
could participate in the development of this area of protection because, 
in addition to its quasi-judicial jurisdiction, it mediates between the 
direct parties and also recommends revision of prevailing standards. 
Despite the overall protectionist orientation, enactment of 
legisla tion in some areas, and improvement of standards in all areas, 
~ppear to be influenced by centralized tripartite negotiation (i.e. 
invol ving employers the trade unions and the government as in case of 
minimum wage legislation) - and standard setting by big employers 
respectively. To the extent that the law is impervious to the economic 
position of some employers this is not produced by biased government 
action. It is rather an effect of the specific manner in which relevant 
semi-autonomous factors operate to influence the law - (as explained 
supra Part I.e. 1). 
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Finally the social ideology of the law regula ting the areas 
discussed reveals the limitations which the capitalist under-development 
of an economy in transition might pose for the operation of imposed 
leg isla ti ve standards. We have seen that the law endeavours to 
overcome this by excluding certain categories of workers and employers 
from regulation. Nevertheless the size-diversity of establishments and 
workforces subject to the law is as great as to limit the overall 
spontaneous operation of the law. Even when rigorous criteria have 
successfully been adopted for limiting regulation to selected categories of 
workers and employers - (as in the case of minimum-wage law) - the 
final result is superficiality or elitism of the law - (i.e. limitation of the 
number of members of a group which can formally benefit from the law). 
This is another aspect of the social-ideological under-development of the 
law. 
3.B. Security of Employees' Tenure of Office 
Prior to enactment of the EEPO 1949 employment was viewed as 
a contractual relationship, and, as such, terminable with notice (II 0). 
The EEPO 1949 55.10(1) preserved this right of employers, to dismiss 
without any substantial reason whatsoever, but specified minimum periods 
of the notice to be given (EEPO 1949 55.10(1); IERA 1981 55.34(2». The 
law on dismissal with notice remained basically unchanged until 1973. 
From 1973 onward dismissal with notice has been restricted to few 
instances specifically listed under the law (EEPO 1973 55.10(1); IERA 
1981 55.34( 1), and made subject to approval of the Commissioner of 
Labour (EEPO 1973 55.10(4); IERA 19815.36)(111). 
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The EEPO 1949 also allowed an employer summarily to dismiss an 
employee for "wilful disobedience of a lawful order ••. gross misconduct 
••• serious negligence ••• or wilful misconduct calculated to seriously 
injure employer's business" - (5.10(2». Each of the breaches mentioned 
under 55.10(2) was intended to form a separate ground for summary 
dismissal (I12). 55.10(2) remained in effect until 1969 when the 
Amendment introduced to the EEPO in that year (I 13) divided 55.10(2) 
into two main subsections; one dealing with termination by the employer 
and the other with termination by the employee - (EEPO 1969 
SS.10(2)(a)-(b» It further subdivided the grounds for dismissal by the 
employer - (i.e. those previously contained in the EEPO 1949 55.10(2» -
into 8 specific grounds. Most importantly the 1969 Amendment made 
dismissal or termination of employment under 55.1 0(2)a-l 0(2)b subject to 
prior approval of the Commissioner of Labour (SS.10(2)-c). 
Except for introduction of a new ground for dismissal - (i.e. 
reduction of the workforce for economic or technological reasons)(l14) -
the subsequent, 1973 Amendment of the EEPO, and its replacement by 
the IERA 1981 have not however substantially changed the grounds of 
summary dismissals catalogued in the EEPO 1969. Moreover the latter 
did not itself substantively change those previously contained in the 
EEPO 1949 55.10(2). This course of development has made possible, side 
by side with statutory dismissals law, the existence of a wealth of 
judicial precedents the least recent of which are as relevant today as 
they were decades ago. To the extent that they interpret and 
complement statutory law the review of these precedents in the course 
of discussion will contribute to a better understanding of the law. 
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More important however is the significance of these judicial 
precedents to the main theme of the Chapter. The focus of the 
discussion is to demonstrate the role of the Civil Courts as one of the 
factors influencing the development of individual employment law, and 
whether and to what extent this role has contributed to the elaboration 
and elucidation of the form of the law. Wi th regard to the substance of 
the law the discussion endeavours to explain the extent to which judicial 
approaches to the various issues considered, are compatible with the 
protectionist orientation of the law suggested by the discussion under the 
previous section. Both findings are relevant for assessing the ideology 
of the private individual employment law and comparing it with both the 
public sector indi vidual and the collecti ve labour rela tions laws. 
3.B.1. Dismissal With Notice 
There are few reported decisions under the EEPO 55.10(1) pnor 
to 1969. Such cases as there were centred mainly on the scope of 
applica tion of the section and the statutory requirement of notice. The 
Civil Courts had during this period affirmed the application of the 
requirement of notice as a statutory minimum that "does not and should 
not prevent the courts • • • from upholding the bindingness . . . and 
enforceability of contracts of employment offering better guarantees" 
(115). The courts also decided that conditional notice and warning do 
not fulfill the statutory requirement of notice (I 16), that to be effective 
notice must reach the actual knowledge of the employee - (i.e. mere 
posting of notice of terminating employment is not enough)(I17), and. 
tha t the continuity of service stipulated as qualification for the right to 
notice is interruptable only by the proof that the contract had at one 
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time been terminated either with notice or under the 'EEPO 1949 55.10(2) 
(I18). 
Dismissals reported to the Labour Offices under the EEPO 
55.10(1) increased considerably in the period 1969-1973 (119). The 
amendment introduced since 1973 (EEPO 1973 55.10(1); IERA 1981 
55.34( 1)) however has made the law on dismissal with notice once more 
less conspicuous in the litigation arena - (either before civil courts or 
tribunals). This is the case because the instances to which dismissal 
with notice has been restricted fall into cases of; discharge of the 
contract by mutual consent, retirement on age ground, physical 
incapacity of the employee, frustration, completion of the work 
contracted for or expiry of the period of the contract, and termination 
during the probationary period (EEPO 1973 55.10(1); IERA 1981 55.34(1)). 
With the exception of the last ground which has been introduced only 
since 1981, these conditions, by their nature, rarely occur and, even when 
they do, seldom cause controversy under the dismissal law. The 
~xistence of anyone of these conditions is technically easy to verify and 
in the majority of cases is relevant for purposes of laws other than that 
of dismissals (e.g. Work Injuries Compensation, 50cial Insurance, Pensions 
and Contracts Laws). 
The introduction of dismissal during the proba tionary period 
coincided with the other new 55.6(4) of the IERA 1981 which fixes this 
period at 3 months. The concept of probationary period was introduced 
after the Civil Courts had in at least two cases refused to recognize the 
existence of such a period under the previous law (120) (i.e. the EEPO 
1948-1973). Even now a decision of the Labour Court that notice of 
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dismissal during the probationary period must be glven at least a month 
before its completion (121), practically reduces the probationary period to 
only 2 months. Employers have from their side already complained that, 
3 months, is too short a trial period and is even more too short to allow 
for the survival of seasonal economic activity that could employ only 
seasonal labour. The seasonal economic acti vi ties insinuated usually last 
for more than 3 months. Employers are also adamant that the 
government should apply to their cause the same considerations that 
allow it - (i.e. the government) - to give itself 2 years of probation 
vis-a-vis its own employees (122). 
3.B.2. Dismissal Without Notice 
The grounds for this type of dismissal, are now listed under the 
IERA 1981 5.37 and can be compartmentalized under 3 main headings 
namely (a) wilful disobedience; (b) gross misconduct; and (c) serious 
negligence. In all these cases it is always the employer who must prove 
that he has not wrongfully dismissed the employee (123). 
3.B.2.a Wilful Disobedience 
To justify dismissal under this ground the order disobeyed must be 
within the contractual obligations of the employee. This principle 
espoused by the courts from as early as 1957 (124) is now incorporated 
into the IERA 1981 5.9 (125). Moreover the fact that complex and 
elaborated divisions of labour have not yet arisen so as to encourage 
implica tion of job mobility (whether occupa tional or geographical) clauses 
means tha t this concept of contractual obliga tion may in certain 
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situations still be determined on purely formal contractual or statutory 
bases (126). 
Although the statutory law does not requIre proof of gravity or 
seriousness of the instance of disobedience the courts had in the past 
proved reluctant to allow dismissal for just a single isolated incident 
(127). In another case the Court of Appeal even decided tha t 
employee's appropriation of a sum of money he was ordered by his 
employers to deposit in their account "although was a wilful, was not an 
"unlawful" disobedience • • • and, therefore, • was not . . • a 
disobedience at all"! This, in the opinion of the court, was because the 
money was appropr ia ted in part satisfaction of salary arrears due to the 
plaintiff from his employers (128). It is now clear from the wording of 
55.37(d) that to justify dismissal disobedience must amount to breach of 
contract. 
3.B.2.b Gross Misconduct 
Misconduct includes acts or omissions such as assault, breach of 
the duty of fidelity, absenteeism and immoral conduct. Even before any 
amendment was introduced to the EEPO 1949 55.10(2) the Court of 
Appeal ruled in one case that an act which is "non curat de minimis lex" 
could not amoun t to a gra ve misconduct in the meaning of tha t 
subsection. In the opinion of the trial judge; "The right to work IS as 
sacred as the right to life liberty and property and must not therefore be 
disturbed without very strong justification" (129). Th is str ingen t 
interpreta tion of the requirement of grossness or gra vi ty of misconduct 
has been applied to all instances of misconduct. 
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Beginning with assault it has been decided by the Court of Appeal 
that verbally abusing the Manager of the Company and throwing a bundle 
of keys on his desk does not constitute an assault or any other ground for 
dismissal (130). A similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in 
Abbas Issa -v- White Nile Cotton Mills (131). The latter court decided 
that to be an assault the employee's conduct must amount to an actual 
use of criminal force or criminal intimidation" (132). This In effect 
over-rules the Supreme Court's own previous decision - in Siddig Osman 
Omer -v- Port Sudan Car Assembly Factory(133) - that mere verbal abuse 
of the manager was an assault. The decision in The White Nile Mills' 
Case is now reaffirmed by the decision in Mohamed Yousif Dahab -v-
Abdel Bagi Omer Engineering Works Ltd (134). Both the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the Province Judge distinction 
between assaulting a manager and a person other than the manager and 
his view that to justify dismissal assault must in the latter case be 
"gr ievous physical assault". 
into the IERA 1981 S.37(g). 
This is now the law as also incorporated 
Moving to the second instance of misconduct the IERA 1981 5.37 
however lists only specific types of breaches of the duty of fidelity. 
These are; (a) deception by presentation of forged documents (135) or 
impersonation (136); and (b) disclosure of commercial or industrial secrets 
- (IERA 1981 SS.37(a),(e». Some commentators believe that "although 
the list is meant to be exhaustive it should not, at least on public policy 
grounds prevent the inclusion of other equally serious breaches" (Hassan 
1979.173). The Court of Appeal did in one case however decide that 
engagement in private work during working hours is a breach of the duty 
of fidelity - (137) even though this was not mentioned among the 
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breaches listed under the then EEPO 1969 55.10(2)( 1)( v). 
Although some commentators see all types of breaches of the 
duty of fidelity as serious per se (Hassan, 1979.120) the Courts do not 
necessarily hold a similar view. Employee's engagement in private work, 
at his employers~ premises and during working hours in one case (138) and 
employee's fraudulent appropriation of 2 pIeces of wood belonging to his 
employer, in another (139) were held to be insufficient grounds for 
dismissal. In both cases the court relied on that the consequential 
monetary loss to employers was so insignificant as to make employees' 
actions not even criminally punishable - (i.e. on ground of de minimis non 
cura t de lex). 
The third instance of misconduct IS unjustifiable absence. 
Absence was until 1969 dealt with by the courts as an instance of 
misconduct. The 1969 Amendment of the EEPO provided for dismissal 
on ground of "failure to carry out contractual obligations .•• ". Most 
cases of absenteeism that came to the courts after 1969 were dealt with 
under this new ground. However following a revised re-enactment of 
this ground under the 1981 IERA it is no longer possible to treat all cases 
of absenteeism under it. The IERA 1981 55.37(d) substitute the words 
"deliberate omission to carry out contractual obligations" for the old 
phraseology of failure to carry out such obligations. Hence, it is now 
possible to follow the old judicial practice of trea ting cases of 
absenteeism as instances of misconduct. 
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The courts have always maintained that in order to justify 
dismissal absenteeism needs to be more than just short term casual 
absence (140). In determining the seriousness of the effect absence has 
had on the employment relationship the courts take into consideration 
factors such as, the position held by the employee or the nature of his 
job, the actual damage caused by the alleged absence and the ratio of 
the total of the days of casual absence to the length of employee's 
service. In Vasili Bamboulis -v- Osman Abdulla (141) for instance 
absence for an aggregate of 104 days during a period of service of 7 
years was held not long enough to justify dismissal. But absence for one 
month during a 6 months period of service was in another case seen long 
enough to justify it (142). 
Decisions from 1969 onward continued this trend of narrowmg 
absenteeism as ground for dismissal. In Mohamed Nurain Khalifa -v-
Modern Match Co (143) the Court of Appeal reasserted that, 
"absenteeism justifies dismissal only when it is repeated or prolonged . 
Any other interpretation will endow the employer with a power of 
dismissal for the most trifling absence. This could not have been the 
intention of the legislature". A year later the same court ruled; " •.. 
casual absence for short terms with no effect on employer's interest does 
not amount to an omission to carry out contractual obligations" (144). 
None of the decisions so far discussed, mention anything about 
deduction from wages for absence - (EEPO 1969, 1973 S.20) and the 
effect of such deductions on any subsequent claim for dismissal based on 
the same absence. In a recent case however the Supreme Court (145), 
after reasserting that casual absence and later arrivals "are not such a 
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gross omission of contractual obligations as to justify dismissal", also, 
added; "the employee in this case had already been punished by deduction 
from his wages • •• It is not therefore just to inflict upon him another 
punishment - i.e. dismissal - for the same mistake" (146). 
The last instance of misconduct covers cases of immoral 
behaviour at the place of work and conviction with an offence affecting 
honour morals or honesty. Although covered by this broad label, 
drunkenness is also specifically provided for as a ground for dismissal 
under the IERA 1981; 55.37(d). Offences affecting honour morals or 
honesty, include such offences as; "theft, cheating, criminal breach of 
trust and the alike" (147), but do not include e.g. the offence of "causing 
gr ievous bodily har m" (148). 
The wordings of both the EEPO 1973 55.10(5)£ and the IERA 1981 
5.37(f) suggest that conviction is unnecessary in case an immoral act is 
committed at the place of work. This was also the view held by the 
Court of Appeal in Albert Hanna Ishag -v- National Tobacco Co Ltd 
(149). 50me commentators believe that in all allegations affecting 
honour morals or honesty conviction is, irrespective of the venue of 
commission, always necessary (Hassan, 1979.180). Although it makes 
dismissal in all cases almost impossible before conviction and in spite of 
its discrepancy with the express wording of the sections the latter is the 
view that has been overwhelmingly applied by the Courts (50). 
The individual employment legislation does not requlre the 
employer to wait until the conviction has become final in order lawfully 
to dismiss the employee. The courts however have held that the 
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conviction must be final. Dismissal based on a conviction that was later 
quashed by the appellate criminal court was held to have lost its 
lawfulness from the date the conviction was quashed (151). Moreover, 
to be lawful dismissal must take place after final conviction and not 
before it. In Atta Mustafa Salih -v- Adam Harroon Fadlel-Mula (152) an 
employee was accused of theft and immediately dismissed by his 
employer. The employee was later convicted with theft on the same 
facts. The Court of Appeal ruled that because it was based on what 
was then a mere accusation the dismissal was unlawful. 
3.B.2.c Negligence 
It was generally accepted even prior to 1969 that to justify 
dismissal under the EEPO SS.10(2} the employee's act or omission must 
be seriously or grossly negligent (153). Up to 1969 the courts could 
judge the seriousness of negligence either by the nature of the act - {i.e. 
the magnitude of the risk involved} or by its consequences. The law has 
SInce 1969 made it clear that to justify dismissal the employee's act 
"must be a serious negligent act that has resulted in heavy financial loss 
to the employeer (EEPO 1969 SS.10(2) C-I1; EEPO 1973 SS.10(5)b; IERA 
1981 SS.37(b». It is now only after these two ingredients have been 
proved that the courts would approve the legality of the dismissal (154). 
However the possible practical outcome of this rule might in some cases 
prove unacceptable to employers (155). 
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3.B.3. Disciplinary Dismissal 
Employers are required to make work rules and disciplinary 
regulations in writing and conspicuously display them at the place of 
work - IERA 1981 55.48-49. Such rules and regulations are effective 
only after copies of them have been filed with and approved by the 
Commissioner of Labour (156). Even then these regulations and rules 
enable employers to impose only disciplinary measures short of dismissal. 
In contrast to the position In the public sector it IS not within 
private employers' powers to dismiss inter alia on disciplinary grounds 
before reference of the case to the Commissioner of Labour and it is 
then always the latter which would decide for or against the dismissal. 
Although there are a few firms (157) where management consults with 
trade unions over the making of work rules and disciplinary regulations 
and few in which management additionally accepts formation of joint 
union-management disciplinary boards (158), these consultations and 
boards do not empower the employer or the trade union to lay down 
effective procedure for dismissals or dismiss an employee. To be 
effective the procedures must even in this case first be approved, and, to 
be lawful each case of dismissal must likewise first be approved, by the 
Commissioner of Labour (159). 
To recapi tula te, irrespective of the serIOusness of the violation 
alleged against an employee and of the formality of the disciplinary 
procedure adopted employers cannot lawfully dismiss without firstly 
satisfying the procedural requirements discussed under Part 3.B.6 below 
and secondly proving that the dismissal IS In fact substantively valid in 
the manner described under the previous Part 3.B.2. Hence the concept 
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of disciplinary dismissal signifies dismissals that are distinguishable, not 
by their grounds, but, by the formality of the procedure through which 
they are imposed and nevertheless governed by the general law of 
dismissals. 
3.B.4. Reduction of the Workforce on Economic or Technological 
Grounds 
This ground was introduced in 1973 and has been in effect since 
then. There were two reasons which had possibly influenced its 
introduction. The first reason was tha t following the 1969-1970 
na tionaliza tion and conf isca tion decrees and the dena tionaliza tion 
measures that began in 1972 the new management - (both public and 
private) - of the firms affected (160) needed to re-establish their 
businesses on new economic bases. The second reason was the new 
emphasis which Numeiri's Regime, from July 1971 onward, placed on 
encouraging industrial investment and the transfer of technology (161). 
An employer desirous of reducing his workforce must apply to the 
Commissioner of Labour for approval of the reductions (IERA 1981 
SS.40( 1)). The Commissioner may after considering the number, length 
of service, persons and trade union occupation of those to be made 
redundant and investiga ting the economic or technological changes 
alleged make a decision, regarding the application, within 2 weeks from 
the date of receiving it (162). Dismissal before obtaining the 
Commissioner's approval or in disregard of any condition to which his 
approval of the reduction is made subject is unlawful. An employee 
lawfully dismissed in accordance with the above procedure is not entitled 
to a compensation for loss of employment. 
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Although cases of reduction of the workforce are not, for the 
purpose of determining employee's right to notice, statutorily treated as 
cases of dismissal with notice - (i.e. under IERA SS.34( 1» - the Court of 
Appeal has decided that the employer must give notice or the monetary 
equivalent of the period of notice even if the reduction IS effected with 
approval of the Commissioner (163). 
The permissibility of uncompensated dismissal for economIC and 
technical reasons IS a gap in private sector individual employment law. 
The weakness of the law derives not so much from the possibility of 
abuse as from the vulnerability of employee's right to his job the law 
indicates and supports. The law does not provide any redundancy 
payment or compensation for employees dismissed on these grounds. 
However although the risk of abuse is also present (164), it IS partly 
offset by countervailing efforts of, the Labour Offices, and In a few 
cases, the trade unions. 
The Labour Offices do not usually approve dismissal on these 
grounds unless they are satisfied through field visits inspection and 
consultation with the Ministry of Industry, that the employer's complaint 
is genuine (165). Trade unions also guard against abuse either by 
directly negotiating with the employer the number and description of 
those to be made redundant (166) or by presenting to the Commissioner 
their own view regarding the redundancies and their approval (167). 
The permissibility of dismissal on technological or economIC 
grounds is in practice convenient to many foreign contractors who are 
resident in the country usually only for the period of their contracts. 
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Many of these contractors make periodical reductions corresponding to 
completed specific phases of the work contracted for. Workers affected 
by applications by foreign contractors constitute a high percentage of the 
workers affected by all applications for reduction of workforce (168). In 
cases where the foreign contractor has had more than one construction or 
engineering contracts the labour office refused to approve reduction upon 
performance oJ the first and insisted that the contractor use the same 
workforce for his other contracts (169). 
Despite its apparent weaknesses the legal position of redundancies 
In the private sector is superior to its counterpart in the public sector. 
Reduction of the workforce is in the latter left to the discretion of the 
Head of Department or employing unit. Moreover the procedure of 
reduction itself is not supervised by the Labour Department or any other 
independent body (170). 
Nevertheless, reduction of the workforce for economlC or 
technological reasons is an area where the line of demarcation between 
public and private employment is relatively blurred. The control which 
the State exercises on import and export of raw materials and the 
influence which its fiscal policies exert on the choice between 
capital-intensi ve and labour-intensi ve techniques of industrializa tion 
(Hussein, 1983.242-244) are directly responsible for the economic (171) 
and technological conditions of employing units in the private sector. 
The concern which the State, in a centrally planned economy, shows for 
these policies may dissuade it from attempting any protectionist 
intervention in this area. However it is important to mention that the 
trade unions' leadership has not itself so far proved conscious of a need 
No. of 
Employer Firms 
Invol ved 
Foreign 21 
Indigenous 14 
Total 35 
TABLE 10 
Appendix to Footnotes 168, 171, 206 
Applications for Reduction of Workforce Processed by Khartoum North Labour Office 
and the Khartoum Labour Office in the Period March 1981 - July 1983 
No. of 
Redundancie~ 
Proposed 
873 
1255 
2128 
No. of Average Reasons 
Redundancie~ Days taken Economic Completion 
Approved to reach Deterior- of 
decision ation Contract 
863 7 88 772 
1196 7 349 -
2059 7 437 772 
---
Source: Khartoum North and Khartoum Labour Offices; 
Industrial Disputes Monthly Report Files 
Poli tical or 
Administ-
rative 
-
906 (1) 
906 
---
(1) The high percentage of redundancies under this ground coincided with the closure of the 
distilling industries following the introduction of "Sharia Law" and government direction 
tha t the employees affected be treated under the IERA 1981 5.40 
Others 
13 
-
13 I 
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for protection in this area! (I72). 5uch protection as there is of this 
area of private employment largely derives from the practices of _ the 
Labour Department and individual trade unions. Although a government 
department, the former, in so far as the bulk of private sector 
employment law is concerned, operates on autonomous professional basis 
that has remained unchanged despite the changes in political regimes and 
central governmental labour policies. 
3.B.5 Constructive Dismissal 
The EEPO 1969.55.1 O( 2)b introduced a right for the employee to 
terminate the contract of employment without notice In anyone of 
definite instances catalogued by the sub-section. This same rule, was 
later to be incorporated into the EEPO 1973 55.10(6), and, is now 
incorporated into the IERA 1981 5.38. The instances catalogued under 
the law could all be instances of breaches of contract by the employer. 
Furthermore the employee's right to terminate has always been subject 
to obtaining the prior approval of the Commissioner of Labour - EEPO 
1969 55.10(2)c; EEPO 1973 55.10(7); IERA 1981 55.39(1). 
An employee who terminates the contract of employment in 
accordance wi th the above law is not entitled to any sta tutory 
compensa tion or reinstatement. Hence, if judged by the remedies which 
legisla tion provides for unlawful dismissal, there is no concept of 
constructi ve dismissal under labour legislation in the 5udan. This raises 
questions as to the relevance of the IERA 1981 5.38 and its predecessors. 
Although the role gi ven to the Com missioner restr icts employee's 
freedom to treat the contract as discharged by breach. The conciliatory 
\ 
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role which the Commissioner may play is totally useless for an employee 
who nevertheless insists on terminating the contract. Furthermore,_ the 
section is not a codification of an employee's right to resign because 
such a right is already provided for under other sections of the law _ 
(EEPO 55.10(9), IERA 1981 5.41). 
Although there is no decided case on the issue an employee 
termina ting the contract in the manner discussed above may still be 
enti tIed to damages under the general law of contract. Finally, despite 
its apparent redundancy--, the enactment of the EEPO 1969 55.10(2)b was 
demanded by the trade union leadership. This and other 5 WTUF's 
subsequent recommendations regarding the same rule reveal certain flaws 
in the 5WTUF's perception of employment law. The point will be 
examined in the summary of this Part 3.B. 
3.B.6 The Commissioner of Labour's Factor 
As already mentioned, the law has Since 1969 made employer's 
right to dismiss without notice subject always to the prior approval of 
the Commissioner of Labour (I73). Ha ving discussed the substantial 
reasons that justify dis missal I now examine the effect which this 
procedural requirement has on the lawfulness of dismissal. Although 
specifically tailored for cases of summary dismissal this procedural 
requirement also applies to cases of disciplinary dismissal and 
redundancies. Hence its examination at this stage. 
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For the sake of articulation and brevity I will examine the effect 
of the procedural requirement in relation to five hypothetically poss.ible 
situa tions. Two of these situations are crystal clear cases of lawful and 
unlawful dismissals respectively and have to be disposed of at this stage. 
The two are: (1) the situation where the employer dismisses for valid 
substantial ground and with approval of the Commissioner of Labour - m 
which case the dismissal is lawful (174); (2) the situation where the 
employer dismisses for insufficient substantial reasons and without 
referring the dispute to the Commissioner - in which case the dismissal is 
unlawful. 
The first of the three remammg contestable situations IS the one 
where the employer dismisses for substantively-valid grounds but before 
reference of the dispute to the Commissioner of Labour. The view 
accepted in the vast majority of cases is that dismissal IS in such a 
situation unlawful. This view rests on the interpretation that the law 
stipulates the existence of a substantive valid reason, and obtaining of 
the Commissioner's approval, as two separate conditions both of which 
must be satisfied for the dismissal to be lawful. This was the view 
espoused by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in three leading 
cases (175) and the one that has been applied in the majority of cases 
smce then (176). Reasserting this interpretation in three more recent 
cases, the Labour Court, the Province Court and the Court of Appeal, 
without even discussing the alleged substantive grounds of the dismissals 
in all three cases, have accordingly held employers liable for unlawful 
dismissal on ground of their failure to refer the disputes to the 
Commissioner of Labour (177). 
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The justification for this majority Vlew and for the interpretation 
on which it is based has been stated by the Court of Appeal as; "The fact 
that the propriety of dismissal is made conditional on the consent of the 
Commissioner indicates that the legislature intended to appoint the 
Commissioner as an indispensable referee in Labour disputes. We should 
therefore abstain from interfering with this clear intention." (178). 
The second of the three contestable si tua tions ar Ises where the 
employer dismisses for substantively-valid reasons after reference of the 
dispute to the Commissioner but against the latter's disapproval of the 
dismissal. Until recently the Courts had not drawn any distinction 
between this and the first contestable situation discussed above. In 
many cases (179) the employer, even though had referred the dispute to 
the Commissioner in advance, was held liable for unlawful dismissal 
because of his subsequent dismissal of employee in defiance of the 
Commissioner's decision. Moreover, in the majority of cases where the 
unlawfulness of dismissal was upheld, the Courts had in fact compelled 
the employer to abide by the Labour Office's decision without even 
discussing the substanti ve grounds for the dismissal or the Labour 
Office's view of it (180). 
In a recent case however both the Labour and the Province 
Courts agreed that once a dispute is referred to the Labour Office the 
latter's categorization of the dismissal must not exclude the Court from 
re-examining the alleged substantive grounds and judging the lawfulness 
or unlawfulness of the dismissal in the light of such re-examination (181). 
Both Courts are right in distinguishing this second si tua tion, which relates 
really to conclusiveness or finality of the Labour Office's decisions, from 
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the first contestable situation which asserts the indispensability of the 
preliminary jurisdiction of these offices. But in so far as both Courts 
failed to distinguish between one employer who defiantly disregards the 
Commissioner's decision and another demanding a stay of execution of 
the Commissioner's decision until he has appealed to the Civil Court, 
their reasoning is incomplete (182). 
The third contestable situa tion arlses where the employer 
dismisses an employee with approval of the Commissioner but on 
substantively insufficient grounds. Because it involves questioning 
conclusiveness of the Labour Office's decisions this situation is in this 
sense similar to the second contestable situation. However in contrast 
to the more recent judicial view expressed In Kenana's case (I82A) in 
respect of the latter si tua tion the Court of Appeal has since 1975 
established that an employer who duly obtains and relies on approval of 
the Commissioner will still be liable for unlawful dismissal if the grounds 
alleged by him and accepted by the Commissioner are In fact 
substantively insufficient (183). This rule has since then been 
consistently applied by the Court. 
3.B.7 The Remedies for Unlawful Dismissal 
From what has been said unlawful dismissal under Sudanese 
private sector law could be defined as dismissal in circumstances and for 
reasons that do not procedurally or substantively conform to those 
considered by statutes or the Courts as empowering the employer to 
dismiss (Cf. supra Parts 3.B.1-3.B.6). An unlawfully dismissed employee 
must either be reinstated or given compensation equivalent to 6 months 
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wages plus one month's pay in lieu of notice where applicable. There 
are three decisions, a Court of Appeal's and two Province Courts', to. the 
effect that it is the employee and not the employer who must make the 
choice between receipt of compensation and reinstatement (185). Inspite 
of the generality in which they are expressed the Province Court 
decisions were made in situations in which the employees were asking for 
compensation whilst the employers offered only reinstatement. The 
Court of Appeal decision supported the employee's claim for 
reinstatement. It is worth mentioning however that, although the Court 
of Appeal in an earlier case referred to the practical difficulties 
encountered in enforcing reinsta tement on small employers, it had 
already agreed that the Law "has provided reinstatement as one of the 
remedies open to the employee" (186). Although not judicially binding 
on the Courts the Attorney General "Fatwa" in the Trial of El Fatih 
Muhyeddin & Others discussed earlier (187) is also confined to 
reinstatement of employees whose dismissal although unlawful under the 
Trade Union Law is not necessarily so under the IERA 1981. 
Since it is the reasons and circumstances which justify dismissal 
that are specifically listed under the law, dismissals for reasons and in 
circumstances other than these excepted are all, equally unlawful and 
always remediable by one and the same compensation or reinstatement. 
It is an anomaly of Sudanese law that it thus adopts restrictive notions of 
lawfulness and unlawfulness and in effect equates all types of "unlawful" 
dismissals irrespective of whether such dismissals are due to e.g. racial 
or sexual discrimination or harrassment, trade union activism, malicious 
intention or honest mistake on the part of the employer or to no reason 
whatsoever. In its 1981 ·Memorandum to the then Ministerial 
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Commission for Revision of Labour Legislation (MCRLL) the SWTUF 
thought this anomaly remediable simply by repeal of the section of. the 
law which provides for payment of the 6 months compensation to 
employees unlawfully dismissed (188). This was also the approach which 
the repealed 1971 CLC followed. This provision for compensation has, 
in the condition of employment relations law in the Sudan, paradoxically 
always operated as both deterrent and incentive: as deterrent to 
employers who are unwilling to pay the compensation, and as licence for 
otherwise unlawful dismissals to employers who are motivated enough to 
dismiss and pay the compensation accordingly (189). Despite this, the 
S WTUF recommendation had it been accepted would have worsened the 
posi tion of a grea t majority of employees. The si tua tion could 
alterna tively of course be remedied by a provision, to be effected by 
legisla tion or the Courts, that the 6 months compensation shall be 
awarded, not in lieu of, but, in addition to damages under the general law 
of contract. 
Summary 
The purpose of this summary is to examme the implications of 
the discussion under the preceding Part 3.B for the objectives of the 
research outlined under Part I.C.3. Beginning with the plurality of 
factors influencing development of the law, it is noted that the present 
standards of protection of employees' tenure of office owe their 
existence to legislation, favourable judicial interpretation and elaboration 
of statutory provisions and the supervisory and judicial jurisdictions which 
the Labour Department exercises over the administration of the Law. 
The apparent pre-eminence of the contribution of the Court derives 
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largel y from the fact that this is an area of Ii tiga tion where the issues 
contested centre around the technicalities of termination of employm.ent. 
Hence, even where they have been initiated at the Labour Offices, 
disputes of this nature are often ul ti ma tely settled in Courts. 
The pre-eminence of judicial contribution reflects positively on 
the formal ideology of the law. Although compatible with the general 
protectionist orientation of private sector individual employment law, 
judicial interpretation and elaboration of the law have always been 
founded on technical legal reasoning. Even if there are latent policies 
that underpin judicial decision-making, the autonomy of the judicial 
system and the internal rationality of legal reasoning constitute an 
outward appearance that effectively ensures the apparent neutrality of 
the law. Hence neither the workers nor employers have complained 
about the way the Civil Courts interpret and apply the law. Employers 
ha ve even demanded the transfer of the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the 
Labour Offices to the Civil Courts (190). 
Also relevant to the analysis of formal ideology of the law is the 
formal effectiveness of rules. It is true to say that the rules governmg 
the security of the tenure of office are effectively enforced whenever 
grievances are brought to the attention of the authorities. This formal 
effectiveness of the law IS reinforced even further by expense-free 
litigation, as explained in Part 4, and the jurisdiction of the Labour 
Offices to prevent dismissals in the first place. 
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As to the mode of employment protection ~ the discussion also 
suggests that the law regulating the termination of employment IS 
protectionist in orientation. Focussing on its development across time it 
is generally true to say that the standard of legislative protection has 
been gradually improving since 1949. The most important changes that 
ha ve been brought about during this period were the installation of the 
Labour Department as an indispensable referee in employment disputes in 
1969 and the amendment of the law of dismissal with notice and 
extension of the jurisdiction of the Labour Department in 1973. A few 
areas of the law of dismissal are also demonstrative of qualitative and 
quantitative improvements that have been made by the 1981 IERA. The 
most important quantitative improvement is the lncrease of the 
compensation for unlawful dismissal, from an amount equalling 3 months 
wages under the EEPO, to the sum of 6 months wages under present law 
- IERA 1981 55.39(6). Other improvements made by the IERA 1981 
include, the reduction of qualification period for after-service benefits, 
the generalization of these benefits to all cases of termination of 
employment (I9 1) and the general increase in their amounts. 
As to compatibility of judicial approaches with the protectionist 
orientation of the law, it can fairly be said on the evidence shown that 
with only few specific exceptions the contribution of legislation has 
always remained co-extensive with and sometimes even lagged behind 
that of sympathetic judicial interpretation of pre-existing law in the 
post-independence era. The 1973 amendment of the law of dismissal 
with notice, which was a legislative innovation, is one such exception. 
The Courts could not do anything about this rule prior to the amendment 
because the wordings of the section - (EEPO 55.10(1» were too obvious 
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to allow of any other interpretation. A second possible explanation for 
this judicial abstention could also be that the Courts did not even have 
the chance of evaluating the practical impact of 55.10(1) because of the 
rarity of litigation under it (192). The observation by one commentator, 
quoted earlier - (supra text above L16), that the Common Law concept 
of contract was then dominant in Courts circles also offers a third 
possible explanation. This observation is made more plausible by the 
fact that judicial decisions that openly challenged the contractualist 
conception of the employment relationship appeared only in mid 1970s 
after the amendment had been introduced. But, because some Courts 
had in their interpretation of the legal effect of absenteeism and other 
instances of misconduct proved ready to sometimes transcend this 
supposed contractualist ideology I am inclined to attach more importance 
to the other two reasons aforementioned. 
There are certain areas of protection that are apparently difficult 
to reconcile with the general protectionist orientation of the law. These 
include constructive dismissal and the reduction of the workforce for 
economic or technological reasons. I have already argued that the 
nature of the right or area of employment concerned is sometimes 
relevant in explaining the stance of the law vis-a-vis such right or area. 
Hence I consider the circumstances that surrounded the innovation of 
dismissal on economic or technological grounds as partly responsible in 
this respect. However the attitude of the trade union leadership IS 
partly responsible for the present stance of the law towards this ground 
and also towards constructive dismissal. Both because of the emphasis 
on political bargaining with the government and lack of expertise the 
recommendations which the trade union leadership makes do not always 
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reflect an awareness of the plant-level day-to-day problems in need of 
solution or of the measures necessary to solve them. It is therefore. not 
surprIsIng tha t some of the most practically significant legisla ti ve 
reforms were introduced upon the recommenda tion of the Labour 
Department. As a recent example the increase of the compensation for 
unlawful dismissal was definitely made on recommendation of the Labour 
Department and contrary to the confused submission of the 5 WTUF (I93) . 
. 
\0. 
Likewise neitherA its 1974 or 1981 submissions did the 5WTUF 
suggest any substantial change of the law relating to redundancies. In 
its 1981 Report however the 5WTUF endorsed a proposal, made by the 
Ministry of Labour, that the power of approval of redundancies should be 
transferred from the labour offices to the Minister of Labour (I94). To 
the extent that such a transfer would have meant the removal of 
redundancy cases from the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the labour offices 
to discretionary preroga ti ve of the Minister, the rationale behind its 
endorsement was not immediately clear. 
The 5 WTUF was also of the VIew that where an employee 
terminates the contract of service due to the conduct of employer, in the 
manner described under the EEPO 1973 55.10(6) - (now the IERA 1981 
5.38), the case must be treated as one of dismissal with notice (195) -
(i.e. under EEPO 1973 55.10(1) or now the IERA 1981 5.34). Although it 
could have enabled employees terminating their employment under 5.10 
(6) to claim after-service benefits, the 5 WTUF argument, to the extent 
that it equates termination of employment under this section (which lists 
instances of lawful termination by the employee in reaction to employer's 
maltreatment or breach of contractual obligations) with dismissal for one 
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of the legal grounds ca talogued by the EEPO 1973 55.1 O( 1), was 
extremely unwise. Al though there IS no concept of constructive 
dismissal under Sudanese statutory law there is nothing to prevent an 
employee whose dismissal is caused by a breach of contract by the 
employer from seeking damages under the general law of contract. Had 
the 5WTUF recommendation been incorporated into the law it would have 
eliminated even this possible contractual remedy. The extension of 
after-service benefits to all types of termina tion of employ ment 
accomplished under the IERA 1981, has not by itself, as the 5WTUF 
thought it would, bridged the gap which 55.1 O( 6) and its successor 5.38 
open In the Law. However the gap is bridgeable by treatment of this 
type of termination, not as a dismissal under the IERA 5.34, but, as an 
unlawful dismissal remediable with the 6 months wages compensation 
under the IERA 1981 5.39(6). 
As to the social ideology of the law there are two aspects of the 
law that need explanation. The first, is the nu mber of workers who 
~ctually benefit from the law and the second is the social effectiveness 
of the law - (i.e. wide-scale spontaneous operation of the law). As to 
the first aspect it must again be stressed that private sector employees 
as a whole are a minority and even within this minority the provisions of 
the IERA 1981 do not apply to casual and agricultural workers (l96/;the 
former category in particular constituting an important segment of the 
urban labour force. Bearing in mind the largely agricultural economy of 
the Sudan, the number of agricultural wage-labourers, (ILO Sudan, 
1984.56,112) - their disorganization and poor conditions of service (ILO 
Sudan, 1984.54) - the exception of agricultural workers is another 
evidence of the elitism of the law. 
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In respect of the social effectiveness of the hiw the size-diversity 
of private sector employers and work forces and the economic position of 
some of the former are hardly conducive to the development of this 
ideological aspect. This makes the operation of the law totally 
dependent on the performance of enforcement agencies. This in turn 
tends to increase the burden on the 28 already overloaded - {i.e. by 
litiga tions under other, collective labour relations, manpower, wages and 
industrial safety laws} - Labour Offices in the Country. Table 11 shows 
that the number of employment termination disputes handled by the 
Labour Offices, increased considerably every time after the law has been 
amended - (in 1969, 1973 and 1981) - and, has been on the increase ever 
since. 
Finally, to the extent that the rules discussed under the previous 
parts are formally effective and protectionist in orientation, these are 
attributes which are also partly explicable by the performance and 
orientation of the bodies entrusted with the administration of the law. 
This is examined next. 
4. Administration of the Law 
The discussion in this part focusses mainly on the factors 
influencing the performance and orientation of the bodies entrusted with 
the administration of the law. Where relevant these factors will be 
compared with those influencing the performance and orientation of these 
or other bodies administering public employment law. To illustrate the 
points made the discussion will in case of Labour Offices include case 
studies. There is no need for a similar inclusion in case of the Civil 
Year 
1965-1966 
1977-1978 
1978-1979 
1979-1980 
1980-1981 
1981-1982 
, i 
TABLE 11 
Number of Dismissal Disputes Handled by the 
Labour Offices Prior To and After 1969 
Total of No of Disputes 
Disputes Under Over Termination 
the EEPO & IERA of Employment 
18128 89 
16125 10214 
18171 11415 
21002 17624 
28291 25333 
36153 29507 
% 
,49 (1) 
63.3 
63.4 
83.9 
89.5 
81.6 
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Department of Labour 
Reports 1965-1966, 1977-1982, and the monthly reporting of 
individual complaints filed by the Khartoum North, 
the Khartoum, and Omdurman Labour Offices. 
(1) The Labour Offices did not have a formal jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on dismissal disputes prior to 1969. The figure 
suggests that the Labour Department handled few number of 
disputes in a consultative capacity prior to 1969. Cf Taha & El 
Jack, 1973.17. 
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Courts SInce sufficient Courts' decisions have already been examined. 
Although some trade unions do participate in administration of the law, 
they are not included in the discussion. There are two reasons for this. 
The first is that the effect of trade union participation has remained 
confined to individual firms and trade unions, and (with the exception of 
the situations, already shown under the previous parts, in which some 
individual trade unions exert some influence on individual employers in 
ma tters of overtime, wage-determina tion and redundancies) left no 
material imprint on the law in general or on its administration. The 
second reason is that collective labour relations law as the direct factor 
responsible for this confinement has already been examined in Chapter 
III. 
4.A. The Labour Offices 
Prior to 1969 the role of the Department of Labour and its 
offices was formally confined to inspection of factories and workshops 
and the monitoring of employment and manpower planning under the 
industrial safety and employment exchanges laws respectively. The 1969 
Amendment of the EEPO placed the Commissioner of Labour as an 
"indispensable referee" (I97) in certain cases of dismissal. Subsequent 
changes in individual employment law have generalized this jurisdiction of 
the Commissioner to almost all dismissals and grievances under the law. 
Although the trade unions' discontent with the pre-1969 dismissals 
law was evident they had never however envisaged as part of their 
proposals for reform a role that the Department of Labour or any other 
government body was to play in administration of the law (Hassan. 
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1979.203). .. i In their own words the promulgators of the 1969 Amendment 
justified the new role assigned to the Department of Labour arguing; "the 
proof • • • and application of the grounds that justify dismissal under the 
Amendment •• • need for their verification a formal investigation that 
has to be • •• carried ••• by somebody with especial knowledge •.• 
external to the dispute • •• and easily accessible" (I98). This model of 
administration of individual employment legislation and grievances IS 
possibly not peculiar to the Sudan (De Givry, 1968.364-375). According 
to one view its introduction in the Sudan may have even been influenced 
by ILO recommendations (199) (Hassan, 1979.205). Hassan does not 
provide any grounds for this belief. However the point is difficult to 
concede in the light of the fact that Sudan has not signed this or the 
1983 ILO conventions (200). Nevertheless the educational influence 
which ILO-provided training programmes (201) may have had on labour 
relations law cannot be ruled out. Assuming that these programmes did 
influence the law, this does not challenge my argument tha t the 
development of the law is influenced by superstructural or external 
factors (Cf. supra Part 1.C.l of this Chapter, and the Conclusion in 
Chapter III). 
The Department of Labour and its offices intervene In one 
capacity to protect employees against imminent dismissal and in another 
to redress grievances. In all cases of disciplinary dismissal, redundancies 
and dismissal without notice the Labour Department and its offices act 
as central governmental authorities whose prior approval is essential for 
legality of dismissals. In all other cases employers are not prohibited 
from taking immediate measures against employees, although the 
employee then has a right of appeal to the Labour Department and its 
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offices. , I In cases where the employer applies for approval of dismissal, 
or unlawfully immediately dismisses an employee, or the latter complains 
to the Department against measures - (whether dismissal or otherwise) _ 
taken by the employer, the Department of Labour and its offices 
investiga te and make binding decisions regarding the application or 
complaint. 
The Department of Labour is a government body. The Labour 
Commissioner (i.e. Head of the Department) and the Labour Officers to 
whom he delegates his powers are ordinary public servants. There are 
28 Labour Offices in Regional Capitals and districts all over the country 
from which Labour Officers operate. Decisions made by the district or 
any other Labour Offices are deemed decisions of the Commissioner of 
Labour and, therefore, appealable directly to the Civil Courts (202). 
The function the Department of Labour and its offices perform in 
relation to private sector employees corresponds to that performed by 
~Heads of Department" and "Disciplinary Boards" In case of the public 
sector. However more to the advantage of private sector employees is 
that the Department of Labour and its offices are not directly a party to 
disputes. Most important however IS that the intervention of the 
Department of Labour and its offices has as its objective (203) and does 
in practice operate to further protection of the interest of the employees 
(204). This is an objective hardly identifiable with the intervention or 
demonstra ted by the practice of the public sector bodies. 
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Intervention of the Labour Commissioner arid officers does not 
oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. This has enabled the evolution 
of an integrated - (administrative-judicial) system of administration of 
the law. For employees this is a doubly advantageous arrangement. On 
the one hand it provides employees with the costless simple and fast 
service of the Labour Offices. Supervision by the Courts on the other 
hand safeguards against the shortcomings that are usually associated with 
the performance of administra ti ve bodies carrying out judicial functions. 
Although each one of these advantages appears as achievable only at the 
expense of the other, this is not necessarily always the case. 
Complainants with crystal clear claims are under this arrangement 
protected from unnecessarily encountering delays that are inherent in the 
Sudanese legal process (205), while other complainants are allowed to 
appeal and addi tionally advised on the ir prospects of success. 
It often takes the Labour Offices 15 days or less to dispose of 
any complaint under the law. This compares favourably with a lengthy 
judicial process that sometimes takes years to dispose of a similar 
complaint (206). However because the employee is always free to 
choose between complaining to the Labour Office or initiating a civil suit 
judicial delay does not mean that the integrated administrative-judicial 
system is disadvantageous to the employees. Anyway judicial delay is 
not a result of this integration but inherent in the Sudanese judicial 
system as a whole. 
As to simplicity of procedure, an employee need only make a 
verbal complaint to the competent Labour Office. The task of verifying 
the section of the law governing the complaint and the remedies 
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awardable in the circumstances IS entirely borne by' the Labour Office. 
In contrast to this, judicial procedure including that of the "Labour 
Courts" (206A) restricts the Court to adjudicating the issues already 
framed and awarding the remedies claimed by the complainant. it is not 
therefore unusual for the Labour Court to acknowledge entitlement of 
the employee to rights but refuse to award them because they have not 
been claimed (207). Although the Civil Courts also accept labour suits 
free of charge (208) it is these, speed and simplicity of procedure, 
factors which inter alia encourage complainants to first seek intervention 
of the Labour Offices. Nevertheless, intervention of the Civil Courts is 
not totally without advantages. 
In my discussion of public employment law and its administration 
I occasionally referred to shortcomings that are associated with the 
performance of administrative tribunals (209). Common to all types of 
labour tribunals in the Sudan these problems can now be summarized as 
arising from the following: (a) vulnerability to external influence; (b) 
incomplete knowledge of substantive law; (c) non-judicial techniques of 
weighing and standardiza tion of proof; (d) inconsistency; and (e) 
insufficient powers of enforcement. Many of these problems are 
peculiar to the industrial tribunal system of the Sudan although few of 
them have been noted to exist worldwide (210). Al though the Labour 
Offices are relatively immune (211) from governmental influence their 
performance is affected by all the other problems (212). It is here that 
the easy and free access to the Civil Courts works to offset these 
shortcomings and distinguish the private sector law and its administration 
from the public sector law. Many of these shortcomings are remediable 
upon appeal to the Civil Courts at the intiative of the employer the 
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employee or the Labour Office itself (213). Table 12 shows that the 
majority of Labour Offices' decisions disobeyed are usually referred to 
the Civil Courts for execution. Moreover, the cases that are not 
referred to the Civil Courts are usually those of employees who abandon 
further pursuit of their rights. 
Furthermore, the work which the Labour Offices do is of special 
practical importance for organiza tionally weak employees in small 
employing units. Although small these units employ among themselves a 
high percentage of the workforce in the private sector (214). Out of the 
32 unlawful dismissal cases that the Khartoum North Labour Office 
handled between September-November 1981, 12 came from units 
employing less than 10 persons, 14 from units employing less than 50 and 
only 6 from units with more than 50 employees. 
The intervention of the Labour Offices does not preclude trade 
Unions and employers from operating private schemes (215) for handling 
dismissals provided such schemes are more favourable to employees - (i.e. 
than statutory schemes) and that both the schemes and the dismissals 
processed through them are always antecedently approved by the 
Commissioner of Labour. An employer who agrees with the trade union 
to observe negotiated rules of dismissals that are in fact more stringent 
on the employer than the statutory rules will be held liable for unlawful 
dismissal if he dismisses in contravention of the negotiated ; though not 
the statutory. rules (216). 
TABLE 12 
Reinstatement and Compensation Orders Issued by KNLO 
in the Period September-November 1981 
{Appendix to fs 206, 212-213 and the text above} 
Total of Number of Number of Number of Average 
Orders Orders Those Disobeyed No. of Days 
Made Obeyed Disobeyed Orders taken for 
Referred the KNLO 
to Courts to reach a 
decision 
32 16 16 10 9 
Source: KNLO Monthly Reported Disputes; 
Orders KNLO*7*1981-{non et seq) 
KNLO*480* 1981 
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In conclusion however tha t the 
performance of the Labour Offices has in the last 15 years been directly 
affected by the legal position of collective labour relations. The 
restrictiveness of collective labour rela tions law and the resultant 
obstruction of effective voluntary procedures have worked to inundate 
these offices with a huge annual case-load. Many of the defects pointed 
out in the preceding discussion may be due to the limited financial and 
personnel capacities with which these offices strive to cope with the 
overload. 
4.B The Civil Courts 
The Civil judicial hierarchy - (i.e. as opposed to the Sharia 
Judicial Hierarchy) - consists of District Courts (with preliminary 
jurisdiction), Province Courts (with appellate and preliminary 
jurisdictions), Courts of Appeals and a Supreme Court. It is the District 
Courts which deal with Labour actions at first instance. Decisions made 
by these District Courts are appealable to the higher Courts. There are 
certain District Courts that are designated as Labour Courts - (e.g. the 
Khartoum North Labour Court). This designation means that such 
Courts may as a matter of convenience deal only with individual 
employment claims. Cases that are referred to the Labour Court for 
enforcement of a Labour Office decision are usually dealt with as 
execution petitions. Litigants may take their claims directly to the 
Labour or any other district Courts. Actions directly taken to the Civil 
Courts are triable as ordinary civil suits. 
TABLE 13 
Appendix to Footnotes 205-206 
Dismissal cases pending appeal or execution in the 
Khartoum North Labour Court (1) 
with the time they have taken to reach their 
respecti ve stages 
Civil Date of Date of No. of Date of 
Suit No. Institution Labour Appeals Final 
of Claim Court's the case Decision 
Decision 'Went 
through 
DC-CS-263-1981 9.7.1980 30.11.1981 3 16.1.1984 
DC-CS-5-1982 7.2.1982 20.11.1982 1 30.12.1983 
Not passed 
DC-CS-335-1982 7.9.1982 until - -
1.3.1984 
DC-CS-234-1981 21.11.1981 N.A. 2 5.1.1984 
DC-CS-234-1980 26.1.1983 29.10.1983 - 29.10.1983 
DC-CS-72-1983 11.1.1982 13.2.1983 - 13.2.1983 
DC-CS-68-1981 17.3.1981 13.1.1982 1 18.1.1982 
DC-CS-154-1981 1.4.1981 N.A. 1 29.1.1983 
DC-CS-252-1981 5.12.1981 N.A. 1 9.3.1982 
DC-CS-19-1980 12.11.1979 N.A. 1 21.3.1981 
DC-CS-53-1981 Feb.1981 N.A. 2 6.5.1982 
DC-CS-315-1982 22.8.1982 10.11.1982 2 18.12.1983 
DC-CS-329-1982 1.9.1982 5.6.1983 - 5.6.1983 
DC-CS-236-1981 23.11.1981 N.A. 3 28.9.1983 
Not passed 
DC-CS-402-1982 20.9.1982 until - -
20.2.1984 
Last though 
DC-CS-488-1976 8.8.1976 25.7.1979 4 not final 
decision 
28.12.1983 
(1) The cases shown are all the cases the Court were to deal with 
within the week ending 24.2.1983. 
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There are two factors which influence orient~tion and optimality 
of Courts intervention with administration of the law. The first is the 
social and economic conditions of the Sudan. The second is, the 
intrinsic properties of the area of individual employment relations, and 
the provisions of individual employment legislation conditioning 
intervention of the Courts. 
Beginning with the first factor, it is generally true to say that 
tribunals are by their nature special types of courts. There are 
sometimes reasons which cause a government to except a certain area of 
social relations from the general jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and set 
tribunals for its regulation. The stance of the Civil Courts vis-a-vis the 
area excepted and the wish of the government to accord more or less 
protection for the classes of people affected IS one of many other 
possible reasons which may prompt the setting up of and determine the 
powers to be given to such tribunals. The stance of the Civil Courts 
towards regulation of the employment relationship is determined inter 
alia by the position of the judiciary in the social and economic 
establishment and the social background of the judges. "The story has 
been sufficiently told for it to be established that this relationship can be 
understood only in the framework of a class analysis" (Clark and 
Wedderburn, 1983.166) (217). 
In Britain for instance "the tendency of the judges to read 
statutes in the light of the Common Law and their inability to break 
away from Common Law concepts" have been identified as reasons for an 
observed "marked upturn in the use of tribunals in the administration of 
new jurisdictions in ... the Labour Law area" (218) during the 1960s and 
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early 1970s. From a doctrinal analysis perspectiv-e some writers are 
ready to blame this inability and tendency and the resultant traditional 
stance of the Courts towards the employment rela tionship on the 
techniques of judicial decision-making alone (219). Techniques are 
however mere instrumental forms for articulation of the points of view 
which the judges take on substantive issues. It is not the techniques but 
the points of view on substantive issues - (in its turn determined In the 
manner explained at the end of the above paragraph) - which build up the 
general orientation of Court~ intervention in a specific area of social 
rela tions (220). Tracing these points of view to their social and 
economic orIgms and rediscovering them within the language of judicial 
discourse can only be effected with the assistance of sociological analysis 
of law and its administration (221). 
Civil Courts in Sudan follow judicial techniques of decision-making 
that are almost the same as those of their British progenitors. These 
same techniques have since Independence however been used to reach 
aecisions that are not detrimental to employees (222). This is explicable 
by the position of the judiciary and the social background of the judges. 
Judging by either factor the Civil judicial hierarchy in Sudan is not the 
establish ment of any particular class. The building of this hierarchy 
started only from 1900 under the auspices of colonial rule and with 
material and human resources that had had no link whatsoever with the 
pre-1900 era or any ruling class from that era. Until 1956 the 
jurisdiction and size of the judiciary (223) had been dwarfed by colonial 
omnipresent military and political administration. From 1956 onward 
the development of the civil judicial hierarchy has remained co-extensive 
with development of other segments of the State apparatus. The judges 
TABLE 14 
Appendix to f.223 
Number of Civil Cases and Judges until 1950 
Year Average Number Number of 
of Ci vll Cases Qualified Judges 
1900-1905 4,182 3 
1906-1910 7,175 5 
1911-1915 15,919 5 
1916-1920 14,305 6 
1921-1925 16,822 6 
1926-1930 12,019 8 
1931-1935 6,667 12 
1936-1940 7,089 12 
1941-1945 5,124 11 
1946-1950 7,178 10 
Sources: Zaki Mustafa (I971) .231 
428 
and lawyers who have joined the legal profession SInce then are drawn 
from different social backgrounds - (courtesy of free and regionally 
equally distr ibuted educa tional opportunities that ha ve also been 
expanding since 1956). The judiciary is, in conclusion, a hierarchy 
parallel to the administrative, military and political hierarchies that 
constitute the structure of the centralized State. Unlike other 
hierarchies the relation among the various strata of the judiciary and 
between these strata and other hierarchies of the State are supposedly 
regula ted in such a manner as to make the judiciary subject only to the 
rule of law. 
In practice however the judiciary is not Immune from the purges 
that after every political change, affect all segments of the State 
apparatus. Even in times of stability the Supreme Court and the Courts 
of Appeals are in particular not always free from political intrusion. In 
the economic and political conditions of the Sudan described under 
Chapter II there has so far been no room for such a thing as total 
judicial independence. The Courts cannot effectively interfere with 
matters - (no matter how wide and controversial these matters are) -
which the political regime does not want them to interfere with. The 
Courts may either acknowledge this practical limita tion of their 
intervention and follow the pragmatist approach of seeking to legitimate 
the very restrictions imposing it (224) or, otherwise make decisions that 
may only be contemptuously ignored by the political regime (225). This 
takes me to discuss how the individual employment relation IS In 
particular itself relevant in determining orientation of the Cours· 
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It could be argued on the basis of what has been said, that the 
independence of the Courts is only violable by intervention of _ the 
political regime. I have mentioned elsewhere (226) that the intervention 
of the political regime with the autonomy of other social institutions is 
guided by certain politically relevant factors. Because the private 
individual employment relationship is relatively - (i.e. in relation to 
collective and public employment relationships) - politically insignificant 
Sta te commandeering intervention with administra tion of the law 
regulating it is minimal. This is true in cases of both institutionalized _ 
(i.e. legislation ousting jurisdiction of the Courts) - and non-institutionalized 
- (i.e. contingent obstruction of the course of justice) interventions. 
Relevant also in explaining orientation of judicial intervention are the 
considera tions pointed out earlier as responsible for shaping political and 
legal attitudes towards the individual employment relationship (227). 
The unequivocal prOVISIons of the individual employment relations 
law regarding reference of disputes to and obtaining of prior approval of 
the Commissioner sometimes prevented some Courts from deciding other 
than in favour of the employee even when such decision was harsh on the 
employer (228). Coupled with the circumstances that accompanied 
introduction of the 1969 Amendment in general, this unequivocality has 
led the Courts to interpret as the objectives of individual employment 
legisla tion in general, and of these provisions in particular, the protection 
of the employee (229) or of the interests of both the employer and the 
employee (230). All these interpretations contrast with that applied by 
the Courts in case of public employment law. The Courts see and 
accept as justifications for existence and exclusiveness of jurisdiction of 
public sector tribunals (e.g. PSAB) the need for the protection of the 
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integrity and interest of the public service (231). 
Conclusion 
It is generally true to say that pr i va te individual employment law 
IS formally ideologically developed, protectionist in orientation, socially 
ideologically under-developed and influenced in these and other respects 
by a plurality of factors. This condition of the law is an indirect result 
of the stance of the State towards this area of Labour relations and 
vis-a-vis the factors influencing its regulation. 
Each one of the relevant factors - (i.e. judicial administration, 
administrative enforcement, trade union-government political relation and 
standard setting by employers) - affects the law either at the level of 
rule-making or the level of interpretation and administration of rules or 
at both. Each one of these factors is in turn conditioned by certain 
social and economic circumstances that make its operation at the 
respective level or levels conducive to development of the formal 
ideology and under -development of the social ideology of the law. 
In contrast with private sector employment law, and due to the 
stance of the State towards its enactment and administration, public 
employment law is formally ideologically under-developed. The weight 
of text and materials presented in this and the preceding Chapter are in 
each case themselves reflective of the practical formal ideological 
condition of the field of study. In contrast to the unreported and 
inaccessible (232) administration of public individual employment law the 
administration of private sector law is widely reported accessible 
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comprehensive on all aspects of the law and legally rational In its 
approach. 
As to the under-development of the social ideology of the law it 
IS endemic to both the public and private divisions of employment law, 
although the symptoms of this under-development are in both divisions 
different. Because of its generality to the analysis in the preVIOUS 
chapters examination of the social ideology of the Law will be dealt with 
in the Conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The general hypothesis of the thesis has been that the form of 
law is determined by the dominant form of relations of production but 
that the substance and ideology of the law are in turn conditioned by 
social and economic development within this form of production. The 
first parts of Chapter I have argued for a methodological approach which 
if applied to the study of empirical labour relations law may provide the 
prima facie explanation for holding such a hypothesis in the first place. 
The third part of Chapter I has elaborated the arguments of the 
hypothesis explaining in particular the mechanism of determination of the 
form of law and the instrumentalization of the State (i.e. through 
economIC and political class struggles of the social forces of production) 
in the transmission of the effect of social and economic change on the 
law. 
Chapter II has been a particular statement and elaboration of this 
general hypothesis in relation to the Sudan. As a prelude to knowing 
the dominant form of law the Chapter has endeavoured to explain what 
specific form of economic relations is dominant in the Sudan. The 
argument of the Chapter has been that economIC relations in the Sudan 
are vastly "non-capitalist". But that this does not mean the dominant 
form of the State and Law are also non-capitalist. To explain this 
paradox I have argued that the centralized State and Law in the Sudan, 
far from being autochthonous structures, are Capitalist forms that were 
imposed from outside the social formation. From this I have drawn the 
conclusion that because, as a united whole, it is governed by this State 
and Law the Sudanese social formation is one in which " Capitalist 
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economic relations" are politically dominant. 
Whereas the political dominance of Capitalist economic relations 
is by itself sufficient for determining the form of law; it is not however 
equally sufficient for determining the substance and ideology of the law. 
Development of the latter is conditioned by expansion of the economic 
and social foundation of Capitalist relations of production. The Chapter 
has argued that this foundation is under-developed in the Sudan. This 
under-development is manifest in the quan ti ta ti ve subordina tion of 
relations that can be categorized as socially and economically Capitalist. 
The argument has been that Capitalist economic relations and the 
Capi talist pa th of develop ment are, notw i ths tandingly, poli tically 
dominant only because of the lead given to them by the State. The 
centralized State is by itself the biggest single employer of the majority 
of wage-labourers. The Chapter has also pointed out to many factors 
which make State-sponsored economic planning likewise biased towards 
the Capitalist path of development. 
The under-development of the substance and ideology of labour 
rela tions law is a reflection of the wider under-development of the social 
and economic foundation of Capitalist rei a tions of production in the 
Sudan. Sudanese labour law is in effect merely statutory regulation 
designed to achieve certain policy -ob j ecti ves for mula ted and gi ven 
pre-eminence by the State. Although systematic operation of various 
areas of industrial relations is itself part of these objectives, it is an 
operation which, is always perceived from the standpoint of the State, 
and, as an objective is always secondary among other considerations 
which influence a particular mode of regula tion of industrial rela tions. 
Most important among these other considerations are: (a) exigencies of 
descendent political control by the State; (b) the role of the State as a 
lever of Capitalist reproduction; and (c) the position of the State as 
employer of the majority of wage-earners. 
Having outlined the factors which condition under-development of 
the substance and ideology of labour relations law the thesis has then 
examined the extent to which laws regulating the different areas of 
labour relations in the Sudan are reflective of this under-development. 
My argument has been that laws regulating all areas of labour relations 
in the Sudan are devoid of a socially and economically structuralized 
ideology. However with regard to the formal ideology of the law the 
argument has been that, depending on the type and extent of State 
intervention in these different areas, the laws regulating collective, 
public individual and private individual labour relations reflect varying 
degrees of formal ideology. The extent and type of State intervention 
are themselves determined by the respective significance of each one of 
these areas of labour relations for the considerations claimed above as 
influencing that intervention. 
To explain the formal ideology of the law the discussion has 
centred on the substantive content of rules and the processes of 
law-making and legal administration. The focus of the discussion has 
been on examining whether and to what extent these content and 
processes enhance or undermine the "formal impartiality" and "formal 
enforceabili ty" of the law. 
With regard to collective labour relations law the findings have 
been that: (a) neither at the level of enactment of the basic right_s of 
association nor at the level of improvement of wages and conditions of 
service do the majority of trade unions participate in the determination 
or administration of the law; (b) the authority to make and the authority 
to administer the law are sometimes consolidated into one and the same 
hands; (c) the law is generally "commandeeringly interventionist"; (d) the 
limited protection which this law in few places provides for trade Unions 
and their members is superficial and non-enforceable; and (e) the law is 
hardly distinguishable from the economic and political thrust exerted on 
it by the State. To the extent that collective labour relations are the 
most extensively-regulated this is explicable as an apparent apprehension 
of the potential threat which the uncontrolled power of organized labour 
might pose for political stability of a State that has so far failed to 
provide the working class with a permanent interest in the economic and 
political establishment. 
Public sector employment law is distinguishable from the above 
law in that it in certain places provides detailed statements of 
employees' rights as against their employer - i.e. the State. Hence in 
so far as "employment rights" are concerned this law is in this sense 
protectionist. However upon exa mina tion of, the substanti ve rules 
governing employees' tenure of office, and, the determina tion and 
administration of the law the conclusion has been that public employment 
law is equally "commandeeringly interventionist". Sta tutory powers of 
dismissal on "public interest" and "service interest" grounds, and the 
discretionary powers of dismissal exerciseable by "Ministers" and "Heads 
of Departments", undermine the contractual basis of the employment 
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relationship. For its part statutory law does not provide any alternative 
demarca tion between lawful and unlawful dismissals. Even when 
dismissal takes place as a result of misapplication of statutory law, the 
agencIes responsible for administration of the law cannot effectively 
rectify the position. These agencies include tribunals consisting as a 
matter of fact of the "Ministers" and "Heads of Departments" themselves 
or of "Disciplinary Boards" constituted by them, and of a central tribunal 
(PSAB) which is likewise a stratum in the State bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Furthermore "Heads of Departments", Ministers" and the President of the 
Republic not only administer but also make the law. The jurisdiction of 
the Civil Courts is ousted both by express statutory provision and by 
self-imposed restrictions on the Courts. 
This unilateral and rather arbitrary determination and 
administration of public employment law and the convergence of judicial 
and leg isla ti ve powers they involve affect both the for mal effectiveness 
and i mpartiali ty of the law. The practical condition of existence of 
public employment law affects also the academic discipline dealing with 
this law as its subject of study. Decisions of the bodies administering 
this law are unreported and hardly accessible on record. Even when 
some of these decisions were made available and examined the result has 
been that they are totally devoid of any juridical conception of the 
employment relationship. Hence, as apparent from the discussion in 
Chapter IV, even when employment disputes have reached the Civil 
Courts, the focus of adjudication has been on issues relevant largely for 
purposes of the Administrative and Civil Procedures Laws. 
437 
.. i 
The mode of determination and adminrstration of public 
employment law in vogue in the Sudan consolidates the control of the 
political leadership over the internal functioning of the State bureaucracy 
and is also crucial for the success of central determination of wages and 
conditions of employment. 
The position of private sector labour relations exempt them from 
control on some of the grounds relevant with regard to other areas. It 
also generally affects the scope and orientation of State intervention In 
this area. Moreover, although the control of this area may also equally 
contribute to primitive accumulation of Capital, the possible political 
friction the imposition of such control might cause in the particular case 
of the pr i va te sector is grea ter a coun tervailing considera tion. 
The non-applicability of State "commandeering intervention" to 
indi vidual labour relations in the pri va te sector has paved the way for 
the intervention of other secondary factors in its regulation. As a 
"result of this plurality of its sources and the autonomy of the bodies 
vested with its administration, private sector employment law is 
apparently impartial, rational and formally enforceable. 
The analysis of the "social ideology" of the law has been given a 
wider scope throughout the discussion of private employment law in 
Chapter V. To explain the reason for this I need first to recall my 
earlier arguments regarding the empirical foundation of legal studies and 
the plurality of levels of explanation. What distinguishes private sector 
employment law is the practical and social existence which the 
participation of the many contributing factors give to it. The practical 
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condition of existence of this law introduces also simultaneously a new 
level of empirical data that is worth investigation. The exa mina tion of 
this empirical data and that of its implication for the law are important. 
To rest content with the apparent plurality of the law and with the 
conclusions regarding its formal impartiality and enforceability may give 
the impression that private sector employment law in the Sudan is not 
any different from individual employment law in developed Capitalist 
societies. To show that this is a false impression I have gone beyond 
the formal facade and pointed to a discrepancy between what the law 
endea vours to achieve and what is practically achievable in the economic 
and social conditions of the private sector in the Sudan. 
The above discrepancy is caused by the superstructuralness and 
specific operation of the factors influencing the development of private 
sector employment law. This superstructural ness applies also of course 
to the centralized State and reflects more adversely on public sector and 
collecti ve labour rela tions laws. Because the centralized State 
'monopolizes, to the exclusion of other superstructures and factors the 
determination and administration of the latter laws these laws are In 
consequence deprived even of a "formal ideology". The case of the 
private sector shows that although plurality of the factors influencing 
development of the law might enhance its formal ideology it cannot 
however by itself make the law socially effective. Tha t to be sociall y 
effecti ve the law has to be representa ti ve of the "balances of powers" of 
the parties to, or bearers of, the individual relations it endeavours to 
regulate. The law cannot be so representative in the Sudan because of 
the political pressures exerted on the law from above. The thesis has 
argued that the phenomenon of descendent "political" control is itself 
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produced and in this sense explicable by the underdevelopment of the 
economic and social foundation of Capitalism in the Sudanese social 
forma tion as a whole. 
The state of the law in the Sudan discussed in the last three 
Chapters adds to the weight of empirical evidence that the substance and 
ideology of the law are determined by the stage of social and economic 
development. The fact that private sector employment law possesses 
some ingredients of formal ideology does not affect the validity of such 
evidence. I ha ve in this respect already pointed out that the ideology of 
law consists of a sum total of levels of ideologies of law. Formal 
ideology is only one and the most superficial of these levels. Hence 
even if private sector employment law is formally ideologically developed 
this formal ideology is supported neither by social nor by socio-historical 
levels of ideologies. The formal ideology of private sector employment 
law is even more superficial because, far from being a reflection of 
underlying material relations of production indigenous to the Sudan, it is 
'a creature of superstructures that are themselves not indigenous to that 
country. 
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( 1) Cf. also Korsch, 1970.44. 
( 2) Thus Korsch demands "the application of the materialist 
conception of history to the materialist conception of history itself 
(Korsch, 1970.92, 118). 
( 3) Lenin Philosophical Notebooks.319 vol.38 Collected Works quoted 
in Lukacs, 1978.22-23. 
( 4) For the need to distinguish between scientific concepts and 
philosophical categories within Marxian theory Cf Althusser 1977.50-52. 
( 5) I do not claim that this is the only valid distinction between 
science and philosophy. It is however adequate enough to illustrate my 
point that there are two levels of theorization within Marxian theory. 
The extent to which the highest of the two levels can be claimed to be 
philosophical is shown in the course of the discussion. For the possible 
distinctions between science am philosophy Cf. (Korsch, 1970.45-67)(Bottomore, 
1985.371), (Bhaskar, 1979.5-10)(Althusser.1977 30-68). 
( 6) Marxist philosophical materialism expounded by Engels (Dialectics 
of Nature Moscow 1954), Plekhanov and Lenin Cf (Jordan 1967). 
( 7) Plekhanov, FPM.111, Lenin PHN 82, CW38.p233, CW.14.15, 
CW15.p.406, CW.16.348 and Jordan 1967.184,210. 
( 8) Engels expounded the Dialectics of Nature and his own 
classification of the so-called Laws of the Dialectics. Plekhanov revised 
and rearranged the laws of the dialectics and placed more emphasis on 
their applica ti on within the socio-e conom ic historical environ men t. 
Lenin followed Plekhanov, but, also propounded episte mological 
materialism. Stalin placed more emphasis on voluntarist interpretation 
and utilization of dialectical materialism in development of so-called 
doctrine of scientific socialism. Cf Jordan, 1967.151-294. 
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( 9) Destratification of science is a substantive' or methodological 
conception of science that (isolates a necessary connection or relation 
from others essential to its existence or efficacy within the domain of 
reality) Cf Bottomore 1985, 404-408, 254-262. 
(10) Quoted in Bottomore, 1985-256. Cf also Jordan, 1967.313-315 
and Marx in Kolnische Zeitung No.179 1842.30 "Philosophy does not stand 
outside the world, just as the brain does not stand outside man merely 
because it is not in his stomach!". 
(11) Marx Capital I 1983.29; "To Hegel the life process of the human 
brain . .• is the demiurgos of the real world and the real world is only 
the external phenomenal form of the idea. With me, on the contrary, 
the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human 
mind . .• " Cf also Lenin, PHN.104 CW38 Moscow 1960. 
(12) Cf infra f.64 and the text above. 
(12a) Cf infra fs.19, 41. 
(13) Cf infra Part 2.B.1.d. 
(14) Hegel describes the process of knowledge within the mind as one 
Of contradictions involving a thesis (condition of equilibrium) antithesis 
(disturbance of equilibrium) and synthesis (re-establishment of equilibrium 
on a new basis). Hegel argues - Werke 2nd edit vol 3 p.434 Quoted in N 
Bukharin, 1969.79-80; "It is said that there are no sudden changes in 
nature ••• yet we have seen cases in which the alteration of existence 
involves not only a transition from one proportion to another but also a 
transition by a sudden leap into . .. a qualitatively different thing. 
(14a) Hook, 1971 presents the same argument as follows; "Within (the 
" . . . 
social) whole, the moments of opposition are the objective conditions 
(thesis) which are independent of immediate consciousness (but not of 
history) and the human needs and desires (antithesis) which project 
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possibilities on the basis of those conditions. A t a: certain point, as a 
result of objective conditions on the will and thought of a definite class 
action (synthesis) results. An attemnpt is made to actualize the 
objective possibilities generated by the interaction of the social 
environment and the human needs. By means of class action the 
'moments of opposition' are transformed into 'phases of development'" •. 
. "There can be no consciousness without mechanism and no social 
mechanism without consciousness •.. p. 71". 
(15) Thus, Marxian theory, becomes a particular statement of 
Feuerbachian Genetic Materialism and asserts the ontological priority of 
nature over spirit, matter over mind, body over consciousness, brain over 
thought and the development of the productive forces over the 
development of human society Lenin CW2 1960.21, MEC 1960.46,55,90,323,326; 
Plekhanov FPM 7,21; Jordan 1967.188. 
(16) Cf Althusser, 1977.76 - (My endorsement of Althusser's views is 
subject to the reservations expressed in various places throughout the 
Chapter); (Hyppolite, 1969.95-96,126,127). 
(,17) Cf Capital Vol III Chaps.13-15, Capital I (1967).151-152 and the 
Grundrisse 1973 146-147,151,270. 
(18) Especially f.3 and text p.7 and f.1 and text p.9. 
(19) Thus Plekhanov argues; "the self-development of the forms of 
production is only a metaphorical way of speaking about men acting in a 
certain manner" DMVH 732-733. Also quoted in (Jordan 1967.310). 
(20) Cf Cohen 1978.86-87, 216-289 as example of erroneous approaches 
that posit the pre-eXistence of distinctively separate "economic 
structure" and superstructures, and, as if unaware that this very position 
undermines the tenet of "Marxian philosophy", nevertheless pretend to 
offer an explanation of the relation between the two supposedly on the 
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basis of that philosophy. 
IV 
TO CHAPTER 1 
:1 
(21) J Hirsch, the State apparatus and social reproduction, in J 
Holloway and Sol Picciotto Ibid p.S 7, identifies the tendency for the rate 
of profit to fall as crucial in analysis of the State. Hirsch is right and 
to this category could be added many other crisis situations at the stage 
of distribution. But these are only effects, of causes (e.g. concentration 
and centralization of capital and extent of socialization of social labour 
produced by it, and, productivity of labour) that take place at the 
production stage. These effects materialize as a result of the influence 
which the "causes" exert on the State via economic and political class 
struggle. A theory of the State based on an empirically observed 
correspondence between the situation of capital valorization and the 
"State" activity disregards the importance of the analytical interrelation 
of class struggle and the State not only as a key to grasping the State 
but also as a guidance for the right emplacement of these empirical 
obse rva tions. Hirsch analyses are analyses of phenomenal forms of 
social relation (e.g. value profit commodity tendential development of 
"'value) which substitute, as a subject of their study, the contradiction 
between these forms for the contradiction between the social actors. 
They are also analyses of form because they draw limitation frameworkS 
for capitalist development formulated not with reference to history or 
experience (i.e. substance) but by analytical derivation from the general 
laws of capitalist production and the combination of its elements. This 
latter is the sense in which they are unable to relate to the substance of 
the historical process. Cf also Colletti 1972 who although starting from 
different perspective utilizes the opposition of "value" and "use value" to 
reach the conclusion that Marx's analysis of contradictions are specific 
to Capitalism. 
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(22) Quoted in (Jordan, 1967.302). ,1 
(23) Marx MEGA 1/6 p.538; Manifesto of the Communist Party SWi 
32-61 Quoted in Jordan (1967) 313. 
(23a) Cf infra the text above fs.25-26. 
(24) Marx, Capital I (1983) 713-715. 
(25) The process of production is complete as soon as the means of 
production have been converted into commodities whose value exceeds 
that of their component parts. Reproduction is the incessant renewal of 
this same process Marx; Capital I 1983 pp.529-32. 
(26) Marx Capital I 1983 pp.448,451,282. In another place discussing 
co-operative factories of the labourers Marx wrote "they show how a new 
mode of production naturally grows out of an old one, when the 
development of the material forces of production and of the 
corresponding forms of social production have reached a particular stage. 
Without the factory system arising out of the capitalist mode of 
production there could have been no co-operative factories Marx Capital 
III 1962 p.431. 
f26a) As exa mples of changes in the mode of labour control within 
Capitalism Cf infra Parts 3.A and 3.B.3. 
(26b) Cf infra Part 2.B.1.a. 
(27) Marx, Grundrisse, 1973.748 ff· 
(27a) This expression is used in several other places in the Chapter. I 
use it to stress that empirical data cannot directly explain or 
substantiate a philosophical theme or a general theory. "Analytical 
accentuation" is a concept borrowed from Weber (Weber, 1969.90). It 
designates Weber's technique of classifying the "scientific" investigational 
process into stages each corresponding to a definite level of analytical 
accentuation - (e.g. historical interpretations - historical kno\dedge -
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descriptive types - ideal types - theory Ibid p.66, 94). Marx uses a 
formally similar method of stratification (i.e. of levels of abstraction Cf 
infra f·44). The substantive difference between the two methodologies 
is of course that Weber's is analytical and Marx's is dialectical. Marx 
viewed his method as naturalistic and derived from and applied to an 
equally structured and differentiated reality. Weber viewed his 
methodological stratification as a one-sided analytical accentuation of 
one-sidedly emphasized view points. Both views distrust the "scientific" 
truth of phenomenal interconnections of things and stress that to 
discover their scientific significance these interconnections must be 
subjected to rigorous stratification or abstraction. Thus Marx believes; 
"all science would be superfLuous if the outward appearances and 
essences of things directly coincided" (Capital III Ch.48). Weber also 
believes; "It is not the actual interconnections of "things" but the 
conceptual interconnections of problems which define the scope of the 
various sciences" Weber, 1969.68). 
(28) Cf also Cohen, 1978.86-87, especially his reply to (Raymond 
"Williams 1973.6). 
(29) Balibar interposes that his "combination" is a synchronic 
connection in which not only the places of factors and their relations but 
also their nature changes. But it is not enough from a Marxian 
perspective to merely establish a synchronic combination. It is essential 
to analytically link that synchrony to a diachronic/synchronic 
development of the combination. As it stands Balibar model is a 
combina tion of substance possessing its own Ita te mporal" structural 
movement. This is structuralism whether Balibar likes it or not (Balibar 
Ibid 225-226). 
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(30) M Glucksmann 1974 "The notions of determination by a structure 
and synchronic causality are peculiar to structuralists. They are also 
very simple - explanation for them involves laying bare the internal 
mechanisms of a social formation or cultural item and the relationships 
between its different orders • • • Ibid pp.149-50." The opposition of 
synchronic and diachronic/synchronic explanations counterposes the notion 
of system to the notion of system/evolution - or systematic evolution 
(Jakobson and Tyanyanov, 1966.60). Marxian theory emphasises both the 
evolutional and systematic characteristics of social phenomena. "The 
system which Marx was analysing was a social system in movement. 
The logic of co-ordination must be modified by the logic of succession. 
The whole at rest must be regarded as a limiting case of the whole in 
movement . • • The equilibrium which is analysed in the present cannot 
be regarded in complete independence of the equilibrium which preceded 
it; and that it already contains within itself indications of the general 
character of the equilibrium to be realized in the future •.. " Hook, 
1971. 64-65. Although Althusser endeavours to distance himself from 
the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. The extent to which Althusser's own 
theory is not structuralist is not all clear Cf Glucksmann, 1974.167 and 
Clarke, 1981. 223-235. 
(31) Marx; Capital III 1962.798; Material conditions like social relations 
"are on the one hand prerequisites on the other hand resul ts and 
creations of the Capitalist process of production; they are produced and 
reproduced by it". Cf also Lukacs 1932.22 "The most essential element 
of Marxian conception • •. is the dialectical relationship of subject and 
object in the historical process". Quoted in Giddens 1971.189. 
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(310) Cf infra f.39. 
(32) Thus the substantiation of the thesis of primacy of the productive 
forces and of determination of the superstructures by the economic 
structure becomes with Cohen 1978 a matter for formal logical 
explanation or linguistic interpretation (Ibid 160-174). To do the former 
Cohen also reduces "correspondence" to a mere functional-explanatory-
formal-logical concept (Ibid.160). For a similar criticism of 
(Cohen,1970) Cf Clarke 1980 f.85 p.95. Cohen and Elster approaches 
disregard or deny (Elster 1985.37) an essential ingredient of Marxian 
philosophy namely, that formal logical thinking is significant only within 
certain limits and constitutes a particular instance of dialectical 
thinking." (Plekhanov, FPM. 112-113,115,117-120); (Jordan 1967.192) 
Jordan, 1963.294. 
(33) Despite the overall similarity Cohen and Elster have different 
views on certain details Cf e.g. Elster 1985. 30-31, 258-260. 
(34) For general meaning of historicism and human nature in Marxism 
Cf. Bottomore, 1985. 210-211, 214-217. Marxism is not historicism in 
the sense in which Korsch would like it to be (Korsch, 1970 esp. 51, 118). 
Nor is it historicist in the sense in which Popper thought it is (Popper, 
1960) - Cf also Bottomore, 1985. 210-211. Nevertheless, Marxism is not 
"anti historicist" in the sense in which Althusser thought it was 
(Althusser, 1975. 119-144; 1969. 221-24 7)! Althusser anti-historicism 
eternises the epoch of c:zpitalism and projects this eternity into both the 
future and the past. Althusser therefore empiricises the historical 
epoch of capitalism and idealises its essence. "Thus the critique of 
empiricism conceals the truly empiricist foundations of Althusserianism -
(Clarke 1980. 74). Henceforward whenever I use "historicism" I reserve 
it solely for this empiricism of the historical epoch, and idealization of 
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"ideological appearances of law and the State . • . present within it. 
(35) Althusser, 1969. 110-116, 229, 255 and generally 86-255). 
(36) Clarke 1980. 81 f.18; Sumner, 1979.49. 
(37) Cf infra Part 2.B.1.e. 
(38) Althusser conception of the "economic structure", his structuralization 
of the social totality and his "theoreticisation" of Marxian philosophy are 
interrelated. If we agree with Althusser that the economic is, the 
elements he (Althusser, 1975.176) enumerates - (i.e. Labour power, direct 
labourers, masters who are not direct labourers, object of production 
instruments of production) - in their combination of substance, we end up 
with a structure - (a combination of substance of the subjects and 
objects of the historical epoch) whose very conception implies solidity 
and whose existence in a definite form is therefore inexplicable without 
presupposing a "legal-political and ideological superstructures as 
'conditions antecedent to that existence - (Althusser Reading Capital Ibid 
177-181). Althusser then gives "the economic structure" the credit for 
calling in specific superstructures but, counterposes that the economic 
~tructure assigns determination to these superstructures for ever. 
"From the first moment to the last the lonely hour of the last instance 
never comes Althusser, 1969. 113." On the basis of thisy Althusser 
substitutes structural causation - (consisting simply in explanation of 
synchronic interconnection of phenomena Glucksmann 1974. 149-50) for 
Marxian hypothesis of ever-continuous dialectical interaction of the 
economic structure and the superstructures. Having thus denied Marxian 
dialectical method any application in history or concrete history 
Althusser then moves to construct it in the sphere of philosophy. 
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(39) This distinction between "History" and ''histor~'' is based on Marx's 
distinction between social process of production in general and 
''historically determined" forms of this process respectively-Marx; Capital 
III. 1962. 798. Although it is claimed that Marx is Eurocentrist 
(Bottomore 1985. 200) he considers his analyses of capitalist societies of 
Europe as exemplification of a general materialist philosophy that is 
reflective of th~ development of all forms of societies Jordan 1967. 299 
- Marx; Capital I. 1983. 179. 
(390) Cf supra f.27a and the text above. 
(40) Plekhanov, FPM.80; DMVH.731 also quoted in Jordan 1967. 347. 
(41) Thus commentators who blame the inadequacy of the metaphor of 
base and superstructure are prey to this misidentification (e.g. Williams 
1973). Althusser has rightly noted; "the fact that the metaphor of the 
structure is a metaphor matters little . • . since in philosophy one can 
only think through metaphors". Althusser, 1976. 139-140. 
(42) Marx Capital I 1970 London 10; Grundrisse, introduction (1973) Cf 
also Bukharin, 1969. 93-101. Methodological individualism begins and 
ends its inquiry into the human societies with a consideration of the 
properties, rationally imputed or empirically determined of the individual 
atoms themselves (Bhaskar 1979. 1-91). 
(420) The causal criterion - (as opposed to a normative criterion) means 
that the causes which produce a social fact are separable from the 
function which it has in society • . • The causes which give rise to a 
given social fact must therefore be identified separately from whatever 
social functions it may fulfill. Cf Giddens 1971. 82-91-
(42b) Methodological collectivism is in certain respects opposed to 
individualism (Cf supra f.42). Broadly stated, the former emphasises 
that societies cannot be studied merely from the point of view of the 
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consciousness of the individuals involved and that the influence of factors 
which escape consciousness and help to shape it must also be examined. 
(42c) Durkheim's "externality" designates two senses in which social 
facts are "external" to the individual. "Firstly every man is bom into 
an on-going society which already has a definite organization or structure 
and which conditions his own personality" • • . "Secondly social facts are 
external to the individual in the sense that anyone individual is only a 
single element within the totality of relationship which constitutes a 
society." (Giddens 1971.87). With Marx the reality of social facts is 
.--
due to derivation of the latter from production relations that are 
themselves at any given time socially determined (Marx Grundrisse 1973. 
156). The "consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material 
power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, 
bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in 
historical development up till now". Marx, the German ideology CW5. 
19-539. 47-48. Also Q. in Elster, 1985. 100. 
(42d) Cf infra Part 2.B.1.a. 
(43) Quoted in Jordan 1967.302. 
(44) (Marx Capital 11983.19) Cf also Bottomore 1985407-408. 
(44a) "Levels of socialization" is a phrase used in several places 
throughout the thesis. Marx uses the expression "socialization of labour" 
or "socialized production" - Capital I 1983.715 - to connote the extent of 
expansion of spontaneous social organization resulting from the 
concentration and centralization of capital. Durkheim uses a concept of 
"dynamic density" or "organic solidarity" to connote the social cohesion 
connected with expanded functional interdependence in the division of 
labour - (Giddens 1971.77-78). Levi-Strauss (l968b.312) develops a 
"geological" conception of the social totality viewing it as composed of 
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different types of interacting and possibly ordered layers levels and 
elements. He enumerates among these the "kinship system", "so~ial 
organization" and "social stratification" whether economic or political -
Glucksmann, 1974.34). I synthesize these views in developing a 
conception of a social formation as made up of concrete hierarchical -
(i.e. judging by the level of societality they reflect) - structures and 
practices. Within a historically determined social formation, "economic 
relations" at the individual level - (i.e. at the material production or 
enterprise level) - constitute the substratum or lowest level of 
societality. Next to them in the degree of socialization are "economic 
relations" among labourers and relations among owners of the conditions 
of production and also the relation between the economic organizations 
of these two classes. At still a higher level of socialization is the 
relation between the political organizations of the two classes. The 
Centralized State with its various centralized apparatuses constitute the 
apex of the hierarchy. This hierarchical order governs the relation 
among the different social structures as well as among the social and 
political practices; Cf infra fs. 75, 77, and also Durkheim (1938) 
pp.12-13. 
(45) Thus Otto Neurath 1973 remarks; "Marxist sociology is a sociology 
on materialist foundation in which the task is to discover laws of highly 
complicated social machines in action and then if possible these laws 
have to be reduced to their elementary relationship... 371" Quoted in 
Bottomore 1975.28-29. 
(46) O. Neurath 1973 view5the framework of Alarxist Sociology as "the 
whole structure of an age conditioned by the situa tion of the time". 
Ibid 358. Cf supra f·30. 
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(46a) Cf supra f.44a. 
(47) On methodological monism of historical materialism Cf. (Korsch 
1970.52-54; Marcuse, 1963.320). On the importance of psychoanalysis Cf 
(Erich Fromm, 1970). 
(48) Jordan, 1967.305; Elster, 1985.300-304, Acton 1955.143. 
(49) The class struggle in France 1848-1850 (1850) and the Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) in M ESW Moscow (1962) Vol.I. 
(50) This is the explanation offered by Elster, 1985.300! 
(51) Cf also Jordan, 1967.307-310. 
(52) Marx; Eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, theses on Feuerbach CW5. 
Quoted also in Althusser 1977.40. 
(520) Thus it is suggested; "As a philosophy • .. Marxism •.• like every 
macro-theory requires a micro-theory to work; but it does not focus 
attention on the details of such a theory. Bottomore 1985.228. 
(53) Cf Lenin. Critical remarks on the National Question CW20.224-6 
1960 Moscow; MEC 335-344 CW14 1960 Moscow, Althusser 1977.63-67 
and Althusser 1976.68. 
(54) Cf Bottomore, 1975. 36,40-41; Gareth Stedman Jones 70.NLR. 
44-47. The extent of similarity between Lukacs and Korsch ideas is 
disclosed in (Korsch 1970. 91-92). 
(540) Thus "For Marx and Hegel the social system constitutes a whole • 
The mutual determination of function and structure becomes intelligible 
only from the point of view of the whole system Hook, 1971. 63". Cf 
also Marcuse, 1963. 313. 
(54b) Cf infra Parts I and 3.A of Chapter II, and f.103a and the text 
above in this Chapter. 
(55) Cf e.g. infra Part 3.A of Chapter II. 
(55a) Cf supra the last sentence of footnote 34. 
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(56) In French Trans. of Grundrisse Dietzverlag 1953. Quoted in L. 
Althusser, Reading Capital English Translation NLB 1975 p.1_87. 
(57) I shall always use this phrase - (or sometimes the phrase complex 
social relations) - to denote agglutination of different individuals or 
groups of individuals along the identical manner in which they relate to 
the means of production as distinguished from a simple social relation 
between two or more individuals vis-a-vis the means of production, in its 
isolation from other similar relations Cf infra Part 3.B.2. 
(58) Marx 1857 Introduction pp.17-18 "Before distribution is 
distribution of the product, it is : (i) the distribution of the instruments 
of production; and (ii) what is a further definition of the same 
relationship, the distribution of the members of the society into the 
different kinds of production (subsumption of the individuals under 
determinate relations of production). The distribution of the products is 
obviously only the result of this distribution which is included within the 
production process itself and determines the articulation of production. 
It is obviously an empty abstraction to consider production while ignoring 
this production which is included in it. Production must start from a 
certain distribution of the means of production." Quoted in L. 
Althusser, Reading Capital p.175. 
(59) 1979 Academic Press p.97. 
(60) In interpretation of concrete historical situations the emphasis is 
of course shifted from these analyses of forms to analyses of substance. 
This means that the focus will then be on discerning the concrete 
phenomenal forms or modes of expression which economic relations 
assume and their empirical inter-relationship at various concrete levels 
of a concrete social totality. 
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(61) In a period of transition (i.e. a period of beginning of a mode of 
production) for subsumption to be effected at the "societal" level, .the 
use of external force (i.e. force external to economic relations) is always 
inevitable. Cf K. Marx, on the use of law and State power in the 
transition to Capitalism in, Capital Volume (1) pp.667-693 1983 Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
(61u) Cf supra f.60 and the text above. 
(62) For the definition of the "balance" of power and its distinction 
from an "equilibrium" of power Cf infra f.98 and the text above in 
Chapter II. 
(63) It is the essence of economic relations as balance of power 
between people, derivative of factors external to people which make 
these re la ti ons "indispensable and inde penden t of men's will" Marx 
Preface 1962 362-363. 
(64) Marx Preface 362-63; Cohen 1978.30. 
(65) "Value exists only in articles of utility, in objects: we leave out 
of consideration its purely symbolical representation by tokens. (Man 
himself, viewed as the impersonation of labour-power, is a natural object, 
a thing, although a living conscious thing, and labour is the manifestation 
of this power residing in him." .. Marx Capital I 1983 p.196. Cf also 
Marx comment on Rossi Ibid pp.169-170. Cf also; Cohen, 1978, 42-45; 
Marx Capital I 1983. 535-536; Marx Preface where the productive forces 
are qualified as the "material productive forces Ibid p.362-363". For a 
different confused definition of the productive forces" as "relations of 
production" Cf Balibar 1975.253. 
(66) "The labour-process, resolved as above - (p.l 74) - into its simple 
elementary factors - (1. labour power; 2. the subject of that labour 
power; and 3. its instruments) - is a human action with a view to the 
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production of use-values, appropriation of natural substances to human 
requirement; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange_ of 
matter between man and nature; it is the everlasting nature-imposed 
condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every 
social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such 
phase." Marx Capital I 1983 p.179. 
(67) Cf supra f.14. 
(67a) For the definition of "equilibrium" Cf infra f.98 and the text above 
in Chapter II. 
(67b) Thus Marx states in the Preface (M ESW I 1962. 362-63) that the 
economic structure of a society is constituted by its relations of 
production and naturally "correspond to a definite stage of development 
of the material productive forces". In Capital III 1962.772 Marx 
contends; "It is always the direct relation of the owners of the conditions 
of production to the direct producers - a relation always naturally 
corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of 
labour and thereby its social productivity - which reveals the innermost 
secret the hidden basis of the entire social structure ... " Cf also in 
Bottomore, 1985.42-43; "The economic structure is not conceived as a 
given set of institutions, productive units or material conditions; it is 
rather the sum total of production relations . .. " Cf also Marx Capital 
I, 1983.85-86 where the "mode of production" and the social relations 
corresponding to it are referred to as the economic structure. However 
this latter text is made with reference to the Preface above. The 
"mode of production" is also reductively used in this text to connote the 
material relations of production. 
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(68) For views which agree with my interpretation Cf; G A Cohen, 
1978.29, G V Plekhanov and Lenin in Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks 
CW38 1961.405-408; N Bukharin 1969.149; Gramsci, 1971.432; Bottomore, 
1985.43. For views which differ and reply to them Cf Ibid Cohen, 1978 
f.2 and the text above p.29. 
(690) Cf supra last sentence in f.34. 
(69) Thus Acton, 1955.167 is right that the economic or material basis 
of society cannot be clearly conceived apart from the legal moral and 
political relationships of men. But the belief that Marx conviction is to 
the contrary of this is due to the confusion of the philosophical and 
scientific levels of analysis. This distinction is always essential for a 
consistent understanding of Marx ideas. Cf also Cohen 1978.234-235. 
(70) Cf supra f.34. 
(71) Cf; Bottomore, 1985.373; Clarke, 1980.73-74. 
(72) Cf supra f.44a for the meaning of "levels of socialization". For 
further elaboration Cf infra fs.73, 77. 
(72a) "Roles" designate the managerial and working functions which 
owners of the conditions of production and labourers, respectively, 
perform in the process of production; being always a reflection of the 
parties' relation to the means of production. Cf infra Part 3.A. 
(73) Cf supra f. 44a and infra f. 77. 
(74) Cf Poulantzas 1982.85-93. 
(75) The basis for this hierarchical organization could be the extent of 
concretization in cases of structures and the level of communality in 
case of practices. Both Lenin and Plekhanov argued for a principle of 
"emergent evolution" indicating the materialization of phenomena and its 
passage from a lower to a higher state - Lenin AI EC (1960) 261-2 PH N 
(1960) 97, 109, 221, 283, 360 Cf Jordan 1967.129-249. 
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(750) For the relevance of this discovery to the the me of the thesis Cf 
infra Part 3. 
(75b) This means transcendence via critical exa mina tion of the 
empirical and phenomenal representations these forms possess and of 
their significance. This distinguishes it from an idealist transcendentalism 
which achieves its purpose by dehistorisization of reality or 
destratification of science. Cf Bashkar, 1979; Bottomore, 1985.256. 
(75c) Cf supra f.72a. 
(75d) Thus Marcuse, 1963.315 emphasising the historical nature of 
Marxian dialectic writes; "The negativity and its negation are two 
different phases of the same historical process, straddled by man's 
historical action ••. " 
(76) Gramsci, Prison Notebooks.208, 428; Lenin Collected Works 31, 
226-227 quoted in Lukacs (1973) 141-142. 
(77) Two important points to add here: (a) - levels of socialization 
referred to here comprise, in addition to the limited connotation they 
have, so far, been given, - (i.e. as structural hierarchical levels of 
existence of an economic relation e.g. individual level, economic- social 
level and the political social level) - among themselves an unmeasurable 
series of social phenomena (i.e. superstructural levels of socialization) 
whose effect is to solidify or direct the action of a unity at or towards a 
particular structural level, or to bridge the gap between structural levels 
of socialization. Furthermore not every change in the economic 
structure produced by development of the productive forces would 
produce a contradiction across all the levels of socialization. The 
disturbance of the balance of powers inherent in economic relations, as 
manifested by its effect, is not therefore always visible. The 
disturbance is visible only when contradiction resolves into action at high 
XIX 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
structural levels of socialization e.g. the levels of economic social 
relations and political social relations; (b) the characterization of 
contradiction as one between relations of distribution is only an 
abstraction which while emphasising the most important contradiction, is 
not meant to underestimate contradictions at superstructural levels of 
socialization (cultural, ideological and ethical levels) nor to simplify the 
process of social evolution by presenting it as a phenomenon 
unproblematically reducible to economic conflict. 
(78) This "overdetermination" is different from the Althusserians' 
"Overdetermination" in that it is subject to to structural changes in the 
capitalist mode of production and also therefore to ideological and 
political class struggle instigated by these changes. The Althusserians' 
overdetermination is impervious to these structural changes and cannot 
also possibly be overcome by ideological or political class struggle - Cf 
infra f.86. The process of social evolution I describe under this part is 
also different from that formulated by N Bukharin, 1969.104-242. N 
Bukharin, argues that there are three types of contradiction: (a) an 
external contradiction between society and nature; and (b) an internal 
contradiction within society among different series of social phenomena 
and (c) a contradiction between the movement of the productive forces 
and the socio-economic structure of society. The fact is that the 
external and internal contradictions are two different stages in the 
process of social evolution and by no means two distinct contradictions 
or processes. Instead of basing a theory of historical materialism on the 
basis of the contradiction between the process of social evolution -
(comprising both the external and internal contradictions) - and the 
determination of the superstructures in society, Bukharin endeavours to 
base it on the internal and external contradictions. His model of 
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historical materialism in effect looks more like a mOdel of sociology in 
which contradiction is conceived as inherent in the historical process and 
men and classes as actors whose predestination is the fulfillment of that 
contradiction. For other criticisms of Bukharin Cf Gramsci Prison 
Notebooks.419 and Lukacs, Political Writings 1973.135. 
(79) Dobb identifies the genesis of industrial capitalists in a petty 
production which establishes itself solidly on the basis of feudal society, 
and, through increased productivity, escapes from feudal restrictions, 
arrives at its own disintegration and thereby creates the capitalist 
relationship. However, Kohachiro Takahashi - p.87 - rightly stresses the 
importance of explaining the development fo the productive forces which 
historically made inevitable the bourgeois movement which abolished the 
traditional feudal production relations (i.e. explaining the development of 
industrial capital which necessitated bourgeois revolution) - Maurice Dobb 
Studies in the Development of Capitalism, 1972. K Takahashi in Rodney 
Hilton (edit) The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism 1976 NLB p.68. 
(79a) Cf infra f. 84. 
(80) Bettelheim; La Construction du Socialisme " La Pensee No.126 
April 1966. Quoted in Poulantzas 1982.157-158. 
(81) Cf supra f.19 and the text above. 
(82) Cf infra Part 1. C. of Chapter II. 
(83) "The revolutions of 1648 and 1 7 89" - In England and France - /I •• 
. did not represent the victory of a particular social class over the old 
political system . .. The victory of the bourgeoisie was at that time the 
victory of a new social order." Marx, The Bourgeoisie and the Counter 
Revolution, Marx, K and Engels, F (1972) Articles from NRZ p.183 
Progress Publishers Moscow. 
XXI 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
(84) , , The politico-economic structure of the new order, though an 
embryo of a potential social system, lacks the "social". It will eventually 
develop into a mature socio-economic order when, due to expanded 
reproduction within the new forms of economic relations, the political 
begins to respond to the mediation of the 'social' between itself and the 
economic. For this reason Marx sometimes, refers to the phase of 
primitive accumulation - (in which the bourgeois state exists, but, in 
economic-corporate primitivism) - as a prehistoric stage of the capitalist 
mode of production. Marx; Capital I p.668, 1983 Lawrence and Wishart. 
(85) "The retroaction of the State power upon economic development 
can be of three kinds: it can proceed in the same direction, and then 
things move more rapidly, it can move in the opposite direction in which 
case the State will go to pieces in the long run in every great people .. 
" Engels, Letter to Conard Schmidt, 27.10.1890, M ESC 399-402 1934 
Moscow. 
(86) Poulantzas - (Nicos Poulantzas; political power and social classes 
Verso 1982) - proposes a theory of a capitalist State which, from its 
inception, is relatively autonomous. He attributes this intrinsic 
autonomy to the combination of elements peculiar to the CMP. The 
separation of the direct producers from the means of production 
characteristic of the CMP determines, in his view, the specific autonomy 
of the political and the economic in this mode as opposed to the union of 
direct producers with means of production, characteristic of non 
capitalist modes of production, which presupposed political relations of 
domination and servitude (pp.29-33). On the basis of this he conceives 
the political as the global role of the State (p.51) through which it keeps 
the dominated classes in their economic isolation - (i.e. through 
mystification of economic inequality by the juridical equality underlining 
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the political (pp.188-191). , ! How does he reconcile' this interpretation 
with determination by the economic structure? Poulantzas interpolates 
that the economic is determinant in the last instance which in his model 
takes the form of the political. The obvious the ore tical fla w in 
Poulantzas' work is that by conceiving determination by the economic 
structure, not as an ever-continuous dialectic between the material and 
social substance of a production epoch, but, as something that took place 
at the beginning of the CMP - (Cf supra fs.29-30 and the text above) he 
reduces determination by the economic to a travesty. The disastrous 
outcome of this erroneous formulation is that the incessant process of 
production and reproduction of material life and its social consequences 
across different stages of development of the productive forces is looked 
upon as over-determined by a global political architectured by analytical 
deduction from the combination of elements peculiar to the CMP. 
Relative autonomy of the State vis-a-vis the field of class 
struggle is looked upon as a reflection of this structural or analytical 
outonomy of the political. Class struggle is, in effect, bound to be the 
prisoner of these structures (pp.256-257). The theory of relative 
autonomy of the State becomes with Poulantzas a theory of abolute 
autonomy of the political. What is more, because the economic is, for 
all practical purposes, absent, the political becomes also the 
overdeterminant instance. We end up with a static model of the State 
and the CM P and a reversed dialectic in which the political determines 
the course of material development. Poulantzas does all this on the 
basis of a philosophy that promotes ideology to the rank of science 
attributing to it an independent historical existence while relega ting the 
process of production of material life to an ideology. Poulantzas does 
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not spell out these convictions but they are implied throughout his 
analysis. Look for example at his basic assumption that the juridtcal 
autonomy of the political mystifies economic inequality. With Poulantzas 
mystification is, not simply an ideological contraint whose effectiveness 
is subject to underlying and everchanging material conditions of existence 
but an absolute overdetermination of people's ability to know that 
inequality or to fight it. Hence his denial that ideological dominance 
can be overcome (p.204-206). He nevertheless is ready to argue that 
revolutionary change is possible (i.e. even from a position of ideological 
subordina ti on). This seems to contradict a basic principle that 
knowledge of the sensuous consciousness of the conditions for change (i.e. 
overcome, of ideology or mystification) is the first step towards action 
for change. Even Hegel would not accept the oblivion of such a 
principle let alone Marx (Cf Hegel, phenomenology of mind in: The 
Philosophy of History, New York Dover (1956). 
Poulan tzas' thesis of the "dominant juridico-politica l" is 
identifiable with Althusser's early theory of ideology. Denouncing tha t 
position Althusser later writes "I saw ideology as the universal element 
of historical existence: and I did not at that time go any further . . . 
The absence of contradiction was taking its toll: The question of the 
class struggle in ideology did not appear. Through the gap created by 
this "theory" of ideology slipped theoreticism •.. And so on" Althusser 
1976.141. Notwithstandingly Poulantzas position on this issue remained 
unrevised. To reach the conclusion that the political is autonomous 
Poulantzas this time following Balibar, places much emphasis on the 
following text; "In all forms in which the direct labourer remains the 
possessor of the means of production and labour conditions necessary for 
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his own means of subsistence f! the property relationship must 
simultaneously appear as a direct relationship of lordship and servitude . 
. • " - Marx Capital Volume III p.771 1962. Marx is emphasising that 
there is nothing inherent in the system of distribution of the means of 
production, in these forms, to explain the social relations of dependence 
and that they must therefore be extra economic or external to the 
material rela tions of production. Balibar (Ibid pp.220-224) and 
Poulantzas - (Political power and social classes Ibid pp.29-33) conclude 
from this that because the capitalist owns and possesses the means and 
objects of production - (the implication is that the worker, by operation 
of economic necessity, is left with no choice but to sell his labour power) 
- economic conditions in the CMP by themselves perpetuate the process 
of production without the need for importation of extra economic 
pressures. This to them implies autonomy of the economic instance. 
Autonomy of the economic in turn implies autonomy of the political. 
This interpretation overlooks the following: a) The point is not that the 
extra economic political of the pre-capitalist forms continued to exist 
clnd gained autonomy as a result of the autonomy which the economic has 
acquired under the CMP, but that the transition to capitalism featured 
the termination of the extra economic political and the beginning of a 
political personified by the domination of the conditions of production 
over the producers-Marx in Pashukanis selected writings 1980 p.95; b) the 
writers' occupation with analytical theory lead them into ignoring the 
historical process through which the capitalist mode of production 
became consolidated and the implication of that on their theory of 
autonomy of the political. Cf Marx; Capital I p.669. 
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(87) Ii Examples of wage-fixing and compulsory labour legislation could 
be the Statutes of Labourers (23 Edw.III (1349) cc.1-8;25 Edw.III (1350) 
St.1, 34 Edw.III (1360) cc.9-11) - In England and the Ordinance of King 
John 1350 in France. In respect of the former their chief features were 
(1) the fixing of wages; (2) compulsion of the landless to work; (3) 
annexation of the Law of Master and Servant to the Criminal Law. 
Jenks, 1912.321. The first of these statutes (i.e. 23 Edward III 1349) 
"found its immediate pretext (not its cause ..• ) in the great plague .•. " 
Marx Capital I 1983.258. Cf also Macfarlane 1978.150-151). In respect 
of other uses of the law referred to in the text Cf Marx Capital I 
1983.686-693, 252-286. 
(88) According to Marx this era begins, in the history of English 
working class, from around 1800 (Marx Capital I p.264). But, Cf infra 
Part 3.B.3 as a complementary to the discussion in this part. 
(89) Marx consider this socialization and the legislative changes it 
prompted in England as a product of the conversion of the manufacturing 
system into the factory system Marx; Capital I 1983 pp.448-451, 282). 
(90) We can legitimately assume that representatives of a class are 
the ones who know better than anyone else the sub-system of distribution 
best favourable to the interest of their class. The first task facing a 
class desirous of promoting its own conception of the sub-system of 
distribution would then be the seeking of access to the institutions of the 
State (i.e. Education institutions, the media, institutions of the 
Centralized State) and it is here that material might (wealth) asserts its 
supremacy. Cf pp.196-236, in Ralph Miliband, the State in Capitalist 
Society Quartet Books 1983. 
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(91) :.1 The autonomy of these organs means their· apparent immunity 
from control, for service of divisional interest, by anyone single class. 
Two more points need to be added here: (a) because some of these organs 
or some of their constituent institutions have existed even before the 
extension of the franchise to the majority of the population the 
interrelation of the judiciary the executive and legislative organs may 
not always possess the effectiveness of making each one of them 
autonomous; (b) while class struggle within the ideological forms of 
Capitalist Society can affect the manner in which these organs are 
interrelated and to that extent secure their structural autonomy, it 
cannot however by itself neutralize the class affiliation of the potential 
occupants of these organs. In this respect Miliband - (Ralph Miliband, 
1983) investigation of the social backgrounds of the members of the 
State apparatus far from being a substitution of an effect of dominance 
for the cause of dominance (i.e. which is, dominance of the capitalist 
syste m of distribution of the means of production), as Poulantzas sees it 
(Poulantzas, The Problem of the Capitalist State NLR No.58.73), is 
Mther a further investigation of that dominance at a specific empirical 
level of socialization and of its implication for the neutrality of "the 
political system". These two factors may compound to lead an organ 
into producing an image irreconcilable with its supposed autonomy. See 
for example in case of the judiciary in GB; (Griffith, 1981.61-85, 
209-242); (Clark and Wedderburn, 1983.166-173); (Wedderburn 1971, 
304-387) and the decisions in Osborne -v- ASRS 1911.1 Ch.540; Quinn -v-
Leathem 1901 AC 495; Taffvale -v- ASRS 1901 AC 426. 
(92) Cf John Austin "the province of jurisprudence determined". 
Lecture I pp.1-25 2nd edit 1861 John Murray. Thomas Hobbs Dialogue 
1971 UJniversity of Chicago Press. Hans Kelsen "Pure Theory of Law" 
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University of California Press 1967 pp.1-58. 
(93) Friedrich Carl von Savigny; "System des heutigen romischen 
Rechts Berlin edition 1840". System of Modern Roman Law English 
translation by W Holloway 1867. G F Puchta cursus der institutionen. 
Leipzig 1841. 
(94) Earlier writers supported their idealist empiricism of "society" by 
theories which see its evolution as determined by the natural laws 
governing the working of the Universe (as implied by the writings of the 
economists of laissez faire; Adam Smith Malthus and Ricardo) or the 
Laws of biological evolution (Herbert Spencer) - (J W Burrow Evolution 
and Society 1970.223); (Lloyd, 1985.551). 
(95) In Ehrlich's own words: "Justice is a power wielded on the minds 
of men by society • .• 1936.203". In the illustrations he offers Ehrlich 
(198-203) implies a society which is external to its atomistic individuals. 
Yet he offers no "realistic" basis for this externality (i.e. it is simply a 
reification of society). Furthermore it is this "unrealistic" duality of 
individuals/society which blurs the fact that this "power wielded on the 
minds of men ••• " might in fact be a derivative of the power of a 
certain class of men within "society". 
(96) The sociological method of "jurisprudence" finds its best 
utilization at the hands of Roscoe Pound. This, however, is more than 
just a coincidence. Pound's realistic approach of abandoning the use of 
the sociological method in the search for the truth of law (what it is and 
how it relates to economic social and political power or what Pound 
refers to as "claims to self assertion") and confining its application to 
furthering the effectiveness of a pre-given system of law "under the 
standards of the given civilization", provided the soil for the empirical 
potential of sociology to materialize - (Roscoe Pound Philosophy of Law 
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(Revised edit) 1954). .. ! In the science of society,' the true and the 
concrete real do not necessarily coincide. To take either of them for 
the other is to idealise the essence of the subject (i.e. society) and thus 
prevent knowledge of its truth. To take the concrete real for what it is 
- as Pound does - is a rational choice because, it avoids confusing the 
findings of the empirical method with the findings of general theory (i.e. 
philosophy) and thereby trim the sociological method (which is an 
empirical method) to its real size Cf A Gramsci Prison Notebooks Ibid 
pp.425-432. 
(97) Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, Piers Beirne 
and Robert Sharlet (Ed) 1980 Academic Press. 
(98) "Commodity-exchange" is itself an ideological form of capitalist 
relations. Pashukanis knows this very well, but, instead of transcending 
this ideological appearance of relations to their realistic essence he bases 
his theory of law on the ideological appearance thus transforming the 
latter into an idealist essence. To explain this I give the following 
example: The relation of A (an employee in a food processing factory) to 
B (owner of the factory) although might, due to market circulation, 
appear as one of commodity-exchange is in fact not so, because the 
commodity which A tender (e.g. 7 hours of A'S labour) to B, is exchanged 
for foodstuff which took - e.g. 5 hours of A'S labour to produce. This is 
not "essentially" a commodity exchange relationship. A has simply been 
dispossessed of 2 hours' worth of his labour-power. The fact that A in 
the example is paid in kind is insignificant since this is the ultimate 
essential result if instead of taking a single capitalist and a single 
labourer we take the class of the capitalists and the class of the 
labourers as a whole (Marx, Capital I 1983.533). The law worth 
examination is not the law directly implied by commodity exchange on 
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Ii 
the market, but the law that keeps A subjected to B" and thereby makes 
possible the commodity exchange epiphenomenon. 
(99) John Holloway and Sol Picciotto (1978) 18-19, Isaac D Balbus.11 
Law and Society Winter 1977.572. 
(100) Pashukanis does not observe the qualitative difference between 
capitalist production and commodity production. He often speaks of the 
former as an enormous accumUlation of the latter (Ibid p.62) or of 
Capitalist Society as one of commodity owners (Ibid p.75). Capitalist 
production differs from commodity production in that with the former 
the property laws of commodity production changes into laws of 
capitalist appropriation Marx Capital I 1983 p.550-51. 
(101) Pashukanis is ready to argue that Human history of which law is 
only an ideological form is a product of this evolution (i.e. historical 
development of matter). However the interpretation which he places on 
this development is one of extreme "economism". Pashukanis presents 
the "commodity-exchange" phenomenon as possessing its own extra-social 
motor of motion, and living social relations as subordinate to this 
hypostatized power. 
(102) Pashukanis concludes from this that, because of the primacy of 
relations in kind, legal forms were extremely underdeveloped in Medieval 
Europe (Ibid p.44) - the implication being that primacy of relations in 
kind would not permit a rational interpretation of authority. Cf 
Pashukanis reply to Stuchka Ibid p.195. On another page (Ibid p.90) 
Pashukanis approvingly quotes Marx as saying: "Club law is nevertheless 
law". To reconcile this with the main theme of his analysis (i.e. the 
legal as rational interpretation of authority) he introduces, for the first 
time in the text, a distinction between law and the legal order giving the 
indication that the latter is the rational final result of development of 
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the former. 
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t 
(103) There is an unbridgeable gap between Pashukanis subjective 
political commitment (grasped from the utterances he makes reminding 
his reader of his acceptance of Marxist mainstream) and the theoretical 
discourse of his work. In a bid to bridge it he grafted a class function 
on top of his rational state. He classified those areas of public law and 
state functions which do not fit his image of the legal order as belonging 
to its class function, and, the other functions which do fit, together with 
his commodity exchange laws as belonging to the rational state (i.e. the 
State) (Ibid pp.59, 73, 92-93). Pashukanis analysis does not show where 
this class function derives from. Moreover he introduces a duality 
which obscures rather than explains the idea of the State and Law. 
(103a) Cf Sumner, 1979.273. 
(104) If the State and public law (e.g. labour law) are determined by 
economic relations so too of course is private law which indeed in 
essence only sanctions the existing economic relations between 
individuals which are normal in the given circumstances. Engels; Ludwig 
Feuerbach and The End of Classical German Philosophy M ESW (3) III 
370-72 1970 Moscow. 
(105) A relation of the ancient commune to the earth is in this respect 
one of property relation as against other communes or tribes, but the 
relations of each of its constituent members to the earth and to the 
commune are organic or metabolical relations (Marx; Grundrisse. Ibid). 
(106) The analysis in this paragraph does not suggest that men had, 
historically, settled individually and only later formed communities. 
Such a suggestion would be against the weight of obtainable evidence -
(ef Marx; Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations pp.139-1.J8 1964 Lawrence 
and Wisha rt). The analysis here relates, rather, to development taking 
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place within a secondary - (as opposed to primitive or communal) social 
formation (Marx, Ibid p.145). On an attempt at visualizing transition 
from a communal formation to a class formation Cf S Amin; Unequal 
Development,English Translation,1976 Monthly Review. 
(107) Thus in case we have e.g. a set of relations in each of which (L) 
owns the land and the means of labour and (S) possesses the m, and, 
another set of relations in which (C) owns and possesses the land and the 
means of labour and (W) owns only his labour power; all existing side by 
side in the same geographical locality, complex social relations appear 
when, due e.g. to competition over land, Bs unite together and, with the 
help of their subordinates (Ws), oust (Ls). 
(108) A class exists when association of either of the poles of an 
economic relation with other poles, of other economic relations, 
corresponding to itself in their relation to the means of production has 
been completed at the "highest level of socialization". This completion 
signifies the existence of a class as an organized social force (i.e. a 
structure). This does not mean that there is no class struggle prior to 
this status. Every social practice by a fraction of a class undertaken 
with a view of realizing that existence is, theoretically speaking, a class 
struggle. There is class struggle even in the case of complete negation, 
by one class, of the structural existence of another. There is class 
struggle wherever there are opposed interests, which consists of these 
opposed interests in their unity, no matter how embryonic the social 
organizations representing these interests. On the distinction between 
structures and practices, Cf Poulantzas; political power and social classes 
Ibid pp.85-98. 
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(l09) The use of stage of development of the productive forces as an 
indexation of development of the substance of law must not be 
understood as meaning that every instance of development of the 
productive forces over a period of time would necessarily produce an 
amendment of the law over that period of time. Development of 
material productive forces affects law only through its effect on class 
struggle. Law as an index of a balance of power can only be changed 
by a disturbance of that balance of power through class struggle at 
different levels of socialization. More importantly, class struggle should 
not be reduced to the contradiction between workers and capitalists. 
While this is the most important potential contradiction, it is only at an 
advanced stage that class struggle in capitalist society becomes so 
polarized. The definite stages of class struggle which indexed the 
development of the substance of law during the secondary and the first 
decades of the contemporary forms of exchange between capital and 
labour comprised in addition to the contradiction between capital and 
labour a multiplicity of contradictions within the capitalist classes 
between the manufacturers and industrialists and between the capitalist 
class and the landowners - (as specific examples Cf the division within 
the capitalist class which accompanied the enactment of the (iictory Act 
of 1833 in England, in Marx; Capital (D p.265-286). K Wedderburn (the 
worker and the Law 1971 Penguin p.239) has also noticed that it would 
be wrong to assume that the "protective statutes" developed in any 
smooth or logical progression. Rather they were the historic product of 
a swaying struggle between reformers workers unions and factory 
inspectors. 
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(110) DN Pritt, Employers, workers and trade union71970 Lawrence and 
Wishart p.15. Cf also Neville Kirk 1985 xi where it is suggested that 
the onset of Mid-Victorian stability and reformism is inter alia attributed 
to emergence of a re-established and dynamic capitalism which greatly 
enhanced the scope for class manoeuvre. 
(111) This was done in 1871-75 and featured the following legislation; 
Trade Union Act 1871, Criminal Law Amendment Act 1871, Employers 
and Workmen Act 1875 and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act 1875. 
(1110) But see how this policy of voluntarism was partly replaced in 1971 
and has now been "ruptured" and largely replaced by a new policy of 
restriction in (Wedderburn, 1983(a).499-50 7); and Wedderburn, 1985.36-49). 
(112) Cf C Sumner, 1979.52. 
(113) David M Trubek, 1984.582. 
(114) Cf Melvyn Dubofsky (1981) Criticism of K E Klare (1981) and 
Staughton Lynd (1981) in Industrial Relations Law Journal Vol.4:496.p.498. 
(115) Cf Beirne 1977, Thompson 1977, Quinney 1974, and the comments 
in Sumner 1979.253-256. 
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( SOCIETY THE STATE AND LM IN UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIAL FORMATIONS) 
(1) Among critics of dualism Laclau (Laclau 1971) was the first to 
counterpose that commercialization although penetrates into remote peasant 
zones does not transform pre-capitalist relations. For scholars who consider 
urban centres as "Capitalist", Laclau has thus inspired espousal of a new 
dualism - (one which exists in spite of commercialization. For Laclau himself 
there is no such dualism because of his readiness to assert non-capitalism of 
the entire social formation - see infra Part 1.B. 
(2) Henceforward the phrase "non-capitalist", if unqualifiedly used, shall 
mean "non-fully-capitalist" - (i.e. relations so described shall differ only in 
forms of organization from capitalist relations. 
difference of degree. 
(2a) Cf infra f.10. 
Hence I see this as a 
(2b) Paradoxically, the possibility of transition seems to depend on the ability 
of pre-capitalist economic relations to reproduce and expand their forms of 
organizations. Dobb (1976) holds a similar view - see supra f.79 in Chapter I. 
( 3) This is true for two reasons: (1) unequal exchange - (i.e. in the labour -
cost of commodities exchanged between the two sectors) - and (2) monopoly of 
price determination by the Capitalist sector. 
( 4) This is so because of legal restriction on ownership of land imposed to 
give priority to the State central economic and social planning - (Cf Land 
Settlement and Registration Act 1925, and, Land Acquisition Act 1930) - and 
also because of lack of resources for purchase of capital goods necessary for 
expansion. 
( 5) Improvement of infant mortality, and population growth do not by 
themselves - (i.e. in absence of causes mentioned under fs.3-4) explain why 
rural zones fail to accommodate their own population. 
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( 6) Kursany (1983) b. 
(60) Cf infra Part 1.B. 
(7) See supra Part 2.B.3 in Chapter I. 
( 8) Cf Snyder 1981.296 where transition is described within a theoretical 
framework that does not always imply the virtual displacement or inevitable 
destruction of all previous economic or legal forms as is sometimes suggested -
e.g. Wolpe 1980.1-3. 
( 9) Cf supra fs.44a, 75, 77 in Chapter I. 
(10) I use this phrase - (without implying any inevitability of transition) - to 
describe a level of a non-capitalist economic relation which is taxonomically 
non-capitalist as opposed to the sum total of the relation which - (because of 
its inclusion of this and other capitalist or "non-capitalist" levels) - is 
non-capitalist in the sense previously defined supra f.2. 
(11) Cf supra f.3. 
(lla) Cf infra f.64 and text above. 
(12) In the balance of the Chapter and throughout the thesis I ascribe a 
particularly dominant role for descendent political control enabling it to 
influence economic social and cultural changes. 
(13) Accounting for more than 83% of the population in Sudan in 1973 
(ILO.Sudan.1976). 
(14) For the case of the Sudan Cf Hussein 1983 Chapters I-II. 
(15) i.e. A class structure that consists of different classes of one and the 
same mode of production Cf infra f.41 and the text above. 
(16) Even when they focus on the internal class structure underdevelopment 
theorists continue denying it any specificity - (i.e. do not recognize that that 
class structure possesses its own internal motion which is alone responsible for 
its continuity). It is either a class structure defined by dependence (Dos 
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Santos 1978 p.79) or determined by dependence (Frank p.]). Amin (1976) does 
not attribute any significance to internal class structures. Cf infra fs.59-64 
and the text above. 
(160) Consequential upon this is also my agreement that the social and 
ideological appearance - or "forms of exploitation" - which a "form of economic 
relations" at enterprise level assume is not by itself enough for determining the 
specificity - (i.e. whether capitalist, feudalist or otherwise) - of "the form of 
economic relations" ••. Cf infra f.65 and the text above. 
(16b) Cf supra Parts 3-3b in Chapter I. 
(17) Banaji's analysis would have been more intelligible, but still sweepingly 
general, if its scope had been limited to the concrete situation of the Third 
World. For in that case he may, like the "underdevelopment" theorists, be 
able to claim that these laws of motion are determined by a World Capitalist 
System. Cf Peter Fitzpatrick; Law plurality and underdevelopment in D 
Sugarman (edit) Legality Ideology and The State 1983 Academic Press p.165. 
(18) There is considerable body of Third World literature on the issue of 
categorization (i.e. as Capitalist or otherwise) of the economies of that part of 
'the World. In addition to "underdevelopment" literature, which is reviewed 
next, there is modes of production approach which treats the issue as part of a 
conviction in a theory of exclusiveness, co-existence or articulation of modes of 
production. This is to be found in the works of Pierre-Philippe Rey 1973, 
Meillassoux 1972, Bradby 1975, Banaji 1977, Aidan-Foster Carter 1978, and 
Laclau 1971. However the mechanism through which capitalism preserves or 
excludes antecedent modes of production is not clear from these works. There 
is a considerable neglect of class structure and class movement as a motor of 
preservation or exclusion depending on the historical specificity of the class 
structure under consideration. Poulantzas (1974) points to class struggle as the 
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basis for conserva lion or di.'isolution of ant.ecedent modes (p. J ·J8). A min (197() 
p.77) touches on the issue when he suggests tha t capitalist accumula tion is 
exclusive oj' other modes of production if it is "autocentric" but does not go 
beyond his economic structures to answering the question of wh\' that is the 
case. Banaji (1972) and Alavi (1975) provide attempts at relating the questions 
of dominance of the capitalist mode of production and that of transition to the 
specificity of the class structure created by imposition of capitalism from 
without. Banaji's earlier remarks on the issue (Banaji 1972 pp.2498, 2502) are 
completely absent in and, in effect obscured by his subsequent works (Banaji 
1977, 1983). This leaves only Alavi as consistent defender of a theory of a 
post colonial indigenous class structure. Because of its relevcl11ce to the theme 
of my analysis Alavi's view will be dealt with later in detail. 
(19) Peter Lloyd, a Third World proletariat? 1982 George Allen and Unwin. 
Giovanni Arrighi and John S Saul Essays on the Political Economy of Africa 
Monthly Review Press 1973. L S Senghor Nationhood and The African Road to 
Socialism Presence Africane 1962 p.129. Frantz Fanon "The Wretched of the 
Earth" OP. Cit pp.122-126. 
(20) G Arrighi and J S Saul Ibid pp.105-152. 
(21) A G Frank Lumpenbourgeoisie lumpendevelopment (1972) .\10nthly Review 
Press. 
(22) Cf Hussein (1983), pp.40-48, 67-74. 
(23) Cf Nicos Poulantzas (1982) OP. Cit.pp.1 04-110. 
(24) A class is both an economic - (i.e. a relation to the economIC structure; 
an economic position) - and a political (i.e. organizational) existence. Between 
these two levels of existence lies, in case of European classe,'i. a history or 
struggle and indw.;t rial and social revolu tions which shaped European cla,')ses lT1 
their historical specificity - (i.e. with a di,<.:tinct cultural heritage and identity) -
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(Lloyd 1982). The appearance of class organizations in under-developed social 
formations was contemporaneous with the appearance of "classes" as economic 
categories. This contemporaneity of "class consciousness" with the emergence 
of the economic category is due to the role which the State Law and external 
influences have been playing in the creation of class organizations and class 
consciousness. 
(25) Alavi.1975 and Banaji 1972. 
(26) S Amin (1976) Opcit. 
(27) A G Frank (1972) Opcit.Page I. Dos Santos (1978) Opcit.p.57. 
(28) Amin 1976 pp.198-206. 
(29) This may not of course be the subjective belief of "under-development" 
theorists. However it is the conclusion destined by the logical discourse of 
their argument. 
(30) Amin 1976.pp.198-206. 
(31) Cf supra Part 2.B.1 in Chapter I. Cf infra fs.59-61 and the text above. 
(32) Cf supra f·18. 
(33) Cf e.g. infra Part 3.B. and supra f.96 and text above in Chapter I. 
'(34) Cf supra f·18. 
(35) Cf (M Glucksmann, 1974.139), (K Popper 1960.26-34, 102), (Heller, 
1984.165-168), Althusser, 1970.184, and Marx Capital I Part III Cahpter II, Value 
price and profit Part VI. Capital III Cahpter 48. 
(36) Cf also Hindess and Hirst (1975.15, 263) (1977.1-57) Cutler et al (1977), 
Banaji (1977), supra Part 2.B.3 in Chapter I, infra f·63, and (Lock, introduction, 
1976.14). 
(37) Cf supra Part 2.B.3. in Chapter I. 
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(38) "In Hegel's Philosophy of Right Civil Society includes economic relations 
- and it is in this sense that the term is used by Marx for exa mple in the 
Jewish Question • • • Gramsci 1971.208. "Production relations logically 
expressed comprise what Marx following Hegel called civil society Pashukanis 
1971. 66. 
(39) Cf supra the conclusion to Chapter I. 
(40) This diagnosis is undertaken and a similar finding is reached infra Part 2. 
Cf also supra Part 1.B. 
(41) I use this word to indicate that "non-capitalist" as defined earlier (f.2 
and text on p.2) is still an umbrella description covering various types of 
"non-capitalist" economic relations (e.g. feudal, petty commodity production 
slavery • .. ). 
(42) Superficial political participation by classes of the non-capitalist 
periphery within the social formation is of course possible e.g. by exercise of 
the franchise under a parliamentary regime. But, at least in case of the 
Sudan, this is not an effective participation. This is because (a) extension of 
the franchise to classes of the non-capitalist periphery may only, be effected 
'by a class or classes of the "Capitalist Society", and last as long as it is in 
congruence with interests of the latter classes. Otherwise the latter may 
terminate that right through military coups or general strikes; (b) although the 
political party(ies) representing classes of the non-capitalist periphery may hold 
a majority of seats in parliament there is nothing they can do to stop the 
Military from taking over or the trade unions from destabilizing and eventually 
over-throwing the political system. The Army which is the only guardian of 
pOlitical authority and itself a faction of the "State-bureaucracy" - Cf infra 
f.45 has much in common with modernizing political elements (Halpern 1963) 
than with traditional political commitment often prevalent in the non-capitalist 
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periphery. 
(43) Cf supra Part 1.B. 
(44) See supra and the text above fs.39-40. 
(45) The bureaucracy or the bureaucratic apparatus is used throughout the 
text to mean the specific system of organization and internal functioning of the 
State apparatus (bureaucratism). I use the term State apparatus in a wider 
scope to include the entire organization of production in the public sector. In 
this sense almost the wholea.capitalist society~may be construed as a 
hierarchical organization of production with its base stratum made of manual 
and non-manual workers in public employment - (constituting more than 60% of 
the workforce in Sudan) and its top stratum made of the heights of the 
bureaucracy. The ''heights of the bureaucracy" signifies the social category of 
executives in the different divisions of labour that make up the State 
apparatus. But we may note that the heights of the bureaucracy is not only 
the sum total of top positions or their occupants in each of a number of 
otherwise qualitatively equal divisions of labour or professions. The manner in 
which different profeSSions or divisions of labour are arranged is itself 
'reflective of a hierarchical organization. 
(46) Cf supra f.42 and the text above. 
(47) Although this dominance was due to expertise the fact that there was no 
"proper" classes - (i.e. no criterion, for stratification of statuses, other than 
expertise) made "possession" of expertise a temporal class position - Cf infra 
f·66b. 
(48) "Classes" necessarily means social categories defined by their relation to 
the economic structure - (this is so in Marxist theory). See Poulantzas, 1982. 
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(49) : i As relations of power - Cf supra Part 2.B.1.il in Chapter I - capitalist 
relations of production do not depend for their "expansion" on the success - (i.e. 
the achieved general social utility) - of economic undertakings. Even when 
they proletarianize peasant communities and increase inequalities such 
undertakings expand capitalist relations of production. 
(50) Pre-colonial society in the Sudan was a closed traditional one based on a 
subsistence rural economy. The advent of Islam did not change matters in this 
respect. Indeed, during the period beginning with the Fung Kingdom and up to 
the eve of the Turkiyya Islam enhanced the powers of the tribal leaders through 
the introduction of a theory of obligation based on religion (ILO Sudan 1976). 
(51) Political development since independence in Sudan is illustrative of the 
forms of alliances that are structurally possible in the context of an 
underdeveloped social formation. The Parliamentary era represents, in effect, 
a form of alliance in which a heights of the bureaucracy (i.e. Leadership cadre 
of the traditional parties which, in addition to a spiritual leader, consisted of 
professional elites) and a small capitalist class sought augmentation of their 
constitutional power through fostering an alliance with agents of the 
'Pre-capitalist periphery. The 1969-1971 Military era represents an alliance 
between a heights of the bureaucracy and the lower strata of the bureaucracy 
made possible by the adoption, as political programme, of policies promoted by 
the urban working class (In Hussein 1983). The 1971-1985 military era 
represents an alliance between a heights of the bureaucratic apparatus and a 
capitalist class. We may note, that, on occasion the working force remained 
outside the alliance the state system was defective i.e. either was too fragile 
because of its dependence on the support of agents of a pre-capitalist periphery 
in case of parliamentarianism or too coercive and rigid because of its elitism 
and superficiality - i.e. not only exclusive of participation by the working class 
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but also inherently incapable of enabling participation by agents of a 
pre-capitalist periphery in case of military dictatorship. On developments 
since independence in Ghana Cf (Damachi 1974). For a comparison with other 
African States Cf (Davies 1966). Sudanese experience could also support a 
thesis that the prevalence, at any given time in the history of a particular 
social formation, of one form of alliance or another is to a great extent 
influenced by - inter alia - the extent of destruction of pre-capitalist economy 
and proletarianization of peasant communities. This is a major factor because 
it affects rural urban migration and thereby intensifies contradiction among 
classes of the capitalist society through its effect on employment opportunities 
wages and conditions of employment and the social conditions of the urban 
population in general. 
(52) Cf infra f.55 and, supra subtitle 2.A. 
(53) Cf supra f.42 and the text above. 
(54) The credit goes to Alavi (Alavi 1972) for introducing an idea of 
overdevelopment in the analyses of the State in post-colonial societies. 
However I borrow the appellation to describe a state apparatus whose 
superiority is due to its nature as a level of existence of economic relations 
(i.e. capitalist economic relations) which are historically superior to other 
economic relations in the social formation. This "overdevelopment", therefore, 
affects class struggle and the class structure (i.e. because these are, in the 
final analysiS, limited by their specific underlying economic relations) and, is, in 
turn reproduced by them. 
(55) State bureaucracy in underdeveloped social formation may be considered 
as a level of a sub-system of distribution (i.e. of roles in production and shares 
of the product) which was set by the metropolitan states to fit a system of 
distribution of the means of production they had imposed on the colony. 
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Despite the frequent changes to which the system 01 distribution of the means 
of production has from time to time in the post independence era (e.g. through 
na tiona liza tion, de-na tiona liza tion, socia liza tion) been sub jec ted, the 
bureaucratic apparatus, as a level of a sub-system of distribution has retained 
its main characteristics. As a moulding pre-existing level of a sub-system of 
distribution bureaucratic organization may impose constraints on the potential 
of a change of the system of distribution of the means of production. The 
bureaucratized socio-technical division of labour is thus at the heart of 
Capitalist exploitation and may, even in a supposedly socialist economy, operate 
to generate a new bourgeoisie - Cf Lock, introduction 1976. 9-22. 
(56) Concluding from an analyses of the Sudanese situation, Kursany (Kursany 
1983) wrote: "The absence of both political and economic democracy in 
"under-developed capitalist countries" is largely responsible for the parasitic 
capitalist class which depends on the bureaucratic apparatus of the State for its 
very existence as well as for increasing its income and rate of capital 
accumulation". With due respect, although there is a parasitic capitalist class 
which depends on the bureaucratic apparatus, it is in the first place the 
'dominance of a state apparatus which makes that parasitism possible, and, in 
the second place, decree the absence of political and economic democracy, and 
not the vice-versa. The fact that a system of liberal democracy - (which 
Kursany sees as the solution Ibid.p.122) - had twice been imposed but failed to 
stop the military from taking over or the State apparatus from being infested 
with "parasitic capitalists" (Cf Mahmoud 1983 p.113) suggest that absence of 
political and economic democracy is a mere phenomenon. 
(57) Cf infra f.63 and the text above. 
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(58) Cf supra fs.25-30 and text above. For additional empirical data sources 
Cf (Mehmet 1978) Adelman and Morris 1973), (ILO 1973) and (Chennery et al 
1974). 
(59) Thus A G Frank (1972.1) defines underdevelopment as "product of 
bourgeois policy formulated in response to class interests and class structure 
which are in turn determined by dependence! See also Dos Santos 1978 f.69 
p.79. 
(60) Cf Limqueco and McFarlane et al (1983). 
(61) Consequential upon this is my disagreement with the thesis that 
dependence is eternal. This is a view theorists of underdevelopment hold -
(Amin 1976.351-364) (Dos Santos 1978 f.69 p.79) and Frank 197 1967 (1969) -
because of their attribution of dependence to factors external to the 
underdeveloped social formation. 
(62) This is possible because of the role, heights of the bureaucracy play in 
preponderating these interests Cf supra pp.35, and infra f.67 and the text 
above. 
(63) I believe that unless it is shown to be based on movement engendered by 
'Class struggle within that mode, the view of a mode of production as a living 
organism which can "dissolve" "articulate with" or "dominate" other modes 
becomes a symptom of a simplistically economistic approach - (Cf supra Part 
2.B.3 in Chapter I, and, Lock, introduction 1976.14) - and a fictitious 
anthropomorphism. See supra f.18. 
(64) i.e. Subjected to Capitalist exploitation whilst lacking the forms of 
organiza tion essen tial for enabling the m to negotia te the terms of tha t 
subjection. Explanation of the persistence of pre-capitalist forms of 
organization on grounds of resiliency of pre-capitalist modes of production (Rey 
1973) is naive, because it assumes that this persistence is self-imposed whilst 
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the truth is that it is an intensification of existing backward forms of 
exploitation brought upon rural communities by operation of forces - (classes 
within the "Capitalist Society") - external to them - see (Banaji, 1972.2499 and 
f.1l) and (Banaji, 1977-8). 
(65) For further discussion of this and of the theoretical plurality of social 
forms Cf infra fs.82-91 and the text above. 
(66) Many articles are written and different views scattered here and there 
are expressed on the subject of the State in post-colonial societies - (Cf in 
particular: Pompermayer and Smith 1973, O'Brien 1976, Leys 1975, 1976, 
Longdon 1977, Evans 1979, Ziemann and Lanzendorfer 1977, Saul 1974. The 
approaches adopted range from underdevelopment and dependency theories to 
bureaucracy, overdevelopment and class analysis - (revie"Wd in Snyder 1980). 
Despite the different approaches adopted relative autonomy of the State in 
post-colonial societies is seen as the booty which the many contributors share 
out among themselves - see Roxborough 1979 p.119 where the general 
acceptance of a theory of relative autonomy is reiterated. (A) The analyses of 
those who took underdevelopment or dependency theory is to a great extent 
tainted with the economism of that paradigm. From this perspective Evers 
theory (Evers 1975) is an example of the fantasies social science will end at if 
"dependency" and "underdevelopment" presuppositions are to be the ultimate 
terms of reference • •• Cf Ziemann and Lanzendorfer Ibid p.160. Ziemann and 
Lanzendorfer provide an extended enumeration of characteristics of the 
peripheral state but unfortunately floating without an organizing theoretical 
theme. This is so because they approved - (in agreement with Evers; in 
Ziemann and Lanzendorfer Ibid footnote 112) ruling out the relevance of the 
internal class structure and preferred to extrapolating - (as all theorists of the 
Dependent State do) instead from changes in a supposedly international 
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(B) My conclusion regarding the group whose organizing theme is bureaucracy _ 
(Fanon 1967, Meillassoux 1970, Mamdani 1975, Shivji 1976, Seidmann 1978) is 
that the bureaucracy cannot be conceived of as a ruling class or an effective 
class except when this status is awarded on the basis of an economic position 
the "heights" of the bureaucracy are shown to occupy, and, on the 
understanding that the heights of the bureaucracy rules from this position not 
as a bureaucracy but as a class i.e. their power derives, not from a relation to 
the non-economic bureaucratised structure, but, from the economic position 
which their occupation of a bureaucratic function, in a class structure peculiar 
to underdeveloped social formations, enables them to enjoy. See also infra 
f·51o 
(67) These are: (a) the State in post-colonial societies is not the instrument 
of a single class. "None of the three propertied classes dominates the State 
apparatus or subordinate the other two Alavi Ibid pp. 71, 62; (b) once the 
controlling hand of the metropolitan bourgeoisie is lifted at the moment of 
independence no single class has exclusive command over the bureaucratic 
"military oligarchy; (c) the far-reaching interventions by the State in the 
economies of post-colonial countries both by way of a network of control in 
which the vested interests of the bureaucracy are embedded and a direct 
appropriation and disposition of substantial proportion of the economic surplus. 
(68) Alavi does not expressly suggest this nor is it clearly implied by his 
analysis. This being the case it is not at all clear why the 
bureaucratic/military Oligarchy should remain autonomous. Relative autonomy 
of the State is a class relation i.e. a configuration of powers and counter\'ailing 
powers of classes. Alavi by depriving his military/bureaucratic oligarchy of a 
class base undermines the grounds on which he may argue for an autonomy of 
the State. If the State is a baseless superstructure in an admittedly class 
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society what chances are there against its manipulation by anyone of the 
classes in that society? If we accept that the State is overdeveloped in 
relation to the classes which Alavi recognizes, what chances are there against 
manipulation by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy of the State to serve its 
interest as a class? 
(69) Autonomy of the State vis-a-vis dominant classes can only be established 
by the antecedent proof of its autonomy in relation to the dominated classes. 
This is the essence of relativity of State autonomy. 
(70) Alavi recognizes a mutual co-existence and a convergence of interests of 
the propertied classes (Alavi Ibid pp.74-75). He also accepts that the common 
commitment of preserving the social order unites the three propertied classes 
and brings the military-bureaucratic oligarchy within their social matrix (Alavi 
Ibid p.72). 
(71) Following an approach of class analysis other writers - (Leys 1975), 
(O'Brien 1976) have also arrived at the conclusion that the State in African 
social formations is relatively autonomous. Leys for instance by assimilating 
the position in Kenya - (though he does not limit the outcome of his analysis to 
'Kenya) - to that one, analysed by Marx (M ESW 1962), which prevailed in France 
during the first decades of the second half of the 19th Century, (Marx Ibid 
p.243) proposes that the leader in an African State is not the agent of anyone 
class but enjoys a measure of independence. The analogy of the Kenyan State 
to that of 19th Century France is far-fetched. This is so because, 
Bonapartism was a phenomenon of the Capitalist type of State in whose social 
formation the dominance of the CMP was already established. The rela ti\'e 
autonomy of the Bonapartist State was not a negation of bourgeois hegemony in 
19th Century France (Poulantzas 1982 p.258). It was rather a situation in 
which the economically - cum ideologically hegemonic class (the bourgeoisie) 
temporarily lost control of the centralized State due to the strictly political 
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struggle of the dominated classes. 
(72) See supra f.51 the comment on, Leys 1975. Alavi's theory of the 
overdeveloped post-colonial State is original. But his visualization of a 
"relative autonomy" that could stand independently of the configuration of 
powers and countervailing powers of classes within the social formation is in 
line with Poulantza's theorization of an inherently relatively autonomous 
Capitalist State - Cf supra f.86 Chapter I. See also how this tendency is 
manifest in discussions presented by Roxborough 1979.118-122. 
(73) For definition of "historical determination" Cf supra, Part 2.B.3 in 
Chapter I. 
(74) 0' Donnell (1980.717) has also noticed that the industrial bourgeoisie and 
its counterpart - the industrial working class - have in underdeveloped countries 
resulted from public policies. 
(75) Cf infra the Conclusion to Chapter III. 
(76) i.e. "balance of power" as defined infra f·98. 
(77) Cf infra f.106 and the text above Cf also (Althusser, 1977.135-141). 
(78) This is because, I believe, these bureaucratized controls are creatures of 
a class structure that is not conducive to autonomy. This could of course also 
be proved, at a less abstract level, by empirical data showing the share each 
one of these superstructures gets in social control (taking as specific example 
labour relations) and their tendency to overlap and sometimes merge into 
political control at the expense of public (democratic or plural) - and judicial 
controls. These are issues extensively covered in the balance of the thesis. 
(79) Cf supra f.41 and the text above. 
(80) (Bryde, 1976) also speaks about a "pluralistic African legal system" (Ibid 
116), but uses the terms loosely to imply heterogeneity without necessarily 
implying a pluralistic ideology - (i.e. a belief in a theoretical plurality of modes 
of production and social forms). In many places the impression gi\'en is that 
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"customary law" is receding (Ibid p.110, 113). He approaches the survival of 
"customary law" and "official law" from the angle of their compatibility or 
imcompatibility with modernization and development planning (Ibid. 1 08-123). 
(80a) The number of page given in reference to (Fitzpatrick 1983(b)) designates 
not the number of page in the AJLS but in a mimeograph of the manuscript. 
(81) Only a terminological distinction is offered between "plurality" and 
"pluralism" (Fitzpatrick 1983.160). Conceptually however the two are not 
taxonomically different. The former opposes that all social forms are 
reducible to the economic structure the latter opposes that State power is 
reducible to that of a class whose dominance is determined by the economic 
structure - (Cf infra f·96) - they are in effect one theory of plurality at two 
different levels of social relations. 
(82) Determination by the economic structure does not of course mean that 
different series of social phenomena do not possess their own internal logic and 
intelligibility as synchronic totalities. There is no contradiction between 
economic determination and possession of these characteristics. This is 
specially so if it is born in mind that evolutionist socio-economism has a 
systematic character - (i.e. it is a synchronic diachronic process). Cf Jakobson 
and Tyanyanov 1966.60. Cf supra f.30 in Chapter I. 
(83) Cf Glucksmann, 1974.167, Clarke, 1981.223-235, and supra f.30 in 
Chapter I. 
(830) "The materialist conception of history is monistic as far as the origin of 
various social phenomena is concerned." Plekhanov; for the sixtieth 
anniversary of Hegel's DeathJSelected Philosophical WorksJ Trans. R Dixon Vol.I., 
Moscow s.a. pp.455-83. Quoted in Jordan (1967).342,Cf supra f·27a in Chapter 
I. 
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(84) Cf supra Part I, and also, for the connection of economic and social 
relations, supra Part 3.B.1 of Chapter I. 
(85) It is no surprise that such evidence came overwhelmingly from 
anthr~pologiSts - (Cf Fitzpatrick 1983.164) - such as Meillassoux Study of the 
Curo in the Ivory Coast, Pollet and Winter Study of the Soninke in Mali .•. Cf 
pp.289, 331 of David Seddon 1978 et ale Cf also Bradby (1975).146 and Wolpe 
(1980) et ale 
(86) Fitzpatrick 1983.160. 
(86a) Cf supra the text above footnote (103a) in Chapter I. 
(87) Cf supra f.2(b) and the text above. 
(88) Cf supra footnote 60 and the text above and Part 3.B.1 all in Chapter I. 
(89) Cf supra Part 2.B.3 in Chapter I. 
(90) Cf supra the Conclusion to Chapter I. 
(91) Cf supra Parts 3-3B in Chapter I. 
(92) Cf Althusser 1976.47-54. 
(93) The fact that a legal administration and a comprehensive body of 
legislation (which was in fact a codification of English Common Law precedents 
" or a copy of English legislation; at least in cases of the Sudan India and 
Nigeria) - were introduced from the earliest days as part of a bureaucratized 
administration, which for the first time extended a central authority over these 
social formations, as we know them now by their political boundaries, enabled 
colonial law not only to be the dominant law but also a symbol of 
modernization and unity to which the post-colonial nationalist leadership, aware 
of the ethnical heterogeneity of the national formation, strongly adhered 
(Mustafa 1970, Lutfi 1968). Colonial law included laws aiming at regulation of 
relations whose underlying economic structure was brought in on a large scale 
by colonialism itself (e.g. Administrative Law, Commercial Codes, Labour Law). 
Also it included laws which appropriated for themselves fields of application 
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which, although existed before colonialism, were, be~ause of their existence at 
"high levels of socialization", deemed too universal to be left to the diversity 
of local customs. As part of Sudanese customary law the Sharia rules of 
criminal law, were in this respect substituted by a penal code incorporating the 
English Criminal Law of precedents. Moreover the authority of English 
precedents in all fields was established as part of the Sudanese legal tradition 
by a first generation of judges and lawyers who were predominantly British and 
subsequent generations of Sudanese judges and lawyers trained in the tradition 
of the English Common Law. The binding effect of English precedents was 
and is still being upheld sometimes at the expense of customary law. In fact 
legislation itself, either through its comprehensiveness or sometimes express 
provision (55.5, 9. CJO 1929) curtailed the incorporation of local custom. 
Akolawn 1968.230 
(94) For a different view of the origins and perspectives of "British Industrial 
Relations pluralism Cf Hyman, 1978.16-40. 
(95) But see Wedderburn, 1983.61 where it is suggested that "the debate 
about industrial democracy suggested again, however, that Kahn-Freund did not 
'espouse pluralism only as a method of explaining what happens (as he claimed 
in 1977)". 
(96) The different theories of pluralism (i.e. classical-liberal; neoliberal and 
neocorporatist) subscribe to a broad premiss that dilute State political power 
into a pluralist multiplicity of decision centres between which "equilibrium" is 
automatically realized by the concertation of the various "power groupings" or 
"pressure groups" or "de facto powers" - (enterprises, trade unions, consumer 
organizations) representing the economic forces of an "integrated" society 
(Laski 1931, 1948) (Kaiser 1956). On the concept of pluralism, it is necessary 
to remember that it does not merely serve to designate a multi-party political 
system as opposed to a one-party system, but that it is also extended to a 
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whole "integrationist" conception of the sociai' system in its ensemble 
(Poulantzas 1982 p.266). For a liberal pluralistic perspective of the system of 
industrial relations Cf (Kerr 1955). 
(97) One commentator - (R Hyman 1982.100) - has in this respect observed a 
contrast evident in some pluralist writings between commitment to a pluralistic 
conception of industrial relations and their value-judged views about the 
possibility or desirability of conflict reconciliation in this field. This is also 
evident in FOx;s 1979.107 reply to Wood and Elliott (1977). COincidentally this 
is a tendency which has also been noticed to exist in some earlier sociologist 
writings - (e.g. Weber's) in Giddens, 1971.190). 
(98) It is important, from my perspective, to distinguish between a balance of 
power and an equilibrium of power. I use "equilibrium of power" to conno!e 
equality or inequality of peoples relations to the means of production. In this 
sense a capitalist society rests on a disequilibrium of power. A "balance of 
power" is used to connote a definite stage of the class struggle in a capitalist 
society as manifested in specific concessions and compromises that have to be 
made, at this stage, on the terms and conditions governing the relations of 
"distribution in society so that the society may continue to maintain its 
integrity. A balance of power in this sense does not need for its existence an 
underlying equilibrium of power. A balance of power (or an artificial or 
ideological equilibrium or consensus of social phenomena) does exist in a 
capitalist society in spite of the underlying disequilibrium of power in that 
society because the dominant section in that society from a position of 
hegemony "coerce" the rest of society not only into accepting that 
disequilibrium as a fact of life but even into smugging in that acceptance and 
seeking to maintain the status quo. The visualization by pluralism of a 
balance of power, in so far as that meant to indicate an observed o\'erall 
willingness on the part of all classes and organizations to compromise and make 
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concessions, is justified. Clegg holds that the pluralist ethics does not 
postulate a balance of power (Clegg 1975.315). Yet for a consistent- reading of 
Clegg's argument - (Cf Ibid 310-311) I assume that he is actually dismissing 
postulation of what I define as an "equilibrium of power". From a different 
perspective Hyman 1978 distinguishes between procedural rights and substantive 
interests arguing that, students of British Industrial Relations pluralism, 
evaluate the former far above the latter. I do not consider this as challenging 
the proof of the overall phenomenal willingness. Although emphasis on 
procedural rights does play down the significance of fW1damental and continuous 
antagonism of interests. The fact that conflicts supposedly manifesting this 
antagonism arise in such a manner as to make them resolvable within existing 
procedural arrangements, means that the fW1damentality of this antagonism is 
not yet reflected by trade W1ion industrial and political practice. As a science 
of praxis "industrial relations pluralism" should not be blamed for playing down 
an aspect that is not sufficiently manifest in practice. 
(99) The emphasis by pluralists and critics on morality or immorality of a 
pluralist conviction obscures the fact that the objection to pluralism is not only 
an "ideological" one - (i.e. is not only based on the value-judged benefit or 
detriment it might bring for a particular class or for society). Pluralism as a 
political and legal theory is W1acceptable in the first place not because it is, or 
it is not the manager's ideology or because it did or did not cover and sanctify 
class inequalities of power or because of the reformist ideology it does or does 
not imply - (Goldthorpe 1977, Fox 1974.282, Miliband 1969.155-156, and Clegg 
1975). Before that and apart from all these questions, and they are all 
important, pluralism is W1acceptable because as a theory it misidentifies what 
is phenomenal for what is real and overestimates the epistemological value of 
the former. 
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(100) I use the phrase politico-economic - (i.e. economic relations in their 
crude political manifestation) - forms to distinguish third world classes and 
political forms from their European counterparts which are "socio-economic" 
forms - (centralized or organized forms of existing social relations which - (i.e. 
the latter) are in their turn economic relations in their social manifestation). 
The intention is to distinguish between political organizations - (parties 
governments trade unions) - which, are superficial levels of underlying social 
layers in a developed capitalist society in which they exist, and, together with 
these layers and their economic infrastructure constitute a socio-economic 
form, and the political organizations, of an underdeveloped social formation, 
which have no developed, crystalized underlying social base, and, economic 
infrastructure. The latter are original and their existence and practices are 
susceptible to and give more space for human intervention. See supra fs.24 in 
this Chapter and supra Part 2.B.2 of Chapter I. 
(101) It is usually the case that after every political change the civil service is 
purged. This was the case in 1958, 1964, 1969, 1971 and 1985 in Sudan. The 
objective is to implant in the bureaucratic hierarchies elements whose loyalties 
are certain. These purges are by no means limited to levels above permanent 
under secretaries. Some have noticed that party governments during the 
parliamentary era were also guilty of such practices - (Mahmoud 1983) (El 
Tayeb 1967). 
(102) Cf supra fs.44a, 75 and 77 in Chapter I. 
(103) Cf infra fs.164-169 and the text above in Chapter III. 
(104) Cf supra the Conclusion to Chapter I. 
(lOS) Cf supra Part 3.B.3 in Chapter I. 
(l06) Cf supra Part 2.A of Chapter I. 
LV 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
,I 
(107) This is also a specific application of the general methodological principle 
- (supra Part 2.A of Chapter I) - that explanation of one set of phenomena by 
another does not deprive either of the m of its internal characteristics. 
(l08) For definition of, and, the distinction drawn between "balance" and 
"equilibrium" of power Cf supra f.98. 
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( COLLECTIVE LMnR RELATIONS AND TJ;iE LAN ) 
(I) Cf supra Part 3.B.3, and the Conclusion in Chapter I. 
(W Cf infra the Conclusion to this Chapter. 
(ID) Cf supra fs.56-65 and the text above in Chapter II. 
(IV) This proposition is founded on the theoretical discussion made in 
parts 2 and 3.B of Chapter II. However it is also substantiated at a less 
abstract level, by empirical materials discussed in this Chapter, Chapter 
IV and Part 4.B of Chapter V. 
(V) Cf supra Part 2.A -2. C.2 and fs.82-83 and the text above in 
Chapter II. 
(VI) (Hussein 1983.6, Chapter II) (Willard A Beling 1968) (A Gladstone 
1980) (Damachi 1974 90-107) (Ioan Davies 1966). 
(VII) Cf earlier comment that the State apparatus is overdeveloped in 
relation to the urban classes - Chapter II Part 2.B.1. 
( 1) Civil Secretary Circular No.CS/37/A12 19.8.1946, in Fawzi 1957 
p.26. 
(2) Sudan Monthly Records Feb-March 1946 in Fawzi Ibid p.33. 
( 3) Fawzi - (Ibid pp.26-33) - mentions as reasons behind this little 
success: (a) these committees "were to operate in a situation where no 
tradition of Labour organization or Labour management relations existed" 
Ibid p.26; (b) "opposition from private employers . .. " Ibid pp.28-29; (c) 
"wages and terms of service were, to the disappointment of employees, 
outside the committees I jurisdiction ••• " Ibid p.28; (d) "refusal of some 
workers to participate in the formation or work of the committees ... " 
Ibid p.28. 
(3a) Trade Union Ordinance 1949 S.5 (15.3.1949). 
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( 4) S.C. Development of Trade Unions and Organization of Labour 
(mimeographed Khartoum s.a. quoted in Beshir 1978.194; Abu IS$a, 
1981.1-24 and (Hussein 1983.118-120). 
( 5) Cf supra f100 and the text above in Chapter II. 
( 6) For a comparison with the distinction, adopted in Western Europe 
and the USA, between economic and political action Cf, Wedderburn 
1972.320-23) (L J McFarlane 1981.452-59) (C Morris 1982.27). 
( 7) Fawzi (1957) pp.65, 92. 
( 8) The characteristics of this orientation and instrumentalization of 
legislation for its achievement are described in Hussein 1983.117-120. 
( 9) Cf supra Part 3.B of Chapter II. 
(9a) In the words of one commentator, "The Western conception of 
human rights that gave birth to freedom of association implies curtailing 
the powers of the State so as to ensure maximum individual freedom and 
the recognition of collective rights in a pluralist society . . • Perhaps 
that conception may be superseded by another which frequently prevails 
in countries that are late developers • " (Caire 1977.109). 
(9b) Cf Table A and B. 
(1O)I~hllFreund and Hepple see that strikes are not prohibited in 
democratic countries because inter alia they are a social necessit~afn 
-Freund and Hepple 1972.4-9), see also Wedderburn 1971.340-344 - or that 
such a prohibition would be ineffective. The so-called less pragmatic 
arguments against prohibition of strikes - "i.e. the equilibrium argument, 
the autonomy argument, the voluntary labour argument, and the 
psychological argument - are not conditions of existence of a right to 
strike. They are simply different ideological perceptions of that 
existence and justifications through which it came to be accepted as a 
right - Cf Davies and Freedland 1984.694. 
(11) 
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This is of course the position in Sudan. Compare with the 
voluntariness and purpose of Registration and Certification under British 
Law - In Davies and Freedland 1984.171-178 and Elias Napier and 
Wallington 1980.28-29. The office of a Registrar of Trade Unions with 
powers inter alia to refuse registration in circumstances similar to those 
discussed below (infra Part 1.A.1) exists in many under-developed 
countries (Erstling 1977.26-28). The extent and purpose of the control 
which this office exerts depend in each case on the orientation of Labour 
legislation of the particular country. 
(12) 55.9(1) of the TUO 1949 and the TUO 1966 limit the number of 
members who could apply to form a trade union at a minimum of 10. 
Section 9(1) of the 1960 TUO fixed the minimum eligible for application 
at 50. 55.25(2) and 26(2) of the 1971 ETUA and the 1977 ETUA 
respectively require that application should be made by members of a 
provisional committee elected by employees desirous of forming a trade 
union. 
(13) Since the Ordinances did not specify who could object to an 
application and who could not, presumably anyone could. 
(14) 5ee also 55.9/28 of the ETUA 1971 and now 55.9/29 of ETUA 
1977 which are similar to previous sections. 
(15) Identical with Section 28(c) of the ETUA 1971 and the present 
SS.29(c) of the ETUA 1977. 
(16) Under 55.31(1) and 32(1) of the 1971 and the 1977 ETUA's 
respectively power to make regulations vests with the Minister of Public 
Service. The colonial trade union ordinance - the TUO 1949 - required 
that all such regulations be laid before the House of Parliament. 
However this proviso was repealed by the 1958 Military Government and 
:JJ 
never resurrected not even by the Parliamentary Government Trade 
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Union Ordinance 1966 (TUO 1966). CF S.20 of the TUa 1966 and 
55.14(1) of the TUO 1960. 
(17) The High Court r.mder SS.14 of the TUa 1949 and its 1960 and 
1966 Amendments. The same Court r.mder 55.30(2) of the ETUA 1971. 
But the Court of Appeal r.mder the ETUA 1977 55.25(4), Cf infra Part 
1.A.3. 
(18) To meet the government's demands the SWTUF ought to have 
dissolved and reorganized itself into three separate federations. The 
motive behind the governments' move was pOlitical, namely to weaken 
the 5WTUF opposition to their policies. Cf Taha 1970 125-140 and 
Hussein, 1983.76,92. Cf infra f.53 and the text above. 
(18a) Taha, 1970.132; Hussein, 1983.94. 
(18b) Warburg, 1978.110; Taha, 1970.113; Hussein, 1983.82-83; Cf infra 
text above f.23. 
(19) Registration of trade unions striking for political objectives could 
be cancelled on ground of "unlawfulness of objective" under the Tua 
1949 SS.18(1)(b) because the dispute is not a trade dispute under the 
RTDO 1949 SS.2(5). In Jr.me 1961 the Sudan Railway Workers Trade 
Union (SR WTU) was dissolved just 3 days before launching a strike. 
Although the Military Government claimed that the strike was political it 
did not bother to invoke these relevant sections of the law as 
justification for the dissolution. Parliamentary Governments although 
preserved these powers of dissolution for political strikes did not use 
them. To some of the strikes that they regarded as political the 
Parliamentary Governments reacted instead by invocation of criminal 
sanctions and mass dismissals; Hussein 1983.106 f.88, El Rai El Am 10-15 
June 1966; and Fawzi, 1957.116. Cf supra text above f.18a and infra text 
above f.22. 
(20) 
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Cf Hussein, 1983.108-112, 142-145, 165-166. This gives a 
description of the changes that took place and their implication for .the 
trade unions. 
(21) Cf section 18(1)-e of the TUO 1960 and SS. 6(1)/31 (a) of the 
present ETUA 1977 read with S.17 of the State Security Act 1973 and its 
1981 amendment. See also Resolution of the Registrar of Trade Unions 
No.RTO/TU/32/V:1/4/1984 in Sudan Government -v- The Doctors Trade 
Union. See El Sahafa 1/4/1984 and 2/4/1984. 
(22) Cf RTDA 1966. S.28. 
(23) Cf El Sheikh 1967, Taha 1970.113 and G Warburg 1978.110. 
(24) Accountants and Cashiers Trade Union -v- The Officials and 
Professionals Trade Unions Federation CA/CV.RV/89/1980 "unreported". 
Quotation translated from original text (in Arabic) per El Asad CAJ 
pp.12-13. For a more recent example see the events that preceded 
accompanied the Registrar of Trade Union decision - No. RTU/TU/32/V: 
1/4/1984 - dissolving The Doctors Trade Union in El Sahafa 1-2 April 
1984. 
(25) These are: (1) the Timing of Workers Trade Union Elections 
Regula tion 1975, 1979; (2) the Timing of Officials and Professionals 
Trade Union Elections Regulation 1975, 1981, 1982; and (3) the Conduct 
of Trade Union Elections Regulation 1983. 
(26) Sudan Government (Ministry of Health) -v- The Doctors Trade 
Union 1984 Ibid Registrar of Trade Unions -v- The Taxi Drivers Trade 
Union 1975 SLJR 132, and Accountants and Cashiers Trade Union -v- The 
Federation of Officials and Professionals Trade Unions - 1980 Ibid. 
(27) Teachers Trade Union -v- The Registrar sc/ev. CASS/246.1982, 
Mohamed Babikir Omer -v- The Registrar A C/CV.RV /402/1982. 
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(28) Cf SSe 9-13 ETUA 1977 and SS.28-30 ETUA 1971. 
(29) Cf on the one hand, The Accountants and Cashiers Trade Union 
-v- The Federation of Officials and Professionals Trade Unions - (1980) 
Ibid, Sudan Government (Ministry of Health) -v- The Doctors Trade Union 
(1984) Ibid, and on the other Mechanical Transport Workers (Sectional) 
Trade Union -v- M T Workers Trade Union CA/CV.RV /546/1982, and The 
Marine Ports Workers Trade Union -v- El Shiekh Yousif and Others 
CA/CV.RV /23/1981. 
(30) Cf A wad A/Gadir -v- The Registrar of Trade Unions and The 
Ministry of Transport AC/CV.RV/13/1983. 
(31) Cf The Registrar -v- The Railway Workers Trade Union 
SC/CV.CASS/154/1978, and, Mohamed Ahmed A/El-Mannan -v- The 
Customs Officers Trade Union RTU/TU/75/1982. 
(32) Supra f.17 and the text above. 
(33) Cf SS.14 and 18(4) of the TUO 1949 and the TUO 1966. 
(34) SS.14 and 18(4) of the TUO 1960 and SS.5, 8 of the TUO 
(Amendment) Act 1960. As to the legal position regarding privilege of 
official documents Cf; K Vasdev Law of Evidence in the Sudan OUP 
1980. 
(35) SS.28(2) and 30(2) of the ETUA 1971. 
(36) Cf infra. Chapter V Part 4.B. 
(37) Registrar of Trade Unions -v- The Taxi Drivers Trade Union 
SC/CV.CASS/230/1975. The Supreme Court considered that the ETUA 
1971 was a statement of the Law before the promulgation of the PCS 
1973 and the CPA 1974 and accordingly ruled that the proviso did not 
oust its jurisdiction to review the Province Court decision (37). The 
decision was a mere procedural adaptation of the ETUA 1971 to the 
subsequent Statutes and was therefore in accordance with the Law. 
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(38) ETUA 1977 SS.25(4). 
(38a) Cf infra f.43 and the text above. 
(39) The Explanatory Memorandum to the 1977 ETUA S.25(3) reads 
"We saw that the Registrar decisions should be treated as judicial 
decisions .•• and executable as such before the Court." 
(40) National Water Authority Workers Trade Union -v- The Minister 
of Public Service - (SC. CV. CASS-150-1980). The Applicants petition for 
a judicial review of the Registrar's decision was dismissed by the Court 
because, in its view, "The Registrar performs a judicial function and its 
decisions are appealable against not as administrative decisions, but, as 
judicial judgments". But see also The Marine Ports Workers Trade Union 
-v- El Shiekh Yousif and Others (1981) Ibid where the Eastern Court of 
Appeal albeit aware of the above Supreme Court decision ruled that the 
Registrar is "a mere public official". Quotations translated from 
original text in Arabic. The ldlter decision coincides with an earlier 
Khartoum Court of Appeal decision in the Accountants and Cashiers 
Trade Union (1980) Case Ibid. 
(41) TUO 1949 S.7, TUO 1964 S.7 an the ETUA 1977 SS.25(1). 
(42) Following the abolition of the Ministry of Public Service in 1981 
the Registrar has since then been subordinated to the Attorney General. 
(43) The Customs and Excise Officers Trade Union -v- The Department 
of Customs and Excise (1978) SLMR.70. Cf. also Hussein 1983.196-200. 
(44) Obiter Dictum per Saddig Selman CA.J in the Customs and Excise 
Officers Trade Union Case Ibid. Cf Hussein 1983.Ibid. 
(45) Hussein 1983.196-200. In the CustomS and Excise Officers' 
case the Court of Appeal rejected the application for execution of the 
Registrar's decision because in the opinion of the Court "it is for the 
Registrar to enforce its own decisions or seek their enforcement through 
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application to the Civil Courts" Ibid p.73. Because the defendant in this 
case - (i.e. the Customs and Excise Department) - is a public sector unit, 
the Registrar - (itself being a government department) - cannot possibly 
take the matter to the Civil Courts. Disputes between government 
departments can only be referred to the Attorney General. For further 
discussion of these procedural impediments on public employees and the 
means of enforcement available to the Attorney General itself Cf. infra 
Parts 4.A - 4.D of Chapter 4. 
(46) Cf Prosecution No.34/1975 Kober Police Headquarters; Sudan 
Government (Registrar of Trade Unions) -v- The Managing Director of 
National Footwear Company Limited. For a whole year after the 
prosecution the employer was never summoned or questioned and there is 
no evidence that he was in subsequent years. What is certain is that 
the 24 Trade Union Officials and members dismissed by him in defiance 
of the law were never reinstated. Cf file no. LO/KN/37/IR/71 Volume II. 
(400) ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recomm~ndations, Report 111 Part IV para 31 
International Labour Conference 43rd session Geneva 1959. Q. in Erstling 
1977.27-28. 
(46b) Cf infra; summary to Part 4. C of Chapter 4; and Part 4.B of 
Chapter 5. 
(47) Executive encroachment upon judicial independence when there is 
a conflict between the two is of common occurrence, not only in Sudan, 
but, in several other under-developed countries. For examples, of such 
encroachment, from Uganda, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania Cf· African 
Research Bulletins Nos. (72)p. 2608C, (70)p.1741B, (69)1479C. Cf Bryde 
1976.69. In certain other African countries a duty of the judges to 
"obey" the interests of the revolution is incorporated in the constitution 
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and enforceable in practice by disciplining of judges who fail to do so. Cf 
Article 62 of Algerian Constitution. Cf also cases of Guinea and Ethiopia 
in Bryde 1976.68. 
(470) This is subject to the explanation given supra; Paragraph below 
note 31. 
(48) Article 5.ILO; The Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize Convention 1948. Cf supra Tables A and B. 
(49) Ibid Articles 1, 7 and 8(2). 
(490) On the influence of this factor on the orientation of Sudanese 
trade unions Cf Hussein, 1983.48-49. Until now the Public Sector in 
Sudan employs 58% of total employment in the modern sector of the 
economy, Cf Abdin, 1983.2 and infra Part l.B of Chapter 4. 
(50) TUO 1949 SS.27(1) "No employee of the Public Services might be 
a member of a union not catering exclusively for such employees and 
SS.27(2) "Unions of employees of the Public Sector shall not federate 
affiliate or participate in joint action with any other Union comprising 
members not employed in the public services or with any political 
. t· " orgamza zan • • • • 
(51) Negotiation of self-Government had commenced earlier from 1946 
Cf Beshir 1974.170. 
(52) Fawzi 1957.112-121. 
(53) On 14.2.1952 the Legal Secretary reiterated before the Legislative 
Assembly: "If a strike were called otherwise than by the individual unions 
themselves all the persons participating in the strike would be liable to 
legal proceeding". Minutes of Legislative Assembly Session 14.2.1952 Q. 
in Fawzi 1957.106. 
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CHAPTER 3 
(54) Cf The Umma 18.3.1956 and El Rai El Amm 18.3.1956. Cf Fawzi 
1957.107, 
(55) Cf Hussein 1983.60 f.88; H Kitchen 1959.16. 
(56) The TUO 1960 contained several provisions aiming exactly at this 
, 
objective. Section 2 of the Ordinance excluded classified officials and 
unclassified employees of the Government from forming trade unions. 
Likewise SS.9, 27 of the Ordinance confined the right of association to 
workers engaged in firms employing more than 50 workers thereby 
depriving 60% of the workforces of their right to organize - Hussein 
1983.80. 
(57) Hussein 1983.154-162, 80. 
(57a) Cf also Hussein 1983.79-85. 
(58) Cf also SS.27-(1) whereunder registered trade unions were 
prohibited from affiliating federating or taking joint action with any 
organization that was not recognized under the provisions of the TUa 
1960, and SS.27(2) whereunder persons employed in the public sector were 
prohibited from joining any trade union the members of which are not 
employees of that sector. 
(58a) This reference gives a description of the events trials and 
execution and the sources of information available on them. 
(59) Cf infra Part 1.C.2.c. 
(60) Hussein 1983.106 f.88 and El Rai El Amm 11, 12, 13 June 1966. 
(60a) This discusses the trade union - government relation during this 
period. 
(60b) For a discussion of the trade unions role in the overthrowal of 
General Abboud Military Government in 1964 Cf. Hussein 1983.85. For 
the part which the trade unions and the professional associations played 
in bringing about the downfall of President Numeiri's Regime in April 
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1985 Cf· The Times 30.3.1985, 1.4.1985; The Guardian Saturday 6.4.1985. 
(60c) Cf· Hussein 1983.77-78, 97 where this original interpretation is 
given. It is important however to point out that the vulnerability of the 
parliamentary Governments in the Sudan does not alter mOdify or 
contradict the thesis of the dominant political. There is a difference 
between the political as defined earlier (supra part 3.B Chapter 2) and 
the concrete political form which the political assume at a given point of 
time. Vulnerability of the Parliamentary framework of governance 
means not that the political is not dominant but that this particular 
framework is unsuitable for centralizing the configuration of powers 
within the under-developed social formation. 
(61) For other possible reasons Cf supra text above f.20. 
(62) SS.9 ETUA, 1971, 1977 and S.2 of the Trade Union Organizational 
Structure Regulation 1972 - (now the Trade Union Elections Practices 
Regulation 1982) - and the Trade Union Bases of Organization Regulation 
1972-1981 Cf. supra f.16 and text above. 
(63) Cf. infra Parts 1. C.2.c and 2B. 
(64) Cf. Hussein, 1983.227-229; for a description of this scrutiny and 
its application in specific situations. 150 out of a total of 35,000 
members of the Political Security Police nominated by a leaflet 
distributed in Khartoum on April 6 1985 were also registered members of 
Trade Unions. 
(65) For a description of the measures introduced during this period Cf 
Hussein, 1983.208-209. Cf. also the State Security (1973) and (1981) 
Acts and The Exercise of Political Rights Act 1974. 
(66) Cf supra f.29 and the text above. 
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(67) Cf The Accountants and Cashiers Trade Union -v- The Officials 
and Professionals Trade Unions Federation 1980- Ibid, Sudan Govemm~nt 
-v- The Doctors Trade Union 1984 Ibid, and The Post and Telegraph 
Workers Trade Union -v- The Federation of Workers Trade Union (1979) 
Ibid. 
(670) This gives a description and examples of the restrictive and 
corruptive practices respectively. 
(68) Hussein 1983.228 where a discussion of this rift is given. 
(69) The Times 30.3.1985, The Guardian 6.4.1985. 
(70) This is so because terms and conditions of the individual 
employment relationship are determined statutorily - ([ERA 1981, EEPO 
1973, 69, 49). Wages are also determined by minimum wages legislation 
(Minimum Wages Act 1974 and Wages Commissions Act 1974). As to 
the scope and effect of application of these Acts see Infra Part 3.A.4 of 
Chapter 5. 
(71) Cf. supra fs. 72-73, 77 and the text above in Chapter I. 
(72) It is important however to emphasise that this does not mean that 
for an employment relationship to become autonomous "Law" and the 
"State" should first become abstensionist. It is rather the case that Law 
and the State become less interventionist - (or autonomous) as a result of 
the self-emancipation of employment relationships toward autonomy. 
This emancipation is motivated inter alia by development of the 
substance of the Capital and Labour relationship; - (i.e. means and 
objects of Labour + Labour power) - enabling it - (i.e. the substance) - to 
increasingly assert itself as a third factor which, if the process of 
production is to continue should be taken into consideration when 
determining the terms and conditions of the employment relationship. 
Cf. supra Parts 3.A and 3.B.3 of Chapter I. 
(73) CF. INffiA F. 74· 
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(74) See also SS.143 of the 1974 and 1983 Penal Codes. Although 
superseding each other these three codes have remained identical in -the 
order of serialization of sections and to a considerable extent very much 
the same in substance. Whenever reference is made to a penal code 
without date the implication is that the section referred to is the same 
under three codes and still the law. 
(75) None of the strikes reported to have taken place in Sudan prior to 
1949 was staged by workers or labourers in private employment. Cf. 
Beshir 1977.190-193 and Fawzi 1957.79. 
(76) Beshir Ibid 190-191 and Fawzi Ibid 55-73. 
(77) But when the WAA held a political demonstration on 14.5.1948 to 
protest against government's proposals for a Legislative Assembly the 
colonial administration quickly reacted by suppressing the demonstration 
and arresting its organizers (i.e. the WAA's executive). Officials of the 
WAA were subsequently dismissed tried and sentenced to imprisonment. 
(78) The TUO 1949 S.5 "The purposes of any trade union shall not by 
reason merely they are in restraint of trade be deemed to be unlawful so 
as to render such trade union or any me mber thereof liable to 
prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise or render void or voidable any 
agreement entered into or signed by the trade union. Compare with S.3 
of the British Trade Union Act 1871. Only after de jure recognition of 
the rights of association and organization that trade unions came to exist 
in fact. 
(79) Compare with S.3 of the British, Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act 1875 and S.l of the Trade Union Act 1906. 
(80) Cf SS.3(1) of the British TUA 1906. 
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(81) For definition of the phrase Cf. SS.2-(5) of the RTDO 1949. 
(82) Cf supra f. 74. 
(83) For the position of the Law on these issues in Britain Cf Hepple 
and O'Higgins, 1979.204-205. Although no such rules have yet been 
made by Sudanese Courts it is very unlikely that the Courts would, 
abandon their tradition of following English precedents, and, hold 
otherwise when the time comes. 
(84) S.228 of the 1983 PC provides for an additional punishment of 
whipping! 
(85) Four of these sentences were reduced on appeal to 6 months. 
The abortive strike was planned by the SWTUF as a threat to the 
Government for the immediate release of the President and Secretary of 
the Federa tiona Both officials had a year earlier been tried and 
sentenced to imprisonment for their abetment of unlawful unionization 
and a general strike by members of the Police Force in June 1951. 
Members of the Police Force are by Law - (SS.4 of the TUO 1949, 1960, 
1966 and S.4 of the ETUA 1971, 1977) - prohibited from forming trade 
unions. 
(85u) For an analysis of the Trade Union political involvement during 
this period Cf Hussein, 1983.63-99. 
(85b) Cf supra fs.59-60 and the text above. 
(85 e) Cf supra the paragraph below n.22 on text. 
(85d) With regard to the massive political changes indicated Cf supra 
the text above f·20. For an analysis of the social and economic 
consequences which implementation of economic development planning 
had and their impact on the labour and legislative policies Cf Hussein, 
1983.166-175,245-253. 
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(86) See 55.6, 11(b)(c) and 15 of the TUO (Amendment) Act 1960 and 
5.17 of the Trade Disputes Act 196 O. 
(87) Cf the TUO 1966 55.22(3),(5),(6). 
(88) Cf K. Bechtold, 1976.261-263. 
(89) Republican Order No.4 Article 13 26.4.1970. 
(90) For a description of thee events and the extent to which they 
were provoked by the February suspension of the CLC 1970 Cf (Hussein 
1983.123-145). 
(91) 5.27 of the RTDA 1971. 
(92) The State Security (Amendment) Act 1981 20.6.1981. 
(93) 5.105 of the PC, 1983 - (P.O No. 30 1983). The Code is still in 
effect. Because it was enacted as part of a move, supported by many 
present Islamic Institutions, to islamize all laws in the country the code 
has survived the demise of the Numeri's Regime and the abrogation of 
its security laws. 
(94) See supra f.78. 
(95) The Trade Disputes Act (TDA) 1960 5.2. 
(96) Cf. infra Part 2.B. 
(97) The RTDA 1966 5.28, and section 31 of the Industrial Relations 
Act (IRA) 1976, and the ETUA 1977. 
(98) The RTDA 1966 SS.5,6,8 and the IRA 1976 SS.6, 7,9. 
(99) Cf. supra the text above fs.81-82; the RTDA 1966 S.28, ETUA 
1977.S.33. 
(100) This was also true under the TDA 1960, SS.5-9/16-17. 
(101) Cf. the Trial of El Fatih Muhyeddin and Others SC-CF.CASS-220-1981. 
(102) Cf. the Supreme Court view in El Fatih Muhyeddin Ibid that "the 
courts cannot interfere at any of the stages of a dispute prior to 
arbitration" Ibid p.4. Since arbitration awards are final and conclush'e 
the Courts may not interfere even after arbitration! Quotation 
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translated from original text in Arabic. 
(103) This is especially true in cases of victimization - (either with or 
without approval of the Commissioner of Labour) - since the State or 
private employer may invoke as "formal" grounds for dismissal SS.37(d), 
SS.22(g) - (infra fs.121, 136) - of the Individual Employment Relations 
Act (IERA) 1981 and the Public Service Act (PSA) 1973 respectively. 
Another reason for this is that apellate Courts concern themselves with 
reviewing judgments whilst leaving execution entirely to the Court of 
first instance. In cases where the Court of first instance is an 
administrative tribunal without adequate power of enforcement - (which 
is true of all Labour tribunals in Sudan) - the complainant may remain 
without a remedy even though he has obtained a favourable judgment 
from the highest judicial authority. 
(104)Customs and Excise Officers Trade Union -v- The Department of 
Customs and Excise LC-R-37-C-116-5-D-26-1980. 
(105) Metal Sheet Industries Ltd -v- MSI Workers Trade Union 
KN-LO-3 7-IR-"A "-85-1973. 
(106) Bata (Sudan) -v- Bata Officials and Technicians Trade Union. 
MPSAR -IR-37-A-6-1-5-D-10-1979 and letters No. KNLO-37-IR-A-135 : 
26/3/1983; KNLO - 11/5/1980. 
(107) Cf. infra the conclusion to this Chapter. 
(108) Cf. El Rai El Am 11.6.1966. 
(109) A.G Champers File No. AG/CC/"B"/715/1968. 
(110) African Contemporary Record Vol.XII 1979-80. B.103. 
(111) Hussein 1983.256.f.26 and Sudan Government -v- Abbas El Khidir 
El Hussein and Others Prosecution No.103/1981. 
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(112) El Sahafa 2.4.1984, and issue No. 1952 of the Middle East 2.4.1984 
and Registrar decision No. RTU-TU-32-V-1984. 
(113) Cf· Registrar's Decisions No. RTU-TU-32-V-1984 Ibid S.GV. The 
Doctors Trade Union, RTU-TU-75-1982 Customs and Excise Officers 
Trade Union, and the Court of Appeal decision in; Accountants and 
Cashiers Trade Union CA -CV.RV-89-1980 Ibid. 
(114) Teachers Trade Union (Upper Nile Province) -v- Malakal District 
Commissioner NO-LOM -UN P-TU-3 7 A -3. 
(115) Although it is a Federal authority the Registrar has no regional or 
provincial divisions to deal with, or channel, regional complaints, to the 
centre. In practice however regional political authorities settle 
industrial disputes in the manner they deem fit without consultation with 
the registrar or regard to the trade union and industrial relations laws. 
(116) Cf also S.28 of the RTDA 1966 and S.17 of the TDA 1960. 
(117) El Fatih Muhyeddin and Others (Ibid) Prosecution No.6088/1980. 
(118) Bata (Sudan) Ltd -v- Bata Technicians and Officials Trade Union. 
9 members of the Trade Union were arrested on the Company's premises 
on 6.11.1979; Cf file No. KNLO-37-IR-B-135. See also Sudan Textile 
Factory -v- STF Workers Trade Union in Sudanow May 1981.23-25. 
(119) Among those who spent more than five years are members of the 
Bata Trade Union and the Textile Industries Trade Unions. See 
Generally Amnesty International Report on Sudan 4.12.1979. 
(120) Marples Ridgway Ltd KN-LO-37-IR-37-1983 especially letters 
dated 29.3.1983, 27.3.1983 and 7.4.1983. 
(121) SS.37"d" of the IERA 1981, SS.10-(5)d of the EEPO 1973, 
$$.10-(2)a (iv) of the EEPO 1969 and SS.10(2) of the EEPO 1948. 
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(122) Metal Shee t Industries Ltd -v- MSI Workers Trade Union 
KN-LO-3 7-IR-A -85-1973. 
(123) Cf Manager of Dar Essahafa -v- Adam Ahmed Mahdi AC-RV-246-1970, 
Abdel Raheem Beshir -v- Adam Ennur Maroaf SC-CV.CAS-31-1975, Atta 
Mustafa Salih -v- Adam Haroun Fadl El Mula AC-APP-736-1976 and 
Adam Mohamed Ahmed -y- Blue Nile Packaging Corp. AC-CV.APP-323-1976. 
(124) Sudan Textile Factory -v- STF Workers Trade Union; SWTUF-LR-37-A-
1-2-4-1974. 
(125) KUSU Automatic Bakery -v- Marco Majok; KNLO-317-1981. 
(126) Cf supra fs.104-106 and the text above. 
(127) Infra Part 1.C.4. 
(128) The IRA 1976 S.ll, the RTDA 1966 SS.11-18 and the TDA 1960 
SS.5-9. 
(129) Cf Sudan Footwear Factory -v- SF F Workers Trade Union 
SWTUF-IR-37-A-1-2-2-1976, Marples Ridgway -v- M R Workers Trade 
Union KNLO-37-IR-37-1983, Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co -v-
KSWC Workers Trade Union Sudanow May 1980.23-25, Sudan Textile 
Factory -v- STF Workers Trade Union Sudanow May 1981.23-25. 
(130) Supra f.129 and the text above. 
(130a) For a discussion of the practical limitation and negative 
consequences of the 1973-1983 legislative labour policy in Sudan Cf 
Hussein 1983.224-253. 
(130b) Cf supra f.128 and the text above. 
(131) Cf infra Part 4. C of Chapter 4. 
(132) Cf supra f.9 and the text above. 
(133) For specific examples of interventions at the expense of the 
interests of the direct employer and of both the employer and the 
employee Cf the cases cited infra fs.36 - (Ennielane Bank Case) - and 5 
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in Chapter 4 respectively. 
(134) See how this political orientation of the trade unions is imprinted 
on both the form and content of the 1970 Consolidated Labour Code; in 
Hussein, 1983.120-121. 
(135) S.8 of the IRA 1976, S.7 of the RTDA 1966 and S.5 of the RTDO 
1949. 
(136) PSA 1973 SS.22'g' PSPA 1975 SS.26(l)b Cf infra Part 3.B of 
Chapter 4. 
(137) Following the 1973 amendments of the EEPO 1949 sections 10(2) 
~v) and SS.l 0(2). C were renumbered as SS.10(5) and 10-(7) and following 
the repeal of the 1949 EEPO by the 1981 Individual Employment 
Relations Act (1981 IERA) the substance of both sections is now 
incorporated under SS.37"D" and 39 of the 1981 IERA - Cf below 
footnote 138. 
(138) These and other grounds of dismissal under private sector 
individual employment law are elaborately discussed under Part 3.B. of 
Chapter 5. The above brief statement of the law at this stage is 
justified by the need to make my argument regarding the relation 
between the law of dismissal and collective labour relations law 
immediately clear. 
(139) See Memorandum sent by workers to the Minister of Public 
Service and Administrative Reform on 18.1.1972 where SS.10(l) of the 
1949 EEPO was described as "a loophole in the law that enables 
employers to victimize trade union activists. See also Explanatory Note 
by the Commissioner of Labour in File No. 37-6-6-11-1 D L Khartoum. 
(140) SS.21 of the ETUA 1971 and the ETUA 1977. 
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(141) National Footwear Co.Ltd -v- NFC Workers Trade Union, 
KN-LO-37-IR.1-70-1976. The employer has a bad industrial record 
known to the Commissioner. At the time of this decision there were 
complaints that the employer had already dismissed 21 employees 
including trade union officials. The Commissioner ought to have used 
his discretion under the law and withheld approval of the subsequent 
dismissals or at least referred the case to the Registrar of Trade Unions 
Cf infra Part 1. C.4.c. 
(142) Cf infra Part 3.B.4 in Chapter 5. 
(143) Cf El Nielane Textile Factory -v- Thureyya Ahdel Wahab 
(CA *CV.RV*226*1979). 
(143a) For other applications of the rule Cf. infra Table 10 in Chapter 5. 
(144) National Footwear Co. -v- N FC Workers Trade Union Ibid f.141. 
(145) Abdel Mutaleb Adam -v- Marples Ridgway Ltd; KN-LO-37-IR-37-1983. 
(146) 5udan Clothes Factory -v- 5CF Workers Trade Union; Collective 
Industrial Disputes: Monthly Reports December 1977 File No. 
KN-LO-37-IR-3. 
(1460) Cf infra Part 3.B.7 of Chapter 5. 
(147) 55.39 of the IERA 1981, 55.10-(8) of the EEPO 1973, and 
5S.10-(2)d of the EEPO 1969. The remedies for unlawful dismissals in 
general are discussed under Chapters IV and V. 
(148) 55.10-2(d) of the EEPO 1973. 
(149) 55.36 of the EEPO 1973 provided a sentence of 6 months-2 years 
imprisonment and an L5 500-1000 fine. 5ee now 5.60 of the [ERA 1981. 
(150) National Footwear Co. Ltd -v- NFC Workers Trade Union Ibid 
and, Abdu Atta -v- Metal 5heet Industries Ltd KN-LO-37-IR-A-85-1973. 
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(151) Cf (a) El-Rubi Transport Co -v- ETC Workers Trade Union 
KN-LO-37-IR-1-1 : Vol II-1983; (b) Medical Products Co.Ltd -v- MPC 
Workers Trade Union LD-IR-37-G-6-1-0-TU-25-1981 and (c) Sudan 
Government -v- El Fatih Muhyeddin and Others 1981 Ibid. 
(152) S.39 of the IERA 1981. 
(153) Cf also S.21 of the ETUA 1971. 
(154) IERA 1981 SS.37'd', EEPO 1973 SS.10(5)d. 
(155) Cf supra f.147 and the text above. 
(156) Cf letter No. DL*IR*37*Y*21*70*Vol.II, in File No. KNLO-37-IR-1-70 
and the case of Mirghani Mohamed Abdella -v- NFC Ltd Ibid the same 
file. 
(157) The Trial of El Fatih Muhyeddin and Others SC*CV.CASS*220*1981.-
Cf.supra f.117 and the text above. 
(1570) The Company's Counsel exhausted all appellate channels simply to 
establish the criminal nature of the defendants' action. However it is 
not clear why that was necessary - (unless as a delaying tactic) - for the 
main issue of reinstatement. The jural correlative of the lawfulness of 
the strike is immunity from the Criminal Law, but not in addition to that 
an obligation on the employer to reinstate. The employer could legally 
resist reinstatement irrespective of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the 
strike. 
(158) Letter No. RTU-10-0-2-61-Vol.II. 
(159) Letter No. KLO-IR-3 7-A -0-Vol.II. 
(160) Letter No. AG-TU-TD-333 25.4.1982 and 4.5.1982. 
(161) Letter No. SWTUF-17-A-3-23.8.1982. 
(162) Letter No. AG-TU-TD-333-6.9.1982. 
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(163) SS.6(4) of the Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act 
1974 "the provisions of a subsequent law shall prevail over those of a 
preceding law to the extent necessary for removing any inconsistency . . " 
(164) El Rubi Transport Co. -v- ETC Workers Trode Union KN-LO-37-IR-1-1-
Vol.II-18.3.1983. 
(165) Cf infra Chapter 4 Part 3.B. 
(166) SS.22(g) of the PSA 1973 and, PSP A 1975 SS.26(l)b. 
(167) Cf infra Chapter 4 footnote 49 and text above. 
(168) As to the manner in which discipline is imposed Cf infra Parts 
3.B.3-4.AB of Chapter 4. 
(169) Cf· infra Part 1.A of Chapter 4 and supra text above fS.1 02-1 04 
of Chapter 2. 
(169a) Cf Diagram I below. 
(170) Cf supra f.131 and the text above. 
(171) Infra Chapter 4 Parts 4. C-4. C.6. 
(172) Post and Telegraph Workers Trade Union -v- the Telecommunication 
Corporation LD-HQ-PS-47-A-1-1980, -and- Soba University Hospital 
Nurses and Sisters -v- Vice-Chancellor University of Khartoum File No. 
LD-IR-37-U-6-1-5-"N" 1979. 
(173) Cf supra f.43 and text above. 
(174) Cf supra the cases cited under fs.43-46 and the text above. 
(1740) Cf supra Part 2.B.1.e of Chapter I, and infra the conclusion to 
this Chapter. 
(175) Cf supra f.100 in Chapter 2. 
(175a) Cf infra f.177, and supra Part 2.B.1 of Chapter 2. 
(176) Cf supra f.22 and the text above. 
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(177) This role is inherent because it is essential to internal functioning 
of the State itself· It is mentioned earlier that the State structure 
constitutes in itself the vastest portion of the Capitalist economic 
structure in the social formation (supra Part 2.B.1 Chapter 2) and that 
the hierarchy of State bureaucracy corresponds to a hierarchy of 
capitalist divisions of labour (supra f.55 Chapter 2). This allowed the 
inference that the Centralized State acts as a corporate capitalist -
(supra paras below f.101 Chapter 2). The internal functioning of the 
State apparatus - (or bureaucracy) itself requires maintenance of a 
balance between State expenditure and revenue. To maintain this 
balance the Centralized State constantly manipulates the factors 
affecting social distribution i.e. imposes restriction on wage increases, 
minimises the pressure power of certain social groups, and imposes a 
tax-policy biased towards investment and investors - Cf. Hussein 1983 
pp.253-54. 
(178) Cf infra the conclusion to this Chapter. 
(179) Supra f.169 and the text above. 
(180) Cf supra f.16. Powers of the Minister of Public service to make 
regulation under SS.31 (1) of the 1977 ETUA can be delegated to the 
Reistrar or the Commissioner. In exercise of powers thus delegated the 
Registrar has in fact made several pieces of legislation including the 
Trade Union Election Practices Regulation 1983 and Timing of Elections 
Regulations 1971, 1981. Cf. supra f·25. 
(181) Banks Employees Trade Union -v- The Minister of Finance and 
National Economy Arbit. No. LD-LR-37-"G"-6-D-3.5.1979, and, Central 
Electricity and Water Authority Officials and Technicians Trade Union 
-v- CElVA Arbit. No. LD-LR-37-G-6-D-29.5.1980. 
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(182) Memorandum No. 3106 MPSAR 19.12.1979. 
(183) Memorandum No. MPSAR-26-"B"-7-23.7.1980. 
(184) Following dismissal and imprisonment of 7 members of the SWTUF 
executive on 8.12.1958 several trade unions agreed to press for their 
release and reinstatement. The Minister of Labour not only refused to 
negotiate with representatives of the Unions but also ordered their 
immediate arrest - Beshir 1977.212. A demand by the Mechanical 
Transport Workers Trade Union for reinstatement of two of its members 
dismissed for their part in a strike in August 1966 was also met by stern 
warning from the Minister of Transport that the dismissed employees 
were capable enough of pursuing their own rights and that the Trade 
Union was wrong in campaigning on their behalf. Following another 
threat of dismissal the Trade Union called off its threatened industrial 
action and gave up supporting the cause of the dismissed employees Cf 
El Rai Alam 11.8.1966. 
(185) S.15 of The Public Service Act 1973 and infra. Part 2.A.2.b. 
(186) From an interview with the Commissioner of Labour Khartoum 
North, March 1984, translated from Arabic. 
(187) Cf infra f.5 in Chapter 4. 
(1870) Cf infra Part 2.B, and the text above fs.191-192. 
(187b) Cf f.189 below. 
(188) This is best evidenced by the surge in number of this type of 
disputes following the introduction of the Job Classification and 
Evaluation Scheme in 1978. See Dept of Labour Annual Reports 
1979/1980.29, and 1978/1979. 
(189) See SlVTUF statistics: (a) Industrial disputes for the period 
between 1.7.1979 - 31.12.1981; and (b) Disputes referred to arbitration in 
the period between 1.1.1979 - 31.12.1981, in SHTUF-IR-37-A.-1-2-2. 
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(190) Memorandum No. MPSAR-3106-19.12.1979. 
(191) Cf supra; Parts 1. C.2.b - 1. C.2.c; and f.57a and the text above. 
(192) S.8 TDO (Arbitration and inquiry) 1949, SS.22(2) RTDA 1966, S.32 
of IRA 1976, and SS.20(1), 25 of the IRA 1982. 
(193) Customs and Excise Officers Trade Union -v- Department of 
Customs and Excise LD-LR-37-C-116-5-D-26-July 1981. See also The 
Stevedores Trade Union -v- Flour Mills Corp. KN-LO-3 7-IR- V, The Bank 
of Sudan -v- The Bank Employees Trade Union, Technical Engineers -v-
The Communication and Telecommunication Department, The Doctors 
Trade Union -v- The Ministry of Health (11.6.1981) Veterinary Surgeons 
Trade Union -v- The Ministry of Agriculture (18.10.1979), Central 
Electricity and Wa ter Authority -v- C EW E Employees Trade Union 
29.5.1980; All in SWTUF; Disputes Referred to Arbitration between 
1/1979 - 31/12/1981; SWTUF-IR-3 7-A -1-2-2. 
(194) Accountants and Cashiers Trade Union -v- The Auditor General 
and The Ministry of Finance, LD-LR-37-M-24.12.1978. 
(195) There are many cases in which the Government refused to abide 
by arbitration awards. See for example Veterinary Surgeons Trade 
Union -v- The Ministry of Agriculture Arbit. No. LD-LR-37-"G"-6-D 
28.7.1979, Central Electricity and Water Authority Workers Trade Union 
-v- CEWA supra f.183 and text above. See SS.25(1) of the IRA 1976. 
(196) This was a Minister-without-portfolio status enabling the then 
incumbent to give advice to the Presidency of the Republic on matters 
relating to the Public Service. 
(197) Ministerial Commission Report on Labour Legislation Khartoum 
1981 pp.220-221. 
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:! 
(1970) Nevertheless legislation sets minimum standards that apply 
irrespective of the agreement of the parties Cf infra Part 3.B.3 of 
Chapter 5. 
(198) S.58 (IERA 1981), S.6 of the Minimum Wages Act 1974, and SS.35 
of the EEPO 1949, 1969, 1973. 
(199) S.60 the IERA 1981 SS.36 of the EEPO 1973, 1969. 
(200) Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co.Ltd 1973/1976, Sudan Textile 
Factory Ltd 1975/1978 and Blue Nile Spinning and Weaving Co. 
1975/1977. All in, the Labour Department Collective Agreements, File 
No. LD-IR-3 7-A -8. 
(201) In two cases the Commissioner decided that the demands put 
forward by the Trade Unions were unlawful because "in breach of a 
subsisting collective agreement" Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co. -v-
KSWC Officials Trade Unions; KNLO-Collective Disputes-Monthly 
Reports No.37-IR-3-April 1979, Bata (Sudan) -v- Bata Officials and 
Technicians Trade Union KNLO-3 7-IR-"A "-35. In 24 other disputes in 
which employers were to blame for alleged breaches, the Commissioner 
did not take any formal action against any. 
(202) Cf supra Bata (Sudan) -v- Bata Officials and Technicians Trade 
Union, f.201. 
(203) From an interview with Sayyed Omer at the Khartoum North 
Labour Office conducted by the writer in February 1984. Quotation 
translated from Arabic. 
(204) Colda ir Engineering Ltd -v- C E Workers Trade Union 
KNLO-Collective Disputes Monthly Report No.37-IR-3 October -
December 1982. 
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(205) Medical Products Co.L td -v- The Company's Workers Trade 
DL-LR-37-"G"-6-1-5-D-25. 
(206) SS.36(1) of the IERA 1981 fixes the period of limitation for 
application to the Commissioner at 15 days from the day the dismissal is 
effected. 
(207) See also, Dar Ettegleef -v- EI Dar Workers and Officials Trade 
Union KNLO - Monthly Reports - March-June 1980, and Khartoum 
Spinning and Weaving Co.Ltd -v- KSWC Workers Trade Union KNLO 
Monthly Reports July 1979. 
(208) The problem of breaches of collective agreements by employers is 
so acute that at one time the percentage of disputes caused by this 
factor amounted to 71.4% of all instances of conflict in the Sudan Cf 
(Hussein 1983.214). See Table (2). 
(2080) All these are terms and conditions of employment provided for by 
Statute. Cf infra Table 3 and Chapter 5 Part 3.A. 
(209) Agreements must by law provide for terms and conditions of 
employment that are at least equal to those guaranteed by Statute. 
One of the three agreements here was still in force when the new 1981 
[ERA came into effect introducing terms and conditions better than 
those provided for by the agreement. The employer was adamant that 
the agreement must prevail. The other two are cases where the 
Commissioner gave his approval subject to certain amendments to be 
made on the agreement, but long after the directive to amend was made 
the Trade Unions were still complaining. 
(210) Cf supra Parts 1.C.2.a - 1.C.2.c. 
(211) Pieces of legislation abolished were the Trade Disputes Ordinance 
1949 and the TDO (Arbitration and Inquiry) 1949. 
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(212) 5ee also 55.5(1) of the TDA 1960 and 5.12 of the RTDA 1966. 
Under both Acts the period within which the parties should enter 
negotiations was three weeks. 
(213) 5.31.IRA 1976 and 55.11(2) of the RTDA 1966. 
(214) The Commissioner may report the trade union to the Registrar 
who can in turn - inter alia - order its immediate dissolution. 5ee supra 
fs.21 and 113 and the texts above. 
(215) 5ee supra table (2). There are practical difficulties involved in 
imposition of these penalties on employers see supra f.128 and the text 
above. 
(216) 55.14-16 of the IRA 1976, 55.13-15 of the RTDA 1966, and SS.6-7 
of the TDA 1960. 
(217) 55.17-18 IRA 1976, 55.16-18 RTDA 1966, and SS.9-10 TDA 1960. 
(218) 55.20-25 IRA 1976, 55.21-23 RTDA 1966 and 55.13-14 of the TDA 
1960. 
(219) This is the language adopted by the TDA 1960, the R TDA 1966 
and the IRA 1976 Ibid. 
(220) Commissioner of Labour -v- University of Khartoum Teachers 
Trade Union DL-LR-37-"G"-6-1-5-D-25 December 1979. 
(221) CA-CR.RV-177-1981 Ibid. 
(222) Quotation translated from original judgment manuscript in Arabic. 
(223) Bata Officials and Technicians Trade Union -v- Bata (Sudan) Ltd 
KN LO-3 7-IR-"A "-35-May 1980. 
(224) 5.29 IRA 1976, 55.27-29 RTDA 1966, and SS.16-18 of the TDA 
1960. 
(2240) Cf. Table 4. 
(224b) Per KhawgeZZy El-Mubareck in the Session convened on the 15th 
March 1981. Minutes of meetings of The Industrial Relations Law 
LXXXIV 
Nd'r ES TO CHAPTER 3 
Commission 1981 (Set up by Republican Order No.1 1981)-
'.) 
Department of Labour Khartoum. Quotations translated from original 
Arabic text. 
(225) Ibid per Khawgelly El-Mubareck. 
(2250) Cf K El-Mubareck's memorandum as summary of this view - Ibid. 
(226) Cf supra the text above fs. 196-197. 
(227) But Cf fLO Sudan 1976.392 where it is claimed that prohibition of 
strikes has brought about some industrial peace. 
(228) Cf supra Parts 1.B.3 and 2.B.1.e in Chapter I. 
(229) Cf supra Part 2.B.2.b of Chapter I. 
(230) Writing about Pakistan Raza also observes that " 
governmental process has inherent tendencies not to re-evaluate major 
policy decisions made m the past in particular contexts of economic and 
political circumstances. Loaded with day-to-day problems the effort 
becomes focussed on fighting bush fires, in administering the law, rather 
than on a critical reappraisal of the basic premises of policies . •. RAZA 
1.967 BJIR.209". 
(231) Cf Ahmed Hassan El Jack and Chris Legget; Industrial relations 
and the political process in Sudan - (See how some of the details which 
these writer mention about the role of the Registrar are also erroneous; 
in Hussein 1983.222-23 f.76)-; A E A Taha and A H El Jack 1973.38-39; 
A E A Taha 1982.155; S S Agabani, (1972).1-62; Taha and El Jack, 
1976.1-15. 
(232) A E A Taha and A H El Jack, 1973 "A".40. For a critical 
discussion of the concept of "development" in relation to Sudanese 
Labour Relations policy Cf Hussein, 1983.239-245. 
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(232a) El Jack and Legget 1983.25-40; Taha and El Jack 1973 "A".35-40; 
Agabani; 1972.1-62. 
(233) This word is used here and in several places in Chapter V. It 
connotes a governmental intervention, in industrial relations, with the 
objective of protecting employers' interest. As such it is the opposite 
of protectionist intervention which aims at protection of the employee. 
(234) Thus some private sector employment statutes have been 
described as Ifflrealistically ambitious; [La; Sudan 1976.118,121.Cf infra 
Chapter V; Parts 1. C - 1. C.3. 
( 1) 
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(THE STATE.INDIVIDUAL EMPLoYMENT IELATIONSHIP IHD ...... E 
In LAW) 
There are two Acts which cut across this division, namely: The 
Work Injuries (Compensation) Act 1981, S.4; and The Sqcial 
Insurance Act 1974, S.4. It is to be noted however that the SIA 
1974 covers those among government employees who are not 
covered by the pension scheme. The uniformity of the social 
objective of the legislation in cases of both private sectors and 
State employees accounts for the generality of the Acts. Both 
Acts fall without the scope of analysis in this Chapter. Despite 
their application to both public and private sector employees the 
administration of the two Acts is assumed by a different authority 
in the case of each sector. 
( 2) This is so either because administrative bodies represent both the 
makers and administrators of rules (e.g. in case of discipline, or in 
cases of anti-discrimination and fair competition principles since 
there is no substantive legislation on the latter two) or that the 
non-judicial status these bodies have, coupled with the exclusive 
non-judicial role they play in administration of existing legislation, 
direct development of the case Law accumulating under this 
legislation along an administrative rather than a legal tradition. 
( 3) Cf. infra, Part 4.A of Chapter S. 
( 4) 
( 5) 
The Individual Employment Relations Act 1981, SS.48, 58. Cf· 
infra Part 3.B.3 Chapter 5 for examples of favourite arrangement. 
Cf. supra Part 2.A.1.a Chapter 3 for reasons why it is necessary 
to bargain in order to enforce statutory protection. 
The Public Service Act (PSA) 1973 S.21. See also Attorney 
General "Fatwa" No. AG/7/6 date 14/2/1979 where it was decided 
that an Employment Committee constituted within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and including members of the consulate and 
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diplomatic staff trade union has no jurisdiction to consider 
employment grievances and that such grievances may only lie to 
the Public Service Appeal Board (PSAB). For a general 
discussion Cf· supra parts 2.A.1.a - 2.A.1.b in Chapter 3. 
( 6) Cf. infra. the Conclusion to this Chapter. 
( 7) Ministry of Justice; Letter No. Mj/L/752/1 dated 24/1/1971. 
(8) Ministry of Irrigation -v- Abram Dow AC*CVRV*317*1982. 
( 9) Murad Saad Hanna -v- Madeline Sami SC - CV. Cass-267-1975 
(1975) SLJR.185. Cf.infra Parts 3, 3.B.1-3.B.2 in Chapter 5. 
(10) Cf. infra part 1.B. 
(11) Cf. infra f.14. 
(12) Cf. infra parts 3.B - 3.B.2 of Chapter 5. 
(13) Thus the TUa 1949 s.27 stipulated that employees of the public 
sector should not be members of trade unions of employees 
outside that sector nor should trade unions of public employees 
federate with affiliate to or participate in the formation of any 
labour organization for the purpose of realizing any of their 
objectives. The TUa 1960 S.2 defined a worker as, for all 
purposes of trade union legislation, any person, in the employment 
of any employer . •• who is engaged in manual work . .• But does 
not include the classified officials or unclassified employees of 
the Government. The Trade Disputes Act 1960 5.9 provides that 
the Minister for Labour may refer a dispute to arbitration without 
the consent of the disputing parties if the dispute is between the 
government and its workers or employees. Finally the TUa 1966 
provides that, a "trade union which includes persons in the public 
services shall not federate affiliate or othenvise take joint action 
in furtherance of its objectives under its constitution, with any 
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political organization" sic. 
(14) Cf. also pp.109-116, 123-131 and 140-145 opcit. The work 
referred to discusses significant changes that the 1970 CL C 
purported to maintain and the events surrounding its withdrawal. 
(15) Cf. infra part 3.B.6 of Chapter 5. 
(16) Cf. infra Part 3.B.6 in Chapter 5. 
(17) Cf. supra f. 7 and the text above. 
(18) The period between 9/2/71-10/5/1973 witnessed major political 
and administrative changes affecting both the structures and 
personnel of the public service. The condition of the public 
service and its laws was being reviewed by a commission which 
eventually reported its recommendations in 1973. Purges of 
employees undesired by the Regime had thrived. It was in all 
respects a transitional period - Hussein, 1983. 108-146). There is 
no reported Court or Labour office decision regarding the position 
of public employees covered by the EEPO 1969 during this period. 
(19) The Public Service Act 1973 (PSA 1973) SS.2-3, the Employees 
Discipline Act 1976 (EDA 1976) S.3 and The Public Service 
Regulation (PSR 1975). 
(20) Cf. supra f.8 and the text abvove, and infra part 4.B.2. 
(21) Cf. also (Hepple and O'Higgins 1971) Public Employee Trade 
Unionism in the United Kingdom : the "Legal Framework" 
especially Chapters III and V. 
(22) S.M. El Telmowi; Disciplinary Action. A "Comparative Study" 
Cairo 1975 in Arabic. Cf. infra the Conclusion to this Chapter. 
(23) Cf. supra f.5 and infra part 4. C. 4 of this Chapter: Cf also supra 
parts 2.A.1.a - 2.A.1.b of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 4 
(24) The role which Law plays in controlling industrial relations is not 
equally marginal in all developed Capitalist societies as among 
themselves. But when these socities are opposed, as a category, 
to under-developed social formations the role which "Law" plays 
in shaping industrial relations appears to be more prominent in the 
latter. The social process of Law-making peculiar to each 
category of societies means that the content of legal norms may 
not be manifestive of equally liberalist contents in the case of 
each category of societies. 
(25) International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations (ELL) R.(Blanpain edit. Kluwer 1979 Volume 5. 
(26) ELL Supplement May 1979. 209-210; NJAC Report 1967.22 HAISO 
London 1967. 
(27) Taft-Hartley Act 1947 S.305 (61.US Stat. 136.1947). By the early 
1980s nine states allowed at least some public employees to 
engage in strikes. Cf. ELL Volume 10, Supp.31 May 1983, 269; 
and also Hogler and Kirsciun, 1984 f·9.p.482. 
(28) Civil Service Law 200-214 (McKinney 1973). 
(29) Cf. especially the decision in Board of Education -v- Huntington 
Inc.1972 cited in the reference Opcit. For the recent position of 
the American Law on this issue Cf. EEL Volume 10, Supp.31 (AIay 
1983) pp.219-220; S D Anderman, 1982.85-86. 
(30) Members of the Police and Armed Forces have always been 
governed by special La ws - Officials Discipline Ordinance 1927 
S.3. In 1973 members of the judiciary and the Prisons and Fire 
Brigade Forces were added as exceptions from the field of 
application of individual employment Laws in the public sector -
xc 
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The Public Service Act 1973 S.4. Because of their supposed 
special position and subjection to special laws the discussion in 
this Chapter will not focus on employment in these units. 
Another general observation about Sudanese public service Laws is 
that, with the exception of members of the forces mentioned 
above, and employees in high level leadership posts, they apply to 
all employees in all divisions of public employment without regard 
to distinctions as that between central government and local 
authorities employees, or, industrial and non-industrial civil 
service or white and blue-collar employees. For the position in 
Britain Cf (Hepple and O'Higgins 1979.64, 1971.9-39). 
(31) Although their posts are unclassified, manual workers constitute 
the vast majority of public employees in the Sudan. In 1972/73 
the number of employees in unclassified posts, in Greater 
Khartoum area alone, was 51,391 compared with the 55,611 
employees in classified and superscale posts all over Sudan for the 
same year. The number of employees in unclassified posts 
recorded also an annual rate of increase of 15%. Compiled from 
statistics in (Al-Teraifi 1980) and the (1LO Sudan 1976.481). 
(32) PSA 1973.SS.2-3, EDA 1976.S.3. Cf. supra f·19. 
(33) "Organized sector . • ." is used here to refer to permanent 
workers in the public sector or registered establishments of 
whatever size in the private sector. The statistics given do not 
cover workers in the unorganized sector - i.e. casual labour in 
d 1 b "th" the "Informal Sector" of "organized" industry an a our WI m 
the economy. Workers covered by the statistics are also covered 
by labour legislation and highly unionized. The Labour 
Department statistics given below are therefore a fair estimate of 
---
XCI 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
the position. (Cf.ILO Sudan 1984. 144-145): There are two 
patterns of statistics available. The first is that of the Labour 
Department, conducted on annual basis, and, the second is that of 
the - 1LO 1976 comprehensive survey of the Sudan (1LO Sudan 
1976). According to the former the number of unionized 
employees in the public sector is 683,539 and that of unionized 
employees in the private sector is 152,777 (Labour Department 
1979-80). The ILO survey provides statistics for the Greater 
Khartoum area only and puts the percentage of those employed by 
the Government at 46.3% and that of those employed by the 
private sector at 32.4% out of a total workforce of 202,400 (1LO 
Sudan 1976.336). 
(34) The Public Service Appeals Board -v- Ennielane Bank CA *CVRV*1 *1979 
(1979) SMLR April June 1986, SC*CV CASS* 1980 unreported. 
(35) Kurdofan Commerce and Engineering Ltd. The Solicitor 
General's decision on the Company's application - (No. 
KCO/AC/507/81-30/9 1981) was that: (1) "The Company may 
amend its memorandum of association to include a clause for 
enabling it to issue its own terms and conditions of service and; 
(2) there is nothing to prevent the Company from applying the 
Individual Employment Relations Act 1981 if the conditions and 
terms of employment recognized under that Act are more 
beneficial to the employees than the provisions of public service 
Laws". 
(36) The statement between brackets was made by the then Ad\'ocate 
General in a personal interview conducted by the writer at the 
Attorney General Champers Khartoum on 26/1/1984. Cf· also 
the dispute between the Minister of Finance and the Banks 
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Employees Trade Union where an arbitration tribunal sitting in 
April 1979 had to consider whether members of the disputing 
trade union were public employees and therefore barred from 
demanding a house bonus by Presidential Decree No.338 - (Cf. 
supra part 2.A.1.a Chapter 3). The Tribunal preferred allegedly 
on public interest grounds not to decide on the legal position of 
the Bank's employees. File No. SWTUF*LR*37*A*1*2*4*1979. 
(37) Davies and Freedland (1984) p.79, (1979).454 give the following 
reasons: (1) prior existence of the employment relationship is seen 
as conferring a vested interest in the continuance of his 
employment; (2) the claim of the existing employee dismissed is 
seen in individual terms while the claim of the applicant is 
generally limited to his claim as member of a certain disfavoured 
group; (3) no pre-existing relationship, between employer and 
applicant, by which the fairness of employer's decision can be 
judged. 
(38) Cf. supra part 3.B of Chapter 2. 
(39) Anglo-Egyption Treaty for the Administration of the Sudan 1899 -
(AET 1899). 
(40) Explanatory memorandum to the Public Service Regulation 1975 in 
Public Service Laws and Regulations issued by the Ministry of 
Public Service. Government Press 1976. 
(41) Central Recruitment Board, 2nd term report 25/4/1978 - 24/4/81. 
(42) Cf. infra part 2.B.2. 
(43) Cf. infra f.48 and the text above. 
(44) There is no trace of any pre-entry closed shop arrangement or any 
other similar collective arrangement which the trade unions in 
Sudan, either in the public or the pri\'ate, ha\'e managed to 
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negotiate so far with employers. 
(45) Paragraph 7 of a booklet entitled "Guidelines on Selection" 
emphasises that, "no person shall be appointed in any post in the 
public sector unless he or she is a holder of a security clearance 
certificate from the State Security Department" (i.e. the secret 
political police). Although the latter has been abolished 
paragraph 7 is still in effect. 
(46) i.e. those qualified to fill posts in Scale (A and P). 
(47) Presidential Order No.PO/1/ A/5/4 - 28/7/1976. 
(48) Cf. supra text above f.43. 
(49) See Presidential Order No.12 1975; Organization of Government 
Operations Regulation 1975. Under the Regulation the Minister 
of Finance - (who is also the Minister responsible for the public 
service since 1981 - Cf. Presidential Decree No. 807 1981) - may 
ask any ministry or department to submit before him information 
concerning any matter which may incur a financial burden on his 
ministry (aGaR 1975.S.5-(5». However while this power may 
enable the Minister to demand information before accepting an 
application for creation of new posts, it does not in any way give 
him the power to intervene in determining the persons of those 
who may fill the posts. Moreover, in all cases the Finance 
Minister's success in obtaining information or taking action 
depends on the discretion of the minister from whom the 
information is sought Ibid. aGaR 1975.SS.5-(5). 
(50) There is no accessible citation of this and other CRB decisions. 
The facts of the case the decisions taken and deadlock arrived at 
were dictated to the author by the Secretary of the CRB in a 
formal interview conducted by the author at the C RB Khartoum 
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13/3/1984. Unpublished decisions and procedures of the CRB 
were not then open to inspection by outsiders. Furthermore 
minutes of procedure and decisions in specific cases are not 
usually reported in the C RB report. 
(51) Cf. supra f.49 and the text above. 
(52) This is the position as can be inferred from: (a) legislative 
arrangements that govern disputes of government departments or 
units as among themselves - (The Attorney General Act 1981, 
1983 SS.7 and the Attorney General's Chambers Regulation 1983 
SS.10(a), 34) - and between anyone of these units and members of 
the public - (the Civil Procedures Acts 1974 (CPA 1974) 
SS.33(2)-3; the Civil Justice Ordinance 1929 (CJO 1929) 5.109) Cf. 
infra f.S 7 and text above, and generally part 2.B.2 and (b) the 
established practice of the Board as summarised by General 
Secretary of the Central Recruitment Board in an interview 
conducted by the writer at the Board's building on Tuesday 
13/3/1984. 
'(53) Government central units making new appointments have to 
obtain, for purposes of budgetary control, the subsequent approval 
of the Public Service (Financial) Affairs Champer - which is also 
a government unit subordinate, since P.O No. 807 1981, to the 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The Champer can in 
theory withhold approval if the appointments are not made 
through the Central Recruitment Board. However the 
effectiveness of this type of control has to be assessed within the 
boundaries of the ministerial jurisdiction referred to earlier supra 
f·49. 
(54) 
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This is a literal phrase not a legal concept.· There is no such 
concept under Sudanese labour Law Cf. infra Part 3.B.5 in 
Chapter 5. 
(55) Cf. infra parts 2.A - 2.A.2 of Chapter 5. 
(56) Cf. supra f.31. 
(57) Mudawi Mohamed Ismail -v- Ministry of Education SC*CV 
CASS*261 *1982; Mekki Ali El Azharry -v- Ministry of Health 
SC*CV CASS*441 *1977 infra part 4.AB. 
(58) For a similar distinction in British Industrial Relations practices 
Cf. Hepple and O'Higgins 1979, para 125-127 pp.54-55. 
(59) Cf. Labour Department Annual Report 1978-1979.49. 
(60) Cf. infra introduction to Chapter 5. 
(61) Cf. infra parts 4. C and 4. D. 
(62) Civil Service Department; Ministry of Public Service and 
Administrative Reform, statistics for 1980. 
(63) Cf. supra f.30. 
(64) Cf. supra f.5 7 and the test above; and also f· 52. 
'(65) This is personal information based on data collected from (a) the 
Sudan Development Corporation during the period 1980-March 
1981; and (b) the Petroleum Corporation 1984. 
(66) Cf. supra fs.36, 45 and text above. 
(67) Cf. supra fs. 50-58 and text above, and infra pJrt 4. C. 4. 
(68) Laws enacted within the first thirty years of colonial rule 
included inter alia; the Officials Salaries Orinance 1905, the Sudan 
Government Pension Ordinances 1904, 1919, 1922, the British 
Transferred Officials Ordinance 1928 and the Sudan Government 
Provident Fund Ordinance 1930. 
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(69) Thus the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Enquiry) Ordinance 1949 
S.B provided that: "where any dispute referred to an Arbitration 
Tribunal involves questions of wages or hours of work or other 
te rms or conditions of or affe cting e mploym ent which are 
regulated by any law in force other than this Ordinance the 
Arbitration Tribunal shall not make any award which is 
inconsistent with the provisions of such Law". The Regulation of 
Trade Disputes Ordinance 1949 S.5, excepting public employees 
from the protection provided under the Ordinance, reads: "Nothing 
in the preceding section shall be construed as exempting from 
disciplinary measures or civil or criminal liability any permanent 
servant of the Government who breaks his contract of service in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. See also supra 
f·n.13. 
(70) PSA 1973 S.10 "Regulations shall prescribe salary and wage 
structures, grading syste ms, as well as the methods of fixing 
salaries and wage rates". Ibid S.20: "Regulations shall determine 
the hours of work and other conditions of service". See also the 
PSA 1973 SS.17, 19-(1), 21 and 27. 
(71) Cf. PSR 1975 SS.99-130. 
(72) Customs and Excise Officers' Trade Unions -v- The Department of 
Customs and Excise; the Labour Department dispute No. 
L/R/37/C+E/116/5/D/26. Cf. also supra parts 2.A.1.a - 2.A.1.b 
Chapter 3. 
(73) In the volumes of the "Laws of the Sudan" statutes are referred 
to by their original date of enactment. 
are only footnoted. 
Subsequent amendments 
(74) 
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Cf· supra part 1.C.3 Chapter 3. In addition to instances 
enumerated there, executive members of trade unions and _ the 
Trade Unions Federation were dismissed and put on trial in 
1956-57 and 1958 by Parliamentary and military regimes 
respectively (Elrai El Am 11/6/1966) and Taha 1970.113). 
However "interest of the service" was invoked as a ground for 
dismissal of 195 economically unwanted workers by the Ministry 
of Construction and Public Works in 1972 MCPW/A/W/43/51/1972. 
(75) PR *PSC* AB*40*L *2*6456 (unreported) Cf. infra. Text above f.121. 
(76) This is personal information based on classification of notes of 
"dismissal in the public interest" issued to employees in 
Departments including Sudan Airways, Ministry of Health, Ministry 
of Commerce, Ministry of Information and Culture and Ministry of 
Transport. 
(77) Cf. infra part 4. C. 
(78) The stance of the PSAB on this issue was disclosed to the writer 
by Sayyed/Omer Mohamed Ibrahim member of the PSAB in a 
personal interview in February 1984. On some occasions 
employees dismissed under the PSPA 1975 S.26-(1)b complained to 
the Attorney General - (Cf infra part 4.D.) - against misuse of 
the powers conferred by these sections. In one such case -
(AG*2*A*1688) - The Attorney General wrote to the department 
concerned reminding it of the employee's right to know the 
reasons that led to his dismissal. 
(79) Cf. infra part 3.B.7 of Chapter 5. 
(80) Adam Mohamed Abdel Mumin and others -\'- Sudan Estates Bank 
PR*PSC*AB*40*L*10 7228*1983. In this case the plaintiff was 
employed as a messenger in a Khartoum branch of the deFendant 
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state-owned Bank. Following a transfer of administration of the 
branch to members of the Police Force and a resolution by the 
new management to "policize" all posts in the branch, the 
plaintiff's post was taken over and he was accordingly dismissed 
without rights on grounds of the abolition of the post - (PSA 1973 
S.22f). Upon complaining to the Public Service Appeals Board 
(PSAB) the latter saw that the situation in which the plaintiff was 
dismissed was not one of abolition of post. The PSAB 
accordingly decided that the plaintiff should either be reinstated 
or, if not possible, be paid an after-service gratuity to be 
calcula ted in accordance with the P SP A 1975 S.31 plus a 
compensation equalling six months' wages for arbitrary dismissal. 
For the reasons explained in the text below the PSAB's decision is 
unsubstantiated and faulty. Following receipt of the judgment 
the employer protested to the PSAB - (letter SEB dated 9/1/1984) 
against propriety of the decision. In its letter of 19/2/1984 
(No.PSAB-40-R-10-7224) the PSAB reasserted its earlier stance. 
By the time I left the country (22/3/1984) the employer was still 
convinced that the PSAB's decision was erroneous and determined 
not to abide by it. No decision to appeal had until then been 
taken. My efforts to know subsequent development through 
correspondence have all failed. 
(81) Cf. infra parts 4.C.3 - 4.C.4. 
(82) Cf. infra part 3.B.3 of Chapter 5. 
(83) Disciplinary Boards are statutory institutions. Hence the EDA 
1976 refers to them always in capital letters as proper names. 
(84) 
IC 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
Establishments or units, whose hierarchical organization may not 
fit that of Disciplinary Boards outlined under the EDA 1976 
SS.9-14, or, which because of their distinctive function may 
require a special disciplinary system, can apply to the President 
of the Republic for exemption from certain provisions of the EDA 
1976. See Application No. UK/VC/2-2 : 31/7/1982 by University 
of Khartoum to the President of the Republic seeking exemption 
from provisions of the EDA 1976 and of its 1981 Amendment. 
(85) EDA 1976 S.5 defines Head of Unit as meaning the Commissioner 
of a Province the Under-Secretary of a Ministry or a General 
Manager of any public corporation. 
(86) Compare with the position of public employees in Britain, in 
Dismissal Procedures NJAC Report HMSO London 1967 esp. paras. 
40, 42, 47, 55. 
(87) Compare with the position of public sector employees in Britain, 
in S D Anderman, BJIR Vol.8 p.360. 
(88) Mohamed El Mamoon Babiker Zerroog -v- the Dean Institute of 
Theatrical and Musical Studies SC/CV CASS/292/1981. 
(89) Under the PSR 1975 S.23 all employees except those appointed by 
order of the President of the Republic shall be appointed on 
probationary basis for a period of two years. Employment on 
permanent basis commences only when the "Head of Unit" either 
during, or upon or after expiration of, the probationary period, 
being convinced of the employee's qualification and competence. 
has notified him in writing that he has been so employed. 
Nowhere under the Law is the "Head of Unit" expressly 
empowered to summarily dismiss an employee in the probationary 
period upon failing to satisfy the competence and qualification 
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test. Nor does the Law provide any procedure for termination of 
employment in this type of situation. 
(90) In reaching its decision the Supreme Court was possibly influenced 
by argument of the Attorney General, on behalf of the defendant 
Institute, that determining the fulfillment of the qualifica tion and 
competence condition is a management prerogative and that 
before this determination, the plaintiff does not qualify for trial 
by a Disciplinary Board. See also the Attorney General "Fatwa" 
No. AG/7/2/23 : 16/4/1981 and infra part 4.C.6.d. 
(91) Penalties inflictable under the EDA 1976 S.7 include inter alia: (1) 
suspension from duty with loss of pay; (2) retarda tion of 
promotion or freeze of increment of pay for at most two years; 
(3) reduction of pay and grade; (4) dismissal; (5) dismissal and 
forfeiture of at most one fourth of gratuity or pension; (6) 
dismissal and fine equalling 5% of after service benefit plus any 
payment deserved in lieu of notice. 
(92) The President may instead of submitting the petition to the PSAB 
for advice, personally confirm the measure taken against the 
complainant or annul it EDA 1976 S.20. 
(93) Assumption of jurisdiction, by the Court, in disregard of this 
requirement renders the proceedings null and void; Atbara 
Philanthropic Society -v- the Director of Estates (1942), Pensions 
Department -v- Blue Nile Company (1981) and People's Armed 
Forces -v- Amal E. Y. Kuboshia (1980). 
(94) The CPA 1974 S.312(b) and the CJO 1929 make admission of an 
application for judicial review of administrative action conditional 
upon proof that the applicant has exhausted all a\'Oilable means of 
redress before seeking judicial assistance. Because the\' perceiH> 
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public employment claims as administrative claims the Civil Court 
in Sudan have invoked the provisions of these Acts to disclaim 
jurisdiction. 
(95) (CA *CV.RV*187*76*1976) and (SC*CV.CASS*441 *1977). 
(96) (SC-CV CASS - 261 - 1982). 
(97) See supra f.5. 
(98) Compiled by the author from the Labour Department Annual 
Reports 1973-1979 and the SWTWF; Statistics on Collective 
Labour Disputes and Disputes Referred to Arbitration, for the 
period between Jan.1979 - December 1981 in File No. 
SWTU F /LR/37 / A/1/2/ 4. 
(99) Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation. 
(100) (Fawzi 1957.104) 
(101) (Taha 1970.140). 
(102) Cf. supra fs.184-186, 192 and the text above in Chapter 3. 
(103) The Public Service Regulation 1938. Transfer and Travel 
Allowance Regula tion 1934. 
1934. 
Leaves and Holidays Regula tion 
(104) Cf. Civil Secretary of the Sudan; note to the Council September 
1942. Appendix 5 in Beshir 1978.266. 
(105) None of these memorandums exclusively dealt with establishment 
of a Public Service Commission. They however indicated the 
problem of administration and determination of employment 
grievances and the need for a body other than the "Head of 
Departments or Ministers" Cf. Beshir 1978 250-263. 
(106) Cf. comment by the Civil Secretary in the Note quoted above in 
Beshir, 1978.269. and supra part 2 in Chapter 2. 
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(107) Cf. Muddathir A/Raheem (1969), (Bakheit, 1965). 
(l08) The Constitution's National Commission: Constitution of the 5~dan 
1958 Article 70-(1). The provisions of the 1953 and 1956 
Statutes regarding the functions and constitution of the 
Commission are not different from those recommended by the 
1958 Constitution. Indeed the Na tional Commission had borrowed 
its recommendations on the issue from these two previous 
Statutes. Cf. also Articles 130-131 of the Transitional 
Constitution of the Sudan 1985. 
(109) The failure of the different party-Governments that reigned 
between 1956-1958, to implement the Statutory provisions 
regarding the establishment of the Commission was due to their 
instability and disagreement (Beshir 1978.202). 
(110) Beshir 1978.226. 
(111) Explanatory memorandum to the Employers and Employed persons 
Ordinance (Amendment) Act 1969 (No.1969). 
(112) aDO (Amendment) Act 1969 55.1-15. Thus in one case whe re 
the Minister of Com munica tion and Transport confirmed the 
decision of a departmental disciplinary board dismissing the 
plaintiff, the Ministry of Justice decided that the Minister's 
confirmation of the decision was within his powers and in 
accordance with the La w! Mj/L/66-5/Vol.II : 2/9/1969. 
(113) In the case cited above the Ministry of Justice believed; "the 
Council of Ministers has the jurisdiction to deal with the 
application made by the plaintiff against the ;\1inister's decision. 
"In exercising this jurisdiction the Council of J\1inisters may, 
depending on its findings, uphold the Minister's decision, increase 
or reduce the sentence against the plaintiff, order a retrial or 
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amend both the findings and sentence." Compare with the 
powers of the Governor General under the ODO 1927 $.25. 
(114) Cf. the CJO 5.109, the CPA 1974 5S.33(3) and the Attorney 
General Act 1973, 1981, 1983 SSe 
(115) Cf. supra f.14. 
(116) Cf. supra f.7 and the text above. 
(117) Presidential Order No.807 : 30/12/1981 and the Public Service 
Commission Regulation 1982 (PO No.7 1982). 
(118) PSCR 1982 5S.24-25, and the PSAB Regulation 1973 SS.16-17. 
(119) This is the position as stated by Sayyed Omer Mohamed Ibrahim 
member of the PSAB in a personal interview conducted by the 
writer in February 1984. Cf. Anwar Ali Hussni -v- Ennielane 
Bank (1977), Mudawi Mohamed Ismail -v- Ministry of Education 
(1982). 
(120) Cf. supra f.78 and the text above. 
(121) (P R/PSC/ AB/40/L/2/6456/1984.) 
(122) The PSCR 1982 S.4 fixes the duration of offices of the President 
and Members of the Commission at three years renewable for 
another three years by order of the President of the Republic. 
See for a comparison SS.7-8 of the British Tribunals and Inquiries 
Act 1972. 
(123) It is worth mentioning that this is a status which the Commission 
has enjoyed only since 1982. Before this date the Commission 
was a subordinate of the Ministry of Public Service. Despite its 
obvious shortcomings the present position of the Commission 
represents the ideal which previous Constitutions and Statutes 
aspired to. See supra part 4. C.1. 
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(124) Cf· supra fs. 119,121 and the text above; Beshir Hamad El Beshir 
-v- The Department of Customs and Excise 1984 Ibid; infra fs. 
130/132 and the text above. 
(125) Cf. infra f.136. 
(126) To be eligible for appointment as legal adviser of a government 
unit the applicant must possess as minimum qualifica tion an LLB 
and the Certificate of Admission to the Bar. This qualification 
is not required for appointment on the PSAB. Some members of 
the PSAB do not possess any legal qualification. 
(127) This is the legal opinion of the A ttorney General regarding the 
bindingness of the PSAB's decisions and its application in specific 
situations. The description "official legal policy" is used by the 
Attorney General itself - Cf. infra f.128 and the text above. 
(128) Letter No. AG/7/6 : 8/12/1977. 
(129) See supra footnote 36 and the text above. 
(130) Cf. supra f.102 in Chapter 3; Customs and Excise Officers' Trade 
Union -v- The Department of Customs and Excise 1978 SMLR.70 
where the Court of Appeal ruled that application for execution of 
a Court decree should be made only to the same Court that issued 
the decree" per Sadiq Salman J.; and Eisha Ali Sid Ahmed -v- Ali 
Dawoud 1967 SLJR.114 where it was decided that "once an 
administrative decision becomes final it is for the administrath'e 
authority to enforce it". 
(131) Omer Ali Ageeb and Others -v- the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning PSAB*40*S*5*G*7102*1983, Anwar Ali Hussni 
-v- Ennielane Bank PSAB*40*L*2496*1977, Mahmoud Gemal 
Saddar -v- the Attorney General CA*CV R\'*141*197i .\lohamed 
El Soofi A/GaUl -v- Sudan Agricultural Bank CA*Cr R\"*108*197i. 
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(132) Thus in Omer Ali Ageeb and Others -v- the Ministry of Finance 
(1983) Ibid, the Ministry deliberately disregarded the statutory 
criteria provided for determining eligibility for promotion and 
used instead a subjective criteria with the effect that the 
plaintiff and eight other assistant under-secretaries, who, had the 
Ministry acted lawfully would have been eligible for promotion, 
were left behind. The plaintiffs complained to the President of 
the Republic who in turn referred the case to the PSAB for 
advice. The PSAB upheld the plaintiffs' view that the Ministry 
had acted against the Law and that most of those promoted were 
in effect less eligible for promotion than the plaintiffs. The 
PSAB however left it entirely to the Minister of Finance - (who is 
simultaneously the Minister responsible for the Public Service) -
and the President of the Republic to decide upon the fate of 
those who had already been promoted and incidentally that of the 
plaintiffs. By the time I left the country on 22/3/1984 the issue 
was still unsettled and the Ministry was still adamant in its 
defence of the "suitability" criterion by whose innovation it 
undermined the plaintiffs' chances for promotion. 
(133) In An war Ali Hussni -v- Ennielane Bank 1977 Ibid the 
intransigence which the Bank has shown in resisting all attempts 
at rectifying the plaintiff's position may not be unrelated to the 
suspected malice, on the part of the management that had led to 
mistreatment of the plaintiff in the first place. 
Ali Ageeb and Others Ibid supra f.89. 
See also Omer 
(134) Cf. letter No. PSAB/40/L/2496 : 14/6/1979 in which the PSAB 
requested the A ttorney General to advise on whether the PSAB 
has jurisdiction over claims brought by employees of State 
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Commercial banks. Cf. also infra f.92 and the text above. 
(135) Cf. infra f.136 and text above. 
(136) Mahmoud Gemal Saddar -v- The Attorney General (1977) Ibid. 
The plaintiff, a clerk was transferred from the judiciary, where 
his name was the third on the list of candidates for promotion, to 
the Attorney General Champers where his position was relegated 
to the twelfth on the Champers' promotions list. The plaintiff's 
complaint to the Champers' Under-Secretary was rejected on the 
ground that the PSR 1975 S.41-(4) gives the power of determining 
the position, of a transferred employee, on promotion lists to the 
head of the unit to which the employee is transferred. The 
subsection referred to gives the head of unit this power subject to 
the circumstances of each case. It might have well been argued 
for the plaintiff that his position on the list of his original 
employer was a circumstance that ought to have been taken into 
consideration. However the PSAB hinting the legal weight which 
the Attorney General's opinion has, decided, on 17/5/1977 not to 
intervene with the Champers' decision. 
(137) Compare with the system of administration of private individual 
employment Law infra Parts 4.A -4.B in Chapter 5. 
(138) Per the Attorney General before the Supreme Court in, j\lahmoud 
Gemal Seddar -v- S.G (The Attorney General 1978) Ibid. 
(139) In Mahmoud Gemal Seddar (Ibid); respect for the plaintiff's 
accrued rights may have persuaded a civil court to protect them 
by invoking an interpretation similar to the one I invoked, under 
footnote 136, or, by accepting the plaintiff's counsel submission 
that his client ought to have been given a chance to know the loss 
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he was going to incur by accepting the transfer. The general 
principles of the Law - (Cf. letter No. AG/3/A/1273 : 22/11/1983) 
may have also persuaded the Civil Courts to agree with the 
plaintiffs in the Graduates of the Institute of Telecommunications 
-v- the Telecommunication Public Corporation (SC*CV CASS*11*1983) 
that since the Corporation has initially employed them in a 
particular scale, it cannot after seven years of continuous service, 
unilaterally degrade the scale of their posts. See also Mohamed 
El Mamoon Babikr Zerroog -v- The Dean Institute of Musical and 
Theatrical Studies (SC*CV CASS*292* 1981), where infringement of 
the plaintiff's natural rights to be heard, to be given a chance to 
defend himself and to know the charges against him may have 
persuaded the Civil Courts to invalidate the procedures taken 
against the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal did exactly that in 
the Central Electricity and Water Authority -v- Mohamed Hamid 
Ahmed 1971. 
(140) The stance of the Civil Courts, vis-a-vis control of the 
employment rela tionship, suggested by the analyses in these 
paragraphs contrast with the position in Britain where the 
Industrial Tribunals were introduced partly to protect the workers 
and the protective legislation against prejudices of the Common 
Law judges Cf. infra part 3.B.2.a - 3.B.2.b, 3.B.3 and generally 
part 3.B.2 of Chapter 5. See also part 4.B of the same Chapter. 
(141) Letter No. AG/3/ A/12 73 : 22/11/1983. 
(142) Cf. infra f.123 and the text above. 
(143) Cf. supra part 4.AB. 
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Ii (144) PSA 1973 S.30. Exclusiveness of the PSAB 'jurisdiction was one 
of the grounds on which the Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs' 
application in the Telecommunications Institute (1983) case Ibid. 
See also Ebram Dow -v- Ministry of Irrigation 1982 Ibid. In the 
latter case, the plaintiff's complaint against arbitrary dismissal 
was upheld by a district labour court and a province court which 
ordered the defendant Ministry to pay him compensation under the 
EEPO 1948 and the IERA 1981. The Court of Appeal anulled 
decisions of both Courts on the ground that the plaintiff was a 
State employee whose grievance could only be dealt with by the 
PSAB. 
(145) Cf. Mudawi Mohamed Ismail -v- Ministry of Education 1982 Ibid. 
(146) Cf. supra; part 4.8·2 esp. f.95 and the text above. 
(147) Building Authority of Khartoum -v- Evangellos Evangellides 1958 
SLJR.16. These powers and the conditions to which their 
exercise is subject are now incorpora ted in the CPA 1974 
SS.309-315. 
"(148) Mahmoud Gemal Seddar -v- the Attorney General 1977, and, 
Mohamed El Soofi Abd El Galil -v- Sudan Agricultural Bank 1977 
supra fs.131,136,139. 
(149) Mahmoud Gemal Seddar Ibid. 
(150) Quotation translated from original judgment manuscript in Arabic 
p.3. 
(151) Excess of jurisdiction need not necessarily be specifically alleged 
by the applicant. In all other cases of judicial re\'iew of 
administrative decisions, the Courts usually in\'alidate decisions on 
this ground on their own motion. 
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(152) D A Siddig SC.J dissenting agreed with th~ submission of the 
Attorney General that the PSAB is a quasi-judicial authority, but. 
quoting Denning; the Discipline of the La w 1979 pp. 70-72, 
contended that "the provision regarding the finality of the PSAB 
decision does not oust the jurisdiction of the Courts. The latter 
must always intervene if the quasi-judicial authority has erred in 
Law or exceeded its jurisdiction. He therefore did not agree 
that the Court of Appeal was right in summarily dismissing the 
application before investigating the claim". 
(153) See supra f.36 and the text above. 
Ibid pp.5-6. 
(154) Quotation translated from original text of the MLJR in Arabic 
p.88-89. 
(155) The Attorney General usually represents State units in legal 
proceedings before the Courts. In this particular case the 
dispute was initially between a State Bank, whose service the 
Attorney General conceives as public service, and one of its 
employees. Following the ruling of the PSAB based on the view 
that service in the Bank is public service, and, the challenging by 
the Bank of that ruling before the Court of Appeal, the Attorney 
General found itself defending the finality of the PSAB's decision 
side by side with the employee's counsel and against the Bank 
which it is supposed to represent. The decision of the Court of 
Appeal in favour of the Bank and the subsequent request made to 
it by the PSAB to advise on the situation led the Attorney 
General to apply, for a revision of the Court of Appeal's decision, 
to the Supreme Court, ironically on behalf of the same PSAB 
which is according to the Attorney General an independent 
tribunal and not an administrative unit in the State hierarchy. 
(156) 
NOTES TO 
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i 
Reference is made to the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan 
1973 Article 205; "There shall be a Civil Service Commission 
which shall have jurisdiction to decide the affairs of the Civil 
Service including complaints. The Law shall prescribe its 
constitution, powers, jurisdiction and functions." Cf. now Sudan 
Transitional Constitution 1985 Article 130. 
(157) Quotation translated from original judgment manuscript in Arabic 
P.2. 
(158) Cf. supra f.36 and the text above. 
(159) SC*CV CAS*292*1981 unreported. Cf supra fs.88,90 and the text 
above. 
(160) Cf. infra part 4.C.6.b.4. Cf also Mahmoud Gemal Saddar -v- the 
Attorney General SC*CV CASS*109*1978 where the plaintiff also 
walked wi thout a re medy even though his grievance was 
consequential upon a breach of the Law. Supra f.136 and the 
text above. 
(161) Cf. supra fs.159, 88, 90 and the text above. 
"'(162) Quotation translated from judgment original manuscript in Arabic 
p.3. 
(163) The Court emphasised in particular the point that a Public Service 
Commission with inter alia jurisdiction similar to that of the 
PSAB has always been provided for by various constitutions and 
statutes in the history of the country Cf· supra part 4. C.l. 
(164) Cf. supra f·156. 
(165) Cf. supra fs.88-90 and text above. 
(166) Cf. supra f.95-96 and text above esp. the decisions in ,\lekki Ali 
El Azharry -v- Ministry of Health (1976), and .\ludawi Mohamed 
Ismail -v- Ministry of Education (1982). 
(167) 
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.' ! 
So far there has been only one instance in which a Court decided 
that the PSAB acted without its jurisdiction and the decision was 
reversed as erroneous on appeal to the Supreme Court. Cf. 
Anwar Ali Hussni -v- Ennielane Bank supra f.36 and text above. 
(168) Cf. the arguments by the plaintiffs' counsels in Mahmoud Gemal 
Saddar -v- the Attorney General 1978, Mohamed El Mamoon 
Babikir Zerroog -v- The Dean, Institute of Musical and Theatrical 
Studies 1981. 
(169) Eastern Khartoum Tenants -v- Sudan Govemment (October-December 
1979 MLR p.137). The plaintiffs, tenants of shops owned by 
Eastern Khartoum Council applied to the Court of Appeal against 
an order of eviction issued by the Commissioner of Khartoum 
Province, under the Evacuation of Public Premises Act 1969. 
The Court of Appeal accepted the application and ordered a stay 
of execution. Whilst the plaintiffs application was still being 
heard before the same Court the President of the Republic issued 
an amendment to the EP P A 1969 whereby Courts were prohibited 
from "reviewing any order or action taken or is deemed taken" 
under the Act (EPPA 1978 S.4). Following the amendment the 
Court of Appeal refused to continue with the hearing. The 
plaintiffs' counsel petitioned the Supre me Court to declare the 
amendment unconstitutional. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
petition on the ground that the amendment was not unconstitutional. 
(170) Situations may arise in which the Attorney General becomes the 
judge of its own case - (Cf. supra fs.136, 139). It is difficUlt to 
separa te the arbitrary interpretation of the La w in such situa tions 
(Cf supra f.139, 136) from this convergence of executh'e and 
judicial functions. 
NOTES TO 
(171) See table (6) . 
CXII 
CHAPTER 4 
(172) Anwar Ali Hussni -v- Ennielane Bank (1977) Supra fS.128, J41. 
(173) See Graduates of the Telecommunications Institute 1983 where 
plaintiffs voluntarily complained to the Attorney General. Cf. 
also Fatwa No.AG/3A/83/11 : 27/1/1982. Cf. infra f.141. 
(174) 40 out of 59 compiled selected pieces of legal advice the 
Attorney General Champers offered in the period between January 
1980-April 1983 related exclusively to disputes ariSing from or 
relating to application of the Public Service Laws and regulations. 
Out of another 50 consultations selected over an unspecified 
period of time, 34 related, also, exclusively to disputes over 
individual employment claims in the public sector. See Edward 
Reyad; selected Fetwas by the Attorney General Champers. The 
Attorney General Champers Khartoum May 1981, 1983 
(unpubl ished). 
(175) Cf. supra f·119. 
(176) Gradua tes of the Telecom munica ti ons Institute -v- the 
Telecommunication Corporation (1983). Cf. supra fs.139, 141. 
(177) Quotation translated from original manuscript of the Supreme 
Court judgment delivered by Z Abdel Rahman, in Arabic p.3. 
(178) Cf. supra Part 2.A.1.b of Chapter 3. 
(179) Cf. infra parts 3.A.3 - 3.A.4 of Chapter 5 and also supra part 
2.A.2.a of Chapter 3. 
(180) Cf. infra Table (9 ). 
(181) ILO Joint Committee on the Public Service (JCPS); Report and 
Resolutions. ILO Official Bulletin Vol. L1\' 1971 375, 380; Hepple 
and O'Higgins 1971.33. 
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(182) ILO JCPS Ibid 375; (Schregle, 1974.404). Cf in contrast Hepple, 
1982.69-80. 
(183) These are the same factors on the basis of which the position of 
public employees is regarded as better. 
f·182. 
Cf· supra works opcit. 
(184) ILO Freedom of Association and procedures for staff participation 
in determining conditions of employment in the Public Service 
Report II. JCPS Ibid. 382,380. 
(185) Sudan has not signed the ILO 151 Convention on Labour Relations 
(Public Service) 1978, Cf Supra Tables A & B in Chapter 3. 
(18SA) Sudan is also unique in its invocation of "public interest" as 
excuse for circumvention of statutory law or statutory regulation 
of the administration of such law. Cf. in contrast the meaning 
and usages of the concept of "public interest" in Britain in 
Wedderburn & Murphy, 1982 especially Hyman opcit.95. 
(186) Cf. infra. Part 4.A in Chapter 5. 
(187) Cf. infra Part 4.B in Chapter 5. 
(188) Because the Supreme Court is more prone to political influence 
Cf. supra f.47 and text above in Chapter 3 and infra Part 4.B in 
Chapter 5. 
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(THE PRIVATE SECIOR INDIVIDUAL LABoUR RELATIONSAfC) THE LAW) 
.t 
( 1) The meaning this term is intended to conno'te has already been 
explained Supra f. 233 and the text above in Chapter III. 
( 2) Cf supra, the text above fs.76, 36 in Chapter IV 
( 3) E.g. Public Sector Trade Unions' acquiescence into Governmental 
control of public employment and their acceptance of Government view 
that the 1970 Consolidated Labour Code (1970 CLC) did not apply to 
Public Sector employees were products of this assumption. 
( 4) Cf supra f7 and the text above in Chapter IV. 
( 5) Bittar v Apkar Petrikian JC-App-9-1914 1 (SLR) 60. In this 
first reported Case the Judicial Commissioner asserted the status of 
employment as a "contractual relation .•• terminable upon service of 
reasonable notice". 
( 6) This was the view of the Supreme Court in Suhair Diryas v 
Central Trading Co Ltd 1975 (SLJR) - 166 and Murad Saad Hanna v 
Magdauline Sami 1975 (SLJR) - 185. In the latter Case the Court 
concluded that "the notion of absolute contractual freedom is no longer 
viabl e in the area of the e mploym en t re La ti onship .•• " Ibid p.187. 
t 7) Cf Beshir, 1978 - 226; A E Ali Taha, 1970, 104-110; Hussein, 
1983 - 248. This is an orientation which is possibly also shared by 
similar classes in some other under-developed countries; C K Wilber, 1979 
- 34-38. 
( 8) Cf (Fawzi, 1957 - 149), (Hashem, 1964 - 14), (Taha, 1970), 
(Hassan, 1979 - 13 f4) and the Supreme Court Judgment in Central 
Trading Co Ltd v Suhaior Diryas, 1975, SLJR - 171. 
( 9) Hashem, 1964 14-15 and the Supreme Court Ibid. 
(10) Cf infra parts 3.A.1 - 3.A.2. 
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(11) Hassan, 1979 - 140. ,I 
(12) Cf SWTUF A preparatory call for implementation of the 3rd 
Annual Council's decisions relating to achievement of Workers Immediate 
Demands January 1955, 12-14, also Memorandum of the Provisional 
Secretariat of the SWTUF to the Minister of Public Service 18.1.1972. 
(13) Hassan, 1979 himself at some point favours this view. Cf pp 
139-141 Ibid. 
(14) Workshops and Factories Ordinance 1949; The Workshops and 
Factories Regulations 1952, SSe 25(1) a-c. 
(15) Cf infra text above f20 and part 1.C. 
(16) Cf Davies and Freedland (1985) 432; HeppZe and O'Higgins, 1979 
- 241, where the position under British Law is discussed. 
(17) But Cf infra the text above f192. 
(18) Cf supra; text above fs 82-83 Chapter II. 
(19) For a description of these events cf (Hussein, 1983, 109-110, 
123-131, 140-145). 
(20) Cf infra fs 97-98 and the text above . 
.. 
(21) For the reasons why Public Sector Trade Unions cannot do the 
same Cf supra Part 2.A.1 in Chapter III. 
(22) The IERA 1981 S.58; see the position of public employment law 
supra f192 and the text above in Chapter III. 
(23) Cf supra the conclusion to Chapter IV. 
(24) Cf Taha, 1982 - 145 and infra the summary of Part 3.B. 
(25) Cf Taha, 1982 - 145 and the summary of Part 3.B. 
(26) Cf infra Part 3.A.4. Revision of the level of wages and salaries 
of public employees began by the introduction of the first phase of the 
JECS in 1978. The scheme has not yet been fully implemented. 
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(27) This is an Employers Association established in 1969 "in reaction 
to the growth in the number and powers of Trade Unions". It deals 
exclusively with industrial relations - A E Taha, 1982, 144-45. 
(28) Cf supra f14 in Chapter IV. 
(29) Cf supra; f14 in Chapter IV, and; f19 and the text above in this 
Chapter. 
(30) Cf infra fs 204, 155. 
(31) Cf infra fs 97-98 and the text above. 
(32) Cf infra Table 8. 
(33) Cf Abdin 1983 - 100 where it is claimed that the total At N Cs 
employment in Sudan is approximately 3,000 - 4,000 or 3% of total wage 
employment. This is a gross underestimation because it focuses mainly 
on permanent firms to the neglect of firms in the construction industries; 
some of which are referred to in Table lOin this Chapter. 
(34) Cf supra the last three pages in the Conclusion to Chapter III. 
(35) Ibid. 
(36) Cf supra Parts 3.B.1 - 3.B.3 in Chapter I. 
(37) For the definition of this term see below; and also supra f33 in 
Chapter iv. 
(38) Cf infra Table 11. 
(39) ILO Sudan 1976, 110. 
(40) The "formal" sector connotes economic activity characterised by 
large-scale operation and a high degree of Capital intensity. The ILO 
Sudan 1976 estimates total employment in the formal sector - (including 
both public and private formal sectors) - at 1.6 million workers (Ibid 110). 
If we deduce from this an estimated 100,000 agricultural workers in 
public sector projects and the 683,539 (cf supra f33 Chapter IV) 
employees in the organized public Sector, the percentage of private 
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sector employees covered by legislation (300,000) to total employees in 
the formal private sector (816,461) is still 36.7%. 
(41) Cf supra Part 2.B.2 in Chapter IV. 
(42) Faisal Sudanese Islamic Bank Act 1977 (No 33) SS.6(a). A 
company exempted in this manner is usually required by Law to provide 
terms and conditions of employment which are at least equal to what is 
guaranteed under Sudan laws. 
(43) Letter No SFIB-M-52 - 7.12.1982. 
(44) The MA 1974 is a law of Is'tikh'dam - (i.e. a process of 
recruitment) and not Khid'ma - (i.e. an employment relationship or 
service). 
(45) SS.24(e)-(h) of the MA 1974 (Amendment) 1979; - (No 41). Cf 
also MA Regulation 1979. 
(46) Supra Chapter IV Part 2.B.1-2.B.2. 
(47) Sudan Employers Federation Memorandum No CMH-"M" 
"L"-"L"-47-"A"-5- 3.8.1982 - to the President of the Republic. 
(48) Per el Sir El Hussein Mustafa, Director, Khartoum District 
Labour Officer - interview by the writer on 28.1.1984. 
(49) Supra f32 (a) and the text above in Chapter IV. 
(50) Cf in this respect SS.25,17(f), 14 of the PSRBR 1982, the PSR 
1975, the PSA 1973 respectively and supra f32 in Chapter IV, cf in 
Contrast Clauses 6, 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the MA 1974 
In MPSAR, Book 1976 362-363. Cf also Manpower Regulation 1979 paras 
3-6. 
(51) Sudan Glass Co Ltd v IDRIS KhalafaZZa "KNLO-15.J-1981". 
(52) Samira Khalil and Zainab Hassan v Sudan-Emerates Investment 
Co Ltd. "LD-IR"-37-"G"-6-1-5-1982" and ALAYYA\1 No 11068 
17.10.1983; and Fajr Bakeries Workers v Hashim Saad Hashim 
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DC-CS-169-1977. 
(53) Cf infra Parts 3.B.6, 4. 
(54) S4 of the Civil Justice Ordinance 1900; Later Ss5, 9 CJO 1925. 
(55) Cf supra Part 1.B; fB. 
(56) Cf supra text above fl in Chapter III. 
(57) S36 of the EEPO 1949. 
(58) Hassan, 1979 - 14 and Hashem 1964 - 14. 
(59) Cf supra Chapter IV, Part 1.A. 
(60) Saeed Salih v Sudan Shipping and General Stores AC-CV.RV-1B6 -
1962, Sir el Khatim el Atta v El Dosh Secondary Schools SC-CIV 
Cass-225 - 1975. In contrast cf; Abdel Maseeh Tesfay v El Tawfik 
Coptic Schools for Girls (1960) SLJR. 40. 
(61) Per D R Siddig; SCJ in Murad Saad Hanna v Madeline Sami 
(SC-CV.Cass-267) 1975 SLJR lB5. 
(62) Central Trading Co v Suhair Diryas (SC-CV. Cass-149) 1975 SLJR 
- 166; Murad Saad Hanna v Madeline Sami Ibid. 
(63) Cf infra the text above fs 120-121 and the I ERA 1981 SSe 6( 4), 
34(1)e. 
(64) Muffit Co Ltd. v Khadiga' Safwat; CA-CVRV-889 - 1975) 1975 
SLJR - 320. Cf also Athnasios Saceliou v Lappas Engineering Workshops 
Ltd (1960) SLJR 191, and Omer Mohamed Abdulla v Gezira Board 
AC-CVRV-617-1969) unreported; and the EEPO S.35; the IERA 1981 S.58. 
(65) Cf; Explanatory Note; The EEPO (Amendment) Act 1969. 
(66) This was the Workers Affairs Associa tion Fawzi 1957-66. 
(67) For Objectives of the WAA Cf Fawzi 1957, 38-39. 
(68) Cf supra Chapter III; text above fs 9-10. 
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(69) Cf Petrie v MacFisheries (1940) IKB 258. Cf also Hepple and 
O'Higgins, 1979 - 142. In relation to limitation of the working day Cf 
the direction by Parke J; " ... As the Ten Hours Act of 1844 was a law to 
restrain the exercise of Capital and property, it must be construed 
stringently". Quoted in J L and Barbara Hammond, Lord Shaftesbury 
London 1923 - 135 and Hepple and O'Higgins 1979, f88 p.162. Cf also 
Wedderburn, 1971 - 243. 
(70) Hassan Hussein v Sudan Gov. Railways "HC-CS-55-1926". 
(71) Ibid Quotation from original manuscript. Also quoted in (Kidd, 
1966 - 193). 
(72) Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, 1925. Cf Wedderburn, 1971. 
287-288, where the introduction of automatic compensation and the 
merits it has had are discussed. 
(73) As to the method of explanation adopted and the objectives of 
the discussion cf supra The conclusion to Chapter II and Part 1. C.3 of 
this Chapter respectively. 
(74) Cf the Explanatory Note to the EEPO (Amendment) Act 1969 
(No 1 1969). 
(75) Hussein, 1983. 85-99; Taha, 1970. 130-134. 
(76) Act No 1, 1969. 
(77) Cf infra part 3.B.1. 
(78) Ibid. 
(79) Mohamed Ali Hamid v Sudan Textile Factory KNLO *18*1981. 
(80) Oil Corporation Ltd v the Loading and Unloading Workers Trade 
Union 1980-1982 Collective Agreement, Sudanese Kuwaiti Packaging Co 
Ltd; both in Files No LD*IR*37*A *B-8. 
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(81) Bata (Sudan) Ltd v Bata Workers Trade Union LD*IR*37*"G"*6-
*1 *5*D1 0*1979. 
(82) Cf infra Table 8. 
(83) 1LO; Sudan 1976, 110. 
(84) Sudan Chemical Industries Co and SCIC Workers Trade Union, 
Collective Agreement 1971-1976 Article (4); in LD*IR*37*A*B-8 and; 
Ahmed Ali Ahmed EI tayeb v Sudan Textile Factory Ltd. 
KNLO*94*1981 *27.9.1981. 
(85) Cf the Judgments of the Labour Court, the Province Court, the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Mohamed el-Malyick el-Basha 
v The International Churches Council (Khartoum) DC-CA-130-1981, 
PC-Cvapp-106-1982, CA -CVR V-808-1982, and SC-L-36-1983 respectively. 
(86) Ibid. 
(87) Employees are now automatically entitled to accrued holiday 
rights upon termination of employment. This applies even if the 
termination was in fact due to resignation; Michael George Androwos v 
Sudanese Glass Co Ltd KNLO-389-1981. 
(88) Public Sector employees who postpone their annual holidays for 
e.g. one year are entitled, in the year thereafter, to only a maximum 
holiday which is in the vast majority of cases less than the double of the 
annual leave. This is so even though the length of annual holidays is 
almost typical for both public and private sector employees cf SS 69(2) 
and Schedule 2 of the PSR 1973. 
(89) The Sudanese Faisal Islamic Bank; Conditions of Service 
Regulations SS 27-43 June 1981., 
(90) Sudan Employers Federation (SEF) Memorandum to the President 
of the Republic and the Ministerial Commission for Revision of Laws So; 
CMH-"M L"-"L"-47-"A"-5 Date 3.8.1982. 
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(91) Some of these instances have given rise to a few litigations. 
See as examples; Cotton Textile Factory (Bagair) v CTF workers Tr:ade 
Union KNLO-37-IR-D-1982, Shems-eddin Ali Ahmed v Sudan Textile 
Factory (DC*CS*263*1980)(CA*CVRV*NA*28.10.1982) Supreme Court 
Judgment on 16.1.1984; Nasser Ahmed Nasser v Khartoum Talis 
Manufacturing Co (CA *CVRV*236*1981)(SC*CVCass*188*1981) and 
Abdulla Hamad Sulieman v The Police Cooperative Insurance Project 
DC*CS* 122*1981). 
(92) In Mahgoub Dreisa v Spence Ltd - (DC*CS*602*1982; 
CA *CVR V*55 7* 1983) - for instance the Court upon finding that the 
employee had over a period of two years daily worked in excess of the 
normal working hours, treated the excessive work as an unpaid overtime 
work, and ordered the employers immediately to pay him in retrospect. 
Although the LS75 monthly salary which the employers regularly paid was 
such a relatively high salary, as to enable them to claim this as evidence 
that the employee's long working hours had been taken into consideration. 
Both the Labour Court and the Court of Appeal rejected this argument 
and treated the LS75 as the employer's basic salary. 
(93) All Agreements were made available to examination by the 
Labour Department. Files No LD*IR *3 7*A *B-8. 
(94) Sudanese-Kuwaiti Packaging Co Ltd; Agreement of 8/1/1975 -
1980. 
(95) Blue Nile Cigarette Co Agreement of 1975-1977, Blue Nile 
Spinning and Weaving Co Agreement of 1976-1978, Sudan Textile Factory 
Ltd Agreement 1973-1974, 1978-1981, Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co 
Agreement of 1973-1976 and Bata (Sudan) Agreement of 22.7.1979. 
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(96) Cf supra Chapter III Part 2.A.1.b. 
(97) Cf supra Chapter III Table 3 - (above f209 Chapter -III). 
(98) SEF Memorandum pp 4-5; supra f90. 
(99) Cf Table 8. 
(100) There are more than 1, 000 units employing less than five workers 
- not included in Table 8. Cf ILO Sudan 1976 -121. 
(101) As to the importance and size of casual labour cf ILO, Sudan, 
1984, 144-145 and supra the text below note 83. 
(102) The organization of one of these classes of workers - (The 
Loading and Unloading Workers Trade Union) - is in the practice of 
blacklisting and imposing embargos on employers who pay below, the 
statutory minimum, or, even the rate of payment maintained by the 
Trade Union in the particular geographical area or industry. The same 
Trade Union is also active in pressing - (through the Workers Trade Union 
Federation SWTUF) - for periodical review of the wages and conditions of 
service statutorily recommended for a certain area or for all areas. Cf 
respectively; the Loading and Unloading Workers Trade Union KNLO -
Collective Disputes - Monthly Bulletin - 37-IR-3 October December 1979; 
and the Loading and Unloading Workers Trade Union letter to the SWTUF 
dated 25.4.1978 in (SWTUF-IR*37*A*1*2*3). 
(103) It was LS16.500 in 1974 and became LS28 in 1979 (Act No 38). 
(104) Cf; Mohamed Adam Musa v El Hadi Mamoon El AIerdi 
(KNLO*13*1981). 
(105) Cf infra Part 4.A. 
(106) f l · No DL*IR*37*W*6*"B"*4. C comp alnt By members of a 
Western Sudan District Police force against their employer - the County 
Council; MohamedSalih Syyed v the Ministry of Agriculture -
(DL *IR *3 7*S*6*"A "*3); ILO Sudan 1984, 144 where it is claimed that the 
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defacto minimum wage in Port-Sudan and Khartoum is higher than that in 
the Public Sector. 
(107) Cf Table 9 and ILO Sudan 1984, 144, f8. 
(108) The Act stipulates additional wage increases above the Statutory 
minimum for workers whose wages equal or exceed this minimum at the 
time of its introduction. 
(109) The ILO justifies its recommendation by claims that a minimum 
wage system of this type encourages capital-intensive methods of 
production, discourages the entry of new firms and tends to eliminate 
marginal firms .•• ILO Sudan 1976, 112". 
(110) Bittar v Apkar Petrikian JC* App*9* 1914 1.SLR.60. 
(111) Cf infra Part 3.B.1. 
(112) Cf Hassan, 1979-85, and Imam J in Ali Ashry El Siddig v Yanni 
Paneeras (1960) SLJR 74, and Vasili Bamboulis v Osman Abdulla 1960 
SLJR 1968. 
(113) Act No 1 1969. 
(114) Cf infra Part 3.B.4; esp f. 163 and the text above. 
(115) Athnasios Saceliou v Lappas Engineering Workshops Ltd (1960) 
SLJR 191. 
(116) Ali Ashry El Siddig v Yanni Paneeras 1960 SLJR 74. 
(117) Sayyed Mustafa Khalil v Pier Liogi Batanino (AC=CVRV-380-1965) 
unreported. 
(118) Vasili Bamboulis v Osman Abdulla (1960) SLJR 168. 
(119) The existence of both SS 1 0(4) and the twin SS 10(2) of the 
EEPO 1949 prior to 1969, and the right to after-service benefit attached 
to termination with notice under the EEPO 1949 SS.10(1) made the EEPO 
1949 SS 10(2), which until 1969 allowed employers directly to dismiss (i.e. 
without reference of the dispute to the Labour Commissariat) - without 
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notice or after-service benefit, a less expensive and more favourable -
(i.e. for employers) - ground for dismissal. Following the restriction in 
1969 of dismissal under the EEPO 1949 SS 10(2) employers resorted to 
dismissal with notice under the EEPO 1949 SS 10(1) which survived the 
1969 Amendment. Hence the aforementioned increase of dismissals 
under the EEPO SS 10(1). Cf, the SWTUF provisional Secretariat 
Memorandum to the Minister of Public Service 18.1.1972, and the 
Department of Labour annual reports for the years 1970-1971, 1971-1972 
where the increase is noted though no statistics are given. 
(120) Central Trading Co v Suhair Diryas (1975) SLJR Ibid, Murad Saad 
Hanna v Madeline Sami (1975) SLJR Ibid. Cf supra f62 and the text 
above. 
(121) Osman Mahmoud Rashid v Shivron (Sudan) (KN*DLC*CS*12*1982) 
unreported. 
(122) SEF Memorandum Ibid pp 1-2. For the position in the Public 
Sector cf Mohamed El Mamoon Babikir Zerroog and the materials 
discussed supra fs 88-90 in Chapter IV. 
(123) Mirghani Mohamed Suliman v Ahmed Ali Abdel Karim 
AC*CVRV*52* 1968 unreported. 
(124) El Shiekh Mustafa El Amin v Muneer Salem AC*CVRV*3*1957" 
(unrep.) and Ethiopian Airlines v Mustafa Ali Abu Baker SC*CV 
Cass*217* 1973 "unreported". 
(125) IERA 1981 S 9; "Except in cases of emergency affecting the 
safety of the workers and the place of work, employers shall not demand 
employees to do without their consent work basically different from the 
work contracted for". 
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(126) Cf Mohamed Hussein Malick v Kenana Sugar Co DC*CS*68*1981. 
As to the position of the Law with regard to job mobility in other 
countries cf the Case of Britain in Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, 
1985, 301-303, 532-535. 
(127) Cf Imam J in Vasili Bamboulis v Osman AbulIa (1960) SLJR 
168-169. 
(128) Christos Simon v SD Mendoros (AC*CVRV*15* 1956) (unreported). 
(129) Per Mudawi J in Awad Saleh v Blue Nile Brewery (1965) SLJR 
27. For facts of the case cf infra the text above f139. 
(130) John Cotsoridis United Ltd v Berj Malkhesian AC*CVRV*642*1970 
(1972) SLJR 82. 
(131) SC*CV Cass*68*1977. 
(132) Ibid - Quotation translated from original text in Arabic. 
(133) Siddig Osman Omer v Port Sudan Car Assembly Factory SC*CV 
Cass* 137* 1976 unreported. Hassan 1979 observes that in its judgment of 
the White Nile Mills' Case the Supreme Court did not refer to its former 
decision in Siddig's Case. However in its judgment in Dahab's Case the 
Supreme Court reiterated its position in White Nile Mills Case even 
though its judgment in Siddig's Case was cited before it in detail by the 
Province Judge. 
(134) (DC*CS*193* 1980) (PC*CVAPP*41*1981)(CA *CVRV*195*1981)(SC*CV 
CAS*200*1981). 
(135) Mohamed Ali Sakran v Port Sudan Cinema and Theatre Co Ltd 
CA *CVRV*12*1964 unreported. 
(136) Ahmed Abdella AlxJ.el Samad v Sharaf International (KLO*37*"B"* 1978 
(1.11.1978)) unreported. 
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(137) Dawel Bate Abbaker v Saleem Metias CA *CVRV*239* 1971 
unreported. Although, under British Law, this is a well established 
implied term of the contract even in relation to work outside the normal 
working hours - (cf P Davies and M Freedland 1985 312-313). It has 
been introduced by the Sudanese Court of Appeal only since 1971. 
Furthermore its application has so far been confined to the Case 
involving work during the normal working hours. Cf below f138 and the 
text above. 
(138) Vasili Bamboulis v Osman Abdulla (1960) SLJR 168. 
(139) A wad Saleh v Blue Nile Brewery (1965) SLJR 27. 
(140) Khalafalla Ahmed Mohamed Saleh v Beshier Ibrahim Saeed 
AC*CVRV*634*1969 (unreported), cf infra fs 141-146. 
(141) (1960) SLJR - 168 Ibid. 
(142) Basil y Bushara v Abdulla M oha med Omer (1967) SLJ R 118. 
(143) CA *CVR V*382*1975 (unreported). 
(144) Adam Mohamed Ahmed v Blue Nile Packaging Co (CA *CVRV*-
323* 1976) unreported. 
(145) Mohamed Yousif Dahab v Abdel Bagi Omer Engineering Works 
SC*CV Cass*200*1981 (decision passed on 9.1.1984). 
(146) Quotations translated from original judgment manuscript in 
Arabic. The Law under which the Case was decided (the EEPO 1973 5S 
10(5)d) did not require the omission to be serious or gross. The 5upre me 
Court is simply perpetuating the judicial view that prevailed prior to 
1973. 
(147) Adam Mohamed Ahmed v Blue Nile Packaging Co Ltd - supra 
£144. 
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(149) AC*CVRV*893*1975 unreported. 
(150) Khartoum Manufacturing Co v Ahmed Omer Ahmed (CA *C\R \'*_ 
762* 1971, Abu Seid National Transport Co v Saad Abdulla Mohamed 
Gameel (CA *CVRV*517*1974), Bata Nationalized Corp. v Mohamed Abdel 
Tam Ibrahim (CA *CVRV*595* 1975), Atta Mustafa Salih v Adam Harroon 
Fadl el Mula AC*CVRV*736*1976 (all unreported). 
(151) Ministry of Health v Khidir El Khowad (AC*CVRV*437*1974) 
unreported; and Abelel Raheem Beshier v Adam El nour Maaroof SC*CV 
Cass*31*1975 (1975) SLJR p 87. 
(152) AC*CVRV*736*1976 unreported. 
(153) SS 10 (2), Fadl el-Mula Abdulla v Blue Nile Packaging Co Ltd 
AC*CVRV*83* 1966 unreported, cf also Hassan, 1979, 128-131. 
(154) Suliman Hagana Bushara v Bata (Sudan) - CA*CVRV*4S4*1983 
unreported. 
(155) The contrasting decisions in Cotton Textile Factories v El Tayeb 
El Amin El Idris (KNLO*92*1981)and Khartoum Teital Oil Mills v Adam 
Hussein Massabbal (KNLO*387*1981) will illustrate the point. In the 
first Case an employee whose main job was the preparation of dyes 
negligently prepared a combination that irreparably damaged 4,000 yards 
of fabric. In the second case the employee omitted to switch off a 
valve thereby causing the adulteration of 18 tons of high-quality and 
low-quality oils. In both Cases the employee's act was held grossly 
negligent. Nevertheless the Office approved dismissal in the first and 
refused it in the second Case. The reason given was that the oils could 
still be reprocessed and separated. Following employer's depiction of 
this second decision as "biased" and "irresponsible" and his refusal to 
abide by it the Case was referred to the district Labour Court for 
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execution. The decision of the Khartoum North District Court to which 
this Case was referred is neither reported nor available on record. 
(156) Modern Matches Manufacturing and Distributing Co v MMJIDC 
Workers Trade Union KNLO*37*IR*3 October-December. 
(157) Blue Nile Spinning and Weaving Co 1975-1977, Flour Mills 
(Sudan) Ltd, Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd 1973-1976, Sudan 
Chemical Industries Ltd 1971-1976 and Sudan Soap Factory Ltd 
1970-1973 All in; LD*IR*37*A *B-8. 
(158) Cf; e.g. Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd 1973-1976 Ibid. 
(159) Hassan Gumaa v Reynold Aluminium Factory KLO*37*"B"*1 *62*1980. 
(160) Listed under the Banks Nationalization Act 1970 and the 
Companies Nationalization Act 1970. 
(161) Cf the Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act 
. . 
1972; and the Encouragement of Investment Act 1981. 
(162) The Commissioner is not required by law to pay attention to 
these considerations. However this is the consistent practice of the 
Labour Offices I visited. Cf e.g. Sudanese Kuwaiti Transport Co Ltd 
KLO*IR*37*A *1 *App*Vol 3, EI Neilane Textile Factory v Thuriyya Abdel 
Wahab - (CA *CVRV*226*1979)(1980)SMLJR Jan-March 156. 
(163) EI Neilane Textile Factory v Thuriyya Abdel Wahab Ibid. 
(164) Cf supra Chapter III Table I. 
(165) Cf Parker Drilling International (Sudan) Application No 
KLO*IR*37*A *l*App*Vol 3*1982. 
(166) Loading and Unloading Workers Trade Union v Sea-Ports 
Corporation; DL *IR *3 7*"G"*6* 1 * VoZ(l) * 1982). 
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(167) United Plastic Industries Ltd and UPI Workers Trade Union; 
KLO*IR*37*"A"*1*App*Vol 3*1982, and, Sudan Textile and Rela-ted 
Industries Workers' Trade Union v El Neilane Textile Factory 
SWTUF*LR *3 7*"A "*1 *2*3* 1978. 
(168) Cf Table 1 O. 
(169) Brown Boveri and Cie (a San Marco International Construction 
Branch) KNLO*37*IR*3*1983. 
(170) Cf Rayea Sweet Factory and Kirikab Manufacturing Co. In 
which employees of these - (then Public Sector) - Companies 
unsuccessfully complained to the Department of Labour against mass 
redundancies KNLO*37*IR*3*1982. 
(171) Only indigenous firms suffer from this incursion, the majority of 
such firms that apply for reduction of the workforce on economic 
grounds - (cf Table 10) do so because of shortage of raw materials or 
competition from abroad. 
(172) Cf infra f194 and the text above. 
(173) Cf supra f128 and the text above. The sections read as follows 
"in all Cases of dismissal .. " without notice "the Contract of Service shall 
not be terminated until after the dispute is referred to the Commissioner 
of Labour and his Consent to the termination is obtained" S 39 [ERA 
1981, SS 10(7) EEPO 1973, 10(2) "c" EEPO 1969). 
(174) Adam Mohamed Rizig v Bata Nationalized Corp. AC*CVRV*644*1975, 
Muawia Toto v Teital Oils Co AC*CVRV*917*1975. 
(175) Manager of Dar El Sahafa v Adam Mohamed J\Jehdi AC*C\'R \'*-
Ad El Nur j\laaroof SC*C\' 246 * 1970, Abdel Raheem Beshier v am 
Cass*31 *1975 Ibid, Atta Mustafa Salih v Adam Harroon Fadl el-,\lula 
A C*CVR V*736* 1976. 
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(176) Cf e.g. Idris Adam Idris v Starbag Co (SC*CV Cass*324* 1976), 
Abbas Ali Kamair v Ali Yahia AC*CVRV*321*1970, Atlas Factory v 
Abdel Raheem Abu Bakr Mahmoud AC*CVRV*295*1976. 
(177) Mohamed Nassir v Ahmed Hussein DC*CS*268*1982)(PC*CVApp-
*217*1982), Ahmed Ali Daleel v Satti Osman DC*CS*53*1981) 
PC*CVApp*270*1981 CA*CVRV*87*1982, Gumaa Harroon Ibrahim v 
Omer Awadalla (DC*CS*236*1981) (PC*CVApp*40*1982)(CA *CVRV*137*1982). 
All unreported. 
(178) El Dosh Secondary Schools v Sirrel Khatim El-Atta AC*CVRV*-
514*1974. There was a minority view; "that the Law merely creates a 
presumption ••• which is rebuttable by proof of a substantive valid ground". 
This view was expressed byH Riyad SCJ in AWel Karim Ahmed v 
Mustafa Ahmed (SC*CV Cass*31 *1975; (1975) SLJR 87). H Riyad 
appears to have abandoned this view in the more recent judgment in 
Gummaa Haroon Ibrahim vOmer Awadella (SC*CV Cass* 169* 1982). 
(179) American Sewerage Co v Hussein Rock Dal; (CA *CVRV*506*1970); 
Manager of Dar Essahafa v Adam Mohamed Mehdi(AC*CVRV*246*1970);Bata 
Nationalized Corporation v Mohamed Alxiel Tam Ibrahim (AC*CVRV*595*1975); 
all unreported. 
(180) Cf supra the Cases cited under f177. 
(181) Mohamed Hussein Malick v Kenana Sugar Co (DC*CS*68*1981) 
(PC*CVApp* 18* 1982). 
(182) Compare A merican Sewerage Co v Hussein Rock Dal 
(CA *CVRV*505*1970) with Manager of Dar Esshafa v Adam Mohamed 
Mehdi A C*CVR V*246* 1970. 
(182A) Supra f·181. 
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(183) Cooperative Society v Mohamed Osman Izzeldin AC*CVRV*55* 1975. 
(184) White Nile Cotton Mills v Abbas Issa El Hulu SC~CV 
Cass*68*1977 (1977) SMLJR (March), Adam Mohamed Ahmed v Blue Nile 
Packaging Co CA*CVRV*323*1976(1977) SMLJR July-September. 
(185) Mohamed Nassir v Ahmed Hussein (PC*CVApp*217*1982), Sayyed 
Faiyyad v Peter Akeg (PC*CVApp*20*1982), Khartoum Transport Co v 
Mahdi El Ghali (AC*CVRV*734*1981). All unreported. 
(186) Bata Nationalized Corporation v Abdel Tam Ibrahim A C*CVRV*-
595* 1975 unreported. 
(187) For discussion of the Attorney General's Fatwa No AC*",\!"-
"T"*333*1982 and the Trial Case cf supra. The text above fs 157-160 in 
Chapter III. 
(188) SWTUF Memorandum to the 1981 MCRLL pp 13-14. 
(189) Cf supra text above fs 148-151 in Chapter III, and, also Table I. 
(190) SEF Memorandum (supra f90) - pp 3-5. The reason for the 
demand is employers' suspicion of the impartiality of Labour Offices cf 
supra f1SS and the text above. 
(191) IERA 1981 S 44 compared with the EEPO S 25. 
(192) Cf supra Part 3.B.1. 
(193) Cf Report of the SWTUF 1974 Conference to the 1974 
Ministerial Commission for the Revision of Labour Relations Laws. 
Minutes of the Third Meeting 24.2.1974. Cf supra the text above f18B. 
(194) SWTUF 1981 Memorandum, supra f1BB. 
(195) SlVTUF 1974 Report - (supra f193) pp 13-14. 
(196) IERA 1981 SS 4 (b), 6( 4), 34(2)a-c. 
(197) Cf supra. Court of Appeal in EI Dosch Secondary Schools \' 
Sirel Kha tim El-A tta (1974). 
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(198) EEPO (Amendment) Act Legislative File No AG *CVL * 1969 
Attorney General Chambers. 
(199) Hassan is referring specifically to ILO Termination of 
Employment Recommendation No 119 1963. 
(200) Cf supra Tables A and B in Chapter III. 
(201) The ILO does provide such programmes for the Labour 
administration in the Sudan. Training has started since early 1960's and 
it is still attracting a considerable number of personnel. 
(202) The Commissioner will not accept appeals against district 
Labour Officer's decisions. See in this respect; Wad Numeiri Coop v 
Omdurman District Labour Office LD*R*G*2*Sec*1983 (S April). 
(203) Cf Explanatory Memorandum to the EEPO 1949 (Amendment) 
Act 1969 pp 2-4. 
(204) This is so judging by the functions they perform and also by 
their interpretation of the law in specific situations. In respect of the 
latter employers believe that the Labour Offices are biased towards the 
workers, and, desire that part of their jurisdiction be transferred to the 
Civil Courts; cf "SEF Memorandum" Ibid f90 pp 3-6, and also supra f1SS 
and the text above. 
(205) Cf Table 13. 
(206) Cf Tables 10, 12 and 13. (206A) Cf. infra Part 4.B. 
(207) Mohamed Yousif Dahab v Abdel Bagi Omer Engineering 
DC*CS* 193* 1980. 
(208) Civil Courts Circular No 24, 11.3.1976. 
(209) Cf supra Parts 4.A - 4. C in Chapter IV, and fs 29-31 and text 
above and Part 1. C. 4. C in Chapter III. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 
CXXXIII 
5 
(210) Cf in particular (EI Cock, 1969. 7-9), (Farmer, 1974. 59) and 
(Joseph, 1983. 398-403). 
(211) This is an immunity that is due not to positive safeguards 
offered but to relatively less pressing need on the part of the State to 
influence the decisions of these offices. If the Government wishes to 
intervene there is nothing to stop it from doing that. 
(1) in Table 10. 
Cf supra; Note 
(212) In relation to the problem of knowledge of substantive law cf; 
Hamadto Sweet Factory; Application No KLO*IR*37*A*1*App*Vol 
3*1982; Watania Distillery CQ Application No KNLO*37*IR*1*1*Vol 
2*1983; Abdel Rahman Bushra v Friendship Palace Hotel KNLO*267*1981; 
Seamen Trade Union, Application No LD*HQ*"AM"*47*"A"*1*1983 and 
Mohamed Gumaa Ibrahim v The American Embassey DC*CS*72* 1983. 
In relation to unsatisfactory Techniques of decision-making cf; Taha El 
Roubi Transport Co v Ismaael Derrag Hussein KNLO*84* 1981; Mekki 
Refrigration Factory v Abdel Rahman Gibriel Hussein KNLO* 104* 1981; 
James Paul v Tag Abdella Workshop KNLO*541*1981. With regard to 
inconsistency cf; El Neilane Textile Factory Applica tion No 
KLO*IR*37*A*App*1*Vol 3*1978; Khartoum Aspestos Co v Abbaker 
Mohamed KLO*37*"B"*1*11*57*1981 and Beshir Omer Hassan v Taha El 
roubi Transport Co KNLO*37*IR*3*1981; Sudan Textile Industry v Alega 
Ateem KNLO*428*1981; Khartoum North Aspestos Co v Rashid el-.\lahdi 
KNLO*120*1981; Hussein Abdel Farrag Gumaa v Pharmaceutical 
Products Laboratory KNLO*247*1981 and Taha El Ropubi Transport Co 
above; Soap and United Products Ltd v AbdeZ Karim Ibrahim 
KNLO*163*1981 and African Holloware Factory v Yousif ,\lohamed 
Gumaa and others KNLO*350-355*1981. In respect of enforceability cf 
Table 12. 
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(213) , ! Cf supra the text and materials under Section 3.B.6 and Table 
12. 
(214) Cf El Hassan, 1975 189-200; and supra Table 8. 
(215) One such a scheme is that of the Medical Products Co and its 
Workers Trade Union provided for in the Collective Agreement of 
1978-1983, Articles 9(a) and Paragraph 3(10-14). 
(216) Compare Suemia Hassan Kuku v Khartoum Spinning and Weaving 
Co, with Sharaf Metal Products v Badr Eddin Ageeb Mubareck in; 
KNLO-3-1981 and KNLO-454-1981 respectively. 
(217) Cf also Lord Justice Scrutton statement quoted in Clark and 
Wedderburn 1983 166; " ... it is very difficult sometimes to be sure that 
you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two 
disputants one of your class and one not of your class". 
(218) Farmer 1974, 55, Hepple and O'Higgins, 1979. 46. 
(219) Hepple and O'Higgins mention in this respect; "rigid ..• literal 
approach ••• ', ' ••• over refinement '... 'hair-breadth legal distinctions" ... and 
"formality" Ibid 46. 
(220) Cf Griffith, 1981 195-207, 61-85; Wedderburn and Clark 1983 
166-184; Lord Justice Scrutton (1923) 1 Cambridge Law Journal 8; 
Robert Stevens, 1979,589-627. 
(221) Cfhow sociological analysis could give more satisfactory 
explanations; in Hyman, 1982 95-104; Milibrand, 1983 124-131; Griffith, 
1981 195-207. 
(222) Cf supra the text and materials in Parts 3.B.2 - 3.B.3. 
(223) Cf Table 14. 
(224) Cf supra fs 26, 117 and the text above in Chapter IV. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 
CXXXV 
5 
I. 
(225) Joseph A Garang and others v the Supreme Commission and 
others 1968 SLJR 1, the Supreme Court decision in this Case - that an 
amendment, of the then Transitional Constitution was unconstitutional _ 
was ignored by the Government. Cf Hussein 1983 94-95. 
(226) Cf supra fs 82-83 and the text above in Chapter II. 
(227) Cf supra Part 1.A. 
(228) Cf Sudan Railways v Atem Akwal Yac (AC*CVRV*121*1971) 
where Shibieka CAJ upholding an interpretation discussed earlier - (supra 
text above fs.175-76) remarked that although he could see "the harsh and 
strange results that may ensue from upholding such an interpretation in 
this particular Case where it has actually been proven that the employee 
was guilty of serious misconduct, the subsection is clear and admits of 
no other interpretation." 
(229) El Dosh Secondary Schools v Sirel Khatim El Atta AC-CVRV-514-1974, 
supra f178 and text above, (Hassan,1979 213). 
(230) Ali Ahmed Nugud v Abdulla Mohamed Abdulla A C-CVRV-325-1972 
unreported where it is remarked; "the 1969 Amendment has reformulated 
Section 1 0(2) in such a way as will protect the interests of both parties", 
Sudan Gov 'I!. Mahdi EI Ghali (AC-CVRV-734-1971) where it was 
remarked; " ••• The role played by the Commissioner is a conciliatory one 
with the object of maintaining good employment relations". 
(231) Cf supra f111 and the text above in Chapter IV. 
(232) Even those Public employees grievances tried by the PSAB are 
treated as Classified Secrets. Access to such materials is possible only 
with permission of the Minister and under constant supervision of a PSAB 
official who will select the materials to be seen by a researcher. 
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